

F.O.

416

E
357



CLOSED
UNTIL
2001.

103

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

(18519)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

PERSIA

PART 4

January to December 1950

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
General Correspondence			
1 Sir J. Le Rougetel ... No. 1	1950 1st Jan.	Annual review of events in Persia during 1949 ...	1
2 Sir J. Le Rougetel ... No. 4	6th Jan.	Monthly report for December 1949 ...	4
3 Mr. Consul Dundas (Kermanshah) No. 9	9th Jan.	Political and economic situations in Kermanshah Province Period 1st July to 31st December, 1949; Kermanshah a "quagmire of ineptitude and corruption"; large scale bribery and intimidation during recent elections; Russian propaganda has little influence on the inhabitants; the importance of the tribes; a review of economic conditions; the failure of the grain collection.	8
4 Sir J. Le Rougetel... No. 22	10th Jan.	Conversation between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs ... The latter's request for co-operation in urging moderation on the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs in connexion with the Afghan dispute with Pakistan; the advisability or otherwise of postponing the Shah's visit to Karachi.	14
5 Consul-General Pott (Tabriz) No. 7	17th Jan.	Political and economic situations in Azarbaijan ... A review for the period 1st July to 31st December, 1949.	14
6 Mr. Lawford ... (Tehran) No. 44	10th Feb.	Political situation in Persia ... The opening of the 16th Majlis and 1st Senate by the Shah on 9th February, 1950. The Shah's reference to constitutional changes and the importance of economic development. Tasks facing the new Majlis.	16
7 Mr. Lawford ... No. 51	17th Feb.	Monthly report for January 1950 ...	17
8 Sir F. Hoyer-Millar No. 121	17th Feb.	The visit of the Shah of Persia to the United States, November to December 1949 ... His success in painting a plausible picture of the "demo- cratisation" of Persia; requests for increased economic assistance to Persia and for modern military equipment.	18
9 Mr. Lawford ... No. 77	3rd Mar.	Monthly report for February 1950 ...	23
10 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 97	20th Mar.	Anglo-Persian relations ... A conversation between His Majesty's Ambassador and His Imperial Majesty The Shah of Persia, on the occasion of the former's presentation of credentials, regarding Anglo- Persian relations and Persia's need for foreign economic assistance; the difficulties in the way of Persian ratification of the Supplemental Oil Agreement; the Shah's apparent lack of confidence in his Government.	25
11 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 108	8th Apr.	Conversation between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Shah The general economic and political situations in Persia; the Shah's complaint at the alleged lack of Western help after the war; his intention to initiate land reform and a reform of the administration and suggestion concerning the allocation as financial help to Persia of some of the United Kingdom's taxation of the oil company.	27
12 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 114	8th Apr.	Conversation between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Shah The Shah's request to General Collins, United States Chief of Staff, for military equipment to enable the Persian forces to fight a delaying action in the event of a Soviet attack; The Shah's suggestion regarding possible financing of the Persian Air Force from Anglo-Iranian Oil Company reserves.	29
13 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 117	14th Apr.	Monthly report for March 1950 ...	30

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
14 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 140	1950 5th May	Monthly report for April 1950 ...	32
15 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 164	30th May	The ascendancy of the National Front Party ... The lack of Persian political parties and coherent groups in the Majlis the reason for the Government's having to canvas for support on particular issues; Persian politicians' fear of nationalistic criticism; narrow nationalism which seeks to diminish all foreign influence in Persia; recent instances of particular animosity against British commercial interests; Dr. Musaddiq's speech of 25th May.	34
16 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 165	31st May	Exchange of views between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Shah ... The Persian wish for better terms in the Supplemental Oil Agreement; the Ali Mansur Government's sensitivity to criticism from the National Front; the rôle of the Persian monarchy in relation to the Government; the United King- dom's interest in an independent, stable and prosperous Persia; relations with the U.S.S.R.	36
17 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 247. Tel.	2nd June	Political situation in Persia ... The declining influence of the present Prime Minister and the possibility of General Razmara succeeding him, if the Government fail to secure the ratification of the Oil Agreement.	40
18 To Sir F. Shepherd No. 106	7th June	Conversation between the Minister of State and the Persian Ambassador ... The Persian Government's wish for modification of the Supplemental Oil Agreement in the form of more generous terms for Persia; the unlikelihood of parliamentary approval of ratification unless the Persian Prime Minister could announce better terms.	40
19 To Sir F. Shepherd No. 109	9th June	Conversation between the Minister of State and the Persian Ambassador ... His Majesty's Government unable to press the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company to make further concessions in connexion with the Supplemental Oil Agreement.	41
20 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 257. Tel.	10th June	Conversation between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Shah The Shah's dissatisfaction with the weakness of the Govern- ment; his intention to appoint General Razmara to lead a strong de-centralizing Government; the question as to whether or not the present Government should try to get the Supple- mental Oil Agreement through the Majlis.	42
21 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 176	12th June	Monthly report for May 1950 ...	43
22 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 184	19th June	Conversation between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Shah His Majesty's Government's forthcoming attitude to an appointment of General Razmara as Prime Minister; the present Government's lack of firmness towards the National Front, which had already interfered with a British interest; the Shah's decentralising plans and the deterioration of security in the country.	46
23 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 189	26th June	The decline of the Ali Mansur Government ... Its inaction, which has had a delaying effect on the locomotive and Teheran water supply contracts with British concerns; Ali Mansur's sensitiveness towards the opposition; the Shah's wish to replace him by General Razmara; the expectation of increased American aid occasioned by the appointment of Mr. Grady as United States Ambassador.	47
24 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 197	1st July	Monthly report for June 1950 ...	49
25 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 201	10th July	Political situation in Persia ... The intention of the Persian Prime Minister to introduce administrative changes; the good prospects of General Razmara's Government if the Shah's co-operation is maintained.	51

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
26 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 232	1950 5th Aug.	Monthly report for July 1950	54
27 To Sir O. Franks ... (Washington) No. 1048	12th Aug.	Conversation between the Secretary of State and the United States Ambassador ... The United States Government's concern at the A.I.O.C.'s failure to settle the Supplemental Oil Agreement with the Razmara Government; the Secretary of State's plea for joint Anglo-American consultation on economic assistance to Persia, in order to prevent the Persians from playing a double game.	56
28 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 258	2nd Sept.	Monthly report for August 1950	57
29 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 262. E.	9th Sept.	Seven-year economic plan in Persia A résumé of recent developments in connexion with the Persian Seven-year Plan for Economic Development. Financial handicaps suffered by the organising body and its lack of spectacular achievement with which to impress a cynical public.	59
30 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 267	16th Sept.	The Shah of Persia An account of various conversations between Mr. Lawford and the Shah of Persia giving an insight to the manner of the Shah's thinking regarding a variety of subjects.	62
31 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 268	18th Sept.	Recent political and economic developments A review of events since Mr. Razmara's assumption of power in June; the case for some modification of the Supplemental Oil Agreement to enable the present Government to say it had been secured by their efforts.	67
32 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 294	6th Oct.	Monthly report for September 1950	71
33 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 301	14th Oct.	The defence of Persia Anxiety of the Persian authorities concerning the defence of their country against a possible Soviet attack; the fighting qualities of the Persian army assessed; Persian strategy in the event of a Soviet attack; the view expressed that a visit to Persia by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces would be untimely in the light of the present relaxed state of Perso-Soviet relations.	73
34 To Sir F. Shepherd No. 179	27th Oct.	Conversation between the Secretary of State and the new Persian Ambassador The Secretary of State's opinion that the additional sums available to Persia once the Supplemental Oil Agreement was ratified by her would enable the Seven-year Plan to be proceeded with.	75
35 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 323	3rd Nov.	Monthly report for October 1950	75
36 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 333	13th Nov.	Supplemental Oil Agreement A review of the currents of Persian public opinion concerning the Supplemental Oil Agreement; the difficulties in the way of obtaining dispassionate consideration by the Persians of the advantages to be gained by their ratifying it; the success of the National Front's campaign of abuse of the Agreement and of the A.I.O.C.	77
37 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 348	4th Dec.	Conversation between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Persian Prime Minister The Persian Prime Minister's satisfaction with progress made in stabilising and developing the country's economic resources, and with foreign trade agreements; the need of the Persian Government for further concessions from the Oil Company in order to satisfy nationalist and anglo-phobe sentiments in the Majlis.	79
38 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 353	10th Dec.	Monthly report for November 1950	81

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
Appendix—Biographical Notes			
39 Sir F. Shepherd ... No. 160	1950 1st June	Annual report on the leading personalities in Persia for 1950	[1

SUBJECT INDEX

[The figures denote the serial numbers of the documents]

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEADING PERSONALITIES—39.	CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE SHAH AND MR. LAWFORD—30.
ANNUAL REVIEW OF EVENTS FOR 1949—1.	DEFENCE OF PERSIA—33.
AZARBAIDJAN PROVINCE, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS—5.	KERMANSHAH PROVINCE, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS—3.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AND THE PERSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS—4.	MONTHLY REPORTS, JANUARY—DECEMBER—2, 7, 9, 13, 14, 21, 24, 26, 28, 32, 35, 38.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AND THE PERSIAN PRIME MINISTER—37.	POLITICAL SITUATION—
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AND THE SHAH—10, 11, 12, 16, 20, 22.	Ascendancy of the National Front Party—15.
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE PERSIAN AMBASSADOR—18, 19.	Decline of the Ali Mansur Government—23.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE NEW PERSIAN AMBASSADOR—34.	General Razmara's programme—25.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR—27.	Opening of the 16th Majlis—6.
	Political and economic developments under the Razmara Government—31.
	Possibility of a Government under General Razmara—17.
	Public opinion concerning the Supplemental Oil Agreement—36.
	SEVEN-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN—29.
	THE SHAH'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES—8.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING

PERSIA—PART 4

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

EP 1011/1

No. 1

PERSIA: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1949

Sir J. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin. (Received 12th January)

(No. 1. Confidential)
Sir,

*Tehran,
1st January, 1950.*

With reference to my despatch No. 48 of 12th January, 1949,⁽¹⁾ I have the honour to submit the following general review of events in Persia during 1949.

2. The year has been one of high expectation, suddenly aroused but so far unfulfilled. A determined attempt on the Shah's life early in February revealed in a flash the pass to which the country had been reduced by two years of faction and ineptitude. It gave point to the Shah's desire for certain increases in his prerogative, which were granted by a Constituent Assembly in May; it also stirred the 15th Majlis into some semblance of activity before it was eventually dissolved at the end of July. The general election which followed was, however, disastrously mismanaged and the Shah was obliged to leave for the United States on 15th November before it was complete, though not before his Minister of Court, Abdul Husain Hazhir, had been murdered by a religious fanatic who was probably the tool of His Majesty's political opponents.

3. The year opened with a crescendo of agitation against the Imperial Bank of Iran, whose concession lapsed at the end of January, and against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose concession was denounced as an anachronism. The Majlis was occupied almost exclusively with an interminable interpellation on both these issues by Abbas Iskandari, a wealthy Deputy with marked pro-Soviet leanings. As an introduction to the negotiations then impending both with the bank and the company this was far from reassuring; it culminated in anti-British demonstrations in Tehran the day before conversations with the company were due to begin. The tension was already extreme when, on the afternoon of 4th February, six shots were fired at the Shah

at point-blank range as he was arriving at Tenran University. As a result of his own agility and presence of mind His Majesty sustained only scratches. The assailant was killed on the spot and no conclusive evidence was obtained about his precise motive and inspiration. But in spite of the determined efforts which have been made to prove that he was an irresponsible fanatic, there is little room for doubt that in addition to being an expert gunman he was both a member and an agent of the Tudeh Party and that this outrage was intended to be the signal for serious disturbances. In the event it produced a spontaneous reaction in favour of the Shah, whose coolness and courage when attacked were matched by his refusal after the event to tolerate reprisals. Military law was promptly reimposed and the Tudeh Party was declared illegal. Some seventy persons were arrested, of whom fifty-six were members of the party. Others took refuge in the Soviet Embassy and were eventually smuggled out of the country. A number of newspapers was suppressed and a law curtailing the rights of the press was introduced but hung fire for some time.

4. After lengthy consultation between the Shah and the older and more responsible political leaders, the Prime Minister informed the heads of parties on 25th February that a Constituent Assembly would be convened to consider (a) the inclusion in the fundamental law of adequate provision for constitutional amendment, (b) the revision of the dissolution procedure in article 48 and (c) the creation of a Senate in accordance with article 44 (if the Senate Bill were not passed by the Majlis meanwhile). At the same time a decree was issued ordering elections for the 16th Majlis. The proposed reforms were all a part of the constitution as originally conceived, but had never been given definite shape as it was

⁽¹⁾ No. 2 in Persia Volume for 1949.

feared that they might be abused. Consequently, there had been no effective check on the power to obstruct of a legislature which was returned by a preponderantly illiterate and politically immature electorate. After a brief and severely controlled election the Constituent Assembly met in May and within a fortnight the proposed amendments were adopted. Meanwhile, the Senate Bill had been passed by the Majlis and the Electoral Reform Bill introduced.

5. A few days after the attempt on the Shah's life Qavam-us-Saltaneh left the country and remained abroad until November. He returned, a very sick man, shortly before the Shah left for the United States, and was gone again by the end of the year. He is expected shortly to undergo a serious operation and unless it is successful he is unlikely to re-enter politics in an active capacity. In the meantime, it has fallen to others to rally the opposition to the Shah and his Government in the Majlis and outside it.

6. The negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which had begun in the autumn of 1948 were resumed in February, but had produced no definite result by the middle of March. After the Nau Ruz holidays they entered a more realistic phase with the arrival of the chairman, Sir William Fraser, who made a specific offer to increase the annual payment to the Persian Government from an effective figure of £9 million to one of nearly £19 million, on the understanding that a number of other claims were dropped. The Government, however, which was very divided on this issue, refused to sign and the chairman returned to London empty-handed. In spite of strong pressure from the Shah, who was more concerned than the Government with the emptiness of the exchequer and the consequent difficulty of starting work on the execution of the Seven-Year Plan, signature of the agreement embodying the company's offer, called the "supplemental" agreement, hung fire until 17th July. Thus only seven days were left for its ratification by the Majlis, and in the event it was talked out by one of a small opposition group. Had the Government shown more determination it might have forced the Bill through, but time was so short that the impression would certainly have been created that the agreement was not in the national interest but had been concluded under foreign pressure. This was, of course, precisely what the opposition wished to achieve. The nucleus of the opposition,

such as it was, consisted of a small group of Deputies which, in October 1947, had refused to support the single article resolution rejecting the Soviet Oil Agreement. It has since been consistently hostile to British interests in every form. Outside the Majlis this group was supported by a wholehearted but hysterical jingo, Dr. Musaddiq, and probably also by one or two Ministers who only agreed to signature when they felt sure that the Bill would not be ratified before the Majlis rose. The fact that the Shah was known to be anxious to secure the ratification of the agreement gave these heterogeneous elements a fallacious sense of solidarity, and subsequent events may drive them into an even closer association. As the year closed there was talk of the formation of a "national front" under Musaddiq's leadership.

7. When the 15th Majlis rose at the end of July there were still high hopes that it would have a more worthy successor. Although for a variety of reasons the Electoral Reform Bill had not been passed, there was a great deal of talk about the freedom of the coming election. The Shah, who now bore an increased personal responsibility, was undoubtedly sincere in desiring that there should be no improper pressure of any kind. But the Government was weak and incompetent and proved quite unequal to the task. As a result, the elections were neither free nor competently controlled, and public opinion reacted most unfavourably. The Shah was due to leave for an official visit to the United States in the middle of November, and as the time for his departure drew near it became increasingly clear that the elections would not be over before he left. Moreover, in the Tehran election Dr. Musaddiq and several of his supporters who took "bast" in the Royal Palace for several days by way of protest against the manner in which the elections were being conducted, acquired a substantial lead. In some quarters it was feared that an attempt might be made to convene the Majlis on the very eve of the Shah's departure, whether the elections were complete or not. There was a rapid increase of tension and, once again, tension culminated in an act of violence—the assassination of Abdul Husain Hazhir, who some four months previously had succeeded Mahmud Jam as Minister of Court. The appointment of this admirable but strangely unpopular man, which unfortunately coincided with the reintegration in the Royal demesne of certain estates confiscated by Riza Shah, had

caused widespread resentment. Although an experienced administrator, well-informed and entirely loyal, Hazhir was conspicuously lacking in political sense and had made a large number of personal enemies. There were many, both in the Government and outside it, who suspected him of wishing to promote a royal dictatorship while concentrating the real power in his own hands. The assassin was duly executed, but he maintained a stubborn silence until the end and once again no conclusive evidence was available about the real motive of the crime. But there were few persons in public life who even attempted to conceal their satisfaction at Hazhir's death, and his funeral was an occasion for open jubilation by large crowds in the streets of the capital. Before the Shah left the country, on 15th November, it was decided to defer convening the Majlis until his return, and to cancel the Tehran election. Hazhir was succeeded by Ibrahim Hakimi, a former Prime Minister who had last held that office in the early part of 1948. As a result of these decisions there was a rapid fall in the political temperature which was sustained during the following weeks. The Shah was expected to return at the beginning of January, and as the time drew near tension rose once more. An agitation was started by Dr. Musaddiq and his "national front" for the cancellation of the elections throughout the country and for the holding of fresh elections on the Shah's return.

8. As a result of all these delays the Supplemental Oil Agreement may not be ratified before the spring or early summer. The company have made it perfectly clear to the Persian Government that they have no intention of reopening negotiations but they have agreed to make them an advance of royalties of £6 million sterling free of interest for their immediate requirements, including the initiation of work upon the Seven-Year Plan. The British Bank of Iran and the Middle East (formerly the Imperial Bank of Iran) concluded an agreement with the Persian Government in March which was intended to enable them to continue operating in Persia after the termination of their concession. Owing to the obstructive attitude of the governor of the National Bank, who, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, clearly intended that the bank should withdraw from Persia, it is not yet certain whether the new agreement will prove workable. At the end of July, two frigates were handed over by the Royal Navy to the Royal Iranian Navy in

replacement for vessels sunk during the operations of 1941. A number of Persian naval and military personnel and a party of pilots and air mechanics of the Persian Air Force are now undergoing training in the United Kingdom. After more than a year's delay the Persian Government formally accepted in August the settlement of £5,700,000 in respect of their claims for the use by the British forces of the Persian railways and ports during the war. This sum was subsequently written up to £8,206,676 as a result of the revaluation of sterling.

9. Relations with the Soviet Union have not improved. There has been the usual crop of frontier incidents, but with a single exception all have been settled on a reasonable basis. In May, after an acrimonious exchange of notes, all Soviet Consulates were closed and the Persian Consul-General was withdrawn from Baku. Shortly before this happened the Soviet Ambassador went on leave and he has not yet returned. His departure followed upon the correspondence referred to above and upon the refusal of the Persian Government in March to accede to the Soviet Government's request for the withdrawal of the Persian case from the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized. During the autumn an agreement was reached for the shipment of 100,000 tons of wheat to Persia from the Soviet Union, and most of this has since arrived. Soviet publicity has lost no opportunity of decrying the Shah's visit to the United States, and the open suggestion of the Soviet Government in the United Nations Assembly that His Majesty was about to conclude a military alliance goaded the cautious Mr. Hikmat into an official protest. There is no doubt that the present régime in Persia is as unpopular with the Russians as they are with it, and there is no sign at present of the return of the Soviet Ambassador, still less of a resumption of consular relations. In April Nadir Arasteh succeeded Hamid Sayyah as Ambassador at Moscow and he is still at his post.

10. During the summer there was a number of official visits, including the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Afghan Ambassador to the United Kingdom in May, the Regent of Iraq and Sir William Strang in June, and King Abdullah of Jordan at the end of July. During these visits, particularly the last, there was talk of promoting some form of Pan-Islamic union, either through an extension of the Saadabad Pact or in some other way. But, so far, such

talk has led to no result, and the present attitude of the Shah and his Government is distinctly lukewarm. They are, however, anxious to eliminate existing differences, such as the dispute with Afghanistan about the Helmand River. So far as Palestine is concerned, the Persian Government would probably welcome an early settlement but they are unwilling to take any initiative. In December a Transit Treaty was concluded with Turkey after protracted negotiations and it is hoped that it will stimulate exports from Azerbaijan. During the Regent's visit in June it was decided to complete the delimitation of the Iraqi-Persian frontier and to negotiate an agreement to regulate the conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab, but no further action has been taken so far in either respect.

11. During the year definite progress has been made, under the guidance of the American Overseas Consultants Incorporated and the British firm of Sir Alexander Gibb, with the execution of the Seven-Year Plan. In May the Planning Authority was set up under the presidency of the Shah's American-educated half-brother Prince Abdur Riza, with a former Prime Minister, Ali Mansur, as chairman of the Advisory Council. The managing director, Dr. Taqi Nasr, was subsequently replaced by the original author of the plan, Dr. Musharraf Nafisi. This change was imposed by the Shah with little regard for his brother's feelings, but in the long run it will probably help the execution of the plan. In August Overseas Consultants Incorporated produced a comprehensive report, and at the end of October a panel of foreign advisers was established. Since the beginning of the year there had, however, been a marked deterioration of economic conditions throughout the country, due in part to a severe winter and late spring sowing followed by a poor harvest, and in part also to a general restriction of credit imposed

by the governor of the National Bank in a misguided attempt to compel the merchant community to accept the plan and, in particular, his own interpretation of it. This was the background against which work upon the plan began.

12. During the spring and early summer United States military stores and equipment ordered under the credit negotiated during the previous year, arrived and were distributed. The effect on the appearance of the armed forces is already noticeable, but the Persian appetite has been whetted by this and other factors and when the Shah left for the United States there was a growing demand for direct aid, both for military purposes and for general economic development. There was also a persistent tendency to draw unfavourable comparisons between the encouragement given to Turkey to stiffen her power of resistance and to console her for her exclusion from the Atlantic Pact, and the comparative neglect of Persia, whose claim to consideration is felt to be quite as strong as that of her neighbour. The Shah's visit to the United States appears to have been quite successful and, in spite of the inevitable adverse comment from diehards of all colours, His Majesty's return was anxiously awaited when the year came to an end.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad; to Air Headquarters, Iraq, through His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad; to the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, and the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf; to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; to the United Kingdom High Commissioners at New Delhi and Karachi; to the British Middle East Office, Cairo; and to all His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

EP 1013/2

No. 2

MONTHLY REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1949

Sir J. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin. (Received 12th January)

(No. 4. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, *6th January, 1950.*

With reference to my despatch No. 424 of 7th December, 1949, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during December. The Shah continued to tour the United States. In his

absence, political life was virtually at a standstill, and action on various important questions, in particular the completion of the elections, was left to await his return. The Opposition press began an agitation for the cancellation of the elections throughout the country. The members of Dr.

Musaddiq's Opposition group were released from the custody into which they had been taken after the murder of Mr. Hazhir. The circulation of Tudeh propaganda continued, but the authorities showed greater resolution in their attempts to suppress it. Economic life stagnated, prices fell, and the continued drastic restriction of credit by the Governor of the Bank Melli aggravated the recession considerably. There were no developments of note in foreign affairs.

Foreign Affairs

2. The Shah continued his visit to the United States. The official part of the programme was, however, over by the beginning of December. There was therefore little occasion for speeches of political importance. The Under-Secretary at the State Department in charge of Middle Eastern affairs, Mr. George McGhee, paid a short visit to Tehran after presiding at the conference of United States Ambassadors in the Middle East held in Istanbul at the end of November.

3. Soviet wheat continued to arrive regularly at Tabriz and Bandar Pahlavi and by the end of the month 76,000 tons of the 100,000 tons promised had arrived. It was announced that the negotiations with the Soviet Government about the implementation of the Caspian Fisheries Agreement had reached deadlock, the Soviet negotiators having been unprepared to make concessions other than an increase of 1 million rials a year in the payment made to the Persian Government, but that the Soviet Government were sending a plenipotentiary to Tehran for the purpose of resuming negotiations. Some concern was shown by the Persian Government at the return to Persia of a certain Komissarov, formerly press attaché at the Soviet Embassy and also Vice-Consul at Riza'iyeh during the Azarbaijan rebellion with which he is believed to have been concerned. On 29th December a minor frontier incident was reported near Astara on the Caspian coast. One Persian was killed. From various parts of the country, visits by Soviet personnel have been reported.

4. On 8th December the Minister for Foreign Affairs reported at a press conference that Persia's friendly relations with Iraq were continuing. He carefully avoided reference to the Government's measures reported in paragraph 5 of my despatch under reference, about which little more has been heard, except that notices to quit have been served on all Iraqis in Ahwaz. It now

42154

appears from information received both here and in Bagdad that the measure was based on an unwise proposal last June by Dr. Jamali, then Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the Persian Government should expel Zionists. The Persian Government sought to use this as a pretext for the expulsion of all Iraqi subjects here, most of whom are prosperous Jews. Mr. Hikmat also expressed the hope that the negotiations about the Shatt-al-Arab would soon be concluded. At the beginning of the month, for reasons which are not altogether clear, many pilgrims on their way to the holy places of Iraq were held up at the frontier, and some suffering and casualties were caused by sickness and lack of food.

5. The agreement providing for the free transit of goods between Persia and Turkey referred to in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 391 of 10th November was signed by Christmas Day. It includes duty free transit of goods through both countries and the construction and maintenance of certain roads and other provisions to facilitate transit trade. The agreement which is subject to ratification by Parliament will probably be of more substantial benefit to Persia than to Turkey. A party of twelve Syrian army officers arrived on 4th December for a visit of a fortnight, during which they were shown round military establishments in Tehran and the provinces. On 28th December a delegation from Jordan consisting of the Minister of Court, the Jordan Minister at Karachi (also accredited at Tehran) and the Mayor of Amman arrived in Tehran bringing a message to the Shah from King Abdullah and a present from the municipality of Amman to the Mayor of Tehran. The news of a loan of \$21 million granted to the Afghan Government for work on the Girishk barrage renewed Persian fears that this barrage will diminish the quantity of water reaching Sistan.

British Interests

6. As expected the British Bank of Iran and the Middle East found that the Persian Government were reluctant to brave Mr. Ibtihaj and stand by the agreement signed with the Ministry of Finance on 13th November. The Minister gave the bank to understand that he wished the new agreement, which would be signed by the Bank Melli, to be on the same lines as the previous agreement but when the bank's representative discussed the matter with Mr. Ibtihaj, he found that the latter did not accept the

bank's interpretation that deposits against credits owned abroad should be included with the British bank's other deposits and maintained that all such deposits against credits should be handed over entire to the Bank Melli. The British bank refused to accept this new demand, and the matter has been left in suspense until the Shah's return.

Home Affairs

7. Mr. Sa'id's Cabinet remained in power, but he himself was known to be anxious to retire. There were several rumours of impending changes in the Cabinet, but none was confirmed or verified. Qavam-us-Saltaneh left again for medical treatment in Europe on 27th December. The Minister of War, General Ahmadi returned from abroad. Mr. Shahrugh resumed his position as head of the Propaganda Department. The Queen Mother followed Princess Ashraf to Europe on 5th December.

8. There was little progress towards the completion of the Majlis elections. Although steps have been taken to convene a new supervisory committee for the Tehran elections, the committee itself was not chosen, and there are still some provincial constituencies where electors have not yet gone to the poll. During the counting of votes at Amul in Mazandaran, trouble broke out and the elections were subsequently cancelled. The so-called "National Front" newspapers which are manipulated by Dr. Musaddiq and his supporters, demanded a cancellation not only of all the elections for the Lower House but also of the second stage of the Senate elections in Tehran. The Senators themselves met once or twice unofficially and set up committees to discuss the internal procedure and administration of the Senate.

9. In pursuance of the Law Report in paragraph 12 of my despatch under reference elections for municipal councils were completed in several places but there have been no reports of the nominations of mayors. At Langarud in Gilan these elections gave rise to a riot in which a crowd broke into the mosque where the votes were being counted and destroyed the ballot boxes.

10. The usual parade in celebration of the liberation of Azarbaijan was held on 12th December, and speeches and wireless addresses were given by the Chief of the General Staff and others on the usual friends. The first reaction of one of the equipment recently bought from the United States on credit was much in evidence.

11. The Tudeh continued to distribute *Mardam* and also a special leaflet on the occasion of the expulsion of the rebels from Azarbaijan, but the police appeared to intensify their efforts to prevent the distribution of clandestine material. On 30th December it was announced that ten people had been arrested in twenty-four hours after being caught distributing Tudeh pamphlets or writing up Tudeh slogans. A duplicating machine was also seized. After this, the Military Procurator General issued a communiqué to the effect that those caught distributing Tudeh propaganda would be regarded as public enemies and sentenced to from three to ten years' imprisonment. From Kurdistan the discovery was reported of a secret radio transmitter—perhaps identical with that referred to in paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 391 of 10th November, 1949. During the month most of those arrested at the time of the murder of Mr. Hazhir, including the "National Front" candidates except Dr. Baga'i, who is to stand his trial and also the son of Sayyid Abul Qasim Kashani were released.

12. The differences between Mr. Habib Nafisi and the Minister of Labour mentioned in paragraph 15 of my despatch under reference, seem on the way to settlement. Under pressure from the Prime Minister and the Minister of Court the two men agreed to an armistice, under whose terms the Minister withdraws his letter of dismissal and Mr. Nafisi is granted leave until 12th January, 1950. But the independent unions have so far achieved little in their effort to break the monopoly of the puppet Iski Union. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company workers have maintained their refusal to allow their representative to attend the High Labour Council in Tehran, where a seat is now open to him, although the representative himself wishes to attend. The A.I.O.C. union, and the other Independents were chagrined to find Hidayat, head of ISKI, elected as Middle East representative on the executive board of the new Trade Union International; their representative in London did not forthrightly oppose Hidayat's candidature, acting as it appears on a spurious telegram sent him in the name of his Tehran principals, by Hidayat's friends. The first reaction of one of the A.I.O.C. workers to Hidayat's election was to threaten adherence to the World Federation of Trades Unions. In Isfahan the position of ISKI, and its leader there, Shams Sadri, is obscure. Sadri, having intrigued to discredit the independent

unions as Tudeh supporters, and at the same time posing as the workers' champion (though he was receiving financial and other support from the mill-owners and the military governor), appears to have tired the patience of the owners, who find him too expensive, and even the military governor, who might be expected to support ISKI on instruction from the general staff, talks of dropping Sadri.

13. Commerce and business continued to be dominated by Mr. Ibtihaj's policy of resolute and ruthless deflation by the restriction of credit. The market, resilient though it is, is feeling the strain of falling prices of imported goods and the difficulty of selling Persian products abroad, especially in countries with devalued currencies. The pessimism of merchants was deepened when Mr. Ibtihaj in a press conference on 8th December, defended his deflationary policy with his usual vigour and said that it would continue until Persian prices were in line with world prices. He is presumably satisfied that the Bank Milli can stand the strain on its reserves consequent on the present cheapness of foreign exchange, especially of sterling, relative to its price a year ago. Presumably, however, he has agreed to a relaxation in favour of exporters, since a decree passed on 21st December for the purpose of encouraging exports states that the Bank Milli will extend credits and assistance to them. The decree also provides for a preferential reduction of railway freights and, subject to parliamentary approval, the remission of customs and municipal duties on exports and on imports of materials necessary for the production and packing of goods for export. The decree's most important provision is the stabilisation of the price of exchange certificates (*i.e.* of the margin between the governmental and official free market exchange rates) at its present level until 21st March, 1951, after which date it may be further reduced. Mr. Ibtihaj's confidence in his reserves of foreign exchange has also reflected in his opposition to borrowing abroad for the Seven-Year Plan. On this, however, he has had to yield and has himself submitted to the International Bank of Persia's request for a loan, which the bank has reduced from \$50 to \$35 million. An officer of the bank's loan division has recently arrived in Tehran on attachment to the resident consultants of the Overseas Consultants, Inc., and when he has submitted his report, the International Bank

42154

will send a full-scale mission to report on the loans' advisability of loans for specific projects. The prospect of the supervision which the International Bank will certainly try to exercise over the spending of the loan has no doubt helped to persuade Mr. Ibtihaj to co-operate in seeking it.

14. The Seven-Year Plan Organisation, whose activities during the month are recorded in detail in paragraph 15 below, still lacks direction and cohesion. As a result, it is in danger of wasting its time and money on things of secondary importance. It is, of course, under constant pressure from unsuccessful promoters to rescue their enterprises from failure. Examples of this are the attempts by the textile magnates in Isfahan and Yazd, by promoters of irrigation and electric generating installations in Shiraz and by a fishery company in Bushire, to secure finance from the plan. It appears that Mr. Ali Mansur, chairman of the Supreme Planning Council, has been in collusion with Mr. Ali Vakili, a prominent merchant and former Deputy, to secure orders by the Plan Organisation of goods for which Mr. Vakili is the agent. There are serious differences between Prince Abdur Riza, who wishes to direct the organisation, and Mr. Mansur, whom His Highness considers the ally of his enemy, Mr. Ibtihaj. There has been a wave of pessimism about the plan: but the popular impression that the organisation is a hive of nepotism and jobbery is grossly exaggerated. In fact, Mr. Ali Mansur was able to state at a press conference that the total number of the organisation's employees, which is 958, was some 500 less than those of the former Industrial and Mining Bank, whose work the organisation has taken over in addition to its own.

15. The projects which, as announced during the month, the Plan Organisation is sponsoring or helping, include the improvement of the port of Khorramshahr (185 million rials, repayable over a period out of port dues) and the cultivation and processing of sugar cane in Khuzistan. The Persian Oil Company, whose formation was reported in paragraph 15 of my despatch No. 324 of 13th September, is apparently being taken seriously by the Plan Organisation, who have obtained Cabinet sanction for the engagement of seven foreign experts: Mr. Mansur announced on 17th December that a test well would be drilled somewhere in the northern sector. The organisation has also engaged a United States expert for the port improvement scheme at Khorramshahr

B* 2

and another to advise on the construction of two cement plants, probably at Meshed and Shiraz. Other Government development projects with which the Plan Organisation is not directly connected include one for improving the operation of the Persian Gulf Ports, to be directed by the recently-formed Ports Commission mentioned in paragraph 12 of my despatch under reference, and the formation of an inter-departmental Board of Tourism.

16. More than half the 140,000 tons of wheat bought from the United States has now arrived in Persian ports, besides the Soviet wheat referred to in paragraph 3 above, and arrivals continue to be much in advance of the Persian Government's arrangements for storing and transporting them. It was reported from Bandar Shahpur that 25,000 tons of wheat there had begun to sprout and energetic measures were proclaimed to speed up the movement of grain to Ahwaz and onwards to Tehran. It was also announced that the Pakistan Government had agreed to deliver a further 1,000 tons of grain to Sistan, in consideration of the poor quality of grain previously delivered. Most of the sugar bought has now reached Persia, and it has been announced that in future half the quota for sugar may be imported by merchants, whose sales will be free of price control. The Government will continue to import the other half and will sell its sugar as and when necessary to keep the price down.

The Provinces

17. The bad harvest in Azerbaijan, which I reported in paragraph 16 of my despatch No. 324 of 13th September, 1949, has led to serious distress and widespread unemployment—3·2 per cent. of the population in the provinces as a whole and 10 per cent. in Tabriz. Starving villagers flocked from their villages into Tabriz and others emigrated to Tehran and are now being returned, as they are considered by the

police a menace to political and general security in the capital. The landowners of Azarbaijan have been ordered to repatriate their own peasants from Tabriz and funds for the relief of destitution have been forthcoming from the Ministry for the Interior, the Imperial Organisation for Social Services and private persons.

18. Attempts to end the stagnation in the textile industries of Isfahan, Yazd and Bushire have still not passed the stage of temporary expedients. In Isfahan the Shahriza mill has started to pay off arrears of wages but available funds are insufficient to cover them all, unless the directors are forced to sell property bought out of profits during the war. A certain number of workers have been laid off against payment of substantial compensation. Less creditably, the already low minimum wages for women workers have been further reduced. The mill owners are attempting to get help (presumably financial) from the Seven-Year Plan, who will as a condition for granting it instal an inspector in each factory. In Yazd many workers have been dismissed without compensation, women's wages have been further reduced and a campaign is on foot to persuade the Seven-Year Plan to help the mill owners. In Bushire the Ittimadieh mill is running at a heavy loss and in danger of closing down, although so far wages are still being paid and workers have not been dismissed.

19. Of the tribal areas, Kurdistan is suffering from the distress general in Azarbaijan and as a result some of the normally law abiding Kurds have taken to robbery. For the first time for many months there have been robberies also on the Bushire-Shiraz road. The authorities at Isfahan have started to control the entry of foreigners into the tribal areas of their district by the issue of passes.

I have, &c.

J. H. LE ROUGETEL.

No. 3

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS IN KERMANSHAH PROVINCE

Mr. Consul Dundas to Mr. Bevin. (Received 25th January)

(No. 9). Kermanshah,
Sir, 9th January, 1950.

I have the honour to enclose herein five copies of my despatch No. 1, addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran, being

my report on this province for the six months ending 31st December, 1949.

I have, &c.

R. G. DUNDAS.

Enclosure in No. 3

SECTION "A"

Political

Introductory

I enquired recently why a town ever came into being where Kermanshah is to-day, since it is neither at a confluence of rivers nor at a junction of trade routes. There were two reasons. Firstly, it was a site of a pleasure palace for early rulers (hence the "shanan" in its true name, Kermanshahan), and secondly, it was a "manzil," namely, a point six days' journey from the last "manzil," for it was customary to have a proper halting place after six nights on the road, and to rest the seventh day. The first reason was purely ephemeral, and the second, by definition, involves lack of movement. It is not, therefore, surprising that stagnation is the character of this city to-day. A picture of Kermanshah over the last six months, or indeed any period undistinguished by the impact of outside events, will therefore approximate rather to a still life than to a motion picture, although, incongruously enough, there will always be a sound track of complaints from officials, citizens, tribesmen and farmers against the very absence of motion from the picture. In spite of this, Kermanshah retains a certain interest for His Majesty's Government. This arises from the very slender allegiance which the tribes consider themselves to owe to the Persian Government. They have been effectively used by us, through the medium of skilled political advisers in the last two wars, and, as they still have great faith in us, there is no reason why they should not be so used again if occasion should arise. This report will therefore take the form of a picture of Kermanshah as it is to-day, a brief account of the elections to the XVI Majlis (the only event of political importance in the period under review, for the Senate elections interested only some six hundred voters) and an account of the tribal situation as it appears to the writer.

Kermanshah

2. As indicated above the main characteristic of Kermanshah is stagnation. So much so is this the case that the fourteenth paragraph of the corresponding report for last year could be lifted in its entirety into this report. It speaks of "an inadequate and wasteful water system, a heavily overworked power plant, and the deplorable state of the streets." Kermanshah, the first city that the road-traveller from Iraq encounters in Persia,

indeed presents a sorry aspect. The roundabout at which the traveller arrives is a sea of mud set about by tumble-down houses with unpainted woodwork. Picking his way to the one respectable hotel, the traveller will struggle to avoid huge pot-holes except on a short stretch of the main street which has been asphalted this year. If night falls he will be greeted by a feeble glimmer of electric light which justifies the classic joke that in Kermanshah one has to strike a match to see if the light is on. If he wishes to telephone for anything he will be well advised to send a bearer with a message at the same time. It is, I think, generally accepted that Kermanshah is the worst-appointed town of its size in Persia.

3. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the province has had an unrelieved series of incompetent and dishonest Governors-General. I have met corruption here which far outstrips anything which I met in Azerbaijan. At this season of the year, when people are stocking up for winter and goods are flowing into the town, the gate tax is yielding a quarter of what it would yield at a less busy season, and the remainder is finding its way into the pockets of officials. The town, situated in the midst of a rich agricultural province, is impoverished by the mass of parasites who masquerade as officials. I have been begged again and again by citizens of all sorts and conditions to do something about it because complaints addressed by them to the Governor, himself one of the delinquents, will never be heard, and complaints addressed to Tehran produce no results. Even the schools in this town, having no premises of their own, are housed in rented buildings, and the children's uniform is made of the material woven for convicts. The cold weather has brought beggars on to the streets, but, while there is hardship, there appears to be little starvation. I did pass a corpse in the street the other day, but I was told that it was the body of an opium addict whose poverty had deprived him of the drug and death had ensued. It is estimated that 80 per cent. of the male adult population are opium addicts, the richer smoking, and the poorer eating the residue of the smoked drug.

Elections to the XVI Majlis

4. It was across this quagmire of ineptitude and corruption that the Shah made his clarion call for free elections. In spite of everything a large section of the public expected that the call of their sovereign

would be heard, even although the new electoral law had not been passed. They were doomed to disappointment, for the candidates themselves came down prepared to bribe their way into lucrative office. It was too much to hope that local officials would spurn the handsome bribes that were offered, and the elections went forward with the outward trappings of democracy, concealing official intervention at every turn. To the general disgust of the population the old members were re-elected. Bribes had passed freely, intimidation had been resorted to, and ballot boxes had been tampered with. The news of the cancellation of the elections in Tehran came, and a committee was promptly formed here to petition the Shah for the cancellation of the elections in Kermanshah. It had the support of the Chamber of Commerce and various religious organisations. The sponsors of the petition are not very hopeful since new elections would be expensive and would be a threat to public order. They feel that the Shah may decide to cut his losses rather than risk a second fiasco, particularly as the new electoral law should become effective before the next elections.

5. The failure of the free elections increased public resentment at the way in which public affairs are handled, and the personal prestige of the Shah undoubtedly suffered. There is general pessimism regarding the future of Iran, and the greatest scepticism regarding the Seven-Year Plan. Still, it must be remembered that the mass of the population of the province have been accustomed for generations to living just above the starvation line, and so much has stagnation become the order of the day that conditions would have to be a great deal worse before disturbances on a large scale broke out.

Russian Propaganda

6. As far as town dwellers are concerned Russian propaganda does not appear to have made much headway in spite of the poor conditions of livelihood. Persians have explained this to me saying that the generality of the population take hardship as a matter of course. There is in fact a continual flow of Russian propaganda which is supposed to come from Tehran, and which is sufficiently regular to adapt itself to events or changes in the situation and is not merely an unvarying stock hand-out. A general nervousness about the intentions of the Northern Neighbour is almost the only reaction to world events which can be said

to be apparent in any considerable section of the population. The question of Russian propaganda among the tribes will be dealt with in the appropriate paragraph below.

Press

7. The local press consists of four insignificant publications, none of which appears more than three times a week, and none of which has any strong political colour. The principal paper, *Kermanshah*, is always ready to public any material passed to them by this Consulate tending to discredit communism.

Tribal

Importance of the Tribes

8. In World War I, the tribes under our control were of positive value to us, as the tribes under German control were of positive value to them. I think it is correct to say that the tribes were of rather negative value in World War II, i.e., that their nuisance value to lines of communication, for instance, would have been great if our political officers had not retained their influence on them. While it is impossible to foresee what might happen in any future outbreak of hostilities, it is suggested that the military value of the tribes to either side must diminish as the science of war progresses. If the tribes were of great value in World War I, it was largely because their traditional weapons, approximated to those being used by regular armies. The tribes still use their traditional weapons, and their value as guerillas or saboteurs is correspondingly reduced in relation to the armies of any occupying or invading force. For instance, one tribal leader recently made a great fuss over the withdrawal by the local authorities of eight rifles issued to him. His total armaments were appreciably affected by the issue or otherwise of eight rifles.

9. An almost axiomatic corollary to this is that, if the tribes were trained in the use of modern arms, their value would be greatly enhanced. If they were trained in road and bridge mining and the use of, say, anti-tank guns, their value as irregular units could be considerable.

10. Here it is that the Persian Government find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. Their tribal policy, as seen here, is hesitant and confused. Let it be said frankly that the tribes distrust the Government, and in almost all ways feel themselves isolated from the body of Persia. They are the object of continual suspicion because of their unruly

character. They are not provided with rations of Government controlled food-stuffs; they have no schools and practically no medical attention. They have little indeed for which to thank the Government. They are divided from Persia by language, and in the case of certain tribes by religious sect, these tribes being Sunni and not Shia. The Government on its side is not sure whether it should arm the tribes or not because (a) they would probably use their improved arms for banditry and cattle stealing, and, if pursued, would disappear over the Iraqi frontier, arms and all, and (b) while properly armed guerillas would be useful against a hypothetical Russian invasion, it is not certain that they would not take sides with the Russians (appearing initially as the irresistible force and therefore the side to back) and turn their arms against the Persian Government. In this connexion it should be added that it is generally agreed that the tribes have no ideological affinity with Russia, and their defection would be instigated only by their desire to back the winner. The Persian Government have adopted an unsatisfactory compromise. Tribesmen get a sketchy sort of military training, and weapons with which they are not familiar are held in store for issue to them if need be. Arrangements have been made for their provisioning if cut off from their central administration. The immediate result of this half-hearted policy of the Persian Government is that they continue to enjoy the complete distrust of the tribes. It is for the Persian Government to solve their own problem, and I cannot see that we could give them any useful advice even if asked for it. The compromise policy, unsatisfactory as it is, is probably the safest.

11. For the moment this hesitant policy leads the tribes to think that they are dependent upon us for friendship and even protection. At various times in the past when there was no effective Persian Government they have had a full measure of protection from us, and it is difficult for them now to understand that protection against their Government is no longer forthcoming. The Persian authorities show themselves extremely touchy about our contacts with the tribes, and I have been careful to discuss with them tribal matters coming to my notice, and continually to recommend to the tribes co-operation with the local authorities. Similarly last summer, when the Acting-Consul visited the tribes, he did so with the full knowledge of the

Officer Commanding the Kermanshah Independent Brigade. That officer has since complained to me that those visits gave the tribes the impression that they could count on our protection, and there was a recrudescence of lawlessness. This recrudescence is, I think, largely imaginary, and I interpret this as being a warning that similar visits next summer would be frowned upon.

Position of His Majesty's Government

12. In view of the foregoing, I submit that the policy of His Majesty's Government with the tribes in this area must be as follows. Firstly, admitting that the tribes have lost a great deal of their former strategic importance, it is certainly not worthwhile risking friction with the Persian authorities, for the present at any rate, by having too close relations with them. Their dislike for their own Government throws them into our arms anyhow, without any very great effort on our part. Secondly, while rebuking them for lawlessness, we must retain their friendship by supporting their case with the local authorities when they have a genuine grievance. Thirdly, we must keep firmly in our minds that in the initial stages of a war, when our opponents appeared to be sweeping all before them, we should not count on loyalty of any sort from the tribes, but that when the tide turned they would probably rally to our cause. Even then, we should have to arm them, and, if the Russians had not already done this, train them in the use of modern arms, before they would be of any great military value.

Pusht-i-Kuh

13. There is one particular area in which I should wish to recommend a more positive policy. In the Pusht-i-Kuh there has not been a tribal governor for many years, and governors sent from Tehran have followed one another in a wearisome succession of persons anxious to get rich quick and return to the capital. There is at present one strong tribal candidate for the governorship of this area, and his nomination would greatly increase our influence there. It is proposed shortly to furnish a detailed report on this question to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran recommending that we should use such means as at our disposal to secure his appointment.

14. Before leaving this aspect of tribal matters it may be added that in general the Persian authorities are satisfied with their

control of the tribes on the Turkish frontier, because the Turkish frontier control is good and tribes cannot slip over the border; they recognise that they have little control over the tribes on the Iraqi frontier and attribute this largely to weak Iraqi control which allows tribes to slip across the border without any difficulty. This is, of course, a typical example of Persian facility in finding somebody else to blame for their own short-comings, but I consider that there is a substantial element of truth in it.

Russian Influence in Tribal Areas

15. As far as one can judge there appears to be very little Russian influence in tribal areas in this region. The tribes in Southern Kurdistan are surprisingly ignorant of what happens among the tribes in Northern Kurdistan, and I think it is safe to say that there is virtually no solidarity between them, and the prospect of an independent and united Kurdistan holds no attraction for them at all. They are capitalists at heart, and like to feel that whatever belongs to them, even if it be only a donkey, is indeed theirs, and it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future they would regard Communist doctrine with anything but distaste.

16. On the other hand these people lead an isolated life and their main source of world news is Baku radio. Their leaders claim that they do not believe a word of it, but the fact remains that they listen to it, and if they hear anything repeated sufficiently often there is always the danger that it will eventually come to represent the truth as far as they are concerned. In any case the vilification of the Persian Government indulged in by Baku radio must be sweet music in their ears. They are not interested in provincial broadcasts from Tabriz, but they would welcome a Kurdish programme from Tehran. It is submitted that we should use our best endeavours to urge the Persian authorities to arrange Kurdish broadcasts. The Kurds do of course listen to Tehran as well as Baku, but they understand the broadcasts in Persian imperfectly and are much happier with the Soviet programme in their own tongue.

17. While the tribes are neglected by the Central Government and are always complaining, I do not think that they represent fertile ground for Communist propaganda. Communism steps in when there is a vacuum, e.g. when a down-trodden or miserable class of society does not know where to turn. The tribes are individualists, quite self-sufficient, and not in need for the

time being at least, of turning to communism as a doctrine of promise for the future, however hollow.

18. I should not wish to end this section on tribal affairs without putting on record what a good servant His Majesty's Government have in the person of the Munshi at this consulate, Aziz Mir Arjumand, who has been in our service for over thirty years, and whose intimate knowledge of tribal affairs and of recent tribal history is of great value.

SECTION "B"

Economic

Introductory

19. The second half of 1949 brought forth exactly what was to be expected after the disastrous winter, namely shortages of staple commodities such as bread and fat. The repercussions of administrative confusion at Tehran produced here, as elsewhere, a shortage of sugar. Local production of sugar at the Shahabad factory was on a very reduced scale. The slow tempo of agricultural life produced its effect on the whole economy of the province.

20. Perhaps the most significant single fact in the economic life of this essentially agricultural province was the failure of the grain collection. The extent of this failure may be judged from the following figures. In a good year the Government would collect 35,000 tons of wheat being approximately one-third of the total yield; in a bumper year as much as 50,000 tons would be collected; in the current year little more than 10,000 tons have been collected. Now, if this were due only to the bad harvest one would deplore it as an act of God. Unfortunately this is not the case, and a ponderant contributory factor has been the new grain collection legislation which is totally unsuited to conditions in this province. In virtue of this legislation landowners were obliged to surrender to the Government at a fixed price a quantity of grain equal to 300 per cent. of what they surrendered in 1936. In order to evade this many landowners divided up their land among relatives until each parcel was so small as to be exempt from the provisions of the law. Some landlords on the other hand were supposed to surrender more than their total production and of course failed to do so. Added to this was the physical difficulty of grain collection from remote areas which had not previously been tapped. Last but not least we come up against the old bogey of bribery and corruption which

received an added impetus from the new legislation. It is estimated that much more grain would have been collected under the old dispensation. The Kermanshah area did in fact produce enough for its own needs, but Hamadan fell short of its requirements and had to be provided with imported wheat from Iraq.

21. After one disastrous year, cultivators saw before them the spectre of a second disastrous year as time wore on and no rain fell. In the end late rain fell on 4th December, just in time to admit of seasonable sowing.

22. This brings us to an important consideration about the future of this province. If the rains had come ten days later, sowing would have been hopelessly curtailed and the crop damned to failure. This is due to the primitive methods of cultivation and the very light ploughs which cannot break up the baked soil. It is evident that the provision of heavy ploughs or mechanised equipment could remove this danger completely and ensure a good sowing season with unfailing regularity. A second important fact is that the average yield in this province is in the region of only three-fold of grain sown. With improved methods such as scientific crop rotation, renewal of seed stock, manuring and so on, none of which involves a great capital outlay, this province could produce at a conservative estimate three times as much as at present even without bringing more land under cultivation. If this were examined by the Organisation of the Seven-Year Plan, it seems likely that they would find that they could get a very quick return against a relatively small investment in equipment and pilot projects, and quick returns are necessary in a country like this unless the whole plan is to be discredited in the eyes of a population which has got neither the long-sightedness nor the patience to wait for slow returns. The foregoing observations are those of a layman, but if the Organisation of the Plan has not already examined this with the aid of technicians, it is suggested that a useful purpose might be served by their doing so.

23. The crop of sugar beet was as disastrous as the grain crops. Riza Shah's big sugar factory at Shahabad which has been

known to extract sugar from as much as 45,000 tons of beet in one season, this year handled only 7,000 tons of beet.

24. The big scandal of the year, here as in other parts of the country, has been sugar distribution. For a long period sugar was obtainable only at twice the controlled price. This situation has now improved and sugar is on the market at prices only slightly in excess of the controlled figure.

25. The bad crops have naturally had their effect on the whole economy of the province. Everywhere money has been tight, and in Hamadan particularly so. There the market has been virtually dead for months with very little business being done. Things have not been quite so bad in Kermanshah where the market in piece-goods in particular has remained fairly active throughout the last six months.

26. The shortage of money has reflected itself in the activities of the municipality, although in this case, as indicated above, the shortage has been accentuated by misappropriation of public funds. The electric light supply remains inadequate and irregular. Some work has been done on streets, mostly in residential areas, and it is only latterly that a stretch of the main street has been resurfaced. The circus outside His Majesty's Consulate remains untouched in spite of repeated representations to the local authorities. It will be recalled that over two years ago we were invited to co-operate in the plan for this handsome circus by adjusting the retaining wall of the consulate. This was done, and our comely semi-circular wall now has the consulate compound on one side, and on the other a tortured mass of rubble and stones.

27. There have been various collections for the relief of the poor, but the problem is not one which can be solved by desultory charitable efforts.

28. Copies of this despatch have been addressed to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, British forces in Iraq, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Tabriz, Kirkuk and Mosul.

I have, &c.

R. G. DUNDAS.

PERSO-AFGHAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Conversation with the Persian Foreign Minister

Sir J. Le Rougetel to Mr. Bevin. (Received 10th January)

(No. 22) *Tehran.*
(Telegraphic) 10th January, 1950.
My despatch No. 445.

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me again to-day at some length about Perso-Afghan-Pakistan relations. He is expecting a visit from Afghanistan Minister for Foreign Affairs on 16th January. Meanwhile no progress is being made with the Helmand River dispute and the latest reports from Persian Ambassador in Kabul indicate a further deterioration in Afghan relations with Pakistan including some possibility of Afghan Ulema declaring a holy war on Pakistan. Both Indians and Russians are said to be exploiting the situation to the full.

2. Mr. Hikmat asked me to co-operate with him in urging moderation on Afghan

Minister for Foreign Affairs and I should welcome early instructions as to what line I am to take if any.

3. Minister was particularly anxious to know whether I thought the Shah's impending visit to Pakistan, for which all arrangements have been made should be deferred on account of above developments. I said I thought that such a postponement would do more harm than good unless it were demonstrably due to requirements of the internal situation here.

4. Mr. Hikmat agreed. He thinks the Shah will open the Majlis at the beginning of February and leaves for Karachi early March. His Majesty is expecting a visit from the King of Afghanistan in February. This, combined with his visit to Pakistan, may enable him to mediate effectively.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS IN AZARBAIJAN

Consul-General Pott to Mr. Bevin (Communicated)

(No. 7) *Tabriz*
(Confidential) 17th January, 1950.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to Tabriz despatch No. 15 of 4th July, 1949, a copy of Tabriz despatch No. 2 of 17th January, 1950, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Tehran, regarding the political situation in Azarbaijan during the period 1st July to 31st December, 1949.

Enclosure in No. 5

SECTION A

In attempting to take a survey of political events in Azarbaijan over the past six months one is faced with the necessity of disregarding much that is either frankly parochial or of general application throughout Persia and of singling out such signifi-

cant features as distinguish the period under review from that which preceded it. The essential interest of the province, it will be agreed, is that it is one of the few territories bordering on the Soviet Union where the liberty of the individual is still respected and that its capital city can serve, in a modest way, as a listening post in the defence of the oilfields of Persia and Iraq. Three years have passed since Azarbaijan recovered her freedom and during this time the possibility of renewed Soviet intervention in the province has become less and less likely. On the one hand, Moscow has been occupied with consolidating gains in Eastern and Central Europe and in China and, on the other hand, she does not appear to be willing to risk the war which intervention in Persia would now entail.

2. Accordingly, during the past six months, while in other parts of Persia evidence is not lacking of Tudeh Party subversive activity, there is nothing of great

importance to report regarding Soviet behaviour towards Azarbaijan. By the end of the year most of the 50,000 tons of Russian wheat, required by a province sorely distressed as a result of an exceptionally severe winter, the year before, and a bad harvest, had been delivered by rail to Tabriz. Although Soviet trains brought the supplies (as Persian locomotives and rolling-stock were inadequate to cope with the traffic) Persian security measures prevented the possibility of Communist infiltration. Whatever attempts may have been made by the Soviet radio to exploit the propaganda value of Moscow's gesture, Azarbaijan continued to love their bad northern neighbour as little as ever. They were confirmed in their attitude by the series of minor frontier incidents which the Russians continued to provoke. The closure of the Soviet consulates in Azarbaijan, it was hoped, would be followed by the shutting down of the Voks Institute, the Soviet Reading Room, the Soviet Bookshop and the Soviet Hospital in Tabriz. No real justification could be seen for the continued existence of these institutions. Only the Soviet Bookshop was closed. In addition, the Tass correspondent left.

3. The above-mentioned institutions, in spite of police supervision, carried on with their espionage and intrigue. Soviet propaganda, however, made as a little impression as ever on a people who have experienced Soviet methods at first hand; but, by the end of the year, the unsolved problem of the destitute villagers seeking food and shelter in Tabriz had brought an element of danger into the situation in Azarbaijan.

4. At last, unfortunately, it was true, as Soviet propaganda had for so long maintained without justification, that people were dying of starvation in the streets of Tabriz. The danger is that those of the peasants who, for one reason or another, consider themselves to have been abandoned, first by their landlords and now by the authorities, may in despair lose their faith in their country and thereby fall a ready prey to Communist propaganda.

5. Landlords, whether they had the means or not, for the most part with criminal short-sightedness professed themselves unable to help their peasants in their distress. The latter flocked into Tabriz or went to Tehran and were returned by the authorities to Tabriz. The Governor-General of Azarbaijan, with funds at his disposal, claimed to have sent back some 1,500 villagers to

the countryside with supplies of food for the winter, but many villagers still remained destitute in the streets of Tabriz. It is not surprising, therefore, that he was severely criticised for not organising adequate and immediately effective relief measures, and that there was a movement in favour of his recall. No gratitude could now be felt for what M. Valatabar may have accomplished for the province since he arrived, six months before. Like Khalil Fahimi and Ali Mansur before him, he now stood condemned as a failure. There was no kind of sympathy with him in his struggle for power with Marshal Shahbakhti, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Azarbaijan. The latter gave no cause for being unpopular. However, much power he may have wielded, he was always able to blame the Governor-General, nominally the supreme authority in the province, for the shortcomings of the Administration. As a result, he continued in office with undiminished prestige. As long as he continues to remain in his unique position in Azarbaijan, no Governor-General, however efficient and energetic he may be, can hope to have the freedom of action necessary to carry out a long-term policy for the province.

SECTION B

Economic

6. Mention has been made earlier in this report of the serious problem created by the influx into Tabriz of destitute villagers in search of work or food. This was some indication of the distress prevalent throughout the province as a result of the previous, exceptionally, severe winter and the bad harvest. In addition, there was the usual seasonal unemployment, together with increased stagnation in the economic life of the province. Bread supplies were threatened at one period, but the position was relieved by imports of wheat from Iraq and the U.S.S.R. Most of the factories in Tabriz found it difficult or impossible to sell their products. Hopes were entertained that the Seven-Year Plan Organisation which was already financing the Mianeh-Tabriz railway project and other public works in the province, might grant them financial assistance. The market continued to be over-stocked with imported goods, particularly cotton piece-goods, which could mostly be sold only at a loss. Money was very scarce, and it was feared that the Persian New Year would produce the first

crop of bankruptcies. The Perso-Turkish Transit Agreement, signed on 25th December, opened up the possibility of developing an additional outlet for Azarbaijani pro-

duce, particularly dried fruits, and of reviving exports to Europe to their pre-war level.

LESLIE POTT.

EP 1016/11

No. 6

POLITICAL SITUATION IN PERSIA

Mr. Lawford to Mr. Bevin. (Received 16th February)

(No. 44) *Tehran,*
Sir, *10th February, 1950*

With reference to my telegram No. 72 of 8th February, I have the honour to inform you that the Shah opened the Sixteenth Majlis and the First Senate in joint session on Thursday, 9th February, 1950. It had been feared that if the Majlis were opened before the conclusion of the Tehran elections demonstrations might occur. In the event, nothing untoward occurred and those who are opposed to the opening of the Majlis without the participation of the Deputies for Tehran have confined themselves to newspaper criticism.

2. In the course of a brief speech, the Shah referred first to the constitutional changes approved last year by the Constituent Assembly; he claimed that these changes protected Persia from the twin dangers of anarchy and despotism. He expressed the hope that the new Chambers would complete the work of the Constituent Assembly and that they would in due course approve a new electoral law. He went on to stress the importance of economic development and the establishment of social justice, to achieve both of which ends his Government would make every effort. The execution of the Seven-Year Plan would receive particular attention since in it lay the best hope for the country's progress. In foreign affairs, he said that he aimed at the maintenance of friendly relations with his neighbours and with all countries in the world on a basis of mutual respect and that the principles of the United Nations Charter were accepted by Persia as the sole guarantee of international peace. A French translation⁽¹⁾ of the speech is enclosed herein.

3. The first task of the new Majlis will be the routine examination of the Deputies' Certificates of Election. This process will probably take some two weeks. When it is

completed, the Majlis will then be in a position to conduct business and to elect permanent officers. In accordance with constitutional practice, the Government will then resign and the Shah will appoint a new Government which will then present itself to the Majlis. The first legislative business to come before the new Majlis should be the revision of Articles 4 to 8 of the Constitution which deal with the size and duration of the Majlis and with the quorum rules. This duty was laid upon the new Majlis and the Senate by the Constituent Assembly, as reported in Sir John Le Rougetel's despatch No. 180⁽²⁾ of 10th May, 1949.

4. I have the honour to enclose herein a list⁽³⁾ of the Deputies so far elected to the Majlis and of the Senators so far elected or appointed. It will be observed that whereas the Shah has the right to appoint thirty Senators, he has in fact so far appointed only twenty-eight. I understand that one vacancy is being kept for a representative of the religious minorities in this country, Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian. It is intended that there shall always be one minority representative in the Senate, the three sects taking it in turn to be represented in this way, and that the Zoroastrians, who are first in Persian alphabetical order, will be so represented in the present term of the Senate. It is said that the other seat is being kept reserved in case the present Prime Minister should retire from office and be desirous of a seat in the Senate.

5. I shall submit my comments on the composition of the two Chambers when the Tehran elections for the Majlis are completed.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

VALENTINE LAWFORD.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

⁽²⁾ No. 18 in Persia Volume for 1949

EP 1013/11

No. 7

MONTHLY REPORT FOR JANUARY 1950

Mr. Lawford to Mr. Bevin. (Received 23rd February)

(No. 51) *Tehran,*
Sir, *17th February, 1950.*

With reference to Sir J. H. Le Rougetel's despatch No. 4 of 6th January, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during January 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. Though the return to Persia of the Soviet Ambassador on 17th January was interpreted by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs as a forerunner of improved Persian-Soviet relations, no noticeable improvement in fact occurred. Indeed, information about Soviet activities in this country caused the Government at one moment to consider the possible expulsion of all Soviet citizens not employed by the Soviet Embassy and the closing of all Soviet institutions in Persia. In the event, however, no action was taken beyond a request for the recall of Komissarov (see paragraph 3 of Sir J. Le Rougetel's despatch under reference). A representative of the Soviet Government arrived in order to continue the negotiations about the Caspian Fisheries Agreement but the negotiations were suspended after a week. The Soviet Union completed the delivery of 100,000 tons of wheat, and began to deliver the cement required for the Mianeh-Tabriz railway.

3. On 2nd January, the Tehran press published the joint communiqué issued by the Shah and President Truman on the occasion of His Majesty's departure from the United States which reaffirmed the belief of both countries in the United Nations, confirmed the determination of the United States Government to safeguard the independence of Persia, recognised the importance of the Persian Seven-Year Plan and promised technical assistance under the President's Fourth Point (subject to Congressional approval) military aid under the programme recently approved by Congress, and United States support for Persian applications to the International Bank.

4. With the convention of the 16th Majlis and the resumption of discussion on the Supplemental Oil Agreement approaching, the Shah showed some signs of weakening in the support which he had hitherto accorded to the agreement in its present form. Both he and Prince Abdul Riza,

titular Head of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation, expressed the view that the agreement, as signed, could not pass through the Majlis without further concessions on the part of the company. In particular, attempts were made to interest the United States Government on the side of the Persian Government. The Prime Minister, however, told His Majesty's Ambassador that his support for the agreement was undiminished.

Internal Affairs

5. There was much facile talk, at the time of the return of the Shah from the United States, of the likelihood of a change for the better in conditions in this country. His Majesty himself defined his objectives as "work, unity and a struggle against corruption." Shortly afterwards Sa'id tendered the resignation of his Cabinet and was entrusted with the formation of a new Government. Its composition, when announced, was not such as to justify confidence that there would be any substantial improvement and it has so far shown little energy. There were, however, several promising appointments. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs passed from Hikmat, who became Minister without Portfolio, to Siassi, a former Minister of Education. Three younger men were to be brought in. Asadullah Alam, formerly Governor-General of Seistan and Baluchistan, became Minister of the Interior. Dr. Taqi Nasr, formerly Executive Director of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation and a protégé of Prince Abdul Riza, was invited to become Minister of National Economy and eventually accepted on the conditions, which were granted, that he should have a decisive say, not only in the formation of the Organisation's policy, but also in the control of credit and imports. The new Government's programme consisted of pious hopes and the usual platitudes. The only field in which it has displayed any activity is in the "purging" of the Civil Service by reducing the number of posts for senior officials which each Ministry is allowed to include in its budget.

6. The new Government had at once to decide whether to convene the 16th Majlis

before the completion of the Tehran elections, and after some hesitation decided to do so. An important factor in their decision was the need to pass a budget by 20th March, if there was to be any means of paying for the administration and the army. Meanwhile the Tehran elections were put in train again. On 26th January martial law in Tehran was raised temporarily. The so-called "National Front" under Dr. Musaddiq continued its agitation against the Government's conduct of the elections and against the opening of the Majlis without the Tehran Deputies. Dr. Musaddiq himself was received by the Shah and made various demands, including one for the cancellation of the elections throughout the country, all of which were refused. The National Front was chiefly occupied in defending one of their number, Dr. Baga'i, who was arrested for an article allegedly attacking the army and sentenced to one year's imprisonment by a Military Court. He gave notice of appeal.

7. Although arrests of distributors of the clandestine Tudeh newspaper *Mardum* and other Tudeh pamphlets continued, the police had still by the end of the month been unable to take effective action against the headquarters of the Tudeh Party, wherever they may be. From Isfahan and Khuzistan came news of increasing Tudeh activities. The Government, in order to complete the action taken at the time of the attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1949, decided to confiscate all the property of the former Tudeh Party and to transfer the buildings to the Ministry of Education.

8. Economic life was considerably affected by the severe winter. Although the prices of bread, fats and sugar, of which large supplies have now been imported, continue to fall, prices for local produce rose when

heavy snow cut off supplies from the towns. Towards the end of the month the municipality of Tehran attempted to counter this by imposing maximum prices, but the only effect was to drive sellers off the market. The distress in Azarbaijan was particularly acute and the failure of various relief measures led to the recall of the Governor-General from Tabriz. Much public money was spent on repatriating Azerbaijan refugees from Tehran but there were continual new arrivals and some of those repatriated made their way back to the capital. At the end of the month a delegation headed by the Minister without Portfolio was appointed to visit Tabriz to investigate conditions in the province. Elsewhere, some nine hundred families were made homeless by a flood in Zahidan; and a much-publicised earthquake south-east of Bushire caused a few casualties.

9. Investigations made by the resident experts of Overseas Consultants revealed that the Supreme Council of the Plan Organisation had been approving projects without due regard to actual income and the recommendations in the Overseas Consultants report. The experts succeeded in securing the establishment of committees which should ensure more thorough screening of projects. An important development for British interests was the decision of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners to accept the invitation of Overseas Consultants to supply the twelfth resident consultant in their team. He will deal with the development of water resources. Three British forestry experts arrived to take up executive posts with the Plan Organisation, and it is confidently hoped that practical steps will soon be taken for organised forestry exploitation.

I have, &c.

V. G. LAWFORD.

EP 1941/4

No. 8

VISIT OF THE SHAH OF PERSIA TO THE UNITED STATES— NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1949

Sir F. Hoyer Millar to Mr. Bevin. (Received 21st February)

(No. 121. Confidential) Washington,
17th February, 1950.

Sir,
With reference to His Majesty's Ambassador's telegram No 519, Saving, of 14th December, 1949, I now have the honour to submit a more general report upon the official visit paid to the United States by

the Shah of Persia during November and December of last year. I regret that it has proved impossible to submit this report earlier.

2. The Shah's arrival in the United States on 16th November was heralded by a statement made by Mr. Acheson at his

press conference on that day, in which he said—

"The Shah's visit is primarily a goodwill visit which it is hoped will enable him to become acquainted at first hand with the United States and its institutions. The Shah is most anxious to see American industrial, sociological and agricultural techniques, matters of first interest to Iran right now since that country has embarked on an ambitious seven-year programme of economic and social development.

We are happy that the Shah is coming and feel confident that his visit will strengthen our existing very friendly relations with Iran."

3. When the Shah arrived at Washington Airport in the President's personal plane on the afternoon of 16th November, he was welcomed by Mr. Truman, Mr. Acheson, the Persian Ambassador in Washington, and representatives of the State Department and Diplomatic Corps. In the official exchange of greetings, the President spoke of his pleasure at receiving the Shah and of his hope that through his visit there might be an even closer mutual understanding between the United States and Persia. He referred to the wartime partnership of the two countries "in the struggle against fascism. The traditional friendship which bound us together during those troubled times has grown even stronger in the years since the war. Your Majesty's visit represents the high point of this relationship, which will, I am sure, become still closer in the years ahead." In his reply, the Shah emphasised his great satisfaction at being able to carry out his "long-cherished" wish to visit the United States. He went on to say that even before his arrival he had "seen and learned of the friendship of the United States for Iran. This friendship the Government and people of Iran reciprocate to the fullest degree. From them I bring you a message of warm regard and goodwill, for Iran was privileged to be one of your Allies, and to contribute to the triumph of the cause of freedom, in the second world war. Allies in war, we shall likewise be privileged, I trust, to work with the United States in the maintenance of peace in the Middle East and in the achievement of liberty and prosperity as the aim of all peace-loving peoples."

4. The formalities of the arrival were on traditional lines, with the twenty-one gun

42154

Royal Salute, a guard of honour at the airport, and a drive through the capital to the District of Columbia building where the Shah received the keys of the city. The Shah's procession then drove through flag-decorated streets to Blair House, where he was to spend the first night of his visit to the United States as the guest of the President and Mrs. Truman.

5. The first official function of the Shah's visit was a State Dinner given in his honour by the President on the evening of his arrival. In his toast to the Shah, Mr. Truman warmly acknowledged the part played by Persia in the war and referred to the similarity of outlook between Persia and the United States in their attitude towards their international obligations. He extended to the Shah his good wishes for his visit and assured him that he would be given the opportunity of seeing everything that he wanted in the United States. In his reply the Shah expressed his "immense pleasure" at being present as the guest of the President and Mrs. Truman, and went on to describe his policy as that of "working for peace and security in the exterior relations of Iran and working with no less fervour for improvement in the social and economic phases of Iran's domestic life." He said that in foreign relations he cherished "the ideal of loyal, non-aggressive cultural and economic relations with our neighbours and with all nations of the world in the light of the United Nations Charter" and that his most sincere wish was "to extend and develop the cordial relations existing between Iran and the United States. Iran needs the friendship of the United States, and the value of the unfailing friendship of Iran for your great country is, to my profound satisfaction, not unappreciated among the American people. We are grateful for what has been accomplished in the past, for what is now in prospect and for our hopes of even closer co-operation and intensified help in the future. If Iran gets technical and material help from the United States, she on her part will contribute, as she has so often in the past, to the mosaic of world prosperity and the deepening of the cultural values of the West." The Shah's speech ended with an invitation to the President to visit Persia—"nowhere in the world will you find a warmer or more heartfelt welcome"—and the happily-expressed sentence that "To-night, Mr. President, as your guest at Blair House, I know I shall

c 2

sleep well and dream true, for I shall be in the house of my friends."

6. The speech set the pattern of much that was to follow during the rest of the tour. It was at once clear that there was to be no diffidence about requests for additional United States help and there was already a good indication from the Shah's polished performance at the welcoming ceremonies and in his first speech, that the public relations angle was not to be neglected. He had made a good start; to the District of Columbia Commissioners, he referred in glowing terms to the capital, with its historic past and its splendid buildings and avenues, of which even a first impression was sufficient to assure him that "Washington's claims to distinction have not been exaggerated"; to the President, he emphasised the deep impression made throughout the democratic world by his efforts in the cause of peace and freedom; he attended a football game as guest of George Washington University and brought them luck in beating a close rival; he praised American women, American cars, and American mass production technique; while explaining the methods of Persian rug manufacture to Mrs. Roosevelt, he was careful to emphasise that child labour had been abolished in this industry; he was photographed doing all the right things at the appropriate moment. In consequence the Shah received warm and indeed enthusiastic press coverage almost from the moment of his arrival. Much of the credit of this should no doubt go to the Shah himself for his evident friendliness and ease of manner, his adept handling of a press conference or of an awkward situation, and his ready and outspoken answers to questions. There is no doubt, however, that an important contribution was made by Mr. Henry Suydam, a veteran American journalist with considerable experience in the field of public relations, who was engaged by the Shah as his adviser on the latter aspects of his tour.

7. The skilful handling of the problem of press relations was evident at the Shah's first press conference on the second day of his visit. This was held at Prospect House, where he stayed for the remainder of his visit to Washington as the first occupant of this house which had then been newly leased by the United States Government as a residence for important visitors. The Shah emphasised the strategic situation of his country which he said was "important to all other countries and the whole security

of the Middle East and the family of the world." He said that on these grounds he would definitely ask for increased United States military and economic aid, and that he would do his best to encourage American business investments "which will be of great value both to the investors and to us." Questioned on whether he planned to marry while in the United States, the Shah, who was described by the press as "matrimonially eligible," replied that he did not "think that is part of an official visit."

8. In responding to the toast at the dinner given in his honour on 17th November by the Secretary of State, the Shah referred to the confirmation provided by Mr. Acheson's statement in connexion with the signing of the North Atlantic Pact of the fact that "in the United States we have a great and powerful friend; and we should like to think that Iran's friendship is also not unappreciated among Americans." He reverted to a similar theme on the next evening in proposing the toast of the President at a dinner which he gave in honour of Mr. and Mrs. Truman. Earlier in the day the Shah had had a discussion with the President and a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which a report was given in telegram No. 519, Saving, of 14th December, 1949. During the course of a full day's engagements, he had also spoken at a luncheon meeting of the overseas writers. His disavowal of the description of "oriental potentate" and his preference for that of "working monarch" was the subject of much favourable comment. During the course of his speech to the club, he again underlined his desire to secure additional external assistance for his country, saying that, "we hope for American technical and material assistance. We hope, under proper safeguards, to interest American investors in Iran. Iran offers a favourable field, we believe, for the working out of the magnificent concept embodied in Point 4 of President Truman's Inaugural Address."

9. On the last day of his stay in Washington, the Shah received and addressed the Persian colony. In this speech he concentrated on the requirements necessary to improve the internal position in Persia. He said that his country's "crying need" was "for more social justice through the elimination of distinctions and discriminations—a new concept of justice which is based on the rule of law." He encouraged his listeners to cultivate and to take back with them to Persia "the American way of

life—hard work, productive power, inventive ability and respect and obedience for the law." No full text of the speech was published here and in that part of it which was made available the remarks quoted in paragraph 1 of Tehran despatch No. 406 (G.21/271/49) of 24th November, 1949, did not appear although they are generally in keeping with the main tenor of his speech.

10. On 20th November, the Shah, accompanied by M. Ala, left Washington for New York where he stayed five days. He carried out a full programme on the lines set out in the enclosure to Chancery letter to the Eastern Department (361/16/49) of 10th November, 1949. The highlights of his visit included the traditional ride up Broadway from Bowling Green to the City Hall where he was received by the mayor; a civic luncheon at the Waldorf Astoria; a visit and address to the Assembly of the United Nations; the opening of an exhibition of Persian art at the Metropolitan Museum; and visits to Princeton University, West Point, and Hyde Park. The Shah also attended a number of receptions and other functions in his honour.

11. Public reaction was reasonably friendly. A crowd of about 500 were on hand to witness his arrival at Pennsylvania Station and at least 200,000 persons are reported to have lined the route of his drive up Broadway. Police preparations were on the Presidential scale, the escort including forty detectives and fifty motor cycle policemen. Newspaper publicity was very adequate, the staid *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune* striking their usual solemn notes, while the evening press and the more sensational dailies had some gentle fun on the subject of oil, feudalism, and Persia's economic position.

12. The Shah's reported remarks largely concentrated on the need for economic assistance to Persia, for which he said that his country required \$250 million to complete the Seven-Year Plan, and for modern military defensive equipment. As regards the latter, he stressed that the defence of Persia was critical in the general strategic picture of the Middle East, and that its military preparedness was at present "inadequate." It was in his speech to the Council of Foreign Relations that the Shah gave the most explicit statement of his hopes for closer relations between the United States and Persia. He expressed the view that Persia was a country in

which "President Truman's magnificent concept, embodied in Point 4 of his Inaugural Address, can be made good with special effectiveness. My Government and people are eager to welcome American capital, to give it all possible safeguards. We want to work, with the aid of American engineers and other technical and industrial advisers, for the economic development and general welfare of Iran and a contribution to an improvement in the living standards of the world. Iran needs American collaboration—in her national defence, in her economic development, in the achievement of social progress based upon increased production and a higher standard of living. The relationship between our two countries has been long. Now, I hope, it is to become closer than ever."

13. There was a slight *contretemps* at the United Nations when the Shah began to read the wrong speech, but this was not played up by the press. Indeed, by his presence of mind, the Shah turned the incident to his own advantage since, when asked at a subsequent press conference for his impression of the United Nations, he was quick to reply "I was so impressed I chose the wrong speech."

14. On 25th November the Shah and his official party flew to Detroit in one of the President's planes. The main feature of his visit to this city was a tour on the first day of the General Motors plant, with a dinner given in his honour the same evening by the General Motors Corporation. In his speech at the dinner the Shah emphasised the part which Detroit could play in the industrial development of his country—"Iran needs and would welcome the help of American invention, American industries and American know-how and show-how in the development of Iran along modern scientific and technological lines." He pointed out the need for mechanised equipment to increase agricultural production, and declared his confidence that American aid would be forthcoming. He is also understood informally to have told Mr. C. E. Wilson, president of General Motors, that one of the reasons for his visit was to persuade General Motors to construct at least one assembly plant in Persia, and that he hoped to get trucks and passenger cars for his country. Wilson is reported to have replied "Well, I understand that you have a little oil over there Your Majesty, so I guess we can work out a trade."

15. On the last day of his stay at Detroit, the Shah flew down to inspect the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The next day he flew to Fort Knox in Kentucky where he inspected the Armoured Centre. (His luck rather deserted him at this point since, while touring the Officers' Club, he took a turn at a slot machine and at once hit the jack-pot which failed to pay off, much to the embarrassment of the conducting officers.) The Shah spent the last couple of days of the month on a visit to the Grand Canyon area and then, after looking over agricultural projects at Phoenix, he arrived at San Diego on the West Coast on 3rd December. While he was there, the Shah inspected the aircraft carrier *Valley Forge* and then in the evening he flew on to Los Angeles, piloting himself in the Navy's "Constitution" aircraft for a large part of the flight. The main item of the programme in Los Angeles was a visit to the Lockheed Aircraft works; he was lavishly entertained by the president of the company and taken on a particularly extensive tour of the plant. His comment at the end was that "it will take many generations for the Iranians to organise a plant like this." Most of the rest of the Shah's three days' visit to Los Angeles was spent sight-seeing; it was a process attended with considerable publicity, thanks in a large part to an ill-judged exhibition of car driving which caused the headlines in the next day's papers to proclaim that the "Shah of Iran gives lesson in how not to drive a car"; it was the only public relations lapse of the tour.

16. On 7th December the Shah flew to Sun Valley, Idaho, where he was to have spent some ten days on a skiing holiday. However, a combination of too much publicity and too little snow caused him to change his plans and he left almost at once for San Francisco where he spent about a week on a private visit before flying back to New York.

17. One of the Shah's last public engagements was in New York at a dinner given by the Columbia University on 19th December at which the announcement was made of the establishment by the University of a Centre of Iranian Studies. In welcoming this development, the Shah said that it would help to bring about "a working partnership" with the United States which would "benefit the world" and he also urged the United States to provide

Persia with "all the techniques that would enable us to become a modern industrial State with a high standard of living."

18. Most of the last few days of the Shah's stay were spent in undergoing a medical check-up in a New York hospital. The doctors apparently found nothing physically wrong with him except that he had been overworking—a state of affairs which is probably to be expected in anyone who is called upon to undergo the rigorous hospitality of an official visit to the United States.

19. The Shah left the United States from New York by privately chartered aircraft on 30th December. At a press conference given before he left, he spoke of an "understanding" having been reached "between two sides seeking truth and honesty" and, on the day of his departure, a four-point joint statement on the relations between Persia and the United States was issued from the White House. A copy of this statement⁽¹⁾ is enclosed. In its first two paragraphs the statement emphasises the support of both countries for the United Nations and reaffirms the "great interest" of the United States in "the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Iran." The third paragraph sets out the proposition that a sound and prosperous economy provides the best basis for Persian independence, which stresses the important contribution to this end which can be made by the successful completion of the Seven-Year Plan. Assurance was accordingly given that the United States Government would support Persian applications to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for "economically justifiable" loans, and that Persia would be included in planning under Point Four. For his part, the Shah acknowledged the economic importance of increased private capital investment in Persia and pledged his Government to "consider measures to be taken to encourage such investments." The last paragraph of the joint statement referred to the policy of the United States of helping free people to maintain their freedom "wherever the aid which it is able to provide can be effective" and mentioned the military assistance already approved for Persia. In conclusion the undertaking was given that "the United States will continue to bear in mind Iranian defence needs in connexion with further foreign assistance which may be considered by the United States Government."

20. Also enclosed is a copy of the letter⁽²⁾ dated 7th January which the Shah addressed to the President after his return to Tehran. He expressed his thanks to the President and Government and people of the United States for his "lavishly hospitable reception" and his confidence that "long-standing relations of friendship and understanding which have existed untarnished between our two countries will continue to be fostered and strengthened to the good of our peoples and the cause of a lasting peace."

21. From the Shah's point of view the visit was obviously successful in showing him as much of the United States in six weeks could allow and in enabling him to establish personal contact with the President and leading members of the United States Government and Administration. The understanding of the American scene which he must thereby have gained should help to remove some of the misapprehensions on his part which seemed previously on occasions to have interfered with the smooth flow of United States-Persian relations. His visit was certainly a model of good management in the field of public relations so that he was not only successful in putting across his own likeable

personality, but also in painting a plausible picture of "democratisation" of Persia and of the identity of outlook and interest between his own country and the United States. It was the *New York Times* which commented on the day after his departure that "we pledge aid to Iran because we are both pledged to seek the same good ends." As a comment on the Shah's visit perhaps one which seems to be fairly typical of the general United States reaction was the remark made by a policeman on duty at the airport who, as the Shah's plane left the ground, nodded and said "Nice Guy." Such a remark must certainly have given satisfaction to all those responsible for organising the visit, since it is pretty certain that two months earlier Persia had hardly entered into the scheme of international relations of the average American; still less had he formed any personal ideas about a rather mythical person known as "the Shah." Even in present-day international relations it is the "nice guy" who stands a better chance of getting a helping hand.

22. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Tehran.

I have, &c.

F. H. HOYER MILLAR.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

No. 9

MONTHLY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1950

Mr. Lawford to Mr. Bevin. (Received 13th March)

(No. 77)
Sir,

Tehran,
3rd March, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 51 of 17th February, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during February 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. On 18th February a Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Pakistan was signed in Tehran. Plans for the Shah's visit to Pakistan between 1st and 16th March have been completed and published. The balance of Persia's relations with her two mutually antagonistic Eastern neighbours is to be preserved by the forthcoming visit of the King of Afghanistan now fixed for the last days of March. During the month a special representative of the Indonesian Government, M. Raden Haji Abdoelkadir, spent some days in Tehran as the guest of

the Persian Government. The object of his visit was to establish contact with the Persian Government and to discuss the possible establishment of diplomatic relations.

Internal Affairs

3. The Shah opened the Senate and the Majlis on 9th February. Both bodies dealt speedily with the credentials of their members and with the election of officers. M. Hasan Taqizadeh was elected President of the Senate and M. Riza Hikmat (President of the 15th Majlis) was elected President of the Majlis. Both Chambers were formally constituted for the transaction of business on 23rd February. In accordance with constitutional custom, M. Sa'id then resigned. The Shah at once invited him to form a new Government without, as has been the practice since his

accession, first ascertaining from the Majlis the name of the man most likely to enjoy their confidence as Prime Minister. The new Cabinet differs but little from the outgoing Cabinet; Dr. Taqi Nasr and Amir Asadullah Alam, the two most interesting appointments to the last Cabinet, appear in the new Cabinet, the second-named at the Ministry of Agriculture instead of the Ministry of the Interior.

4. Voting in the Tehran elections took place in an atmosphere of apathy; at the end of the month the counting of the votes was still proceeding, with Dr. Musaddiq and three members of the "National Front" holding the first four places.

5. The Tudeh (Communist) Party continues to be active and the authorities are still unable to prevent the printing and circulation of its propaganda, including the clandestine weekly newspaper *Mardum*. The authorities were given a reminder of the popular discontent which gives Tudeh propaganda its appeal when several hundred unemployed men demonstrated in front of the Majlis building on 25th February. It has since been announced that 3,000 unemployed men have been given work on road-making in and around Tehran. The public-spirited officials who have been concerned with the establishment of the Persian Ministry of Labour and the elaboration of labour and social insurance legislation were much encouraged by the visit to Tehran of Sir Guildhaume Myrddin-Evans, Deputy Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Labour.

6. The Princesses Shams and Ashraf returned to Tehran during the month.

7. Severe weather in the first part of the month continued to block communications and hamper economic activity. The mission to Azerbaijan was held up by snow for some days but eventually reached Tabriz. It has now returned to Tehran and it is announced that, as a result of its report, 12,000 tons of seed grain is to be sent to Azerbaijan by the Ministry of Finance, 4,400 tons of wheat is to be sent for the needy (up to 40 kilog. per person for about 120,000 persons), a commission has been set up to investigate the people's complaints and fifty to sixty local officials are to be

replaced. As a result of the precautions taken by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in building up stocks in Tabriz there was no recurrence of the serious shortage of oil products experienced last winter in Azarbaijan; in other parts of the country also, and especially in Tehran, stocks of oil products are holding out well, contrary to expectations of deficiencies towards the end of the winter.

8. Early in the month the new Minister of National Economy, Dr. Taqi Nasr, arrived in Tehran from the United States with the evident intention of making his presence felt in economic affairs. It is reported that there has already been a clash between Dr. Taqi Nasr and M. Ibtihaj on questions of credit policy, in the presence of the Shah. Dr. Taqi Nasr is understood to be drafting a decree which provides for the full mobilisation of the Bank Melli's cash holdings for economic development, and also to be pressing for the establishment of a Plan Bank, proposals which will encounter bitter opposition from M. Ibtihaj. The manoeuvres of the opponents of Ali Mansur to secure his removal from the Plan Council continue and the latest rumour is that he is to be given an ambassadorial appointment. Meanwhile, overseas consultants' experts are still finding difficulty in selecting projects which the International Bank would consider bankable and sense a passive resistance on the part of some senior officials of the organisation towards financial aid from the International Bank at this juncture. A Swiss accountant and seven Swiss oil geologists have joined the Plan Organisation. Three officials of the United States Department of Agriculture spent a few days in Tehran towards the end of February, examining proposals for economic and social reforms and Persia's possible needs for technical assistance under President Truman's Fourth Point. The State Department recently informed the United States Embassy here that it was in process of recruiting several experts, mainly agricultural, for temporary service in Persia under the Smith-Mundt scheme.

I have, &c.

V. G. LAWFORD.

ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his Credentials to the Shah

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 30th March)

(No. 97. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, *20th March, 1950.*

I have the honour to report that I presented credentials to His Imperial Majesty the Shah this morning at the Marble Palace. This is a square building set in a largish garden, and the expedition was something of an ordeal since the fifteen members of my staff and myself, accompanied by the Chef de Protocole, disembarked from our cars at the garden gate and marched in a procession (extremely slowly since the Chef de Protocole was suffering severely from asthma) round to the entrance to the Palace on the far side, where a guard of honour was drawn up and the British National Anthem was played. After the ceremony the procession completed the circle in like manner. This proceeding was not without interest to His Majesty, who was observed to be peeping from an upper window at the procession as it made its way round the Palace.

2. In presenting my Letters of Credence and the Letters of Recall of my predecessor, I said that I was sensible of the honour which had been done me in appointing me as Ambassador to His Majesty's Court, and expressed the hope that I should be able to conduct my mission in such a manner as to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries which were so important for the peaceful development of the world. I thereupon conveyed to the Shah a personal message from His Majesty The King, who sent his regards and expressed the hope that His Majesty had enjoyed his visits to the United States and Pakistan: The King had charged me to assure the Shah of the interest he took in what happened in Persia.

3. After I had presented the members of my staff the Shah took me into an adjoining room where he retained me for about forty minutes while he ran through the problems of Persia so far as they affected relations with Great Britain.

4. He said that he was of the opinion that the only means of conducting relations between us was that of complete frankness. He had adopted this method reciprocally

with my predecessor and hoped to be able to continue in the same manner with myself. He then said that Persia was the only country which had received no assistance from the West after the war, and he was unable to understand why this had been the case. It was of great importance that there should be a stable Government in the country and it was to the interests of the Western Powers, and especially Great Britain, that this should be so. He was aware that people were apt to say that Persia was a rich country, on account of the proceeds from her oil, but she was faced with a number of difficult problems. It was unfortunately the case that there was a lack of discipline among politicians and there were no political parties which could be utilised for the creation of a stable Government. In this connexion he said that although his present Prime Minister, Sa'id, should have terminated his Ministry about six months ago, he had requested him to remain in office for the present for the sake of continuity and stability. He went on to say that a great deal was being said in the press and elsewhere regarding the support of the British Embassy for this or that politician, and that this tended to impede good relations between Persia and Great Britain. I said at once that I had heard that such rumours existed but that I could assure him that neither the Embassy nor any members of its staff were authorised to express any preference for any particular Persian politician, and I found it impossible to believe that they had indeed done so. It was the policy of His Majesty's Government not to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, and this was a policy which I should be careful to follow during my tour of duty at Tehran. The Shah went on to say that any discussions regarding Persian political affairs should take place between himself and myself. This was the only way in which he could profit from the great experience and wisdom in foreign affairs which characterised British Governments.

5. He then reverted to the need of Persia for foreign assistance, and I said that it seemed to me that the Seven-Year Plan

contained the necessary elements for the creation of a stable and prosperous community. The Shah agreed, but said that what was wanted was not so much grandiose schemes for large dams but the immediate provision of smaller development schemes such as the provision of pumps, tractors and locomotives which would have a more immediate effect. I said that this was undoubtedly the case, but that at the same time it was difficult to visualise a scheme of widespread economic reform which could be put into effect with any great rapidity. The economic reorganisation of the country was essentially a rather long-term matter and involved important schemes which could not be effective overnight but which should not on that account be neglected.

6. The Shah then returned to the Supplemental Oil Agreement and said that there were difficulties in the way of its ratification. There were people who said that the oil company itself were not anxious for ratification: they were sceptical as to the real desire of the company to double the amount of their payments to the Persian Government. I said that I was quite convinced that the company themselves, as well as the British Government, wanted the agreement to be ratified as soon as possible. I had made some attempt to familiarise myself with the agreement before coming to Tehran and my personal impression had been that since it had been negotiated at a period of great prosperity and high prices, and since prices were now showing signs of falling, it would be very much to the advantage of the Persian Government to secure ratification of the agreement as quickly as they could. The company had expressed some doubt as to their wisdom in guaranteeing so large an amount as £4 million in participation of the company's annual distributions, and I was fairly sure in my own mind that the present Supplemental Agreement represented the frontier beyond which the company could not go. As regards their willingness to increase payments to the Persian Government to such an extent, I pointed out that the company had themselves admitted that the post-war increase in production had made it only fair that a new agreement should be made: I did not claim that the company were being philanthropists, but they had honestly recognised the change in conditions and had done their best to meet it. There were people who seemed to think that the company had not given enough, and this

did not seem to square very well with the criticism of those who enquired why they were giving so much. The Shah took these points very well, and said that he himself was extremely anxious that the agreement should be ratified as soon as possible. It was, however, difficult to explain the agreement to the public, and in this respect the company had not been very helpful. I said that I thought the company took the view that since the agreement had been signed by the Persian Government it was the latter's business to explain it to those concerned: I understood however that this point was under consideration by the company. He then referred to the prevalent argument against the agreement that the British Government was receiving in taxation as much as or more than the Persian Government. I said that in this regard it must be remembered that the present rate of taxation in the United Kingdom was abnormally high and was the result of an abnormally difficult post-war economic situation. It was to be hoped that this situation would gradually improve and that taxation would therefore eventually be lowered. When this came about it was evident that the share of the British Government would decrease proportionately to the share of the Persian Government, which was guaranteed by the rate of royalty and by the participation guarantee. The Shah then mentioned that he had heard that the Americans were negotiating a new agreement with Saudi Arabia which might result in a higher rate of royalty. I said that I had heard nothing of such a new agreement, but that I had seen figures which indicated that the rate of royalty accruing to the Persian Government under the Supplemental Agreement was higher than that paid to any other of the Middle East countries.

7. As regards Persian foreign relations, the Shah mentioned that relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were difficult: there were no countries, except the satellites, with which Russia had friendly relations. Partly for this reason, and partly because of the predominant position of Great Britain in the Middle East, he regarded it as imperative that there should exist a reciprocal friendship between Great Britain and Persia. He quoted as instances of the special position of Great Britain in the Middle East the British treaties with Iraq, the prestige and friendship enjoyed by the United Kingdom in Pakistan, and British influence in Egypt

and on the Suez Canal. British interests in this region were very great, and it followed that friendship with Persia was of great importance. It was no longer a question of Russian and British zones of influence in Persia. There could be no return to 1907: British interests rested now on the Persian frontier with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the case of an attack on Persia, he was certain that the Anglo-Iranian oilfields would be destroyed within two months. With the strategic importance of Persia in mind, he considered it a strong British interest that the political and economic stability of the country should be assured. He was not satisfied with the present condition of the country, and was afraid that the subversive activity of communism, which knew no frontiers, was making headway.

8. He referred briefly to his visit to Pakistan, and told me that he had been greatly struck by the legacy of development and efficiency, both civil and military, which he had seen in that country and which had been left by the British administration.

9. His Majesty then proceeded to complain that the British press had been in recent times less than fair to Persia and that this had led to criticism here which tended to worsen relations between the two countries. I pointed out that British journalists did not spare their criticism of their own Government or of any matters which they thought to merit it: there was a system in the Foreign Office of giving information and guidance to journalists but anything beyond this might be con-

sidered interference with the liberty of the press.

10. His Majesty concluded by requesting me to thank The King for his message and to say that since his visit to the United Kingdom in 1948 he thought that the good relations between the two countries had been strengthened.

11. It is not always the case that the Shah retires into private audience with foreign representatives when they present their credentials, and it seems unusual that an Ambassador should be retained for such a long period or that current questions should be so extensively reviewed on so formal an occasion. After the interview had proceeded for some time I pointed out to the Shah that I had only been in the country for a week and that I was therefore not conversant in detail with the matters he had raised. The somewhat plaintive note which the Shah adopted during the interview suggested that he was oppressed with the difficulties of his situation and that of his country, and had some vague feeling that he should be supported in some more concrete fashion than had hitherto been the case in his efforts to reorganise and improve it. Without entering into the extent, if any, to which such a feeling may be justified, it seemed to me that a good deal of his evident depression was due to his lack of confidence in those in his own country who were available to assist him in his admittedly difficult task. The tone of the audience was friendly throughout.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1016/28

No. 11

CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AND THE SHAH

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 14th April)

(No. 108)
Sir,

*Tehran,
8th April, 1950.*

I lunched with His Majesty the Shah on 3rd April, at his request, in his private palace. His remarks in the main followed very much the lines of his remarks to me when I presented credentials (as reported in my despatch No. 97 of 20th March). His Majesty again mentioned that he could not understand why Persia had not received after the war help similar to that which had been given to other countries, although it

had been promised. After pointing out that the countries which had received direct help after the war had been in a worse position than Persia, I asked him what in particular he had in mind. He said that Persia had expected railways and roads to be repaired and, where necessary, re-equipped, seeing that they had been used for the transport of such large quantities of war materials to Russia.

2. The Shah then said that his trip to the United States had not been a success from

the point of view of his personal influence with the Persian people; they had expected him to bring back something with him and, in fact, he had brought back nothing. This made it more difficult for him to put through the reforms that he desired. He had transferred to a charitable organisation all the Crown lands, but his example had not been followed by the large landowners. I said that the opinion in Persia appeared to be that the large landowners were responsible for the difficulties in the way of agricultural reform, and the Shah rejoined that it was he himself who had put these accusations about. There were not more than one hundred of the great landowners, but they were quite intransigent and did not appear to be capable of understanding that the times called for drastic measures. He, himself, was not advocating confiscation, but he considered that there was a maximum holding of land beyond which any individual should not go. He wished to acquire the surplus land and sell it to the peasants, who then, with the help of a greatly strengthened agricultural bank and the provision of a certain amount of machinery, could cultivate it for themselves. The landowners, however, were terrified at this prospect and were even in some cases working up the Mullahs into a counter-attack on the ground that such a movement would be against the religion of Islam. He proposed, however, to proceed with the organisation of the Crown lands which he had transferred but which were still under his control, although the proceeds went to the charitable organisation concerned, and he hoped that it would be possible in due course to induce the other landowners to follow his example.

3. His Majesty then referred to the reform of the Administration and said that if he were to cut down the Civil Service to the lowest level at which it could work efficiently he would be faced with the problem of thousands of unemployed clerks, and this was something which he did not consider desirable at the present moment. He thought, therefore, that the only solution to this question was a gradual reduction of staffs with a view to increased efficiency. He was aware that there was a great deal of corruption, but he had no solution to offer other than that he himself could refuse to grant offices to corrupt persons and he hoped that corruption would gradually diminish once it was seen that it did not lead to official posts.

4. At an early stage in the conversation the Shah mentioned his desire to get the

oil question out of the way as quickly as possible, and complained, as he had done before, that the company were not being of much help. I said that, as I had mentioned previously, I thought the agreement was a good one for Persia and that the company had gone as far as they safely could. It seemed to me that the Ministers were taking far too defensive an attitude and that the agreement was so favourable to Persia that they were in a position to present it as such and to take a positive rather than a negative line. The Shah then referred to the question of the taxation accruing to His Majesty's Government and gave me to understand that this was the main stumbling block to the ratification of the Supplemental Agreement. I explained that the very high rate of taxation in the United Kingdom was due to abnormal post-war conditions: the agreement had forty-three years to run and it was to be hoped that long before that time taxation would have greatly decreased. This would not only mean that the share of His Majesty's Government would decrease with the rate of taxation, but that the share of the Persian Government would increase by reason of the higher funds which would be left at the disposal of the company. The Shah seemed to think this was not an argument which would greatly appeal to the Majlis, and enquired whether His Majesty's Government could not allocate some of the taxation derived from the Oil Company to financial help for Persia. He admitted, however, that the amount of royalties under the Supplemental Agreement would be sufficient for Persian requirements during the next two or three years. I took it, therefore, that what he was looking for was some gesture with regard to taxation after a certain period, which could be sprinkled like a little sugar on the Supplemental Agreement. I said that I could not imagine that His Majesty's Government would be able to juggle with the proceeds of the taxes from any particular company without involving themselves in intricate and difficult commitments in other directions. The Shah seemed to appreciate this point.

5. As regards the Seven-Year Plan, he thought that progress on roads, railways, wells, pumps and agricultural machinery would be visible in the next few months. As regards the organisation of industrial labour, he said that something must be done to bring help to the industrial concerns. They were at present unable to sell their products in competition with imported

articles, and reorganisation was needed. Part of the new taxation scheme would be directed towards taxation which would fall more heavily on the rich than on the poor, and it would be necessary to increase the taxation of industrial concerns. As regards labour conditions, he had the impression that the British Government had shown themselves hostile to the Eski trade union, and wondered why this was. I said that I was not aware that His Majesty's Government were hostile to Eski, but that they thought that the Persian Government for their part seemed hostile to the free trades unions. The Shah said that a number of persons of doubtful antecedents had shown themselves interested in the trades unions and care had been taken to see that the direction of Eski was, so far as possible, not of an undesirable character. He thought that it was a principle and a source of strength of British trades unions that their leaders were men who were or had been themselves workers. If this could be the case with Persian trades unions he would be only too happy, but the fact was that they were too frequently headed by outsiders.

6. The Shah returned more than once to the accusations which he had made to me before about the intervention of the embassies in Persian affairs, and while giving the British Embassy a comparatively clean bill he referred several times to statements made by the Tribal Attaché at the United States Embassy who, he thought, had some influence with the ambassador. The Tribal

Attaché had not concealed his opinion of certain Persian statesmen, and this had had a very bad effect. Before 1941 Persian politicians had realised that there was no particular point in securing the support of the embassies, but owing to events since then this regrettable practice had sprung up again and seemed to be getting worse rather than better. It greatly complicated the internal political position.

7. With regard to the new Government and Majlis, the Shah indicated that he might take a strong line although he said that he would not entirely ignore the minorities. This suggested, however, that he was prepared to use his influence and his constitutional position to try and force the necessary reforms through Parliament. He was quite animated in his denunciation of the National Front, which he said stood for absolute neutrality as between Russia and the Western Powers. This was quite absurd and even dangerous, and he had no patience with people who could not make up their minds to take one side or the other.

8. When we parted the Shah invited me to go and see him whenever I had anything I wished to discuss.

9. I am reporting separately on certain other questions, of a military nature, which arose in the course of this conversation.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Moscow, and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1192/3

No. 12

CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AND THE SHAH

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 14th April)

(No. 114)

Sir,

Tehran,

8th April, 1950.

In the course of the conversation which I have reported at length in my despatch No. 108 of to-day's date, the Shah also mentioned that he had seen General Collins, the United States Chief of Staff who has been visiting Persia recently, and had tried to convince him that military aid to Turkey would be quite insufficient to counter any attack from the north. Persia and Iraq constituted a dangerous area through which Turkey might be outflanked and taken in the rear. He had not suggested, nor would he be foolish enough to suggest, that the

Persian army could hold up a Russian advance for more than a few weeks, but he thought that they could fight a delaying action. This would have to be done in two sectors—one via Khuzistan and the other southwards in the direction of Ahwaz. If this task were to be required of the Persian forces, they would need equipment and he thought that as a result of General Collins's visit Persia would be included in the allocation of old equipment which was being made to Korea and the Philippines.

2. Turning to the air force, he said that he was very much in favour of integration of equipment with Pakistan. He had spoken

with Air Marshal Atcherley on this subject. There was, however, no money for air force equipment, and there was another difficulty in the way of the financial terms which we were insisting on under Scheme B. If Persia were to pay for the equipment of their air force, the Americans would naturally doubt whether they were justified in supplying equipment for the army free of charge. In this connexion, he wondered whether the

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could not come to the rescue with a loan from their very large reserves. He would be speaking to the Air Attaché later about air force matters.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo. I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1013/19

No. 13

MONTHLY REPORT FOR MARCH, 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 20th April)

(No. 117)

Tehran,

Sir,

14th April, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 77 of 3rd March, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during March 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. The most interesting event was the sudden cessation, at the beginning of the month, of the broadcasts of the Azarbaijan Free Democrat Radio station. For some two years this clandestine station has been broadcasting in Persian and Kurdish abuse of the Shah and of the Persian Government and Communist Party propaganda. From its title it seems highly probable that the station is situated either in North-West Persia or in Soviet Caucasia. Since the Persian authorities have been unable to locate it on Persian territory it must be assumed that the station operates from the safety of Soviet territory. The sudden cessation of its operations was represented in some quarters as a conciliatory gesture on the part of the Soviet Government, destined to lead to official Soviet demands on Persia. Many Persians, however, pointed out that if the Soviet Government wished to improve Soviet-Persian relations the most useful gesture they could have made would have been to hand over the gold which Persia claims in return for Persian currency supplied to the Soviet forces during the war. In the event, the Azarbaijan Free Democrat Radio resumed its operations in the middle of the month on all too familiar lines. It therefore seems probable that the brief suspension of its operations was due simply to technical reasons. But the episode serves to illustrate the extreme sensitiveness of political Tehran to anything connected with Soviet-Persian relations.

3. During the first half of the month the Shah was in Pakistan. His visit appears to have been well organised and he is reported to have formed a very favourable impression of the economic development achieved by Pakistan. During the last days of March the King of Afghanistan visited Tehran as the guest of the Shah; he was on his way back to Afghanistan after receiving medical treatment in Europe. Having recently signed a Treaty of Friendship with Pakistan, the Persian Government have now balanced their relations with the Indian sub-continent by signing, on 15th March, a similar treaty with India. Relations with Israel have also been established by the *de facto* recognition of the Israeli Government. There has been some criticism of this action in religious circles but very little general interest seems to have been aroused by it. It is reported in the press that M. Abdul Qadir, who visited Tehran last month on a preliminary mission, has now been appointed Indonesian Minister to Persia and Afghanistan.

Internal Affairs

4. The two Chambers spent the first half of the month, before going into recess for the Persian New Year holidays, in a desultory but highly critical discussion of the programme of the new Sa'id Government. No vote on the programme had been taken when the two Chambers were adjourned for the New Year recess but it had become abundantly clear that Sa'id did not enjoy the confidence of either. The Shah, on his return from Pakistan, also made it clear that he did not regard Sa'id as an effective Prime Minister and on 18th March Sa'id submitted his resignation. The Shah, however, had not yet decided on a successor and the resignation was not accepted. He was apparently seriously considering the

appointment of a Senator, Abul Qasim Najm (Personalities No. 121), who has a reputation for being honest but ineffectual. Many Deputies were actively opposed to the appointment of Najm and let it be known to the Shah that they would not give him a vote of confidence. His Majesty then turned to Ali Mansur (Personalities No. 103), chairman of the Supervising Board of the Seven-Year Plan, accepted the further offer of resignation from Sa'id and instructed Mansur to form a Cabinet. This choice was at first sight somewhat surprising, since Mansur's reputation made it unlikely that he would put much driving force behind the Shah's anti-corruption campaign and it was known that there was much powerful opposition to him, for example from Prince Abdur Riza. The facts were, however, that Mansur, who had been working quietly behind the scenes for some time, was able to claim with some justice considerable support in the Majlis, and that the field of choice was somewhat limited unless the Shah was prepared to go outside the ranks of the routine politicians and entrust the Government to one of the outstanding personalities such as Sayyid Zia-ud-Din Tabataba'i or General Razmara whose names had been canvassed in the Tehran press. His choice indicates that the Shah is not yet ready to try this road to salvation. The new Prime Minister has not yet announced the names of his Ministers and does not propose to do so until the first days of April. Public judgment will depend to some extent on the composition of his Cabinet and more on its actions.

5. During March the Tehran elections at last came to an end. Of the twelve Deputies elected six were members of Dr. Musaddiq's National Front. Their success reflects the dissatisfaction about the state of the country and their own affairs which is strongly felt by considerable sections of the population of Tehran.

6. During the month it emerged that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had dismissed a few hundred redundant employees in Khuzistan just before the Nau Ruz holiday. Greatly exaggerated reports in the Tehran press severely criticised the company for dismissing their workers at a time when there was already considerable unemploy-

ment in the big towns. Local agitation was lessened by the company's agreement to grant an additional payment on a percentage basis over and above normal entitlement under the company's gratuity on retirement scheme and Labour Law, and also to pay travelling expenses of all discharged workers who wished to return to their home towns. Two representatives of the Central Union of Workers of Khuzistan (Munammadi and Yamani) were discharged by the company for threats of strike action and for unauthorised absence from work. Both men had previously been detained by the gendarmerie. There was some labour unrest in Isfahan owing to the failure of the millowners to pay the usual New Year bonuses.

7. Harvest prospects are more promising than a year ago, prices of essential goods have fallen and the winter has passed without the bread and sugar queues of last year. None the less, discontent has grown owing to further recession of trade and serious unemployment in Azarbaijan, Tehran and Isfahan. The presence in the capital of about 20,000 unemployed, mainly distressed Azerbaijanis, caused the Government acute embarrassment. During March work on roads was hurriedly found for some 6,000, a further 8,000 were removed to a camp 25 miles outside Tehran, but the remainder continued to attract attention in the centre of the town. It was reported that the Azarbaijanis were encouraged by subversive propaganda to believe that work and food were to be found in Tehran.

8. The Government ran short of money and raided the funds of the Seven-Year Plan to meet salary payments during the last month of the Persian year. The Plan Organisation's actual resources are now likely to be so limited until the main 1950 oil royalties fall due early in 1951 that even projects in the course of execution may be seriously delayed. Four specific projects were submitted in March to the International Bank for consideration and a mission from the Bank will probably come to Tehran in the second half of April to make the necessary detailed investigations.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

MONTHLY REPORT FOR APRIL 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 9th May)

(No. 140)

Sir,

*Tehran,
5th May, 1950*

With reference to my despatch No. 117 of 14th April, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during April 1950.

2. As soon as Parliament reassembled after the New Year recess, M. Ali Mansur presented his Cabinet to the two Chambers. On 13th April he received a unanimous vote of confidence from the eighty-five members of the Majlis present on that day and on 15th April the Senate accorded him a vote of confidence by thirty-nine votes out of forty-six. The degree of support accorded by the Majlis was unusual and appears to be due to the Prime Minister's careful cultivation of the Deputies, to a fear on the part of many Deputies that unless they gave the Government a vote of confidence they would lay themselves open to the charge of being unwilling to give it a chance to improve the state of the country and to the fact that the Shah made it known that he wished the Government to be supported.

3. The vote in the Majlis was to some extent artificial since the members of the National Front elected to the Majlis from Tehran had not yet taken their seats. This they did towards the end of the month and, with their numbers increased to eight by the disqualification of certain ballot boxes unfavourable to them, quickly made themselves felt. Before he and his followers took their seats on 25th April, Dr. Musaddiq had been very active and had been received both by the Shah and the Prime Minister. The result of these conversations quickly became apparent when he and the Prime Minister both announced to the Majlis on 25th April that they agreed that before the Majlis and the Senate met in joint session to carry out the further revision of the Constitution entrusted to them by the Constituent Assembly last May, bills for a new Electoral Law and for a new Press Law should be tabled and discussed. One important effect of this will be to defer consideration of the Supplemental Oil Agreement, the ratification of which is an urgent necessity if the Persian Government is to be able to finance its plans of economic development. When addressing the Majlis Dr. Musaddiq made it clear that unless his proposals were

accepted he and his party would very strongly oppose any revision of the Constitution. The most important point about the proposed revision is the desire of the Shah to have the right to send back to the Majlis for reconsideration legislation which he considers contrary to the interest of the country. There is considerable opposition in both Chambers to this idea and many feel that the right to dissolve the two Chambers which was granted to the Shah last May already gives him a sufficient increase in his prerogatives and that what the country needs at present is effective use of the power already enjoyed by the Executive rather than further amendment of the Constitution. Dr. Musaddiq and his party have established themselves simply by opposing the Shah and the Government and it remains to be seen if, in return for the passage of a new Electoral Law and a new Press Law, they are prepared and can afford to abandon their opposition to the proposed suspensory veto. Incidentally, the case against this measure received considerable publicity early in the month when Qavam-us-Sultaneh, a former Prime Minister now living in France, sent the Shah an open letter couched in rather threatening terms, denouncing the proposal. Copies of this letter were sent to the Tehran press and to many political personalities. The Minister of Court replied to Qavam-us-Sultaneh in a turgid and rancorous letter, the despatch of which has done the Shah's prestige no good.

4. The Imperial Family has further suffered in popular estimation owing to the way in which the marriage of the Shah's half-sister, Princess Fatimeh, to an American has been handled. The news was apparently first received in a B.B.C. broadcast and the Imperial Court at once issued a proclamation announcing that the Princess was deprived of all her rights as a member of the Imperial Family. It is now reported that the husband has declared his willingness to become a Muhammadan and to go through a Muslim ceremony of marriage and it appears that a reconciliation with the Shah is to take place. Public attention has been further focussed on the Imperial Family by the elaborate arrangements which are being made to transfer, early in May, the remains

of Riza Shah from Cairo to a mausoleum which has been specially erected at a shrine near Tehran. Popular memories being brief, there has been some tendency to look back with nostalgia to the beneficial aspects of the late monarch's reign. The clergy at the holy city of Qum have raised some outcry against the arrangements; they have not forgiven Riza Shah for the secularisation of Persia nor for the brutal methods which he sometimes used to achieve his ends.

5. During the month the Government was somewhat handicapped in obtaining the passage through Parliament of legislation which it had tabled by a dispute between the Majlis and the Senate as to the powers of the latter in respect of money bills. The immediate cause of the quarrel was the submission by the Government to the Majlis of a proposal that for the first two months of the current Persian year it should be authorised, pending the approval of a proper budget, to spend up to two-twelfths of last year's budget allocations. The passage of some such measure is essential to enable the salaries of the army, the police and other Government employees to be paid. The quarrel between the two Houses is still unresolved but the Senate have agreed that the pay of the Government employees should be sanctioned.

6. The principal pre-occupation of the Government has been unemployment (paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 117 of 14th April. In fact the general employment situation has improved slightly as compared with the previous month. For a time the position in Tehran was difficult owing to severe depression in the brickworks and the influx of between 12,000 and 13,000 peasants and other workers from Azerbaijan. Altogether it was estimated that approximately 40,000 workers in Tehran were unemployed in the early part of April when the seasonal decline in brickmaking is most keenly felt, only about 1,000 brick workers being employed out of approximately 12,000. Shortage of orders due to the credit restriction policy was given as one reason. A further allegation was that the factory owners had deliberately held up production in order to press their demands for lower piece-work rates than those prescribed under the Labour Law. The position at the brick factories gradually improved, however, and the Ministry of Labour's estimate of the number wholly unemployed there at the end of the month (there are no reliable statistics) was 2,000.

42154

7. The problem created by the large number of Azerbaijanis who came to Tehran in search of employment has not yet been resolved. Fearing disorder the Government arranged for their transfer to a camp at Karaj on the site of a partly-built iron foundry. Here they have been housed, fed, and paid a small maintenance allowance. The Ministry of Labour has subsequently been arranging for their return to their home districts and (as a temporary measure) for employment on roads and building excavation jobs. About 8,000 have already left for Azerbaijan and the general expectation is that the remaining 3,000 or 4,000 will have returned to land work or other employment by the end of May. Their retention at the Karaj camp beyond that period may raise grave problems of health and discipline.

8. In the last week of April trouble occurred at the textile factories at Shahi in Mazandaran. Full details are not yet available, but it seems that the workers objected to a reduction in wages and threatened dismissals arising from reorganisation. To prevent wilful destruction to the factories the military intervened and during general disturbances a number of people were killed and wounded. A Commission headed by the Minister of Labour is investigating the position on the spot.

9. During the month there was considerable evidence of Tudeh Party activity in various parts of the country. The newspaper *Mardum* continued to circulate and two further Tudeh newspapers appeared: *Razm* and *Zafar*, organs of the Tudeh Youth and Labour Movements respectively. The discovery by the authorities of several Tudeh cells in Tehran, Gilan and Tabriz has been reported. Towards the end of the month twelve non-commissioned officers of the Tehran garrison were arrested for contact with Tudeh elements and special police precautions were taken in the city for a short time after these arrests.

10. As far as the economic future is concerned, the most interesting event has been the arrival in Tehran of a delegation from the International Bank. The party only arrived towards the end of the month and are still at a preliminary stage of their investigations. It is understood that the Persian Government have several projects for their consideration. The presence of the delegation is spurring the Plan Organisation to prepare an overdue budget for the current Persian year. Meanwhile the execution of projects is being slowed down by shortage

D

of funds, and although the Governor of the Bank Melli has presumably agreed to assist Ali Mansur with financial facilities, these will be conditional on the early approval of the note cover reduction bill by the Majlis.

11. The arid and backward South-Eastern regions of Persia are receiving some attention from the Seven-Year Plan Organisation. It has been reported in the press that it has allocated 10 million rials to build a pier at Bandar Abbas capable of handling 100,000 tons of goods a year and that foreign engineers will examine the project. The Swiss expert engaged to advise the Persian Oil Company formed by the Seven-Year Plan Organisation has reported that he has found promise of oil in twenty places in the Kirman and Baluchistan districts. The discovery and exploitation of oil on a large

scale would obviously alter the face of this unfruitful part of Persia.

12. During the month the press has shown some more interest than has been common of late in the Supplemental Oil Agreement and even published some facts about it reported in a Reuter message. There has also been considerable press criticism of the United States for not giving financial assistance to Persia. The press has welcomed the withdrawal of martial law from Tehran (already provisionally suspended during the elections) and the acquittal by Civil Court of Dr. Baqa'i, the National Front Deputy, on charges originally brought before a Military Court of insulting the army.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1016/49

No. 15

THE ASCENDANCY OF THE NATIONAL FRONT PARTY

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 9th June)

(No. 164)

Tehran,

Sir,

30th May, 1950.

In my despatch No. 134 of 28th April I described how the Prime Minister and the Majlis had made no difficulty about accepting the request of Dr. Musaddiq that the decisions of the Constituent Assembly should be set aside and that two Bills in which he was interested should be dealt with before the Majlis started on the constitutional work entrusted to it by the Constituent Assembly. Since then the moral ascendancy of the National Front over the Government and the bulk of the Majlis has continued to increase. Since the National Front and those directly affiliated to it command no more than ten votes in the House, which at present comprises over 120 members, this ascendancy is at first sight difficult to understand and it might have been supposed that if the Government commands any sort of a majority in the Majlis it could by regularly mobilising this majority and taking a vote, reduce the National Front to noisy impotence. That this is not so is due partly to the lack of political parties in the country and of coherent groups in the Majlis; this means that no Government ever has a dependable majority and on every occasion on which an important vote is to be taken the Government is obliged to make elaborate preparations and to canvass for support in order to obtain a majority on that

occasion. This is, of course, a general condition and does not apply only to the Government's difficulties with the National Front. Here the trouble is that Persian politicians are mostly very frightened of criticism, especially from a Nationalist standpoint. Two of the main lines of thought in the National Front are a narrow nationalism which seeks to diminish all foreign influence whatsoever in Persia and a contempt for the methods and practices, both of the Shah and of recent Persian Governments. There are, therefore, very few positive decisions which any Government can take which do not incur the criticism of the National Front on one ground or the other. Given the unwillingness of many Persian politicians to stand by their decisions and to take responsibility for them, the result of this state of affairs is that the Government tries to avoid taking any decisions whatsoever.

2. It so happens that during the last weeks among the few measures on which the Government were absolutely obliged to take decisions have been questions affecting important British interests. Against the background I have outlined above, it would have been difficult enough for the Government to stand by any decisions it might make. In this instance there is an aggravating factor in the particular animosity with which some members of the National Front have decided

to regard Great Britain. One reason for this is the existence of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's Concession and the British economic activity which, either directly or indirectly, results therefrom, offends the feeling of the National Front that foreign influence and activity must be reduced to a minimum and is further objectionable because, in the eyes of some members of the National Front, it impairs Persia's relations with the Soviet Union. A factor of equal, if not greater importance, is that the National Front is bitterly critical of the late Riza Shah and most of his deeds, and it is an irremovable part of their historical mythology that the British put him in power and kept him there until they were tired of him. It can therefore be confidently expected that every opportunity will be taken by the National Front to attack British interests.

3. In the last few weeks several opportunities have presented themselves. The British firm of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners have for some months been in negotiations for the extension of their existing contract to act as consultants of the Tehran Water Supply Organisation of the Tehran municipality. Agreement was reached and submitted to the Cabinet who approved in principle but took no final decision. At this stage a report was circulated by the Tehran Municipality, some members of which throughout had shown hostility to the British firm, to members of the Cabinet and a number of Senators and Deputies severely censuring the British firm for alleged failure to carry out its contract effectively. Questions were asked in the Senate and the Majlis about the terms of the renewal of the contract and the Government was urged not to renew it, especially by National Front Deputies. The firm have submitted a sound defence to the Ministry of the Interior and the appropriate members of my staff have done everything possible to urge the Government to renew the contract, I have myself spoken to the Shah and the Prime Minister, but as yet no decision has been taken. The second opportunity occurred in connexion with the contract for the supply to the Iranian State Railways of forty locomotives by a British firm, Vulcan Foundry Limited. The Cabinet decided some two months ago that the contract should go to this firm and this decision was confirmed early in May. The contract was practically ready for signature by the Persian representatives and the general manager of the British firm when the

42154

National Front Deputy, Baqa'i, published a long article in his newspaper attacking the Government for awarding the contract to the United Kingdom and pressing for the purchase of German locomotives. The Minister of Communications and his Under-Secretary were described as traitors for concluding this contract. An additional element in this attack was the personal feud which Baqa'i is conducting against Dr. Iqbal in connexion with the latter's tenure of the post of Minister of the Interior. There were other attacks by National Front Deputies in the Majlis and in consequence the contract has not yet been signed on the Persian side. Here again I have urged the Persian Prime Minister as well as the Minister of the Interior, to have the courage to stand by the decision of the Cabinet. It must also be noted that the competing German group has been actively canvassing the support of the National Front and have been bribing railway officials. A third opportunity has presented itself to the National Front in that some four weeks ago the Ministry of Finance accepted a joint offer from two United Kingdom firms for 30,000 tons of sugar at a total cost of nearly £1½ million. The acceptance of the offer was duly confirmed and the credit was about to be opened when Makki, one of the National Front Deputies, stated in the Majlis that he would interpellate the Government if purchase was actually effected, since cheaper sugar could be bought elsewhere. The Ministry of Finance officials concerned are wavering under this attack but have been told by this embassy that, since the contract had been concluded and the sugar could have been disposed of elsewhere at a better price, it must be honoured.

4. It so happens that the emergence of these three points affecting British interests has given the National Front the opportunity in the last few weeks to give vent to its Nationalist sentiments at our expense. But its activity has by no means been confined to this. Some ten days ago Dr. Musaddiq, the leader of the National Front, let it be known that he wished to address the Majlis and he was accorded permission to do so on 25th May. He made his speech, a summary of which I attach. The main points may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) The Shah was young and patriotic and a true democrat.
- (2) The Shah should enjoy the support of public opinion and therefore must not attempt to alter the Constitution,

and must abandon his attempt to attain the right of suspensory veto. He had been wrong to obtain the right to dissolve the Majlis, the threat of dissolution being a tyrannical weapon.

- (3) The court ought not to interfere in politics or administration. Princess Shams did not, and was worthy of high praise. Princess Ashraf did interfere and ought to stop.
- (4) The recent dismissal of Major-General Zahidi, the Chief of Police, was a mistake. While he was there there was a balance between the security forces, the police and the General Staff, and this balance ought to be maintained. It was rumoured that this change was a preliminary step in the establishment of dictatorship against which he must protest.
- (5) He hoped that it would be possible to improve the efficiency of Parliament by arranging for legislation, when discussed in the Majlis, to be dealt with by representatives of Parliamentary groups instead of by a large number of Deputies speaking individually.
- (6) He had asked the Prime Minister to bring forward useful reform measures and the Prime Minister had co-operated by submitting electoral reform and press Bills. His party did not wish to content themselves with being a minority in the Majlis and would like to co-operate with the Government if the latter would submit useful legislation.
- (7) He criticised the Government for the appointment of Amanullah Ardalan as Minister of the Interior and of

Gulshayan as Governor-General of Fars. It was well known that the latter had a bad record and had made himself the spokesman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company against the interests of Persia.

- (8) In the course of the speech Dr. Musaddiq held up England as a model of a democratic and a constitutional country.

5. The speech was less violent than had been expected and therefore caused some disappointment among Dr. Musaddiq's more extreme followers: some of them were also displeased at his praise of Britain. In the Majlis the speech was well received and most of it seemed to have been acceptable to most of the Deputies. The most important point is that Dr. Musaddiq made no attack on the Prime Minister or on the Government in general and his conciliatory references to the Prime Minister, together with the Prime Minister's affable reply to the speech, have led many to suspect that some sort of agreement has been arrived at between Ali Mansur and Dr. Musaddiq. If this is so, the test will very soon come, since I learn that Ali Mansur has just informed a secret session of the Majlis that he would very shortly be submitting the Supplemental Oil Agreement to the Majlis for their decision. Opposition to this agreement has hitherto been one of the main principles of the National Front and it remains to be seen if Ali Mansur has been successful in tempering their dislike of this agreement.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1052/3

No. 16

EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AND THE SHAH

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 9th June)

(No. 165. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, 31st May, 1950.

As I had not seen the Shah since 8th April and as I felt that the time had come for an exchange of views, especially as I had heard that he would like to see me, I asked for an audience, and was invited to lunch on 27th May at the Saadabad Palace above Tehran. The audience lasted for three hours and as a great many subjects

were touched upon and occasionally returned to I have made no attempt to record the conversation in any chronological order, but have listed the headings on which discussion took place.

Oil Agreement

2. His Majesty said that he had told the Prime Minister of his desire that the Oil Agreement should be ratified as soon as

possible and had instructed him to begin preparing for its passage through the Majlis within the next few days. I handed him a copy of the Guide to the Supplemental Agreement which had been prepared in the embassy, and he said that he understood that I had already given a copy to the Prime Minister who had found it useful. He seemed determined that the Oil Agreement should go through, but did not seem at all certain that this could be achieved. He accordingly referred to the possibility of some modification or other method of assisting its passage through Parliament. He had in mind the possibility that the company might agree to a rate of royalty that would fluctuate according to the price of oil. He recognised that this might turn out to be less advantageous to the Iranian Government than the proposed flat rate of royalties, but thought that it might perhaps appeal to the Majlis. He also referred to article 16 of the main Concession, which deals with "Iranianisation," and thought perhaps that some agreement on this point might help. I used a number of arguments to show that the proposed supplementary agreement was advantageous and said that efforts were being made to let the Deputies and others know what the contents of the agreement were. The Prime Minister had made no specific references to the difficulties which he might foresee and I was therefore, not in a position to discuss the matter further. The Shah said that if it became clear that some form of lubrication for the agreement was necessary he wondered whether it would be best to agree on something beforehand or to wait until the agreement had already been presented to the Majlis. In case the agreement were rejected he wondered what the next step would be. Would it, for instance, be possible for the company to apply the terms of the supplemental agreement even if it were not passed? These speculations he wished kept between ourselves, but he wished to consider the practical possibilities. I said that there were as yet no definite indications of what difficulties might arise and that it would be better to consider these if and when they did.

Ali Mansur's Government

3. The Shah said that he would insist that the present Government should try and put through the Oil Agreement. If they succeeded, he would see what they could do with the rest of the Governmental programme. I mentioned that I had been

42154

hopeful that when this Government was appointed it might show signs of stability but that it was disappointing to note that its influence appeared already to be waning. I mentioned the difficulties which British concerns were having in connexion with the locomotive contract, the Tehran Water Supply and the sugar contract. (Some account of these difficulties and the part played by the National Front in exploiting them is given in my despatch No. 164 of 30th May.) The Government seemed to have shown themselves unduly sensitive to criticism from the National Front, which after all only numbered seven members. His Majesty confessed to a doubt as to why Ali Mansur should trouble to placate so small a party and said that he wanted to get this matter cleared up. In this connexion he mentioned that it was well-known that the United States Embassy were against Ali Mansur and this weakened his position. He deprecated the unguarded expression of opinion on the part of Embassies about Prime Ministers and other Government officials. In this connexion I said that it was not the intention of the British Embassy to intervene in the personal aspects of Iranian politics. If, however, it was proposed to appoint personalities or to adopt policies which would be likely to affect Anglo-Persian relations or which, in our opinion, would have unfortunate effects on the well-being of Iran, I should not hesitate to indicate to His Majesty what our opinion might be. The Shah welcomed this statement and said that it was just what he wanted.

The National Front

4. In connexion with a remark about the prevalence of inexplicable rumours in Iran, I mentioned that I had even heard the extraordinary rumour that the British Embassy had been instrumental in securing the election of the National Front candidates at the Tehran elections. I did not mention that I was aware that His Majesty had given some credence to this rumour: he immediately admitted, however, that he had been bothered by it and I therefore assured him that there was not the slightest truth in it and that such manoeuvres were completely outside the province of the embassy and entirely against British policy. I then pointed out that I had found that it had been the custom to invite to the King's Birthday Party the Deputies from Tehran, and that I had not wished to break this tradition. If, therefore, His Majesty

D*

heard that National Front Deputies had been to the British Embassy on that occasion I hoped he would realise that they came as Deputies from Tehran and that their attendance had no political significance. As regards the party in general, His Majesty said that there were two enemies of the country—one was the Tudeh Party and the other was the National Front. Perhaps the latter was the more dangerous because it was vague and negative whereas the aims of the Tudeh were generally known. The Shah referred scornfully on numerous occasions during the audience to "our Demosthenes" and it is evident that Dr. Musaddiq's attack on him and his family rankled.

Monarchy

5. The Shah was insistent that a strong and stable Government was necessary, but equally insisted that the power of the Government should derive from the Crown. If this was not the case there was no use in having a Monarchy. It was, however, the case that monarchy was ingrained in the traditions of the Persian people and they could not divorce it from their thoughts of the country. This meant that if nothing were done or if bad things were done the Monarchy was held to blame; and this in its turn made it incumbent on the King to take more than detached interest in the conduct of his Government. I said that he was being quite widely criticised for interference in Government affairs and the Shah replied that he was doing so and would so continue. It was nonsense to talk as "our Demosthenes" had done about the constitutional position of the King of England. Iran was a long way from having reached the perfection of democratic organisation which existed in Great Britain, and in the meantime he must continue to intervene when he found that the Parliament was being obstructive or ineffective. If the present Government proved itself ineffective he must get another and if necessary he must use his power of dissolution. He hoped that in the exercise of his constitutional powers he would not be accused by Western countries of a tendency towards dictatorship. I responded that this could scarcely be the case so long as he acted in accordance with the Constitution. I realised that his position was extremely difficult and appreciated his reasons for intervention. This was a matter which required great thought and

finesse. (At my previous audience, which I reported in my despatch No. 108 of 8th April, the Shah had hinted that he would be prepared to use his powers of dissolution if it were necessary, but on this occasion it seemed clear that his thoughts had taken stronger shape and that he was in process of making up his mind to impose orderly and effective government if Cabinets continued to be as unstable and ineffective as they had shown themselves to be in the recent past.) The Shah evidently did not think that the present generation of politicians was very promising. He considered that they often put their personal interests before those of the country and that they therefore needed a strong guiding hand. He was evidently not prepared to submit to a strong Prime Minister unless he himself nominated him. He was not prepared to play the rôle that King Victor Emmanuel had played *vis-à-vis* Mussolini.

Political Parties

6. The Shah said what most Persian politicians say—that there is little scope at the present time in Persia for political parties founded on principles or programmes. It was the Persian habit for individuals to form political parties. I mentioned that there had been some talk in intellectual circles of the formation of a party on the lines of the Labour Party in Great Britain or the Socialist Parties in Scandinavia. Did he not think that the impact of the general world movement towards the improvement of the lot of the common people would lead to the formation of such a party? It seemed to me that there was a considerable danger for Persia in the political vacuum which existed between the Tudeh Party on the one hand and the National Front on the other. His Majesty agreed and showed some interest in the movement towards a social democratic Party. He asked whether it had been already formed or was about to be formed. I said that so far as I knew it had not been formed yet. He said that the formation of such a party was very much in line with his own ideas and he would cordially welcome it. It would, however, have to grow, and he was sceptical whether it would succeed in view of the Persian tendency towards personalist parties. I said that surely the existence of the Tudeh Party showed that Persians were prepared to support principles and ideas. His Majesty did not think that the

existence of the Tudeh Party meant very much in that sense seeing that they received their orders from elsewhere.

Anglo-Persian Relations

7. His Majesty said that he wished to clarify these. What were British interests in Persia? He presumed that the most important of these was oil. I said that on the contrary our greatest interest was in seeing an independent, stable and prosperous Persia, if only because without these desiderata we could not depend on getting any oil. I would put our oil interests as coming immediately after this. Our oil interests were strategic as well as commercial and our strategic interests corresponded with those of Persia itself. In practice, therefore, our most urgent interest was to get the Oil Agreement ratified. We also desired facilities for the import and export trade, and in this connexion I referred again to the difficulties which British interests were at present experiencing owing to the feebleness of the Government. I also referred to the fact that whereas we would be prepared to purchase Persian exports such as dried raisins, we could not do so because of the inefficient method in which they were packed, which led to their arrival in the United Kingdom in an unusable condition. Since the stability and prosperity of Persia was something which affected the world situation, we took a strong interest in the measures taken by the Iranian Government to improve the condition of the people and we were fully prepared to assist the Government, not only with technicians as we had already done, but also with advice and counsel. The Shah agreed that our advice would be helpful, and said that he would be glad to have frequent talks with me. He was glad to have the question of our interests in Persia clarified.

Relations with the U.S.S.R.

8. His Majesty said that he did not wish to have unfriendly relations with Russia, but the Russians made it impossible for anyone to have friendly relations with them. He did not believe in showing

feebleness or appeasement towards the Russians, but he greatly disliked the unfriendly propaganda in which they indulged. I said that the Russians tended to use the technique of the *douche écossaise*. They were always prepared to seize the opportunity presented by what they would consider to be a revolutionary situation, but apart from that I did not feel that the Russian danger was great or imminent. The main thing was to prevent a revolutionary situation developing. The Russians were unlikely to take any drastic action in Iran unless they were prepared to risk the outbreak of a world war. They were quite aware of the interest taken in the integrity of Persia by the United States and ourselves—an interest which had been reiterated in the recent declarations made by you, Sir, and the American Secretary of State. In regard to the present direction of Russian pressure, the Shah agreed that Communist attention was being turned at the moment more towards the intellectuals than towards the working classes in Persia.

Agricultural Policy

9. His Majesty wished to work for a limitation on the maximum area of holdings of land. There was not a great number of big landowners, but they represented a serious stumbling block to agricultural development and he saw no reason why the holding of land above a certain area should not be made illegal. He also wished to establish co-operative societies, and was making plans to try them out on the royal lands which he had handed over to the Imperial Social Services Organisation. The Government had introduced a Bill for the distribution of the State Domains (which are distinct from the royal lands referred to above), and he hoped that co-operatives would be set up in connexion with these also. The whole agricultural situation required examination.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and Moscow, and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

POLITICAL SITUATION

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger(No. 247)
(Telegraphic)*Tehran,*
2nd June, 1950.

Washington telegram No. 1552.

Political situation is showing signs of developing. Prime Minister has not exhibited the firmness expected of him and has shown himself surprisingly sensitive to pressure from the National Front. In consequence his influence has wained and it is generally believed he will not last much longer.

2. The only person whose name is now mentioned as his successor is General Razmara. Some weeks ago it was thought Sayyid Zia Ud Din might soon form a Government, but it is not now thought he is in the running. The Shah told me on 27th May that he had [? group omitted] Prime Minister to lay the oil agreement before the Majlis and I understand it may well be introduced next week. If the present Government succeed in getting it ratified, the Shah says he is willing to give them a chance to carry the rest of their programmes, if not he will insist on a strong Government to replace them. In present circumstances this could only mean Razmara.

3. I have had little opportunity of forming a personal judgment of him but he impresses favourably everyone he meets. It is on general grounds undesirable to appoint

Chief of General Staff as Prime Minister but in the circumstances he seems the only choice. His appointment would raise fears of dictatorship, and indeed the prospect of it has already done so but I do not think there is need for apprehension on this score for reasons given below. From all accounts Razmara should make an efficient, honest, and progressive Prime Minister.

4. Several Persian personalities have spoken to me recently about the possibility of forming some kind of Social Democratic Party to fill the vacuum between Tudeh and National Front, and to form nucleus of a progressive leadership which could take the place of present discredited ruling clique. Although Razmara is not thought to have much interest in the formation of a party system, he may well be found to have something in common with these [group undecipherable].

5. Much depends on the fate of the oil agreement. The Prime Minister told me on 30th May that he expected to have a majority but that some inducement would be needed. He was not prepared to say in advance what this might be and evidently wishes to wait and see how the opposition develops. I am trying to ginger him up into energetic support of the agreement but I rather fear it will be put forward in a very lukewarm manner.

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE PERSIAN AMBASSADOR

Suggested Modification of the Supplemental Oil Agreement

Mr. Younger to Sir F. Shepherd (Tehran)(No. 106. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *7th June, 1950.*

The Persian Ambassador called to discuss with me, on the instructions of his Prime Minister, the possible modification of the Supplemental Oil Agreement. He began by referring to the importance of stable internal conditions in Persia, and the difficulties which had been experienced as

a result of unemployment since the war. He referred to the ambitious Seven-Year Plan of development which his Government is undertaking and to the need for finance to make it effective. He then recalled that the Secretary of State had quite recently referred to the importance of Iran and had spoken of direct aid. This was the time, the Ambassador said, when direct aid

could be most useful, and as oil is Persia's principal source of revenue the most suitable way aid could be given was to make a more generous settlement than is at present contained in the Agreement.

2. He read me out passages from a telegram which he had received from his Prime Minister, in which it was stated that the Prime Minister intended in the near future to bring this matter before Parliament for ratification. Opinion in Persia, however, was not favourable to this Agreement, and the Prime Minister did not think that there was much chance of obtaining parliamentary approval unless he could announce something better than the present terms. He recapitulated several of the arguments put forward by opponents of the Agreement, stressing particularly that the British Treasury at present receives a far larger amount in taxation alone out of the Oil Company's profits than the total received by the Persian Government. The Ambassador further pointed out that while the British taxation is in form imposed upon the Company it is in fact an indirect way of taxing the Persians, and the argument is always raised that this is a position unacceptable to a sovereign State. He therefore asked that we should use our influence to encour-

age the Company to agree to more generous terms. He emphasised that the Prime Minister was very anxious to get the Agreement approved, but could only do so with our help. He said, moreover, that only a Government with a substantial majority, such as the present Prime Minister enjoys, could hope to obtain approval for the Agreement, even in modified form. He felt, therefore, that it would be unfortunate from both our points of view if this opportunity were to be missed.

3. In reply to a question from me, the Ambassador said that he was not making any concrete proposal but was merely asking that we should encourage the Company to go to the limit in meeting the Persian Prime Minister's wishes. I asked whether that meant that the Persian Government would be making an approach to the Company, but he said that this would not be so. I told him that I was not familiar with the details of this matter but that I would inform myself more fully and would let him know His Majesty's Government's attitude to his suggestion.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

K. G. YOUNGER.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE PERSIAN AMBASSADOR

Supplemental Oil Agreement

Mr. Younger to Sir F. Shepherd (Tehran)(No. 109. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *9th June, 1950.*

The Persian Ambassador called again at my request this morning. I told him that since our previous meeting I had informed myself fully about the points he had raised on the Supplemental Oil Agreement. I had found that the points he had raised were not new but had been considered at the time of the negotiations and had also had the personal attention of the Secretary of State. We were well aware that in presenting a modified Agreement to Parliament criticism was bound to be encountered. In any Parliament there would always be people who would claim that the Government could have got better

terms. It was because we were aware of the Persian Government's difficulties that we had pressed the Company to be as forthcoming as possible during the negotiations, and in fact they had made many concessions at that time. We did not think it possible to press them to make any further concessions now. The Agreement in its present form would bring substantial benefits to the Persian Government, and we very much hoped that the Prime Minister would manage to get it accepted. The Persian Ambassador did not dissent from my statement that all these points had been considered before, he merely repeated that he was afraid that there would be very great difficulty and that his Prime Minister

had hoped that we could have helped him at this stage. He would, however, report what I had said to the Prime Minister.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Wash-

ington and to the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

K. G. YOUNGER.

EP 1016/48

No. 20

CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AND THE SHAH

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 10th June)

(No. 257)

Tehran,

(Telegraphic)

10th June, 1950.

Your telegram No. 2652 to Washington: Political situation in Persia.

I lunched with the Shah on 8th June. He said he was disappointed with the weakness shown by the present Government. Two Ministers had resigned, the Government was appeasing the National Front and the internal situation was complicated by the progress of communism, the murder of Dihan and the return of Kashani. The only person who had the necessary qualifications for leadership of a strong Government was Razmara. Even he however could not succeed with the present governmental organisation. His Majesty considered that it was necessary to decentralise the Government and he wished accordingly to establish a large measure of autonomy in each of the ten provinces. There would be provincial councils from which a governor would be chosen and the provinces would raise and use their own funds with assistance as required from the Central Government. These reforms would improve morale, give the provinces direct interest in administering their own concerns, check drifting to the capital and reduce corruption at the centre.

2. The Shah was evasive as to the means to be used to launch these reforms but from what he said and from a subsequent conversation which the Oriental counsellor had with Razmara, I gather the latter on appointment as Prime Minister would ask for full power from Parliament. I am not certain what this would entail but it would mean a good deal more than the usual vote of confidence. Majlis in Razmara's view would be likely to refuse and would then be dissolved. Reforms could apparently then be instituted under existing legislation and new elections would be held in due course.

3. The Shah said that this project was complicated by the necessity of passing oil agreement. Did I consider the present Government should proceed with its attempt or should Razmara agree to modifications with the oil companies so that in due course he could present it to Parliament as an agreement made by his own Government and not a previous one.

4. I said indications of the past week were that the points of difference between the Government and the companies were narrowing. My reaction was that the present Prime Minister might be given a chance to pass it but that I might be able to judge better in a week or so. It was accordingly agreed that we should meet again in seven to ten days' time.

5. I have discussed the whole question with my United States colleague. We both agree with the substance of your telegram No. 231 though Wiley fears that the appointment of Razmara may lead to disturbances. We also agree that proposed reforms are in principle to be encouraged. The Shah assured me that he would remain Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and that Razmara would have no more control over them than a civilian Prime Minister. Americans and ourselves will meet to discuss the situation further on 15th June before I see the Shah again.

6. If the present Prime Minister is removed before he presents the oil agreement to Parliament there will be a long delay before a new Parliament is elected. The Persians would certainly press for some interim arrangements whereby they would get at least some of the benefit of the supplemental agreement. It therefore seems best to proceed with ratification if arrangements are satisfactory. I expect to telegraph further on this point very shortly.

7. The Shah has evidently now made up his mind what he wants to do and wishes to act quickly. I understand that he has informed Razmara that he has decided to

make him Prime Minister. I do not at present see any need for the urgency and would propose to try to restrain the Shah from rushing his [? group omitted].

EP 1013/27

No. 21

MONTHLY REPORT FOR MAY 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 16th June)

(No. 176)

Tehran,

Sir,

12th June, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 140 of 5th May, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during May 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. The month opened with Soviet Radio attacks on the late Riza Shah, whose reinterment in Tehran had been arranged for 7th May. In the event, the Soviet Union and its satellites neither appointed a special representative nor sent the Head of their Mission in Tehran to the funeral and, the day of the funeral being a Sunday, on which day the flags of foreign missions are normally flown in Tehran, the Soviet Embassy flew their flag at full mast. This action aroused considerable resentment even among persons not normally well disposed to the late Shah's memory. There was some talk of retaliation, if not against the powerful Soviet Government, at least against its satellites, but apart from omitting the representatives of the offending Governments from the list of guests at various Government functions given in connexion with the funeral, the Persian Government in fact took no action.

3. Attention was in any case very soon diverted from the Soviet attitude to the royal funeral by the receipt of an official note from the Soviet Government complaining that the Persian Oil Company had entered into negotiations with foreign concerns for a geological survey and air photograph of Khurasan, Gorgan, Mazandaran and Gilan (parts of which area lie along the frontiers of the Soviet Union). The note also complained that the Persian Oil Company had bought machinery for its operations in these districts from American firms. The Soviet Government then drew attention to a previous note complaining that the activities of foreigners in Persia might create dangers to the frontiers of the Soviet

Government, described the measures now taken by the Persian Oil Company as incompatible with the good relations provided for in the Soviet-Persian Treaty of February 1921, and concluded by requiring the Persian Government to take steps to put an end to this abnormal state of affairs. On 18th May the Persian Government replied to this note that they were surprised that the formation of a Persian Oil Company and the steps to secure an air survey, which were purely internal matters, should have caused anxiety to the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, in order to elucidate the matter, the Persian Government offered certain facts for the information of the Soviet Embassy. The note then declared that the whole capital of the Persian Oil Company had been taken up by the Persian Government, that this 100 per cent. Persian company had engaged a number of Swiss experts to assist Persian experts in exploring for oil and that the surveying parties had so far only explored the South-Eastern areas of Persia. As regards the machinery purchased from America, this was essential for exploration purposes and was obtained from America as that country produced the best machinery of this kind; it appeared that the Soviet Government had also purchased machinery of the same type from the United States for their own use. The note then explained the need for air mapping for the purposes of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation and explained that foreign firms had been brought in as Persia lacked both the equipment and the necessary experts; the relevant Soviet institutions had been given an opportunity to bid for this contract but none had availed themselves of the opportunity. Since the time limit for tenders had been extended to 7th June, 1950, as yet no air photograph at all had been started. In order that there should be no misunderstanding, instructions had been given to the Seven-Year Plan Organisation that in the areas adjacent to the Soviet frontiers, aerial photography

should not be undertaken. The note concluded by emphasising the Persian Government's desire for good relations with the Soviet Government. This conciliatory reply seems to have met with general approval in political circles in Tehran, although there was some tendency to criticise the Government for not having worded the note somewhat more firmly.

4. Attention was in turn diverted from this exchange of notes by the issue of Mr. Bevin's and Mr. Acheson's statements about Persia after the London Conference. Coming as they did immediately after the exchange of notes with the Soviet Government, these statements had an encouraging effect and were in general well received. The conclusion was drawn from them that Persia could now expect to receive as favourable treatment in the matter of aid as Turkey, the supposed discrepancy between the help given to the two countries being a permanent source of dissatisfaction here. Some commentators preferred to reserve judgment on the statements until it was seen what practical results flowed from them. The demonstration of Anglo-American unity furnished by these statements has had a considerable and beneficial effect.

5. The other foreign news which excited most interest during the month was the Turkish election results. Developments in Turkey are followed with keen interest here and the Turks were much and rather wistfully admired for their success in bringing about by peaceful means a complete change in their Government. Another foreign question which has attracted attention in the press is the question of the annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan and the final recognition of Israel. *Ittila'at* stressed that the Foreign Ministers of the three Powers are agreed that a final settlement between the Arab States and Israel is essential for the peace and that they would encourage the Arab States to recognise the annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan. There continues to be some criticism of the Persian Government for having recognised Israel.

6. Towards the end of the month a minor newspaper reported a radio news item to the effect that the Iraqi Government proposed to open consulates in Bahrain and Kuwait. A Deputy has now tabled a question in the Majlis asking the Minister for Foreign Affairs to report on the matter and to state what action the Persian Government has taken about the Iraqi proposal, Bahrain being an integral part of Persia. It is to be

noted that the question relates only to Bahrain and makes no mention of Kuwait.

Internal Affairs

7. The beginning of the month was dominated by the reinterment of the body of the late Riza Shah which, since his death in South Africa in 1944, had lain in Cairo. The funeral was well organised and passed off without incident. Since it was known that the Shah had long wished to reinter his late father in Tehran, the successful conduct of the ceremonies was accounted a success for him. It had the further effect of enhancing the standing with the Shah of General Razmara, Chief of the General Staff, who personally supervised the arrangements. The Shah's increased confidence in him in turn led to much talk of the possibility of Razmara's relinquishing his present post and being appointed Prime Minister. The impression that the Shah had lost confidence in the present Prime Minister naturally weakened the latter's position; and indeed during the month the performance of his Government was not impressive. In paragraph 3 of my report for April I described the success achieved by Dr. Musaddiq, the leader of the National Front, in securing priority for the legislation in which he was interested. It is no exaggeration to say that during the month Dr. Musaddiq and the National Front established a degree of moral ascendancy over the Prime Minister and his Government which would be surprising but for the chronic fear which Persian politicians have of being criticised, especially from an extreme Nationalist standpoint. The result of this situation was that the Government took as few decisions as possible. It so happened that of the matters which inevitably came up for decision during the month, two affected important British interests. The first was the renewal of the contract of Sir Alexander Gibb and Company to supervise the establishment of a piped-water supply for Tehran; Nationalist elements in the Tehran municipality had given the firm considerable trouble and had been doing everything possible to prevent the renewal of the contract and questions were asked in Parliament by Deputies connected with Dr. Musaddiq. The former contract expired on 15th May, and the result of these hostile manoeuvres and the indecision of the Government was that by the end of the month the new contract had not been signed. The second matter concerning British interests was the purchase by the

Persian State Railways of forty badly needed locomotives from Vulcan Foundry Limited. The Cabinet decided two months ago that the British firm's tender was the best and should be accepted, and reaffirmed its decision recently. The contract was almost ready for signature when a violent article was published in his newspaper by the National Front Deputy Baqa'i, accusing the Minister of Communications and his Under-Secretary of treason in awarding the contract to a British firm. Personal animosity against the Minister of Communications and underhand activity by the German interests which failed to obtain the contract by fair means, contributed to the violence of this attack, which was so far successful that by the end of the month the contract had not received the necessary Persian signatures. National Front Deputies also made trouble over a contract for the supply of sugar by a British firm definitely concluded some weeks ago.

8. Dr. Musaddiq emphasised his commanding position when in the last week of the month he let it be known that he wished to address the Majlis. This was regarded as a public event of the first importance and great expectations were aroused. On 25th May he made a long speech, in the course of which he praised the Shah, and described him as a true democrat, but insisted that he must not further alter the Constitution and must prevent members of his family (mentioning Princess Ashraf by name) from interfering in political and internal affairs. In the course of this passage Dr. Musaddiq held up Britain as a model of a democratic and constitutional country. Dr. Musaddiq at several points emphasised his opposition to any attempt to set up a dictatorship, and suggested that the recent removal of the Chief of Police, Major-General Zahidi, supposedly at the instance of the General Staff, was a preliminary in this direction. As regards the Government, Dr. Musaddiq said that his party did not wish to be entirely negative and would have no objection to co-operating if the Prime Minister would bring forward useful reform measures. The Prime Minister replied in a conciliatory speech. Dr. Musaddiq's speech somewhat disappointed those who had expected something really violent, and some members of the National Front are known to be displeased with his praise of Britain, which, in their mythology, is the State which placed Riza Shah in power and kept him there.

In the Majlis it was well received and caused considerable speculation as to whether or not the Prime Minister and Dr. Musaddiq had come to some sort of private arrangement. Whether or not there is any such arrangement, and if so its nature, will soon be apparent, since the Prime Minister informed the Majlis on 30th May that he would very shortly be submitting for a decision the Supplemental Oil Agreement. The National Front have hitherto maintained an intransigent opposition to this agreement, and it remains to be seen if their attitude is in any way modified. Despite his declared intention of laying the agreement before the Majlis at an early date, Ali Mansur had by the end of the month shown no signs that he intended to instruct the departments of the Government to make the facts of the agreement known to the public and to Parliament before formally bringing the Bill forward.

9. Considerable excitement was caused in Tehran on 27th May when Ahmad Dihqan, a Deputy, editor of a much read weekly newspaper, and friend of the Chief of the General Staff and the Court, was murdered in the office of the theatre which he managed. The murderer was caught, but the police had not at the end of the month published the result of their interrogation of him. It was, however, made known that he was an employee of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and a member of the Tudeh Party.

10. The Majlis achieved very little of positive importance during the month under review, although some progress was made with a Bill for the sale of State domains. The Government tabled the budget for the current Persian year and also legislation on the following points:—

- Agricultural taxes;
- The laying-off and compensating of surplus Government servants;
- Treaty of Friendship with India;
- Air Traffic Treaty with Sweden;
- Air Traffic Treaty with Holland;
- The Press;
- Rent Control.

The Budget Estimates showed an initial deficit of 2,500 million rials which it is once again proposed to cover by economies and increased revenue. Details are not available, but an increase in military expenditure, especially for forces near the Soviet frontier, was subject to an immediate attack by Dr. Musaddiq.

11. There is nothing important to report in the matter of Tudeh activities except that in the course of the discovery of several Tudeh cells in Tabriz (paragraph 9 of my report for April) the police seized a number of important papers, including a record of a decision to turn the main energies of the party from the workmen and to concentrate on the *intelligentsia* of the university, the colleges and Government Departments. This trend was already apparent in the observed activities of the party in Tehran and elsewhere.

12. The International Bank Mission (paragraph 10 of my report for April) left Tehran on 27th May for Abadan on their way to the United States. It is believed that

the mission will recommend that the International Bank consider making loans for two cement plants and for improvements to the port of Khorramshahr, to a total of some \$6 million. The mission was greatly concerned about the budgetary deficit of roughly 1,500 million rials on last year's operations and also about the country's balance of payments which showed a deficit for the first time for some years. It reached the conclusion that there was no prospect of real improvement in Persia's financial and economic position unless the Supplemental Oil Agreement was ratified.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1016/54

No. 22

PLANS FOR THE REFORM OF THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT BY DECENTRALISATION

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 23rd June)

(No. 154. Secret)
Sir,

Tehran,
19th June, 1950.

In the course of luncheon with the Shah at the Saadabad Private Palace yesterday, I referred to the plans for the reform of the Government by decentralisation which His Majesty had outlined to me ten days previously, and said that it seemed clear that the proposed reforms would be beneficial to the country. I could also tell him that if His Majesty decided to appoint General Razmara as head of the Government the appointment would please His Majesty's Government. The Shah said that he was relieved to hear this because he had not been certain about our attitude. I said that, when he had spoken to me about this matter before, it had occurred to me that there were some difficulties in the way of carrying out the change of Government and instituting the reforms. After the appointment of the present Prime Minister, His Majesty had expressed the hope that we should be able to support the new Government, and I had promised both him and M. Ali Mansur that we should support the Government in any measures which they might take to improve the condition of the people in Persia. This promise I had kept loyally since M. Mansur had been and still was the Prime Minister appointed by His Majesty. I had, however, been disappointed both at the lack of progress which the Government had made with its pro-

gramme, and with its weakness *vis-à-vis* the National Front, whose activities had interfered with the British interests which had been on the point of being straightened out (see my despatch No. 164 of 30th May): M. Mansur's attitude with regard to the Oil Agreement had not been very helpful and he had told me the previous night that, having appointed a committee of eighteen to study the agreement, he was not prepared to take a definite line himself but would await the opinion of the committee. I said that if M. Mansur were to give a lead in a positive sense to the Parliament there was a good chance that the Oil Agreement would be passed, but that if he did not the chances were very slender. M. Mansur had now made it clear that he did not propose to give a lead and, judging by the delays which had occurred in connexion with the less important matters of interest to us, one could not have any confidence that the Oil Agreement would be dealt with in a reasonably prompt manner. If, therefore, His Majesty decided that he had lost confidence in the present Government, I would not feel myself in a position to criticise him.

2. As regards the appointment of General Razmara, I recalled that I had mentioned that the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff as Prime Minister would come as a shock both in Persia and abroad. I thought that the question of the timing of the appointment

and of choosing the right opportunity to make it was important. The change should be brought about with the least possible brusqueness. The timing, I thought, depended upon three factors: the Oil Agreement, internal security and the Economic Mission of the new American Ambassador. As regards the Oil Agreement, I had already dealt with the poor chances of its being ratified by the present Government, but it would seem that if it were left to a new Government under General Razmara there would be a long delay. The Shah said that this was not necessarily the case. If some slight modifications could be made General Razmara could present it to the Majlis with his endorsement and it was possible that it might be passed. I said that I was under the impression that General Razmara might perhaps ask for full powers, though I was not aware what this might imply, and that a dissolution after his coming into power was likely. The Shah said that he did not think it was the intention to ask for full powers of a general nature, but that General Razmara might ask for specific powers to put into effect the decentralisation reforms and possibly other measures. He thought that the Majlis might possibly agree to vote these powers. In that case it was possible that the Oil Agreement could therefore be passed in the present session. I pointed out that the Persian Ambassador in London, having approached the Foreign Office regarding the possibility of modifications in the agreement, had received the answer that His Majesty's Government considered it to be just and even generous and that therefore the likelihood of modifications was small. His Majesty, however, seemed to think that some face-saving device might still be found.

3. As regards the question of internal security, I said that although the situation was certainly deteriorating I had not the feeling that a crisis had yet been reached. It was important to choose the right moment and this was something which only His Majesty could decide. It was evident

that the situation was developing towards a moment when the time for some action would be appropriate. The Shah referred to the activities of the National Front and of Kashani, and appeared to think that I was advising him to wait until actual disorders occurred before making a change of Government. I pointed out that, on the contrary, it was necessary to choose a moment early enough to avoid, if possible, the outbreak of disturbances.

4. In this connexion I referred to the dismissal on the previous day of M. Shah-ruk, the Director-General of Press and Propaganda, and said that I hoped that the larger budget for propaganda purposes would be agreed to. Persia had suffered in the past from a lack of propaganda facilities and it was important that she should have at her disposal a well-organised and sufficiently extensive propaganda machine to make the Persian view suitably known both at home and abroad. The Shah was evidently annoyed at the dismissal of Shah-ruk, whom he regarded as the only capable propaganda expert in the country. I took the occasion of mentioning also that contacts between Persians and foreign embassies, as well as the activities of bodies like the British Council, were very useful in preserving balanced opinion in the country and in acquainting the population with what went on in the outside world. The Shah agreed with this.

5. It was evident that the Shah had turned completely against Ali Mansur and was contemptuous of his method of going about promising something to everybody and saying that everything would come out all right. Mansur might be a very experienced politician but what was needed now was not this type of talent but the quality of leadership, a conclusion with which I expressed my agreement.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1016/62

No. 23

THE DECLINE OF THE ALI MANSUR GOVERNMENT

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 30th June)

(No. 189)
Sir,

Tehran,
26th June, 1950.

The Ali Mansur Government is evidently far gone in a decline, but it is not yet clear

how long it can survive, or whether it will pass quietly away of inanition or be given a treatment of euthanasia by the Shah. During its brief life it has done, so far as I

can see, nothing to improve conditions in Persia, and has spent most of its time sparring with the demagogues of the National Front. In ordinary conditions, I should have been prepared to watch the opening stages of this game without undue impatience. I do not think that M. Ali Mansur's reputation as a wily politician is unearned and he could normally have been given time to settle his procedural difficulties with the Senate and work out his position *vis-à-vis* the opposition. It has, in fact, been claimed on his behalf that he has succeeded in consolidating his position in the Majlis and has recruited a Government majority on which he could count. So far as British interests are concerned, undue sensitiveness towards the opposition has meant vexatious attacks and delays in connexion with the locomotive contract and the Tehran water supply (both of which are something of more general importance to the country than ordinary commercial contracts), while the Prime Minister has fought shy of defining his attitude towards the Oil Agreement. He has also postponed the attempt to realise his own political programme in favour of giving priority to certain measures proposed by the opposition. He was never in any case a popular choice for Prime Minister, and all these manoeuvres have led to a certain amount of exasperation in political circles. Even though the manoeuvres in question might, if he is left a free hand, lead eventually to some working agreement which would give the Government some grounds for expecting a fair security of tenure, it is abundantly clear that nothing can be expected but cautious palliatives for the country's grave diseases. The exasperation referred to above has therefore a deeper foundation than mere impatience. It has been felt very strongly by the Shah who sees no prospect of getting something done for the country by such tortuous methods, which aim at retaining the exaggerated privileges of the existing ruling class while providing some small relaxation of the general misery. This can only be an interim policy and it has very little chance of starting a healthy movement towards a better balanced society. If such methods are seen to succeed, this will be an encouragement to the "old gang" to hold up reforms by means of the grant of the minimum palliatives at the longest possible intervals. Such a policy is always bound to be dangerous, and is all the more so with the Russians sitting on the doorstep and

blaring Marxist propaganda through the keyhole.

2. In these circumstances the Shah is scarcely to be blamed if he has lost confidence in the ability of the existing Government to initiate the measures called for by the situation in the country, and if he looks round for a Prime Minister with the quality of leadership. Even so, the present Government might well have been left to patch up its programme but for the question of the Oil Agreement and the change of American Ambassadors. The appointment of Mr. Grady from Greece has led the Persians to expect substantial economic help from the Americans, and it is well known that M. Ali Mansur is regarded with suspicion by the United States authorities. His past reputation for venality does not, in fact, make him a very suitable Head of Government to conduct negotiations for a loan with the United States. The country is badly in need of money, not only for its normal budget, but also for the application of the Seven-Year Plan. The only immediate source of revenue is the Oil Royalties, and M. Ali Mansur had let it be known that he is not prepared to defend the agreement signed by his predecessor, but will be guided by the report of a special Commission of the Majlis appointed to examine the question. It is difficult to imagine that the Commission will feel able to recommend signature of the Supplementary Agreement as it stands without a strong lead from the Government. The procedure adopted therefore appears tantamount to shelving the Oil Agreement, unless the Commission exhibits an amount of courage and common sense which we have no grounds for expecting from it, or is goaded into action by fear of a military dictatorship.

3. It is now well enough known that the Shah is dissatisfied with the Mansur Government and that he wishes to appoint General Razmara. This means that the Prime Minister's efforts to consolidate a majority in the Majlis are handicapped by the consciousness of the Deputies that he no longer enjoys the full support of the Sovereign, and when he falls he will no doubt make the most of this circumstance. At the present moment claims are being simultaneously made that the Prime Minister has succeeded in organising a working majority, and that General Razmara has collected sufficient votes to ensure his support when he comes into power. Since the Majlis is composed of a mosaic of small

fractions whose allegiance may prove transferable, both claims may quite possibly be true.

4. In addition to the effect of the need for ratifying the oil agreement and the imminent arrival of the new American Ambassador and his economic Mission, the question of a change of Government is to some extent dependent on the internal situation. The demagogues of the National Front have a certain potentiality for mischief-making, and so has Kashani, the Mullah whose return from exile has aroused a good deal of excitement. Both the National Front and Kashani have exhibited alarm at the possibility of a military dictatorship and have uttered threats about resistance. This makes it all the more desirable that a change of Government should be made with the least possible brusqueness, especially during Ramazan, when tempers are apt to be uncertain, and when popular attendance at

the Mosques gives the Mullahs their best opportunity for exciting an indiscriminating populace. A number of elder statesmen are preaching the desirability of not making the expected change of Government too precipitately, a point which is all the more important because the Shah has recently diminished in popularity. He himself does not want to be manoeuvred out of his plans for appointing General Razmara by a series of short delays for the sake of expediency, and it is for these reasons that the remaining tenure of office of M. Mansur is somewhat uncertain, though it can scarcely be of very long duration.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1013/30

No. 24

MONTHLY REPORT FOR JUNE 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 7th July)

(No. 197)

Tehran,

Sir,

1st July, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 176 of 12th June, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during June 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. The Soviet Government rebutted the Persian Government's note of 19th May replying to the Soviet complaint about the proposed air survey in northern Persia, with a note dated 20th June. The new Soviet communication insisted that the Persian Government had in fact made an agreement with an American company to prospect for oil in north Persia and quoted a State Department spokesman to this effect. The Soviet note declared this and other activity to have a military character, to involve the participation of foreigners and particularly Americans and therefore to contain a potential danger to the frontiers of the Soviet Union, and declared these activities to be contrary to the relations of good neighbourship established by the Soviet-Persian Treaty of February 1921. The Soviet Government therefore renewed their request to the Persian Government to

rectify the situation. It is understood that the Persian Government prepared a reply denying that the Soviet Government had any cause for complaint but at the end of the month the reply had not been sent.

3. Considerable anxiety was caused by the course of events in Korea.

4. Mr. John Wiley, the retiring United States Ambassador, left Tehran on 18th June. Mr. Henry Grady, the new United States Ambassador, arrived on 30th June. It was generally expected that he would bring with him proposals for American economic aid to Persia.

5. M. Muhammad Sa'id, a former Prime Minister, was appointed Persian Ambassador to Turkey and was expected to leave shortly to take up his post.

Internal Affairs

6. The principal events of the month were the return to Tehran of Ayatullah Abul Qasim Kashani, the tabling of the Supplementary Oil Agreement in the Majlis, the resignation of the Mansur Government and the appointment of General Razmara as Prime Minister. Kashani, a clerical demagogue with a certain following in Tehran, had been arrested after the attempt on the

Shah's life in February 1949 and subsequently allowed to leave the country. In the meanwhile he had been elected as one of the National Front Deputies for Tehran and had periodically sent strongly-worded messages criticising the Shah, the General Staff and the Persian Government. His supporters organised impressive celebrations for his return on 10th June and it was estimated that some 15,000 people went to Tehran airport to greet him. After his return he devoted himself to supporting the efforts of the National Front against the Supplemental Oil Agreement and against the coming to power of General Razmara. Although the accession of strength was on some grounds welcome to the National Front, it soon became clear that the emergence of a rival "national hero" was by no means welcome to Dr. Musaddiq, and the latter on 13th June made an attempt to assert his primacy in opposition by proposing in the Majlis a Bill which would have had the effect of cancelling the unconditional right of dissolution of both Chambers granted to the Shah by the Constituent Assembly last year. He tried to insist that the requisite number of signatures for a private member's Bill be affixed there and then but the great majority of Deputies refused to play his game and his manoeuvre ended in an ignominious fiasco.

7. After much hesitation, Ali Mansur formally asked the Majlis to place the Supplemental Oil Agreement on its agenda and to appoint a special commission to consider it. In doing this he made no attempt whatsoever to suggest that his Government had studied the matter and considered the Bill to be in the interest of Persia and his feeble attitude, while possibly gratifying to the few Deputies of the National Front, seriously damaged his position with the Deputies who were disposed on general grounds to support the Government of the day. A special commission of eighteen members was subsequently elected from the six sections of the Majlis. Of the eighteen, four were members of the National Front and a fifth was a member of the Persian Party which for practical purposes can be considered as part of the National Front. The commission subsequently proceeded to elect as its chairman Dr. Musaddiq and as its *rapporteur* Makki, another National Front Deputy.

8. The National Front thus secured a position in the oil question out of all proportion to their voting strength in the Majlis. In the matter of the coming to power of General Razmara, they were less successful. Although their repeated declarations of opposition to "a military dictatorship,"

which they always equated with the appointment of Razmara as Prime Minister, had some effect in strengthening the hand of the Mansur Government, it was clear towards the end of the month that this Government had very little longer to live. One of its most intelligent members, Dr. Ali Amini, resigned earlier in the month. He had his own difficulties to contend with in the Ministry of National Economy but his resignation was generally interpreted as meaning that he preferred leaving the ship before it sank. In the course of the month it became increasingly obvious to all that Ali Mansur had lost the confidence of the Shah. The lack of confidence felt by the Shah in Ali Mansur's Government naturally had its effect on the Majlis, with the consequence that Deputies who were hostile to the National Front and disposed to support the Government of the day developed a kind of transferable allegiance; while Mansur was in power they were prepared to support him but were equally ready to support Razmara should he be appointed Prime Minister.

9. On 25th June the Shah returned from a brief visit to Mazandaran and on the following day dismissed Mansur and appointed Razmara as Prime Minister. The Imperial rescript appointing him described him as "Haji Ali Razmara" and gave him no military rank. The same evening Razmara presented his new Cabinet to the Shah. The composition of this Cabinet has already been reported and it will be sufficient here to say that of the former Ministers whom Razmara appointed both Taqi Nasr and Nakha'i are good men and the other Ministers are mostly experienced officials of good standing. At the same time Razmara announced the appointment of Major-General Garzan to succeed him as Chief of the General Staff and of Brigadier Daftari, formerly head of the military police, as Chief of Police. On the evening of his appointment Razmara held a press conference at which he particularly emphasised his desire to follow a constitutional path, to reform the organisation of the country by democratic decentralisation and to work for its economic improvement. On 27th June he presented his Cabinet to the Majlis and defined his programme on much the same lines as at his press conference. As was to be expected, there was noisy opposition from the National Front Deputies but the day passed off without other incident. On 28th June he presented his Cabinet and his programme to the Senate and this day also passed off without incident. On 29th June the debate on the Government's

programme began in the Majlis, the National Front, speaking against the Government and the only other speaker of the day speaking for it. Before taking office Razmara had prepared the ground very carefully with the Deputies and with all the important political elements, even visiting Dr. Musaddiq, and it was expected at the end of the month that he would receive a vote of confidence in both Chambers. He had at the end of the month in any case scored an important success in that the National Front had not succeeded either in assembling crowds to demonstrate against him or in closing the bazaar, both of which measures had been freely threatened. He further improved his position by a successful address to a large number of students of Tehran University on 29th June.

10. The financial situation awaiting the new Government was described in paragraph 10 of my report for May (despatch No. 176 of 12th June). On the other hand, it could take encouragement from the excellent crop prospects which, in this primarily agricultural country, are of outstanding importance. Industrially the month showed a deterioration, mainly in the textile industry, where there was a serious increase in

unemployment. Textile factories were closed at Isfahan, Fars, and Azar Shahr south-west of Tabriz). Several thousand textile workers were said to be unemployed. Stated reasons for the depression were American competition and inability to pay taxes and prescribed minimum wages. At Azar Shahr unemployed workers demonstrated before the municipality building, and in Samman a factory owner was attacked and injured because wages due had not been paid. Intervention by the military and police prevented further incidents.

11. British prestige was fortified by an air display given at Mihrabad airport, at which there were on show one of the Argonaut aircraft with which the British Overseas Airways Corporation are running their new air service to London, a Vickers Attacker jet fighter, a Vickers Valetta military transport and a Percival Prince aircraft specially adapted for air survey work. A large crowd was greatly impressed by a display of high speed flying by the Vickers Attacker, which was the first jet aircraft ever seen in Tehran.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1016/66

No. 25

POLITICAL SITUATION IN PERSIA

Proposed Administrative Changes

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 14th July)

(No. 201. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, *10th July, 1950.*

I have kept you informed by telegram of the coming to power of General Razmara and have summarised his programme as indicated to the press and to the Majlis. In my telegram No. 299 of 5th July I informed you that on 4th July he obtained a vote of confidence in the Majlis by 94 to 8, with 3 abstentions. A vote will probably be taken in the Senate to-day and the Prime Minister is confident of receiving the necessary vote of confidence.

2. When he has received votes of confidence from the two Chambers, Mr. Razmara, as he now prefers to be called, will be in a position to take the first steps in his ambitious programme of reform. The fundamental point in his thinking is that the excessive centralisation from which Persia at present suffers must

be reversed and that local people must have control of local affairs. If he is successful he expects the present drift of population to Tehran to be checked, a greater sense of responsibility to develop in provincial officials and a surge of economic development to take place throughout the country. The key-point in his new administrative framework is to be an elected Shahrستان Council. It is intended that the Governor of each Shahrستان (of which there are eighty-four) shall be selected from among the members of the elected Shahrستان Council and that eventually the Shahrستان authorities shall take over control of public health, education, agriculture, local communications and local law and order. These functions will be transferred to the Shahrستان one at a time in order that the new machinery shall not be overloaded before it is in working order. The link

between the Shahrستان and its Governor on the one hand and the Central Government on the other will be the Governor-General (Ustadar) of the Ustan (ten in number) into which, as at present, the Shahrستans will be grouped; this official will be the nominee of the Central Government. Once every quarter he will summon representatives from each of the Shahrستان Councils in his district to discuss matters of common interest.

3. The introduction of these changes cannot be accomplished through the present administrative machinery and it is the Prime Minister's intention, when the necessary legislation has been passed, to send a special commission to each province to hold elections for the Shahrستان Councils and see them set up and the new Governors appointed. The extent to which new legislation will be required is not altogether clear since there is in existence a law of May 1907 (a copy of which was sent to you under cover of Sir J. Le Rougetel's printed despatch No. 3 of 4th January, 1946) contemporaneous with the Constitution, providing for the establishment of elected provincial councils, but this law is in many respects vague and will undoubtedly require complementary legislation. When the legislation for the new administrative framework for the country has been tabled, the Prime Minister is then expected to bring forward his proposals for the reorganisation of the Seven-Year Plan in such a way as to give greater initiative to the people of the provinces.

4. The Prime Minister apparently intends to introduce his administrative legislation almost at once and its reception by the Majlis will be the first serious test of that body's willingness to co-operate with the Government in a programme of reform. Although there is general agreement in political circles that many of the country's present troubles spring from over-centralisation, fears about the Government's programme are expressed on two points: first, that it may disrupt the unity of the country; and, secondly, that it may place too much power in the hands of local magnates. Judgment is at present suspended pending the publication of the Prime Minister's detailed proposals. Apart, however, from the merits of these proposals, it must be remembered that they will adversely affect the position of many present Deputies who must therefore be expected to oppose them. More serious for the Government's ultimate prospects is the progressive accumulation

of disappointed hopes which sooner or later has attenuated the majorities of all recent Prime Ministers. It is possible that if the Razmara Government is able to achieve some striking success and improvement in public morale, the Deputies will be moved to place national sentiment before private interest. But it must in any case be expected that a strong current of opposition will develop in the Majlis if it becomes clear that the Prime Minister will not permit Deputies to interfere in the appointment of Government officials. Even stronger opposition can be expected to develop in a section of the Majlis if, in order to reduce the burden of indirect taxation on the mass of the people, Razmara seeks seriously to tax the rich.

5. In the long run, however, the determining factor with both Chambers is likely to be the fear that, at the instance of his Prime Minister, the Shah will dissolve them if they insist on obstructing the legislation necessary for the execution of the programme of reforms. The story is already current that the Shah has signed decrees dissolving both Chambers and that only the date remains to be filled in; this story is probably not true but its currency is a powerful aid to the Government. For the present, however, Razmara is showing himself entirely willing to work with Parliament and is indeed spending much time and energy on consultation with leading Deputies.

6. Since the continued co-operation of the Majlis thus depends to a considerable extent on fear that the Shah may use his powers of dissolution, His Majesty's attitude to the Government is more than usually important. It might have been expected that, the summoning of Razmara having been preceded by such searchings of heart, enquiries about Anglo-American support and declarations of intent to pursue a firm policy of reform, there could be no doubt about the Shah's continued and consistent support of his chosen instrument. Unfortunately His Majesty's character lacks precisely the degree of consistency for which the situation calls. Since his accession it has been observed that soon after the appointment of any Prime Minister the Shah tends to express dissatisfaction and to discuss possible alternatives; the effect on such a Prime Minister's position in the Majlis has invariably been disastrous. In the present case, although the sincerity of the Shah's desire for reforms is not in doubt, it is to be feared that he will

have some difficulty in withstanding the numerous intriguers who seek to discredit Razmara by making out that the Shah intends eventually to displace him. The National Front, in their campaign against Razmara, have published the decree by which the last Qajar Shah first appointed the present Shah's father as Prime Minister and have suggested that Razmara occupies the same position *vis-à-vis* the present Shah as Riza Khan occupied *vis-à-vis* Ahmad Shah. The difficulty of the situation lies in the fact that every success which Razmara achieves can be quoted to the Shah as a reason why the latter should fear him. For instance, shortly after coming to office Razmara addressed the students of Tehran University, who have been during recent months the target of much Tudeh and National Front propaganda. It would have been reasonable to expect that the Prime Minister would encounter a hostile reception. In the event, however, although some elements were dissatisfied, he made a popular speech and scored a distinct success. Voices are not lacking to contrast the two facts that Razmara, when he went to the university, scored a personal triumph and that the Shah, when he last went there, narrowly escaped assassination. The actions of the Shah are likewise used by Razmara's enemies to suggest that he is already losing His Majesty's confidence. On 29th June the Shah paid a personal visit to the Ministry of War and this has been generally interpreted as a public demonstration that the military forces remain, as before, his prerogative and that effective power rests in his hands and not in those of the Prime Minister. I do not wish to exaggerate this and up to the present my impression is that the Shah is, in fact, loyally supporting Razmara, but it will be necessary that I and my United States colleague make every endeavour to encourage co-operation between the Shah and his Prime Minister and to discourage the Shah from being led away by jealousy and suspicion.

7. If the Shah can be persuaded to give, and to give demonstratively, support to his Prime Minister, the prospects for the latter's Government seem to me to be good. Although there is much latent suspicion of him because he is a military man, his reputation for efficiency, honesty and devotion to the national interest have created a favourable atmosphere and there is a general expectancy that he will speedily be able to do something for the people. His provin-

cial reforms will take time to initiate and it will be some time before they bear fruit. To satisfy immediate expectations he must therefore achieve something, at whatever cost, in the way of reducing the cost of living; with this in view the Government announced on 8th July that, with effect from 17th July, the price of Government-controlled bread will be reduced from 3½ rials to 3 rials a kilogram. He has also given instructions that goods now held up in the customs for whatever reason shall be released on payment of customs duty only, fines and demurrage being waived, in order to get more goods on to the market and more customs revenue into the Treasury. If he is not successful in catching the popular imagination, the field of support of the Tudeh Party and of the National Front, both at present shrinking, will grow again. But in the meanwhile the moral ascendancy established in Mansur's time by the National Front (see my despatch No. 164 of 30th May) has been broken and the initiative is with the Government. The National Front did their utmost to prevent the coming to power of Razmara and the grant of a vote of confidence by the Majlis and it had been widely feared that they would provoke serious disorders which would lead to bloodshed. In fact, they failed to close the bazaar, a traditional sign of popular disapproval of the Government, and succeeded in staging outside the Majlis only one sizeable demonstration. This was dispersed by the police, who were wisely forbidden to use fire-arms, with only small numbers of wounded on either side. As far as British interests are concerned, the change in the balance of political power has been marked by a decision of the new Government to open the credit for the purchase of sugar from a British firm which has been much criticised by the National Front, and by the issue by the Prime Minister to those concerned of instructions that the Tehran Municipality and Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners are to be brought together and persuaded to agree with a view to making progress in the matter of the Tehran water supply at the earliest possible moment (compare paragraph 3 of my despatch under reference).

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Moscow and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

F. SHEPHERD.

MONTHLY REPORT FOR JULY 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 11th August)

(No. 232)

Tehran.

Sir,

5th August, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 197 of 1st July, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during July 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. In their reply to the latest Soviet note (paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 197 of 1st July), the Persian Government repeated that the activities of the Persian Oil Company were a purely domestic matter and that no aerial survey of the frontier regions would be undertaken. They added that if a land survey of this area were made, it would be carried out only by Persian subjects. Towards the end of the month the Soviet Ambassador called on the Prime Minister, who tells me that the possibility of a resumption of trade between the two countries was among the subjects discussed. There have been the inevitable reports of Soviet troops concentrations on the Persian frontiers. In fact, there does appear to have been some movement along the Soviet side of the frontier of North-West Persia; this has been so ostentatious as to suggest that it is purely artificial and intended to arouse alarm in Persia. In any case some increase in troop movements during the summer months is to be expected. Agency reports from Tehran about the troops movements have been countered by a Government communiqué to the effect that nothing abnormal was taking place. It is regular Soviet practice for keeping Persian nerves on edge by referring to the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921 with the implication that the Soviet Government can send troops into Persia more or less when they please, and it is therefore useful that a Senator, Dr. Qazimzadeh, speaking in the Senate on 23rd July, should have pointed out that the treaty means nothing of the sort.

3. In addition to causing acute anxiety and a rise in some prices, events in Korea have lowered the prestige of the Americans already unpopular owing to the non-appearance of financial aid. Persians do not want to be liberated; they want to be protected from all harm from the outset. Therefore, although the Persian Government sent a telegram approving the Security

Council's original resolution on Korea and received support in this action from the great majority of the Majlis Persians in general are at present less impressed by the speed with which the United States and other members of the United Nations decided to help South Korea than by the continued retreat forced on the United Nations troops by enemy superiority. The nervousness thus created naturally plays into the hands of Soviet propagandists in Persia preaching submission to the will of the Soviet Union. One such, Malik-ush-Shu'ara Bahar, has recently started a peace-lovers' union which is collecting signatures to a petition of protest against the Security Council's action in Korea.

Internal Affairs

4. In the first two weeks of the month the Government secured votes of confidence from the Majlis and Senate. Much reliance cannot be placed on initial votes of confidence but it can at least be said that the present Government has broken the moral ascendancy established by the National Front in the days of Mansur and holds the initiative; a sign of the Government's confidence can be seen in its decision at the end of the month to remove military governorship from all districts except Isfahan and Abadan. As soon as it obtained votes of confidence in both Chambers, the Government submitted its legislation for the decentralisation of the administration. The essence of the new organisation, based on the original Constitution, is that each administrative unit shall have locally elected councils exercising powers over a wide range of subjects. The present proposal is that the vote shall be restricted to the literate but that there shall be no property qualification. While it is generally agreed that excessive centralisation is one of the principal causes of Persia's troubles, and that power must be given to local bodies to deal with local matters, the Bill hurts vested interests and considerable opposition to it is to be expected. By the end of the month the Majlis had granted a procedure of single urgency to the single article Bill embodying detailed regulations for the new scheme and the Senate, having declined to do so, had gone into recess until

early October. With the Majlis due in the first days of August, to suspend operations for a month's holiday, little further parliamentary action is to be expected in the near future other than approval of temporary authority for the Government to spend money on the basis of last year's budget in order to carry the administration over until both Houses have re-assembled.

5. During July the Prime Minister has been assiduous in cultivating the two Chambers and has been obliged to spend on this task time which he could ill spare from consideration of the problems facing his administration. He originally hoped to set up his new administrative framework much more quickly than is in fact now possible and then to devolve on the new district (Shahristan) councils the putting forward of schemes for local economic development. The measures which will be needed to avert unemployment in the autumn cannot now be handled in this way and he is considering despatching commissions to each province to survey the situation and report to him by the end of August. In the meanwhile, the prospects of a change of emphasis in economic development combined with a change of Executive-Director (Dr. Musharraf Nafisi having been replaced during the month by Dr. Muhammad Sajjadi (Foreign Office Personalities No. 156)), shortage of funds, the appointment of a Senatorial committee of investigation have caused a certain stagnation in the affairs of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation, whose ability to act was in any case limited by the expiry, early in the month, of its right to dispense with parliamentary approval of individual projects. This right was granted for the first year of the plan only, and after 8th July, the Board of Control nominated by the Majlis must first approve all projects. The Board has not yet begun to work properly.

6. Besides the appointment of Mr. Sajjadi, the new Government has made a number of other changes in important posts. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Salahi, whose appointment was not one of Razmara's most successful, is being sent to Bagdad as ambassador and Mr. Muhsin Rais, Persian Ambassador in London, has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. The most sensational change was, however, the dismissal of Mr. Abul Hasan Ibtihaj from the post of governor of the National Bank of Iran, which he had held for the last eight years, and his replacement by Mr. Ibrahim Zand (Personalities No.

183), the recently appointed Governor-General of Azarbaijan and father-in-law designate of Prince Abdur Riza; Mr. Zand was replaced in Azerbaijan by Dr. Manuchihr Iqbal (Personalities No. 78), Minister of Communications in the last Cabinet and a man of personal integrity though no experience of provincial administration. The dismissal of Mr. Ibtihaj caused considerable relief to the British Bank of Iran and the Middle East, to whom his policy had been consistently hostile. But its principal significance lay elsewhere. Mr. Ibtihaj had developed for himself a position in which he was able to conduct, through the bank, a personal financial policy which he imposed upon successive Cabinets; it was known that the new Minister of Finance, Dr. Nasr, was determined to be the chief arbiter on financial policy and that it was most improbable that Mr. Ibtihaj would be prepared to work in with him on these terms. The principal effect desired from this change and from changes in the Seven-Year Plan is that the Persian Government shall in future have one instead of several financial and economic policies. From the point of view of the Government, a useful by-product of the change is to draw away some of the support accorded to the National Front by the Tehran bazar. There is no doubt that part of the discontent on which the National Front feeds was due to the policy of reducing exchange rates and restricting credit to importers, pursued to the bitter end by Mr. Ibtihaj. Because of this he was intensely unpopular in the Tehran bazar and some of his unpopularity was reflected on the Government of the day.

7. Mr. Razmara is firmly convinced that he can only succeed if he does something for the people. In the middle of July he caused the price of Government bread in Tehran to be reduced from 4 rials to 3 rials per kilogram for one quality and from 4 rials to 2½ rials per kilogram for another quality and similar steps have been taken in some provincial centres. The Government price of sugar has been reduced by 1 rial per kilogram, although this was done to offset an increase of 15 per cent. in the import duty on imported cotton piece-goods, intended to help the decrepit Persian textile industry and thereby to maintain employment.

8. Government efforts to reduce the general price level have unfortunately been offset by the reaction of merchants to the news from Korea and also by the effects of a surprising Government decree announced

at the end of the month, which, in order to placate merchants who clamour for protection of exports and domestic industries, allowed exporters to retain export exchange for a year (instead of two months only) and to dispose of it directly to importers at whatever rate they can get. The decree implied that all but a few most essential imports will in future be imported with export exchange only, which is unlikely to be sufficient to meet the demand. The decree will therefore have the effect of raising the price of most imported goods, and current bazar prices have already risen in anticipation. The decree had however not been put into force at the end of July.

9. As far as employment is concerned, there has been little change from the situation described in paragraph 10 of my report for June 1950. In Tehran the new mayor and chief of police caused some dislocation by enforcing regulations approved some

time ago for the destruction of certain brick kilns near Tehran which covered the lower part of the town with dense and foul-smelling smoke. A large number of brick workers lost their jobs through the closing of the kilns, but efforts are being made to find them alternative employment.

10. There have been interesting developments in trade union matters, since during the month it proved possible for the first time to assemble representatives of the ISKI, IMKA and other trade unions round a table in order to discuss the setting up of a central organisation analogous to the British Trades Union Congress. These conferences have been held under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour, but so far no definite conclusions have been reached.

I have, &c.

(for His Majesty's Ambassador)

V. G. LAWFORD.

EP 1531/37

No. 27

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR

Supplemental Agreement between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Government

Mr. Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington)

(No. 1048. Secret) *Foreign Office.*
Sir, *12th August, 1950.*

The United States Ambassador called on me this morning regarding the Supplemental Agreement between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Government. He indicated that the United States was very concerned at the failure to settle this matter with the Razmara Government, and thought that if that Government fell or was weak it would not be a good thing for the Middle East. Mr. Douglas put up various suggestions about the Supplemental Agreement, none of which was new.

2. I replied, however, that I had taken a personal interest in this agreement, that it had been before the Cabinet, that every effort had been made to meet the Persian Government; but that Razmara would never, nor would any other person, tell us exactly what was wanted in order to reach a settlement. It was the bazaar method of negotiation. However, in the hope of being able to satisfy the Majlis and get the whole matter cleared up, I had during last year held a meeting with the chairman of the

company, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and representatives of other departments concerned. We had made a good offer to Persia, and I felt we should stick by it. In any case, the amount of money offered by the A.I.O.C. as a result of these protracted talks was such that I did not think the Foreign Office could reopen the question and ask for more. This was especially so if what was intended in the present case was a gesture to get a settlement. If a settlement was not forthcoming, and it was not likely that it would be, our action would only be taken as a sign of weakness and would lead to further demands. The Persians must really make up their minds whether or not they were going to do business.

3. Mr. Douglas then raised the question of the amount of the proposed loan to the Persian Government. I replied that I did not think the question of whether £6 million or some other figure was the right amount was a matter I could discuss at that moment, as I was not sufficiently acquainted with the details of the question. I put it to the Ambassador very strongly that there should

be agreement between us and the Americans, otherwise the Persian Government would try to play us one against the other. If it was found by the Persians that American representatives were trying to put pressure on us, then neither they nor we would ever reach a settlement with the Persians. As I understood it, we were being asked for payment on account, or for a loan or an advance in some form, which would contribute to the development of the Seven-Year Plan as well as assist the finances of Persia. At the same time, the Persians were applying to the United States for an Import and Export Bank loan. My suggestion was that there should be consultations between the Americans and ourselves, at which we should say what we thought was reasonable—that is, the very furthest we could go—in the way of an advance. The Americans should then make their advance bearing in mind the position as a whole. That, I

thought, would produce a satisfactory result. As to the details and the merits of the proposals, I had not recently been in touch with them and would consult the Minister of State and the other departments concerned during the coming week. Something might then emerge which would allow us to make satisfactory proposals to the Persians without increasing the cost to ourselves of the Supplemental and other agreements and which would satisfy the Persian Government's needs both from the United States and from ourselves.

4. Mr. Douglas undertook to convey this tentative idea to his Government, and I undertook to meet him again during the coming week on this issue.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran and to the head of the B.M.E.O.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

EP 1013/43

No. 28

MONTHLY REPORT FOR AUGUST 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 8th September)

(No. 258)

Tehran,

Sir,

2nd September, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 232 of 5th August, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during August 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. Early in August the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran suggested to the Persian Prime Minister negotiations for the resumption of trade between the two countries. The Persian Prime Minister agreed provided that the Persian gold in Russia was returned, that certain Persian soldiers taken prisoner in border skirmishes were returned and that any commercial exchanges should be by barter and should not involve the transfer of money. Later the Soviet Government duly returned the soldiers. Their assurances about the gold have not made it clear whether they intend to return it. The Persians have informed the Soviet Government of the commodities which they wish to exchange. Towards the end of the month the Soviet Government asked the Persian Government for an estimate of the monthly quantities of goods which they would wish to export and import: the Persian Govern-

ment offered lists on a quarterly basis and at the end of the month were preparing them. The Soviet Ambassador also suggested to the Persian Prime Minister the establishment of mixed Perso-Soviet frontier commissions to demarcate the frontiers at doubtful points; Mr. Razmara agreed. The Persian Prime Minister said very little in public about the negotiations, and the Soviet Government were equally silent. There has been much speculation as to the motives for this Soviet approach, which contrasts with the threatening Soviet notes earlier in the summer. There was no important news of Soviet troop movements on the Persian frontiers.

3. The Soviet "peace" campaign proceeded. *Izvestiya* stated that 25,000 Persian signatures had been collected to a petition supporting the Stockholm resolution.

Internal Affairs

4. The Shah made what seems to have been a successful visit to Hamadan, Kermanshah and Kurdistan, showing a commendable willingness to go amongst and speak to the rank-and-file of the tribesmen. This visit should prove a useful antidote to the hostile propaganda con-

stantly directed to the Kurds by the Soviet radio.

5. The Persian Government also gave evidence of its interest in provincial affairs by despatching to each province commissions instructed to investigate and report on local schemes of economic development. The commissions were to return to Tehran with their reports by 20th September. Further evidence of the Prime Minister's capacity to help the people is certainly needed; for instance, a recent report from Tabriz showed that local expectations from Razmara's new Government had not been satisfied and that confidence in it would not be established without practical steps towards economic development and the creation of employment.

6. In Tehran, the Majlis being on holiday, attention has been largely concentrated on the report of the Purge Commission. This body was set up a year ago in accordance with a law deemed to have received Majlis approval. It was to divide Government employees into three categories, the third being those considered unsuitable for further Government employment. The press has now published, at least in part, the Commission's report, which was meant to be confidential. The third category contains 267 names, among them men in prominent posts. In a country where politics are so largely a personal matter, the publication of these names has caused great excitement. The friends of the accused are active and expected to make trouble for the Government when the Majlis reassembles if the Prime Minister decides to dismiss all those listed in the third category. On the other hand, public opinion, apart from those directly or indirectly affected, looks to the Prime Minister to give effect to the Commission's decisions and prove his desire to root out corruption. The Prime Minister's own inclinations favour action against the corrupt and the incompetent, but being somewhat apprehensive about his position in the Majlis he is in a dilemma. He is thought to intend seeking a decision from the Majlis (appropriately, since the President of the Majlis has been placed in the third category), recommending at the same time an appeal tribunal to enable those concerned to be heard in their own defence, and an invitation to the Purge Commission to resume its activities and consider certain Ministries and individuals with whom it had not so far had time to deal.

7. The Prime Minister showed his desire to disprove accusations of dictatorship by

permitting the publication of all the newspapers which were under suspension.

8. Some excitement was caused in the middle of the month by an attempted assassination of the Imam Jum'eh, chief priest, of Tehran. Its motives have not been fully established, but it does not appear to have any political significance.

9. By the end of the month the Government was somewhat short of money and was anxious to obtain a further advance from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The shortness of funds particularly affected the Seven-Year Plan (compare paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 232 of 5th August), who were virtually without money at the end of the month and were endeavouring to borrow 300 million rials from the National Bank for current expenses. The reorganisation of the Plan did not proceed without friction, which proved so trying to Dr. Sajjadi, the Executive Director, that his health collapsed and he had to be replaced by Dr. Nakha'i, previously Minister of Labour.

10. Other Ministerial changes were the appointment of Ghulam Husain Furuhar to take the place of Dr. Nakha'i as Minister of Labour and the promotion of Mr. Sharif Imami and Engineer Amir Qasim Ishraqi to the posts of Minister of Communications and Posts and Telegraphs respectively; these two had previously been in acting charge of these Ministries.

11. As regards labour, there has been no appreciable change in employment, although the Government tea factory laid off 600 workers owing to reduced sales of Persian tea. The independent trade union leaders are disturbed by the appointment of Mr. Furuhar (see paragraph 10 above) who, during his last spell at the Ministry of Labour, consistently disregarded their interests and promoted a trade union monopoly by the E.S.K.I. Union.

12. The Prime Minister obtained the permission of the Majlis, before its recess, to apply experimentally for six months a new Customs Tariff designed to protect domestic industry, to encourage essential imports and discourage others. The new tariff was applied during the month but had no immediately noticeable effect on trade. The regulations covering foreign exchange were put into operation and the rate for export exchange has now risen by just under 40 per cent. There was progress towards the award to British firms of two contracts hitherto held up owing to the activities of the National Front. An agreement to prolong the contract between Sir Alexander

Gibb and Partners and the Tehran Water Supply Organisation was signed towards the end of the month, and the Persian Ministry of Communications finally started necessary

action under the contract for locomotives with Vulcan Foundry.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1102/24

No. 29

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNEXION WITH THE PERSIAN SEVEN-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 15th September)

(No. 262E.)

Tehran.

Sir,

9th September, 1950.

I have the honour to invite reference to my despatch No. 120E. of 14th April, 1950, and to report recent developments in connexion with the Persian Seven-Year Plan for Economic Development, which may be summarised as follows:—

- (a) The Organisation of the Plan must in future obtain the approval of the Plan Commission of the Persian Parliament before undertaking any new project.
- (b) A dispute about proposed reorganisation and acute shortage of money have very seriously reduced the organisation's activities.
- (c) The organisation is regarded by the public (who know very little about its work) as useless and corrupt, but information available to me does not support this judgment.

2. At the beginning of July 1950 the Plan Organisation completed its first year, and reached the end of the period during which it was authorised to act upon any project approved by the Council of Ministers, without obtaining the authority of the special Majlis Commission for the Seven-Year Plan. This commission had at that time been established only for a very short period, and had not begun to operate properly when the Majlis began its summer recess at the end of July.

3. The organisation's progress was later checked in two other ways. During the first year it had been obliged to spend most of its money upon inescapable commitments such as railway extensions, and subsidies for State-owned factories which it had inherited from the corrupt and moribund Industrial and Mining Bank, and had otherwise devoted itself mainly to short and long-term planning. It achieved little that was spectacular and likely to catch the imagination of the public. It was remarkably successful

in alleviating agricultural distress on the Mogaan Steppe in the extreme north of Azerbaijan by the introduction of a number of agricultural tractors, but the achievement was too remote from the capital to attract public notice. The Plan Organisation's Information Department was singularly inept in making known this and other results of the organisation's work, and after doing little to justify its title the department was closed down about six months ago. The Persian public is always impatient for results and always willing to believe that public money is being squandered. Rumours have spread that the Plan Organisation is just another inefficient and corrupt Government body and that its employees are busy lining their own pockets and buying themselves private cars with the money allotted for the plan. The organisation has done little to counteract these rumours, which were probably put about in the first place by those who wished the plan to fail and who were not interested, in any case, to know the truth.

4. When Mr. Razmara became Prime Minister at the end of July it was clear that he believed that the Plan Organisation had, at the least, been slow at its work. Being in favour of the decentralisation of administrative responsibility to eighty-two Shahristan (Provincial) Councils, he informed the Plan Organisation that responsibility for planning and for executing provincial development would in future fall to special sections of the Provincial Councils, which would report to Ministries. The technical departments of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation would be transferred to the Ministries for the purpose of co-ordinating the recommendations of the Provincial Councils, and the Seven-Year Plan Organisation, much reduced in strength, would remain for the purpose of planning and undertaking works on a national scale, such as port and road development, and of approving provincial development plans, in

conjunction with the Ministries concerned. The Plan Organisation would advance money to the appropriate Ministry for each approved project and would have general powers of supervision of the expenditure of the money so allotted, but no responsibility for execution (except in the case of national schemes). It is not clear whether this reorganisation was originally conceived by Mr. Thornberg, the resident director of Overseas Consultants Incorporated, but he has in any case now become associated with it, and with the Prime Minister in urging its adoption. The Seven-Year Plan Organisation opposed it entirely, and, apparently as a result of this disagreement, Dr. Mucharráf Nafisi, the managing director of the organisation, was replaced by Dr. Muhammad Sajjadi. He tried for some weeks to convince officials of the organisation and its Supreme Council that the Prime Minister's reorganisation was desirable, but he met with little success and after a stormy meeting, at which he fainted, he resigned on the grounds of ill-health and was replaced by Dr. Mohammad Nakhai, who had previously been Minister of Labour. He has been in office only since 28th August, but already he appears to have taken as his own some of the views of the Plan Organisation's officials. In a conversation with the Commercial Secretary last week he said that he would send back to Government Departments a certain number of unimportant officials in the Plan Organisation, but he thought it necessary to keep certain important experts in each technical department of the organisation in order that it could discharge its responsibility for co-ordinating and approving development projects throughout the country, in conjunction with the Ministries concerned. He added that the largest technical department had only six people, so that no great changes in the number of the organisation's employees could be expected. During all this period of internal struggle little progress has been made with development schemes, and the association of Mr. Thornberg with the proposed reorganisation has led even intelligent and responsible officials of the organisation to be outspokenly critical of the value of the Overseas Consultants Incorporated's participation in the organisation.

5. The third check on the plan's achievements has been a shortage of money which has now become so acute that the organisation may not even be able to meet existing commitments during the next six months.

The difficulty is that the Plan Organisation is entitled to receive royalties paid by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the Persian Government, but apart from certain small quarterly payments of about £380,000 each, and profit participation paid in August, these royalties are all payable at the end of February, *i.e.*, during the last month of the Persian year for which they are allotted to the organisation. Furthermore, as reported in my despatch No. 259/E. of 4th September, the organisation's budget for this year is based upon the receipt of royalties at the rate of £23 million although, until the Supplementary Agreement to the company's concession is passed, it can only count on £13 million. The organisation started this current Persian year, 1329, with a small surplus which, with the quarterly royalty payments, was quite insufficient for its expenses. It was unable to obtain credit either from the Government of the Bank Melli to tide it over until February 1951 and would have been unable to do anything this year, had not the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company agreed in May to make an advance of £6 million during the summer against all future royalty payments. One of these was a payment of £1 million for profit participation during the year 1949 which was due to be paid in August 1950. The Oil Company withheld this against the advance of £6 million and the Ministry of Finance deducted £1 million from the advance and passed £5 million to the Seven-Year Plan Organisation, enabling it to continue to the end of August this year. It is now again without money. It has already defaulted on some of the payments, amounting to 40 million rials a month, due to contractors for work on the extension of the railway system in Azerbaijan, which employs 11,000 men, and it fears that unless money is immediately made available, these payments may soon cease entirely.

6. I have recently been able to obtain, confidentially, a statement which shows income and expenditure of the Plan Organisation during the month ending on 22nd July, 1950, during the first four months of the current Persian year, and from the inception of the plan at the beginning of July 1949 until 22nd July, 1950. I transmit to you a copy⁽¹⁾ herewith. You will notice that total receipts during this period amounted to 1,923 million rials, of which about 1,786 million rials came from oil royalties. The only other items of income of any importance were a loan of 95 million

rials from the Bank Melli, 50 million rials of which had already been repaid, and a grant of 20 million rials received from the Government for relief in Azerbaijan. Expenditure at the end of July had amounted to 1,900 million rials.

7. Of this sum 831 million rials (or approximately 44 per cent.) was spent on or allocated to development projects. Details are given in Schedule 1. 237 million rials went to agriculture, including the following: 150 million rials for an increase in the capital of the Agricultural Bank, 30 million rials for combating plant diseases, 18 million rials for animal husbandry, 15 million rials for forestry, and a similar sum for agricultural relief in Azerbaijan (the work on the Moghan Steppe referred to above). 27 million rials was allocated to irrigation, of which 22 million rials was allotted for the construction of dams. The next largest allocation was 262 million rials to industries and mines, of which 216 million rials went to the sugar-beet industry, for the installation of three new sugar refineries, 33 million rials to the textile industry and 12 million rials to mines. Inland communications absorbed 227 million rials, of which 191 million rials was spent on railway extensions, 18 million rials on airport development, 41 million rials was allotted to the Persian Oil Company and 38 million rials to social services, including 29 million rials for malaria control.

8. Advances made by the Plan Organisation to commercial subsidiaries, mainly the State-owned factories taken over from the Industrial and Mining Bank, amounted to 525 million rials, after deducting income received from these organisations. This sum represents 28 per cent. of the total expenditure and further details are given in Schedule 2 of the enclosure.

9. The Persian public imagines that the administrative expenses of the organisation are inordinately high. This statement shows that wages, salaries, travelling, office and similar expenses amounted to 127 million rials, or less than 7 per cent. of the total expenditure. Of this figure, 58 million rials went as salaries and wages for local staff, and 41 million rials represented payments to Overseas Consultants Incorporated, for their fees in connexion with all the investigation which they have carried out since

their association with the Plan Organisation. Further details of these expenses are given in Schedule 3. Other administrative expenses, mainly construction charges, the cost of transportation equipment and a revolving fund for the Purchasing Department, amounted to 145 million rials, or under 8 per cent. of the total expenditure. Further details are given in Schedule 3.

10. At the end of July the organisation had cash resources amounting to 47 million rials, of which one-half were earmarked funds, leaving 23.5 million rials as the cash available at that date. This figure was reduced still further during the month of August.

11. It is, of course, possible, and perhaps even probable in Persia, that some of the money shown as expenditure on a project has found its way into private pockets, without any useful services being rendered in return. From observation of the Plan Organisation from its inception, however, the staff of this embassy have formed the impression that for a Persian organisation it has been comparatively efficient, and that though slow, on the whole its officials have been honest. If, however, it is to win the confidence of the Persian public, it must produce some spectacular results quickly, and make as much use of these achievements for propaganda purposes as it can. Dr. Nakhai has already appointed a Public Relations Officer, who is said to have been trained in the United States; but the dispute about the structure of the Plan Organisation must soon be settled and adequate funds must be provided from internal or external sources before the organisation can even resume effective operation. The Bank Melli may offer a loan of between 100 million rials and 300 million rials. The Persian Government is faced with the probability of a deficit of up to 2,000 million rials on its ordinary budget and therefore look to the Oil Company, to His Majesty's Government and to the United States to get the plan out of its financial difficulties.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, to the Head of the British Middle East Office, His Majesty's Treasury and to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

(1) Not printed.

CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE SHAH OF PERSIA AND MR. LAWFORD

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Attlee. (Received 20th September)

(No. 267)

Tehran, 16th September, 1950.

Sir, I have the honour to transmit herewith some notes by the counsellor of this embassy of conversations with His Majesty the Shah which Mr. Lawford had during a camping trip on which he accompanied His Majesty from 30th August to 3rd September. These notes afford an interesting light on the manner of thinking of the Shah regarding a great variety of subjects.

2. In this connexion I should like to record how useful Mr. Lawford's contacts with the Shah have been. They have become increasingly intimate during recent months and have been of particular use during July and August when, owing to indisposition, I have not been able to maintain my own contacts with His Majesty. The Shah has developed the habit of asking Mr. Lawford to ride with him and to attend family parties, and the occasion of this trip was particularly valuable in consolidating the relations of confidence between the Shah and the embassy which fortunately exist. This is perhaps the most important of many reasons for which I shall regret Mr. Lawford's departure.

3. I lunched with the Shah on 14th September and was then obliged to tell him of Mr. Lawford's resignation from the service and imminent departure. It is not without interest that this announcement was received with a few moments of silence during which it was only too evident that the Oriental mind of His Majesty was considering whether I had not taken the step of dismissing my counsellor out of jealousy for his intimate relations with the Shah. I hope that Mr. Lawford and I between us will be able to check any such belief.

4. I shall be reporting separately on my conversation with His Majesty.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

Enclosure in No. 30

Summary of Conversations with the Shah at Kalardasht, 30th August to 3rd September, 1950

During the five days which I spent with the Shah and the Princes Ali Reza and

Ghulam Reza at Kalardasht I had the opportunity of several hours of private conversation each day with His Majesty. Many of our discussions were necessarily disjointed, since they often took place while we were on horseback, scrambling up rocky paths in the mountains, in a jeep bumping across dirt tracks, in the Imperial Packard convertible, travelling at 80 miles an hour along the precipitous Karaj-Chalus road, or hovering in a small aeroplane a few hundred feet over the forests and rice fields of Mazandaran. But every day there were also quieter moments when we sat in his drawing room upstairs in the pink stucco palace or walked up and down on the terrace outside. By the end of the visit we had covered almost every conceivable topic, political and otherwise. The notes below are intended only to give an impression, as briefly as possible, on what the Shah said on the more important topics which we discussed.

Relations with the United Kingdom and with the British Embassy in particular

The Shah said that although, even after reading Mr. Churchill's Memoirs, he could not really understand the reasons for British policy towards Persia (particularly towards his father) in the war years, and although it had been his experience up till quite recently that the British Embassy had for some reason been highly critical of himself and hostile to his dynasty, he now believes sincerely that we realised, as he did, that his interests and ours were fundamentally identical. Perhaps it had been a question of personalities or perhaps the British Government had changed their policy; but whatever the cause, he was thankful to say that his relations with the embassy were now better than they had ever been. So far as he was concerned, at any rate, they would not be allowed to deteriorate. Naturally there would be differences of opinion, but for himself he was convinced that if only out of self-interest he was bound to collaborate with us and we with him. In the past it often seemed to him that there were several extra British Embassies in Tehran. He meant not only the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the British Bank of Iran and the Middle East and other British business interests, in addition to the embassy proper, but also the Oriental Counsellor's office at the embassy, which had in

the past often been quoted to him as giving its support to this or that politician opposed to the Throne or the Government, whereas the embassy as represented by the ambassador had not overtly given any such support. Like many Persians, he had found this extremely confusing and disagreeable; and he was glad of my assurance that whatever may have been the position in the past (about which I was ignorant) there was no such dual policy to-day. He willingly accepted my statement that the embassy to-day spoke with only one voice. I expressed the hope that he would be so good as to receive Mr. Pyman one day soon and to have a frank discussion with him, in order that Mr. Pyman should have an opportunity to convince him that there was no question at all of anyone in the embassy working against the dynasty or conducting some kind of opposition policy *sub rosa*. To this he readily assented and said that he hoped that among other things Mr. Pyman, who had had a long connexion with Britain's Persian policy, would be willing to explain to him the reasons for the attitude which we had adopted to his father during the war.

The late Reza Shah and the King's powers

The Shah spoke a great deal about his father, frequently pointing out various buildings, including the palace of Kalardasht and most of the village of Hassan Kif which had been constructed during his comparatively brief reign. He also spoke about the relatively immense public works (e.g., the Trans-Iranian Railway) which his father had executed at a time when the country was in a far more backward state than to-day. Personally he had had the greatest respect for Reza Shah; but he had no desire, nor capacity, to imitate his methods. He hated dictatorship and government by violence was alien to his nature and he could never pretend to be something which he was not. At the same time he claimed that his father had cordially disliked both Hitler and the Soviet régime and that if he had occasionally kicked people with his jack-boot that was because it would have been impossible otherwise to get anything effectively done in this country after so many years of decadence and corruption. He himself wished to use more democratic methods but it was undeniable that the state of Persia was still such that the ruler must have wide powers if the country were to be kept together and the situation to remain relatively stable. It was true that his own powers were far greater than those, say, of

the King of England; but then the King of England could trust his politicians to work honestly for their country's good without any need for interference, or even guidance, on his part. Unfortunately no one could pretend that the same was true of Persia, where politicians were capable of working against their King and even on behalf of foreign Powers.

The Prime Minister

Naturally we spoke a good deal about Razmara. Only once did the Shah refer to the rather curious stories which Razmara has been alleged to have been telling lately; and he expressed entire agreement with me when I said that whatever might be the truth it would only be disastrous if he were to take gossip too seriously since it was essential, in his own and his country's interest, that he should do everything to maintain good relations between himself and his Prime Minister. He as good as said that he regarded Razmara as his last and only hope. Apropos of Sayyid Zia, who in the minds of some looms as a possible alternative Prime Minister, he said that in a recent conversation the Sayyid had stated quite bluntly that if he were ever to become Prime Minister there must be "no interference" from the Throne. The Shah interpreted this as meaning that it would inevitably prove impossible for him to work with Sayyid Zia, who had always been as good as a Republican at heart.

Soviet-Persian Trade Negotiations

Though he saw no alternative to negotiating a Trade Agreement with the Russians the Shah was worried by the propaganda advantage that would accrue therefrom to the Soviet Union as against the Western Powers. He had no illusions about Soviet motives and considered that the sole motive in this instance was propaganda. So anxious were the Soviet Government to make a good impression on the Persian people that they were raising no difficulties with regard to the Persian Government's firm stand on the question of method of delivery and were surprisingly willing to take exactly what Persia had to offer. If only for that reason he had been quite furious to hear of the handing over by the Persian Government, without his knowledge and contrary to his instructions, of two Russian fugitives as a *quid pro quo* for the return of the illegally abducted Persian soldiers. He had been assured by Razmara that this had been done

without his knowledge. In the circumstances all that he had been able to do was to secure the immediate dismissal of the Head of the Russian Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Quite apart from any considerations of humanity or morality, he felt that this step had been a major political blunder.

Relations with the United States Government

The Shah said that he was puzzled by the American attitude towards Persia. He argued, on familiar lines, that the United States Government were apparently willing to give financial and economic and military help to almost every country, whereas to Persia they had so far given practically nothing but experts. Rather petulantly he exclaimed at one moment that American prestige in this country was at a low ebb. After hopes had been raised by the Shah's visit to the United States last year, people now despaired of help from that country and were only too prone to contrast the American attitude unfavourably with the readiness of their northern neighbours to contribute to Persia's prosperity. I said that it seemed to me that it served no useful purpose to go around saying that American prestige, or for that matter British prestige, stood very low in this country, since that was precisely what the Russians wanted. I could not, of course, speak for the American Government but, if the attitude of the British Government were any criterion, I knew that my Government felt that they required to be persuaded that their taxpayers' money would not go down the drain in Persia. No one with any knowledge of conditions in this country could pretend that there was not a very considerable risk involved. There was, also, and everyone knew it, very great private wealth in this country which no Government had so far made any serious effort to tap. The Shah did not attempt to refute this. He argued, however, that without financial help from the Western Powers it was quite impossible for the Persian Government to institute the necessary basic reforms and improvements which alone would permit stable and efficient government. At present it was a sort of vicious circle—no money because Persia was corrupt, therefore no possibility of eradicating corruption.

Another, though minor, irritant to him was the alleged sentimental interest which the Americans took in the tribes. He referred in particular to the Qashqa'i. Why did all Americans who came to Persia, diplo-

matists, journalists, &c., spend so much time in the Qashqa'i country? It was not really fair to the rest of Persia and it gave the Qashqa'i Khans an exaggerated sense of their own importance. I said that I could only speak for myself. I had spent ten days with Malik Mansur Khan Qashqa'i in Fars in May and had found the tribal life interesting and picturesque and not entirely lacking in some of the simpler virtues for which one looked in vain for example in the artificial official life of the capital. The Shah said that he was not only thinking of the Qashqa'i. There were other tribal areas where irresponsible foreign interest was the reverse of helpful to those who were trying to maintain good government in Persia. As regards Kurdistan, for example, he had recently been told that Justice Douglas had visited that area and had actually brought with him a message to the Kurds from President Truman. Could this possibly be true? I said I was sure it was nonsense.

On the subject of Persia's relations with the United States I did venture to make one entirely personal suggestion to the Shah. It was during a nocturnal conversation in the palace garden, when the Shah had been rather expansive about his personal life and what he regards as his fate or mission. In doing so he had spoken with feeling of his devotion to the ordinary humane ideals shared by Muslims and Christians alike, his overwhelming desire to keep Persia on the right side of the Iron Curtain and his sadness at not having, as it seemed to him, hitherto received much tangible support or even encouragement from the principal defender of those ideals, the United States. I said that since I had been in this country I had become acutely aware of the importance of three things, which in effect were three aspects of the joint task of the Shah himself, the Americans and the British. I would name them in the order in which they had impressed themselves upon me. First, coming from my last post, which had been in the United States, I had been impressed by the need for the Americans and British in Persia to prove to the Persians, and to anybody else who was interested, that we could, as indeed we must, work as loyally together here as anywhere else in the world. So far as we were concerned at the British Embassy we felt that in spite of the belief of all Persians that the interests of the two Powers must necessarily conflict in Persia, a belief fortified by the welcome opportunity which it provided for intrigue on one side or the other, our United States colleagues and

ourselves had been able in the past year to make just a little progress under this first head.

Secondly (and in this respect I was most grateful to His Majesty for the opportunities which he had afforded me of speaking to him frankly on any subject which I chose) it had become clear to me this year that the British on their side and the Shah on his must put away all suspicions based on history true or false, and convince as many people—as once again we must—to work together for our mutual advantage. Here also I thought that the present good relations between His Majesty and the British Embassy of which he had spoken showed that between us we had not been entirely unsuccessful. Naturally I did not pretend that people in Persia had altogether abandoned their belief that the nefarious British imperialists were at the bottom of everything that went wrong, but even that tendency, die-hard though it might be, seemed to have been wilting somewhat.

The third thing about which I rather hesitated to speak, since clearly I had less right to do so, was the importance of good relations between the Shah and the United States Embassy. So far as the Shah himself was concerned, it seemed to me, if I might say so, that hardly anything could be more important than the attitude which he adopted towards the United States. I had no standing to suggest how His Majesty should proceed in this regard, but in the light of what he had said to me on the subject I had felt justified in mentioning to him this third aspect of the problem which was of equal importance to Persia, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Oil Agreement

It may be thought that in criticising what he regards as the lack of help given to him by the United States Government, the Shah was indulging in the normal Persian pastime (since he is in many respects as Persian as his subjects) of complaining to the British about the Americans and to the Americans about the British. I should, however, make it clear that his criticisms about lack of help were in fact not confined to the United States Government. What he had said about the need for financial assistance applied also, of course, (indeed it went without saying) to United Kingdom interests in Paris as personified by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. He hoped that in due course the company would see the folly of standing rigidly on an agreement which in its present state just would not get anywhere near rati-

fication. How, for example, could we expect the Majlis to accept the scale of royalties provided for in the Supplemental Agreement when everyone would know that the Iraqi Petroleum Company were giving the Iraqi Government a higher figure. I endeavoured to explain that the difference was due to the fact that, unlike the Iraqi Government, the Persian Government enjoyed the right of participation. Assuming that the Supplemental Agreement had been in force in 1948, for example, the Persian Government would have received a royalty of 20s. 4d. for that year in contrast to the 18s. 7d. which was all that the Iraqi Government received under the Iraqi Petroleum Company Agreement. His Majesty commented, as I rather expected, that such technical details would be extremely hard to put across an ignorant and prejudiced Majlis.

Another criticism which he rather half-heartedly levelled at the United Kingdom was that there was still a tendency in London to think that it might be possible, if the worst came to the worst, to divide Persia into two spheres of influence, a Soviet one in the north and an Anglo-American one in the south. I said that I was sure that no one at home played with any such ideas. We knew the Russians just as well as he did. In that case he replied, it was strange that in a conversation which he had had with the Secretary of State in London, Mr. Bevin had let slip the question, when the Shah was mentioning the situation in the Kermanshah area: "Is that in our zone?" I said that I thought Mr. Bevin had been speaking rather loosely and had merely meant: "Is that anywhere near the oilfields?" The Shah said this might be so. In any case, when he had expostulated with the Secretary of State, Mr. Bevin had made it clear that he had had no idea of suggesting the division of Persia into two zones; and he had justifiably recalled the strong line which the United Kingdom representatives, on his instructions, had taken in the United Nations with regard to Persia's most northerly province.

Paragraph (c) and Miscellaneous Topics

The Shah, like various other reasonable Persians to whom I have spoken, took the line, with regard to the report of the Purge Commission, that some opportunity must be provided to people placed in paragraph (c) to defend themselves before an impartial panel of judges. One particular case which had attracted his attention was that of Mr. Karim Sai, the head of the Forestry Department, who, as it happened, was

spending some days a little further up the valley of Kalardasht with Mr Hamilton, the British forestry expert, and a whole camp of newly-appointed Persian foresters. We visited the camp and the Shah seemed pleased with the efficiency and enthusiasm of the group in general. As regards Mr. Karim Sai, he told me in confidence that if he were purged as a result of the commission's report he was considering giving him a job under the Imperial Social Services Organisation. It seemed madness to him to lose the services of a man such as this: moreover, he was afraid that if he were to be purged as he thought unjustifiably, he would become embittered and might even be tempted to join the Tudeh Party. Very often during our journeys the Shah spoke of his interest in forestry and his desire that the natural wealth represented by the forests of Mazandaran should not be wasted. He and Prince Ghulam Reza always pointed out to each other the wisps of smoke rising from charcoal-burners' fires on the wooded hillsides; and it is clear that His Majesty will support anything which Mr. Hamilton tries to do to limit charcoal burning and prevent further devastation. He is particularly keen on replanting, not only in Mazandaran, but also on the hills north of Tehran and elsewhere in Persia. He told me that it was he who had encouraged Malik Mansur Khan Qashqu'i to start making fir plantations on a big scale in Fars.

He was distressed at the wretched state of agriculture in the potentially fertile valley of Kalardasht. Although there is ample rain the crops looked very thin and poor in most places and when the Shah asked the farmers, as we rode through the country, why the crops were not better, they invariably replied that they had insufficient land, no new seeds and no manure. They also admitted rather sadly that they had not enough knowledge.

The Shah often spoke of the crying need for improvement in Persian agriculture generally, though of course here again he emphasised that what was required was money and more money. He looks forward to a time when Persia can produce not only her own type of motor car and truck but also a comparatively cheap tractor. He also spoke of his eventual aim being the nationalisation of land, including forests. In this respect, he said, he was a Socialist.

Another idea which he has in the back of his mind is the eventual development of the tourist industry in this country. He seems to be thinking not only of the construction of hotels in the provinces (he

remarked that even Tehran had not one good hotel) but also of more modest constructions by the side of the main roads, somewhat after the pattern of the American motor camps or "motels." He thought that there might be quite a fair-sized flow of tourists from Iraq into Persia if travelling conditions were improved.

About Persia's neighbours and the Middle East in general, he spoke as usual disparagingly of Egypt, where he said that the lot of the fellaheen was even worse than that of the average peasant in Persia. He had not a very high opinion of the Iraqis. He thought the Afghans, who incidentally had offended him by sending no reply to his proposal of mediation in the Afghan-Pakistan dispute, were as good as crazy in their relations with the outside world. The neighbour of whom he had the highest opinion was Pakistan. He seemed to have been very much impressed during his visit to that country by its comparative efficiency and order, which he attributed at any rate partly to the effects of British rule. He preferred Pakistan to India. He was unfavourably impressed by the latter's attempt to pose as a sort of bridge between East and West.

General Impressions

I was very much struck by the popularity of the Shah in all the countryside through which we passed on our various journeys. Every morning as we rode out of the gates of the palace and through the villages that are scattered over the valley there were groups of peasants, often in very ragged clothes, who shouted and cheered and applauded with what appeared to be sincere enthusiasm. At almost every village the head man, with all the villagers lined up behind him, would make a little speech of loyalty which always concluded with general cheering, after which anybody with a petition or complaint or a story to tell was allowed to approach the Shah, who listened politely, often asking questions in return, and directed one of his officers to take charge of the matter. Women complained of their husbands, husbands of their wives, peasants of landlords or officials. This happened innumerable times but I never saw the Shah show any sign of impatience. The same sort of scene was witnessed on the air fields at Kalarhasht and Ramsar; and the Shah was frequently applauded by workmen and travellers on the journeys from Tehran via Karaj and back.

His Majesty, who had been rather tired at the beginning of his vacation, grew progressively more relaxed and cheerful and he was an exceptionally attentive host. Prince Ali Reza, who usually appeared with a day or two's growth of beard and, to my discomfort (since I sat next to him at most meals) incessantly ate raw onions, spent the days

alone shooting in the mountains. Prince Ghulam Reza, who I had previously been told was not very strong in the head, seemed to me to be very pleasant and normally intelligent, if somewhat shy.

V. G. LAWFORD.

6th September, 1950.

EP 1119/21

No. 31

RECENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 20th September)

(No. 268. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, *18th September, 1950.*

In my letters to Mr. Furlong of 26th June and 10th July, I indicated that the assumption of the Prime Ministership by Mr. Razmara promised certain possibilities in regard to the ratification of the oil agreement, but that the development of the political and economic situation during the course of the summer would mean that steps would probably have to be taken to provide the Persian Government with substantial funds before ratification was likely to be achieved. Political developments since the inauguration of the new Government at the end of June have not altogether proceeded according to plan, and it may be, therefore, of use if I analyse events since then with a view to clarifying the existing position.

2. Mr. Razmara's main plan of campaign consisted in a proposal which had the hearty backing of His Majesty the Shah, for a decentralisation of the administration and the inauguration of regional projects in connexion with the Seven-Year Plan. The process of decentralisation by means of the creation of provincial councils is not new, and is indeed envisaged in the Constitution. It was considered by the United States and ourselves to be a desirable reform and it was decided to recommend it at the Moscow Conference in December 1945—a move which, however, was in the event not proceeded with owing to Russia's disagreement. Mr. Razmara's ideas with regard to decentralisation, however, went a good deal further than those provided for in the Constitution; his intention was to introduce an entirely new scheme and it was evident at the time of his assumption of power, as well as immediately before it, that he envisaged strong opposition from the Majlis. He had

it in mind that this opposition was likely to develop to such a degree that he would, with the approval of the Shah, be obliged to call for a dissolution of Parliament. His object was to utilise the period between a dissolution and the organisation of new elections to apply his decentralisation scheme. He hoped that this proof of his Government's desire to give the people in general a closer participation in the Government of the country would result in the election of a Parliament more representative of the people in general and less devoted to personal interests. With such a Parliament he hoped that his personal influence would be so enhanced that he would have little difficulty in ensuring ratification of the Supplemental Oil Agreement, although he was always careful to indicate that some modification in the text of the agreement might be necessary. He anticipated that he would not be ready to ratify the agreement for a period of perhaps six months, and he was anxious for the assurance of sufficient funds during the intervening period to enable him not only to continue with the work of the Seven-Year Plan but to launch local development schemes which would assist in improving the lot of the individual provinces.

3. While acknowledging the desirability of this programme in general, I pointed out to Mr. Razmara that his simplest method of obtaining the necessary funds would be to secure the immediate ratification of the Supplemental Agreement rather than to wait for the assembly of a new Parliament. I put it to him that the Supplemental Agreement as it stood committed the Persian Government to nothing but receiving a large extra sum of money while the question of Persianisation was postponed for further

discussion. I suggested to him that he should be able conscientiously to defend the Supplemental Agreement in Parliament and that in addition he could very well point out that it was not complete in itself and that further discussions were implicit in the agreement itself. This suggestion was mentioned in the last paragraph of my letter of 10th July to Mr. Farlonge, and it may have formed the basis of the proposal contained in paragraph 2 of Foreign Office telegram No. 330 to the effect that the company were prepared to take a suitable opportunity of indicating to the Persian Government that if they would ratify the existing agreement the company would be prepared to resume discussions on certain aspects of it. My own suggestion was based on the fact that Mr. Gulshayan, who originally negotiated the Supplemental Agreement with the company, had had precisely this idea in mind as forming a convenient method of introducing the agreement to Parliament. Mr. Razmara's reception of this suggestion was non-committal and he informed me that he proposed to leave the oil question completely in abeyance until his position was clearer.

4. It had been anticipated that the brusque dismissal of Mr. Ali Mansur and the sudden appointment of Mr. Razmara as Prime Minister might lead to disturbances, which indeed had been threatened both by the demagogues of the National Front and by the religious leader Kashani, who returned to Persia from exile at that time. Fortunately, these threats came to nothing and the Majlis were able to foresee the danger of their position if they should resort to undue obstruction of a Prime Minister who assumed office with the reputation of an efficient and ruthless soldier. Both the Senate and the Majlis accordingly granted the new Prime Minister a substantial vote of confidence.

5. This action had the effect of somewhat limiting the Prime Minister's approach to Parliament. While the vote of confidence was in some sense an act of self-preservation on the part of the Majlis, it amounted at the same time to an offer of co-operation within constitutional limits and made it very difficult for the new Prime Minister to mark his accession to power by the introduction of reforms which went beyond what was envisaged in the Constitution itself. He may further have been influenced by indications made by the Americans and ourselves prior to his appointment, that the Constitution should be respected. He

found it best therefore to confine his decentralisation proposals within the limits already authorised by the Constitution. This meant that he was only able to submit a short Bill to that effect but he proceeded to define the organisation of the decentralisation proposals by means of somewhat lengthy regulations attached to the Bill. These regulations, of course, had to be approved by Parliament, and it was evident that they could not be discussed in any very short period. The Prime Minister therefore found not only that his ideas were emasculated to a point which he himself found disappointing, but that their application was likely to be delayed by the need for Parliamentary scrutiny of the regulations.

6. In the meantime Mr. Razmara approached both the embassy and the oil company for funds based on the most optimistic interpretation of the possibilities of his original scheme. While continuing to urge the need for ratification of the existing agreement, the embassy asked the Prime Minister for definite estimates of the amount of financial assistance he would need during the six months which he expected would elapse before the agreement could, in his opinion, be put to the Majlis. As you are aware, the Persian Government found great difficulty in arriving at these estimates, which had in the end to be drawn up as well as could be managed in the circumstances by the embassy. The failure of the Persian Government to provide the figures required is partly due to the fact that the Plan Organisation of the Seven-Year Plan had not by then come to definite decisions as to the projects which were to be carried out within the current Persian year. In addition, the new Government had not had time to investigate in the different provinces the local works which they hoped to carry out in addition to the projects of the Central Plan Organisation with the object of demonstrating throughout the country that practical measures were being taken for the improvement of the living conditions of the population. Commissions have been sent out into the provinces to investigate these matters, but their reports have not all been received. It has accordingly been very difficult to give to the Persian Government the assurances they need that sufficient funds will be forthcoming in the interim period for plans which they would like to put into operation.

7. In addition to funds deriving from oil royalties the Prime Minister had been counting on loans from the United States.

Here again, the commission which accompanied the newly-appointed United States Ambassador, and which was conducting investigations on behalf of the Export-Import Bank, found difficulty in securing the information they desired. The expectations that had been aroused by the loudly-heralded arrival of Mr. Grady were therefore not fulfilled, and the recommendations of the Export-Import Bank Commission have only just been forwarded to Washington.

8. This combination of events has been unfortunate for the Government. The Prime Minister has been unable to apply the somewhat spectacular approach to decentralisation and provincial organisation on which he had been counting, while he has not received the expected financial aid from the Americans and ourselves. His arrival in power was widely regarded in Persia as bringing with it the promise of the prompt action which might be expected from an energetic Chief of the General Staff, but the manoeuvres of the two Houses of Parliament, combined with the absence of concrete support from the Americans and ourselves, have reduced him to very much the position of his predecessors. It is true that his own personal reputation is still high, and he has been able to achieve a number of reforms and to execute a number of improvements which have certainly raised his administration above that of his predecessors. The absence of the major achievements for which he had hoped have, however, meant that the usual process of disintegration has begun to appear in both Houses of Parliament. There is less fear of Razmara as a potential dictator and less confidence that adherence to his Government is in the personal interest of Deputies. The Deputies themselves are well aware that the application of a widespread and efficient decentralisation scheme would interfere with what can legitimately be described as their private rackets, and although they are nearly all convinced that a decentralisation scheme of some kind is for the benefit of the country, they are beginning to pluck up hope that they may at any rate be able to save their own pockets. Consequently, support for the Government is less solid than it was, and the usual canvassing of possible successors to the Prime Ministership has once more begun.

9. In these circumstances it has been of great benefit to the Government that the Russians should have chosen to inaugurate discussions for a trade agreement. Such an

42154

agreement would offer substantial advantages to Persia in finding an outlet for her exports, the demand for which is at present low, while it has calmed the fears of Soviet Russia which have been a prominent part of Persian life since the end of the war and which were intensified by events in Korea. It is, however, by no means certain that the negotiations with the Russians will be successful. If success is in fact achieved the Russians are already preparing to reap the greatest possible propaganda benefit from it. His Majesty the Shah told me yesterday that the Russians were preparing to have at least one train-load of supplies ready at the frontier so that at the moment of signature they would be able to point to immediate fulfilment of their engagements. The signature of a trade agreement with the Russians would not, however, be sufficient to solidify the position of the Razmara Government, nor, I fear, will the granting of a loan of 25 or 30 million dollars by the Export-Import Bank. The main source of supply of funds and the main hope of the Government remain founded on oil royalties.

10. It is, of course, from a commercial point of view undeniably sound business to insist that the agreement signed by the Sa'id Government should be ratified by the Parliament, and in normal times there would be no need to dispute the desirability of the company biding its time until the Persians recognise the need for doing so. It is, however, evident that the question is no longer purely commercial; it is indeed possible that the fate of Persia in the future depends on the continuation in power of the Razmara Government and the application of its schemes for decentralisation. It seems incredibly pusillanimous of a Persian Government to refuse to advocate an agreement which is in itself highly advantageous and which would on ratification bring in over £40 million to the national treasury. The fact remains, however, that no amount of urging and arguing has had any effect on the two successive Prime Ministers concerned. It is, therefore, essential that consideration should be given to some means out of the difficulty, and it is for this reason that the various suggestions contained in my recent telegrams have been put forward. At the present moment it would seem that the most promising approach would be the grant by the company of some modification of the Supplemental Agreement which would permit the present Prime Minister to put it forward as an agreement

made by his own Government. The Prime Minister has promised that if this can be done he would then take all means to advocate and publicise the advantages of the agreement by means of explanations to Deputies, newspaper and radio publicity, and perhaps by the issue of a special booklet. If the promise of any Persian Prime Minister can be accepted it is that of Mr. Razmara, and if a definite promise can be extracted from him, I think that it would be a reasonable risk to rely upon it.

11. It seems unlikely that agreement as to modifications can be secured, and ratification obtained, in any very short period of time and it will be essential to assure the Government of sufficient funds to carry on in the meantime. In this connexion it must be remembered that funds sufficient for the continuation of votes under the Seven-Year Plan at the present rate will not be adequate. The Government will need to be assured of resources enough to enable them to plan ahead, not only in developing schemes already accepted under the plan but also for provincial schemes which will assure each province that something practical is being done to improve conditions in its own area. The total amount that would be required for this purpose is still uncertain owing to the fact that the provincial reports already referred to have not yet been received.

12. In conclusion it should, I think, be emphasised that the financial help and assurances of which the Government stand in real need cannot be confined to comparatively small sums or to amounts earmarked for the purchase of supplies from the sterling area. In normal times the proceeds of oil royalties are applied in the broadest possible manner to the financial needs of the country and integrated into the budget like any other normal form of revenue. The development of works in connexion with the Seven-Year Plan does not by any means entirely depend on the purchase of equipment abroad but involves expenditure in local currency which can only be financed by the sale of sterling. We have for some time past been urging the inauguration of measures designed to improve the lot of the population, and three factors have now converged which give promise that essential and long-awaited progress may be begun: the necessary projects have reached the stage when work can be started (it has in some cases already

begun); an energetic and public-spirited Prime Minister has been appointed whose sincere aim is to achieve the desired progress; and ample funds are available. However much we may criticise the successive Governments for shying away from the legislation which would put these funds at their immediate disposition, the fact remains that if this opportunity is lost we shall be guilty in the Persian mind of unfriendly rigidity in clinging to large sums of money which both we and the oil company have admitted ought to accrue to Persia. I do not defend the logic, or illogicality, of this attitude, but having spent six months in the somewhat Gilbertian occupation of beseeching the Persians to accept a windfall of over forty million pounds, I am impressed with their mental impenetrability in this matter. It is something with which we must reckon.

13. I appreciate the practical difficulties in the way of making the necessary funds available, but since we may well be at a turning point in Persian history, I feel that it is worth running some risk in order to secure the needed elasticity: and since the funds accruing from the new rates of royalty are already in hand, the ultimate risk would in fact appear to be minimal.

14. By the end of last winter a profound and widespread pessimism prevailed in this country. Unemployment and distress were rife and the subversive influence of the Tudeh Party was causing anxiety. Although crops are good this year the Government fear a recrudescence of unemployment during the winter, and measures for providing reserves of food-stuffs have had to be curtailed for lack of funds. At the present time, however, the atmosphere is encouraging: it has been improving throughout the summer and although discontent persists there has been a definite strengthening of morale in recent months. The provision of sufficient funds to enable the Government to plan ahead and to fight unemployment and distress during the winter is likely to make all the difference between the maintenance of morale and of stable Government and the recurrence of active discontent and political uncertainty.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Washington and Moscow and to the head of the British Middle East Office at Cairo.

I have, &c.

F. SHEPHERD.

MONTHLY REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 13th October)

(No. 294)

Tehran.

Sir,

6th October, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 258 of 2nd September, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during September 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. Negotiations for the resumption of trade between Persia and the Soviet Union continued, and by the end of the month were covering the quantities and prices of the goods to be exchanged. As regards the Persian gold in Moscow, the Soviet Government had proposed that a joint Soviet-Persian commission should study the financial claims on both sides. It was understood that the Persian Prime Minister intended to accept this proposal.

3. On 24th September a Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Italy was signed in Tehran. It contained no provisions of interest.

Internal Affairs

4. During the month the garrison at Kermanshah was engaged in disarming the Javanrudi tribe, a course apparently decided upon as a result of the tribe's activities earlier in the summer against a neighbouring tribe. These operations were greatly exaggerated in press reports. By the end of the month the possibility of a settlement was approaching. The Persian forces received assistance against the Javanrudi from tribes hostile to the latter. There was no question of a general Kurdish revolt against the Persian Government, as suggested by the Azerbaijan Free Radio and the more credulous sections of the world press.

5. Some apprehension was aroused in Tehran by the wanderings in tribal districts of Mr. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court. He appears to have made some imprudent remarks about the superiority of the tribal elements in Persian life and the principal result of his innocent though ill-conceived activities was that at the end of the month the Persian Government were considering imposing severe restrictions on the movement of foreigners.

6. At the beginning of the month the Majlis resumed its sittings after the summer holiday. Up to the end of the month it had

concerned itself almost exclusively with a bill submitted by the Government in connexion with the activities of the Purge Commission (paragraph 6 of my report for August). The Government's proposed bill provided for an appeal tribunal before which those already condemned and those to be condemned in future could be heard in their own defence and for the establishment of a new commission to deal with the cases of Government officials not so far examined. Since the President of the Majlis was among those placed by the original Purge Commission category "C," and the National Front had decided to make an issue of the strict application of the original Purge Commission's report, the Majlis sessions have been heated and protracted. In the meanwhile no progress has been made with important Government measures such as the budget, the decentralisation bill and a bill for increasing the pay of judges. There was some criticism in the Majlis of Dr. Nasr, the Minister of Finance, and at the end of the month it was rumoured that Dr. Nasr, who had been sent to Europe on Government business, had resigned. On 28th September a former Government supporter, reputedly disgruntled because certain profitable operations of his were no longer possible under the present Government, tabled an interpellation on three grounds:—

- (1) That the Government had done nothing to secure the rights of the Persian people from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
- (2) That its economic policy was wrong.
- (3) That it respected neither the Majlis nor the laws of the country.

The interpellation has not affected the Government adversely.

7. There were signs of growing interest in parliamentary circles in the Supplemental Oil Agreement and the Majlis Oil Commission began its study of documents submitted to it by the Government. The Prime Minister, for his part, showed signs that he intended to take a decision in the matter before very long.

8. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company acceded to the Persian Government's request for a further advance of royalties at

the present rate (see paragraph 9 of my August report). They paid over the sum of £3 million and agreed to pay a further £1 million at the end of September, October, November and December 1950, and January and February 1951. This assistance enabled the Persian Seven-Year Plan Organisation to resume work on, among other things, the Mianeh-Maragheh section of the Tabriz railway which had ceased owing to lack of funds, and on road-works in Southern Azerbaijan. It was not clear for how long this increased level of governmental economic activity could continue in the absence of further financial resources.

9. A new Labour Bill was presented to the Majlis on 12th September, and referred to a Parliamentary Committee. The Bill in its present form extends the scope of the Labour Law approved by the Fifteenth Majlis by defining a "working place" as a "place or an organisation which is managed by an employer and in which a worker is employed." The definition in the previous Law was, "a working place is an industrial, mining, constructional, commercial and transport place and institution, as well as an industrial-agricultural institution and the like." The original provision that "working places" covered by the Labour Law must be determined by the Labour Ministry, subject to approval of the High Labour Council, has been retained in the new Bill. The failure of the Government to observe neutrality in handling labour problems was further illustrated by the conduct of election, under the Labour Law, of workers' representatives on the Factory Councils at Isfahan, where martial law is still in operation. Interference by the Military Governor in support of the Government-sponsored E.S.K.I. provoked a strike at one factory after the Minister of Labour had agreed that the elections should be supervised by a special committee comprising independent observers from the E.S.K.I. and I.M.K.A. organisations. This agreement has not yet been implemented because of the continued intervention of the Governor-General and the Military Governor, and up to the end of the month it had not been possible to hold the elections.

10. The Persian Government began to bring back to Tehran the Tudeh prisoners despatched to southern prisons earlier in the year. This move was made possible by the provision of separate accommodation which would enable the authorities to keep the Tudeh prisoners separated from the others and so prevent them from conducting effective propaganda.

11. Sentence of death was passed on Hasan Jaffari for the murder of Ahmad Dihqan (see paragraph 9 of my report for May 1950).

12. There was a regrettable display of Muslim fanaticism. Last year a Bahai doctor practising in Kashan was murdered and eight Muslims accused of the murder were brought to trial in Tehran during the month under review. A section of the clergy endeavoured to persuade the Government to instruct the judges to acquit the accused, but the Government declined to interfere. The clergy then made their views quite clear to the judges, and as a result the accused men were acquitted by a majority of the Court. After the verdict was announced, there was an unseemly display of jubilation at the house of a leading cleric and there was for a time wild talk about burning down the Bahai temple in Tehran. By the end of the month this had come to nothing. The Public Prosecutor has appealed against the acquittal and the case will now go to the Court of Appeal.

13. During the last week of the month Mr. Phillips Price, M.P., who has for long taken an interest in the Middle East, was visiting Tehran.

14. An adjudication for 33,500 tons of rails was awarded to British Railmakers and the Seven-Year Plan Organisation was authorised to negotiate with them for the supply of the total quantity of 100,000 tons of rails needed for the Mianeh-Maragheh and Shahrud-Meshed extensions of the Persian railway system. Considerable efforts had to be made by this Embassy to prevent other interests from upsetting the results of the adjudication.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1192/13 G.

No. 33

THE DEFENCE OF PERSIA

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 20th October)

(No. 301)

Tehran,

14th October, 1950.

Sir,

I have noted with great interest from Foreign Office telegram No. 4451 to Washington of 6th October, that the Chiefs of Staff Committee are likely shortly to discuss with the Americans defence planning for the Middle East in which the requirements for the defence of Persia would be considered. In this connexion I venture to offer some observations which may help to clarify the Persian attitude in this matter, in amplification of my telegram No. 508 of 13th October.

2. It would appear from the tone of the telegram under reference that the Shah's remarks to Mr. Lawford have been taken as indicating a definite *démarche* contained in a special message. It was not my impression that the conversations between the Shah and Mr. Lawford were of so precise a nature. The point is, however, perhaps not of great importance since the Shah's views are well known and have been indicated on previous occasions. He mentioned this matter to me very soon after my arrival at Tehran and I reported his remarks in my despatch No. 114 of 8th April, 1950. On that occasion he indicated that Persia and Iraq constituted an area through which Turkey might be outflanked and taken in the rear. Persian consciousness of this danger was also shown in the conversation which I had with Mr. Sa'id just previous to his departure to Ankara as Persian Ambassador to Turkey. In my letter G.107/5/9/50 of 3rd July to Mr. Furlonge I reported that Mr. Sa'id was anxious for at least an understanding on defence to be come to between Persia and Iraq, even if definitive staff talks did not take place. In addition to this I would refer to paragraph 5 of the record of a conversation which took place on 16th August between Mr. Lawford and the Shah, a copy of which was sent to Eastern Department under reference G. 101/2/179/50. In that His Majesty enquired whether there was any chance of discussion between the Persian and British General Staffs with regard to the defence of Khuzistan and the oil installations before an emergency arose.

3. The question of the defence of Persia in the event of war has naturally been much

in my mind even without these indications of interest on the part of the Shah. However, as a result of a conversation which I had with the Commander-in-Chief Middle Eastern Land Forces on my way to Tehran, I understood that there was little chance of any definite planning in this direction in the near future. For this reason I have refrained from emphasising the anxiety of the Persians in this connexion and have attempted to soothe the Persians themselves by reference to statements made by the American Secretary of State and yourself regarding the interest taken by the Americans and ourselves in the independence of Persia. I was interested to see that my Military Attaché had been invited to a conference at the end of November at Fayyid in which Middle East defence was to be discussed, and I had hoped that it would be possible on that occasion to clarify the Persian situation and to indicate the extent to which it would be feasible for us to come to the assistance of the Persians, and how promptly this could be done. I was not aware that Persian defence would be discussed in the near future by the Chiefs of Staff, and it is not at present clear to me how these discussions will be integrated with those to be held in the Middle East itself.

4. As will be seen from the communications on this subject referred to above, neither the Shah nor his generals have any illusions about the capacity of the Persian Army to resist Russian invasion for any length of time. I am not competent to assess the fighting qualities of the Persian Army, but I understand that the general efficiency of the forces has been considerably improved by the United States Mission. I do not think there is much doubt that the individual Persian soldier would be perfectly prepared to fight stubbornly for his country under certain conditions, one of which is that he should be well led. There is among foreign missions in Tehran little confidence in the officer cadre and there is little sympathy between the ordinary soldier and the officer class. It is scarcely necessary to blame the Tudeh Party for the disaffection towards their Government and their officers which would appear to be endemic in the lower ranks of the Persian Army. The

Persian people are becoming aware of the inequalities of wealth in this country and of the selfishness and corruption of the ruling classes. There is in consequence a feeling among the soldiery that it would not be very much in their own interests to risk their lives for a Government which has shown little consideration for them. It follows from this that a prerequisite of any stubbornly conducted and well co-ordinated defence of Persia lies in such measures of reform as would give active hope to the poorer classes of the population that their lot would be improved by the Government for which they were being called upon to fight. There is some hope that the present Government will succeed in initiating such measures, but their effect can scarcely be immediate. It is therefore not to be expected that the Persian Army will soon show anything but a limited improvement over the morale which it exhibited in 1942, although the traditional hatred of the Russians might possibly to some extent be a compensation for the fear which they inspire.

5. The general plan of retreat of the Persian forces in the case of an attack by Russia would be in the direction of Khuzistan, Shiraz and Kurdistan. In the two latter areas the Persians would do little except indulge in guerilla activities until help arrived, and it is only in the area of Khuzistan and in the defence of the oilfields that a promising delaying action would appear to be of practical value. At a luncheon which I had with the Shah on 14th September, he referred to the possibility of a defence of the oilfields area. He thought that with proper equipment and planning it might be possible for Persian troops to deny the oilfields to Russian land forces by means of demolition and tank action. He did not think that the equipment which was being provided by the Americans would be sufficient or suitable for such a campaign, and hinted that more modern equipment, especially tanks, would be welcome. It was in this connexion that he made reference to a need for a more

definite pronouncement by the Western Powers as to their attitude in case of a Russian attack on Persia, which is reported in my telegram No. 466 of 22nd September.

6. Although the prevalent Persian fear of Russia is at the moment somewhat in abeyance on account of the current negotiations for a trade agreement, this nervousness will remain latent and is liable to come to the surface at almost any moment. The attitude of mind of many Persians to the rearmament assistance rendered by the United States tends to be that that country is merely proposing to employ Persia as a defence outpost for its own purposes, and this tendency is naturally strengthened by the realisation that the mainland of the United States is so far away. If it were possible for us to give the Persians some kind of assurance of prompt physical help in an emergency it would greatly assist in the strengthening of morale, and technical advice from us, together with the formulation of some general plan, would undoubtedly be greatly appreciated here. As seen from Tehran, there would not, I think, be any objection, while there would be considerable advantage, in making the intimation referred to in paragraph 3(c) of Foreign Office telegram No. 4451. I feel, however, that a visit by the Commander-in-Chief Middle Eastern Land Forces would not be welcome in the present relaxed state of Russo-Persian relations, since it would tend to hamper their development in an amicable manner which is greatly desired by the Persians. It would, however, seem that some form of staff talks or exchange of information as to intentions would be needed as a practical measure so that the preparations of the Persian Army for countering an invasion could be co-ordinated with our own planning.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1531/73

No. 34

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PERSIAN AMBASSADOR

Supplemental Agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

Mr. Bevin to Sir F. Shepherd (Tehran)

(No. 179. Confidential) *Foreign Office, Sir, 27th October, 1950.*

Mr. Ali Suhaili, the new Persian Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, paid his first visit to me to-day. After compliments, His Excellency stated that he had been instructed by his Government to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the general situation in Persia, and particularly to the question of the Supplemental Agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which they were anxious to have settled as soon as possible. He himself, since his arrival in England, had noticed a general desire on our side to see this matter disposed of, and he had so informed his Government. He hoped that he might count on the good offices of His Majesty's Government to secure satisfactory arrangements with the company, and he would keep in

touch with the Foreign Office for this purpose.

2. I informed the Ambassador that I had taken a personal interest in this Agreement and had hoped that it was settled last year, but there had been difficulties which I hoped could now be resolved. The additional sums which would be available to the Persian Government once the Agreement was ratified would enable them to proceed with the Seven-Year Plan, which I regarded as of particular importance in order that the Persian economy should not depend on one sole commodity, but should be placed on a sound basis and provide alternative sources of employment.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Washington and B.M.E.O.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

EP 1013/52

No. 35

MONTHLY REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 10th November)

(No. 323) *Tehran, Sir, 3rd November, 1950.*

With reference to my despatch No. 294 of 6th October I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during October 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. Commercial negotiations between Persia and the Soviet Union continued. Delays seemed to have been caused by a renewed Soviet attempt to obtain the right of direct trade with the Persian population and by Persian resistance to it. It was announced that the first meeting of the Soviet-Persian Frontier Commission would take place at Astara on 11th November.

3. The second Islamic Economic Conference was held in Tehran and closed on 11th October. Some well-intentioned recommendations were made by the conference to member Governments.

Internal Affairs

4. On 8th October the Government received a vote of confidence by ninety-seven votes to eight in the Majlis on an interpellation against the Minister of Justice. The Majlis then turned to an interpellation tabled by six members of the Majlis Oil Commission criticising the Government for not announcing its views about the Supplemental Oil Agreement and for not securing Persia's rights in the matter. Simultaneously, the Majlis Oil Commission, in which the National Front is represented to a degree quite disproportionate to its numerical strength in the Majlis, continued its study of the problem. In both places the National Front made violent attacks on the Supplemental Agreement and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company without the slightest regard for accuracy. On 18th October the Prime Minister, replying to a question in

the Senate which had resumed its activities earlier in the month, indicated that he was in favour of the Supplemental Agreement. Next day the Majlis voted on the interpellation and passed a vote of silence; this meant that they did not proceed with the interpellation but did not express a view on its subject. At the end of the month the position in respect to the agreement was that the Majlis Oil Commission were to present a report on it to the Majlis. The prospect of a relatively favourable report were somewhat improved by the appointment of Mr. Ghulam Husain Furuhar as Minister of Finance in place of Dr. Nasr who had resigned while on an official mission in Europe. Mr. Furuhar's place as Minister of Labour has not yet been filled. It was hoped that Mr. Furuhar would have both the courage and the capacity to explain to the Majlis Oil Commission and to the Deputies the advantages to Persia of the Supplemental Oil Agreement. His task was not expected to be easy since no Persian Government had made any attempt to educate public opinion in the advantages of the agreement and the field had been left entirely to the National Front. This had allowed an impression to grow up that far from providing the Persian Government with the money essential for economic development the Supplemental Agreement imposed new burdens on Persia and granted new benefits to the company. A further adverse factor was that Mr. Razmara's political opponents, especially those who had for themselves or their friends hopes of attaining the Premiership feared that if he received and turned to good account the very large sums due to the Persian Government on ratification he might remain in power for a long time. Favourable factors were the definite pronouncement of the Prime Minister in favour of the agreement and the known desire of the Shah that the agreement should be ratified in the near future.

5. Indeed, the support given by the Shah to the Prime Minister was one of the most satisfactory features of the month. In his opening speech to the Senate on 7th October the Shah indicated his support of a number of specific Government projects, including the decentralisation proposals and in informal conversation with Senators after the ceremony urged them to ratify the Supplemental Oil Agreement. Further, on the occasion of his birthday he conferred on the Prime Minister the Order of Taj, First Class, which is the highest decoration in the

country. The Shah also took a decision which it is to be hoped will make both for his happiness and for the stability of the dynasty, in announcing his engagement to Miss Suraya Isfandiari, daughter of a Bakhtiari husband by a German mother. It was announced that the wedding would take place in December 1950. The wedding ceremony of his brother Prince Abdul Riza to Miss Zand took place on 12th October.

6. The most noticeable opposition to the Government was provided by the National Front in the Majlis, but the authorities showed some concern at the possibility that the Partisans of Peace Campaign was being used as a cover for activity by the members of the banned Tudeh Party. They therefore announced that members of the Partisans of Peace Association or persons signing the Stockholm Appeal who were also members of the Tudeh Party would be prosecuted. On the other hand, Government showed confidence in its position by deciding to raise martial law in Abadan. Isfahan is now the only town in which martial law is still in force. Another relaxation of severity was the decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal that certain of the members of the Tudeh Party condemned to imprisonment for subversive activity after the attempt on the Shah's life in February 1949 were entitled to retrial before a Civil Criminal Court because certain legal formalities had not been fulfilled.

7. A complication was introduced into the political situation by the return, on 12th October, of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. In view of the offensive letters which he had addressed to the Shah he could scarcely expect to be given office. Nevertheless, his numerous friends became very active politically and formed a committee to promote his interests. It seemed likely that he would try to form a political group or party which through its friends in Parliament would be able to bring pressure to bear on the Government to confer benefits on its members.

8. None of the potential trouble-makers were able to take advantage of the Muharran mourning ceremonies to create important disturbances. The ceremonies appear to have been more widely observed than last year but, in Tehran at any rate, the authorities took adequate precautions for the maintenance of order; there had been rumours that an attack might be made on the Baha'i temple (*cf.* paragraph 12 of my report for September) but the authorities

provided an ample guard and there were no incidents at the temple.

9. Operations against the Javanrudi tribe came to an end early on with the surrender by the tribe of some 100 rifles (*cf.* paragraph 4 of my report for September).

10. American aid, about which there had been so much speculation in the Tehran press materialised in the shape of an Export-Import Bank loan of 25 million dollars, of which 18½ million were allotted to agricultural and 6 million to road-making machinery. Some newspapers showed a realisation of the value of this loan to Persia but there was much carping criticism at the "smallness" of the amount and the fact that Persia would have to pay interest on the loan. The Left-wing papers showed some peevishness at being deprived of their favourite cry that the Americans did nothing whatever to help Persia.

11. The United States Government also granted 500,000 dollars for a point-four programme. The main emphasis of this programme will apparently be on agricultural education.

12. The Bank of England and the National Bank of Persia, renewed their Memorandum of Understanding whereby the Bank of England undertake to provide dollars for Persia's essential imports where these cannot be provided on equal terms from sterling area.

13. A decree was published increasing the customs duties on imports from all countries which, while enjoying most-favoured-nation treatment with Persia, restricted or prohibited the import of Persian goods. Though the Prime Minister has stated that the decree was not intended to apply to the United Kingdom, this is not yet certain. No list of the countries affected was published.

14. The contract for supply of 100,000 tons of rails was signed (*cf.* paragraph 14 of my report for September).

15. Dr. Abdullah Daftari, formerly assistant to Mr. Ibtihaj when he was Governor of the National Bank of Persia was appointed Minister of National Economy in the place of Dr. Azmudeh who was apparently regarded as too friendly with the National Front and as ineffective; moreover, he had made enemies among influential importing interests owing to the Government's alteration of the exchange regulations in favour of exporters.

16. It was announced that a census of Tehran had been taken and that the population amounted to 989,871. If the district around Tehran is taken into account, this figure may very well be not far from the truth.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1531/79

No. 36

ATTITUDE OF PERSIAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS THE SUPPLEMENTAL OIL AGREEMENT

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 18th November)

(No. 333)

Tehran,

13th November, 1950.

Sir,

Now that the Razmara Government have adopted the Supplemental Oil Agreement, it may be of interest to review the currents of public opinion concerning the agreement. By "public opinion" in this context, is meant that minority of the population which is interested in public affairs and is able to make its views known in the capital.

2. The British point of view with regard to the Supplemental Agreement is that it is simply a device whereby the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company can put the Persian Government in possession of larger revenues in order to meet the needs of national development, the 1933 Concession retaining its validity and not being in any

way in question. To the Persian mind, however, the negotiations and the present discussions raise the whole question of whether or not it is desirable that Persian oil be leased to a foreign company. It is intensely irritating to Persian national pride that the country should have to depend on foreigners for the development of its most important natural resource and that the only large-scale, efficient and humanely-run industry in the country should be foreign-controlled. National sentiment also finds it difficult to stomach the dependence of the Persian State on the revenues received from this foreign company and that of the Persian consumer on oil supplied by the company. While almost no Persian seriously claims that Persia

could manage the oil industry without foreign help, these sentiments result in a permanent feeling of resentment towards the concessionary company and the British Government, and in an inferiority complex which finds one of its outlets in demands for "equality" between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Government; this latter feeling owes much of its present force to the nominal equality between the Soviet Union and Persia provided for in the abortive 1946 Soviet-Persian oil agreement. An additional grievance against the British Government is that they take large sums in taxation from the company. The atmosphere for any discussion of any aspect of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's operations and relations with the Persian Government is therefore poisoned from the outset and the latent resentment is constantly brought to the surface by newspaper attacks on various aspects of the company's activities.

3. Dispassionate consideration of the issues involved in the Supplemental Agreement is further clouded by extraneous factors. There is, for instance, one school of thought which holds that for Persia to lease any important part of its resources to a foreign concern or Government is directly provocative to the Soviet Union and that relations with the latter cannot be established on a safe basis until this source of irritation is removed. This line of argument is however confronted with the opposite line which supposes that the Western Powers will not take a continuing and effective interest in the maintenance of Persian independence against Soviet designs unless at least one of them has an important material stake in the country; to those who follow this line of thought the continued existence of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession is a political necessity of the first order. Rather nearer to the actualities of the Supplemental Oil Agreement is the attitude of a group which is obsessed with fears of a revival of despotic Government. It is very widely believed that the British brought Riza Shah to power and kept him there. It is also widely believed that the British can produce all sorts of magic changes behind the scenes in present-day Persia. Many politicians are critical of the increase in the Shah's power granted by the Constituent Assembly and by his apparent appetite for more, and they fear that he might one day attempt to rule like his father. Such people, regarding

the approval or rejection of the Supplemental Oil Agreement as amounting to the approval or rejection of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concessionary position, argue that if they are to vote for the Supplemental Oil Agreement they must have a British guarantee that it will not be followed by a dictatorship. When told that the British have neither the power nor the right to do any such thing, they are apt to reply that they must therefore reluctantly vote against the oil agreement since if the agreement were passed it would consolidate the power of the present Shah and probably lead in the end to the dictatorship which is the thing they most fear. There are other Deputies, Senators and politicians who, while less concerned with the question of a hypothetical royal dictatorship, are anxious, usually for interested reasons, to see the Razmara Government fall in the near future and feel that should his Government succeed in obtaining the very large sums of money due on ratification of the oil agreement it may be able to stay in power for a long time.

4. Against this background it is evident that only by a consistent campaign of enlightenment on the part of the Persian Government could public opinion be brought to assess the merits of the agreement to Persia. Unfortunately from the signature of the agreement in July 1949 until very recently successive Persian Governments have made no attempt whatsoever to fulfil this duty. The ground has therefore been left free for the demagogues of the National Front who have engaged in a campaign of consistent abuse of the agreement and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on extreme nationalist lines. Against the background described in preceding paragraphs, their campaign has been successful in creating a prejudice against the agreement and an impression that any Persian politician declaring himself to be in favour of the agreement is a traitor to his country. The effect of this has been cumulative and has resulted in the present situation in which almost no Deputy will take the lead in proclaiming the advantages of the agreement to Persia and the Government spokesmen have been very reluctant to do so. There are however elements in both Houses which realise that the agreement is a serious attempt to provide Persia with the money which she desperately needs for economic development and the raising of the standard of living and, given a lead from the Government they are prepared to exert themselves

in favour of the agreement. This lead, however hesitatingly, has now been given by Mr. Razmara and his new Minister of Finance, Mr. Furuhr, who in a recent meeting of the Majlis Oil Commission stood up to Dr. Musaddiq the leader of the National Front with excellent results on the morale of all the Deputies who would like the agreement to be passed but are too frightened of the National Front to say so. It will therefore be seen that the fate of the agreement in the Majlis Oil Commission and in the two Houses depends on the skill and determination shown by the Govern-

ment spokesmen, supported as they are by the Shah, and by the readiness of Deputies and Senators to permit themselves to consider the facts of the agreement and to be guided by reason instead of by fear and prejudice.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Washington and Moscow, and to the head of the British Middle East Office at Cairo.

I have, &c.

(For His Majesty's Ambassador)
L. F. L. PYMAN.

EP 1016/90

No. 37

CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AND THE PERSIAN PRIME MINISTER

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 7th December)

(No. 348)

Tehran,

4th December, 1950.

Sir,

I had an interview with the Persian Prime Minister on 30th November.

2. After a few preliminary remarks the Prime Minister said that he was quite pleased with the progress his Government was making in its programme of stabilising and developing the country. The signature of a commercial agreement with Germany had been made four days ago and this accounted for an exchange of goods to the value of about 90 million tomans, an amount similar to that of the Russian Trade Agreement. Agreements were also being made with Italy and France for about 30 million tomans and other agreements were contemplated which would bring the total outlet for Persian goods to a value of about 400 million tomans, which would be a record and which he thought was the maximum to which the country could attain. Exchange of goods with the Germans would be organised through the five companies which had been set up under the Russian agreement. As the Germans and the Russians both wanted approximately the same type of goods, these companies could accordingly continue to function even supposing the Russian agreement broke down. As far as the Russian agreement was concerned, the heads of the five new companies were coming to Tehran to organise the allocation of commodities and to discuss prices with the Russians. It had been decided that special arrangements should be made to

exchange Persian tobacco and cotton against Russian sugar: the values of these two groups of commodities would be approximately equal. The reason for this segregation was that both cotton and tobacco were being handled by the Government and not by private traders.

3. The Prime Minister thought that actual exchange of commodities would not start before the New Year. The Russian commission to discuss the gold question was due in a few days and the Persians were not in a hurry to start the exchange of commodities before the gold commission had started its work and had shown some progress. These tactics were not being publicised but the Prime Minister mentioned that he had told me from the beginning that he wanted to get the gold question settled before a trade agreement was put into operation.

4. He was also satisfied with the grain situation. There were about 300,000 tons in reserve and these stocks were being drawn upon at a very slow rate at present. Although the rain had been rather late he did not think that that would have any substantial effect on crops.

5. He said that he was also anxious to develop the mineral resources of the country, particularly in the region between Kerman and the Persian Gulf. His aim was to develop the resources of the country as far as possible not only with the object of increasing exports but also in order to be able to limit the amount of imports.

6. As regards oil, we had what is now almost the routine discussion about the need of the Government for even more concessions from the company in order to satisfy the Majlis. The Prime Minister was anxious that the work of the Majlis commission should be terminated immediately because they conceived themselves entitled to go on altering their decisions at every meeting. He wanted to close this commission up entirely and to put the question to the Majlis itself next week. He did not think that the Supplemental Agreement together with the modifications that Mr. Northcroft had agreed to would be sufficient. He referred to the Saudi Arabian negotiations and said that he understood that the Aramco had already signed an agreement which would give Saudi Arabia a royalty rate of over 20s. This news could not be kept secret for ever and as soon as it was known here the Majlis would naturally demand at least as much. I pointed out that oil was a perfectly ordinary commodity which was sold like anything else and that the selling price consisted in the royalty arrangements made between the selling country and the buying company. The rights of Persia presumably consisted in the country's receiving a fair price judged on the average rate of royalty agreements in the Middle East. Under the new agreement Persia would have received more than any other Middle East country, in spite of the considerable extra expense which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company incurred in freight charges and canal dues. It was obvious that the other countries of the Middle East were quite entitled to expect more than Persia instead of the other way round. The Prime Minister said that he realised this and that he had the figures for extra freight and canal charges. He thought, however, that the main weakness in his case was the comparatively low minimum rate entailed, and he suggested that the company should raise this figure. He again referred to his previous request that the company should supply free an amount of oil equivalent to that used by the company itself in Persia. He then reverted to the question of the financing by the company of cement plants and the survey of the concession area for the piping of gas. His present idea on the latter point appeared to be that the company should undertake a survey in the first place and estimate the costs and advantages. In regard to these points I said that it would be best if he talked them over with Mr. Northcroft.

7. He referred to the anti-Oil Company feeling which existed and said that this was unfortunately an expression of anglophobia, which was fostered by underground methods by the Russians, by people who were paid by the Russians and by people who wanted to secure for themselves an easy reputation for patriotism. I said that I appreciated this and regretted it profoundly. The Government, however, seemed to have taken no steps to counter this anti-British propaganda and were themselves averse to the embassy publishing anything except straight news. Surely this was a matter to which the Government must pay attention.

8. As regards his recent differences with the Majlis, he said that he had objected to the publication by members of the National Front who were on the commission dealing with the locomotive contracts, of extracts from the dossiers submitted to them. The Government could not and would not show dossiers to parliamentary commissions unless they were certain that these documents would be treated as confidential. In reply to a question he said that he had not threatened to resign because of the unparliamentary language used towards himself and his Government in the Majlis but had merely said that neither he nor his Ministers would attend the Majlis (although they continued to attend the Senate) until and unless the Majlis observed its own rules of procedure. I expressed my agreement with him over this and said I was surprised at the language which was allowed to be used in the meetings: I thought that a little discipline of the nature he had adopted might be beneficial.

9. The Prime Minister said that he was taking measures to absorb unemployment in Tehran and that this would in the main take the form of the erection of a housing estate to house about 10,000 people, on which he thought that about 7,000 men could in the initial stages be employed. One of the measures which he was taking to prevent the unemployed from coming to the town was in the price of bread, which was being made progressively cheaper as the distance from Tehran increased. Last winter the tendency had been for people to come to Tehran because of the cheaper price of bread and he hoped that this reversal of price conditions would prevent a drift to the capital.

10. He said that the Chief of Police, General Daftari, had been pleased with his visit to

England and was going to take certain measures to improve the police service in Tehran. It was proposed to erect a large number of bus shelters on the lines of those in London in order to prevent people from fighting to get on board.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Moscow and to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Cairo.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

EP 1013/57

No. 38

MONTHLY REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1950

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin. (Received 14th December)

(No. 353)

Tehran,

Sir,

10th December, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 323 of 3rd November, I have the honour to submit the following report on events in Persia during November 1950.

Foreign Affairs

2. The Soviet-Persian commercial agreement, in the form of an annex to the agreement of 1940, was signed in Tehran on 4th November. The agreement provides for the exchange of certain listed goods between 10th November, 1950, and 10th November, 1951. It made no mention of the arrangement to which the Persian Prime Minister attached particular importance, that the exchanges should be canalised through the five companies which were being set up on the Persian side; Mr. Razmara has, however, stated emphatically on several occasions that the Soviet representatives had accepted this arrangement orally and that it would be put into effect. The exchange of goods is expected to begin in mid-December; the Soviet representatives on the commission to discuss Persia's gold claims should arrive early in December. The first meeting of the Soviet-Persian frontier commission was held on 10th November at Astara. The development of exports is an important part of the present Government's economic policy and in pursuance of this policy the Government has concluded commercial agreements with Western Germany and France and is negotiating one with Italy. The Prime Minister has stated that the total exports envisaged under these four agreements should amount to some 400 million tomans (= 4,000 million rials) which would be a record and was the maximum which he thought the country could attain.

3. The conclusion of the Soviet agreement was hailed with every appearance of joy by

the two Chambers and by the press despite the fear very widely felt that the Soviet Government would use its new facilities for contact with the population to spread subversive propaganda and undermine the Persian State. Much of the satisfaction expressed was genuine: the Persians are always anxious for any sign which can be interpreted as meaning that the Soviet Union does not intend to devour their country forthwith and the Soviet approach over the commercial agreement, coming at the end of a period of tension which had lasted since 1946 undoubtedly brought a feeling of relief.

4. Temporarily reassured as to the intentions of the Soviet Union, the Persians inevitably felt that they could afford to give vent to their accumulated grievances against the Powers to whom they normally look for protection against it. The month was rich in opportunities. The Supplemental Oil Agreement dealt with in greater detail in paragraph 9) was under discussion in the Majlis Oil Commission throughout the month and inevitably stirred up much Nationalist sentiment and a spate of press criticism against the British in general and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in particular. As part of the National Front campaign against the British in connexion with the oil agreement, the issue of Bahrain was raised in the Majlis and discussed in the press. And on the Government's side action gratifying to Nationalist sentiment was taken by the suspension of the re-transmission from Radio Tehran of Voice of America and B.B.C. broadcasts. This was accompanied by much adverse press comment on American policy in Persia, which was already under heavy criticism for the alleged inadequacy of American financial assistance. The disappointment felt by Persian public opinion on this score

was voiced by the Shah himself in an interview with Reuter's Tehran correspondent.

5. It may be said that the general effect of the events of the month was to bring Persia somewhat nearer to her normal position in international affairs: namely, a position in which, while insisting on the maintenance of her independence and integrity, she seeks to avoid identification with the policies of either of the two *bloes* of Great Powers.

6. From 17th to 26th November the arbitration commission dealing with the Helmand River dispute was in Tehran.

Internal Affairs

7. On 20th November the Prime Minister filled the vacant posts of Minister of the Interior and Minister of Labour by the appointment of Amanullah Ardalan and Amir Asadullah Alam. The former is an experienced politician who gained Razmara's confidence when they worked together in Luristan many years ago; in completing his original Cabinet Mr. Razmara tried to concentrate largely on administrative and technical ability and, however desirable from the administrative point of view, this has made his path difficult with the established Tehran politicians; the appointment of Ardalan may perhaps help him in dealing with them. The appointment of Asadullah Alam was desirable in itself, since he is one of the few genuinely patriotic young men in Persian politics, and also because he is a personal friend of the Shah, and his presence in the Cabinet may help to make the latter less suspicious that Razmara or members of his Cabinet are acting against him.

8. Relations between the Lower House and the Prime Minister were not good. The Majlis was largely occupied in discussing a report from its Judicial Affairs Commission which set aside the Government's draft Purge Bill (paragraph 6 of my report for September 1950) and recommended that since the original Purge Commission had exceeded its powers and behaved illegally, its findings were of no effect. This resolution, which was repugnant to a considerable minority of the Majlis, was finally passed and sent to the Senate. In the meanwhile Government business in the Majlis remained stagnant and the number of Government Bills awaiting attention increased. This, coupled with the persistent failure of the President of the Majlis to prevent the National Front, and other Deputies from

abusing the Prime Minister and other Ministers in the House in unparliamentary language, caused the former to inform the presidential body that unless the language of Deputies could be kept within the bounds of decency he and his Government would not present themselves at sessions of the Majlis. He also complained of the leakage of official documents submitted by Government Departments to committees of the Majlis. At the end of the month it seemed that the quarrel would be patched up and that the Government would in future resume attendance at the Majlis. At the time it was reported by the press that Mr. Razmara had threatened to resign. He has denied that he ever said anything of the sort and it is clear that he has no intention of willingly relinquishing power. The effect of this episode, although leading to the usual Tehran talk about possible future Prime Ministers, has in fact been rather to strengthen the position of the present Prime Minister by putting heart into the majority of Deputies who are inclined to support the Government; in particular hints which have been in circulation that if the Majlis continued to obstruct the Government the Shah might exercise his power to dissolve it have also had their effect.

9. The main parliamentary activity of the month was the continuance of the discussion of the Supplemental Oil Agreement in the Majlis Oil Commission. The agreement was vigorously defended by the new Minister of Finance who also published the replies which he had sent to various communications of Dr. Musaddiq. The Prime Minister also addressed the commission at some length on the political and economic advantages of the agreement. By the end of the month the commission felt ready to render a report to the Majlis. The National Front Deputies made determined efforts to pass resolutions that the oil industry be nationalised or alternatively that the period of validity of the concession be greatly reduced. The Government supporters succeeded in preventing the passage of resolutions in this sense and in the end a unanimous resolution was passed on 25th November in the following terms: "After full and detailed discussions on this point the commission decided unanimously that the 'Sa'id-Gass' Supplemental Agreement does not secure the interests of the Persian people in the Southern oil." This was described by the Persian press as rejection of the agreement, although in fact in the absence of any communication of the

respects in which the agreement was supposed to be deficient the resolution was not very injurious. The remaining sessions were devoted to further efforts by the National Front to secure resolutions in the sense desired by them. It was finally agreed by a majority vote that the commission should pass no other resolutions. At the end of the month the way in which the agreement would be sent to the Majlis was still in doubt since the report covering the resolution of 25th November remained to be drawn up.

10. A decree of 8th November fixed the rate for export exchange by authorising the banks to buy and sell exchange to stabilise the hitherto "free rate" at 136.50 rials (selling rate; buying rate 134.90) to the £ sterling. This is the rate available to importers of less essential goods, and now that it has been fixed—and at a reasonable

level—importers and exporters should be less hesitant.

11. A mission of three Persian officials went to Washington at the end of the month for final negotiation and signature of the Export-Import Bank Loan.

12. The Prime Minister attended a Workers' Rally in Tehran on 6th November, the object of which was to further efforts now being made to promote a better relationship between the ESKI and non-ESKI trade unions. The Premier spoke and stressed the need for closer co-operation between the various workers' organisations. He also said that employers would have to be content with smaller profits in the future and be more concerned about improving wages and working conditions.

I have, &c.

F. M. SHEPHERD.

APPENDIX
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EP 1012/1

No. 39

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN PERSIA

Sir F. Shepherd to Mr. Younger. (Received 6th June)

Sir,
(No. 160. Confidential) 1st June, 1950. Tehran.
With reference to Mr. Lawford's despatch No. 319 of 6th September, 1949, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a list of personalities in Persia, revised to 1st June, 1950.

I have, &c.
F. M. SHEPHERD.

Enclosure

Leading Personalities in Persia, 1950

INDEX

1. Adham, Dr. Abbas (Alam-ul-Mulk).
Adib-us-Saltaneh (see Sam'i, Husain).
2. Adl, Ahmad Husain.
3. Adl, Mustafa (Mansur-us-Saltaneh).
4. Afshar, Riza.
5. Ala, Husain, C.M.G. (Mu'in-ul-Vizareh).
6. Alam, Asadullah.
Alam-ul-Mulk (see Adham, Dr. Abbas).
7. Alavi, Dr. Hasan.
Amin-ul-Mulk (see Marzban, Dr. Isma'il).
8. Amini, Dr. Ali.
9. Amir Ahmadi, Ahmad, General (Sipahbud).
10. Amir Ab'i, Shams-ud-Din.
Amir A'zim (see Azudi, Yadullah).
Amir Humayun (see Bushihri-Dihdashiti).
11. Amiri, Javad.
Amir-i-Arfa' (see Pakravan, Fathullah).
Amir-i-Jang (see As'ad, Muhammad Taqi).
Amir Makhsum (see Qubadian, Abbas).
Amir Muvassaq (see Nakhjivan, Muhammad).
Amir Nizam (see Qaraguzlu, Husain Quli).
12. Amir-Taimur Kalali, Muhammad Ibrahim.
13. Ansari, Abdul Husain Mas'ud.
Ansari, Ghulam Ali, Brigadier (Sartip) (see 1949 Personalities, No. 14).
Ara'i, Asadullah Shams-ul-Mulk (see Shams-ul-Mulk Ara'i, Asadullah).
14. Aramish, Ahmad.
15. Arasteh, Nadir.
16. Ardalan, Dr. Ali Quli.
17. Ardalan, Amanullah (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik).
18. Ardalan, Nasir Quli.
19. Arfa', Hasan, Major-General (Sarlashgar).
As'ad, Manuchihr (see Bakhtiari, Manuchihr As'ad).
20. As'ad, Muhammad Taqi (Amir-i-Jang).
21. Asadi, Salman.
22. Ashrafi, Ghulam Husain.
23. A'zam-Zanganeh, Dr. Abdul Hanid.
24. Azudi, Yadullah (Amir A'zim).
25. Badir, Mahmud.
26. Bahar, Muhammad Taqi (Malik-ush-Shuara).
Baha-ul-Mulk (see Qaraguzlu, Ali Riza).
27. Bahrami, Farajullah (Dabir-i-A'zam).
28. Bahrami, Fazlullah.

29. Bakhtiari(i), Abul Qasim Khan.
30. Bakhtiari(i), Aqa Khan.
31. Bakhtiari(i), Jahanshah Samsam.
32. Bakhtiari(i), Manuchihr As'ad.
33. Bakhtiari(i), Murtiza Quli Samsam.
34. Bakhtiari(i), Dr. Shahpur.
Basir-i-Divan (see Zahedi, Fazlullah).
35. Bayandur, Ghulam Husain, Captain.
36. Bayat, Murtiza Quli (Saham-us-Sultan).
37. Bihibahani, Mirza Sayyid Muhammad.
38. Bushihri-Dihdashiti, Aqa Javad (Amir Humayun).
Dabir-i-A'zam (see Bahrami, Farajullah).
Dabir-ul-Mulk (see Kazimi, Mustafa).
39. Dashti, Ali.
40. Divanbaigi, Aqa Riza Ali.
41. Fahimi, Khalil (Fahim-ul-Mulk).
42. Farhudi, Dr. Husain.
Farman Farmanyan (see Firuz, Muhammad Vali Mirza).
43. Farrukh, Mihdi (Mu'tasim-us-Saltaneh).
44. Fatih, Mahmud.
45. Fatih, Mustafa.
Fatimi, Ali Naqi Misbah (see Misbah-Fatimi, Ali Naqi).
46. Fatimi, Mihdi (Imad-us-Saltaneh).
47. Fatimi, Saifpur.
48. Fidakar, Taqi.
49. Firuz, Muhammad Husain, Major-General (Sarlashgar).
50. Firuz, Muhammad Vali Mirza (Farmanfarmanyan).
51. Firuz, Muzaffar.
52. Furuhar, Abbas.
53. Furuhar, Abul Qasim.
54. Furuhar, Ghulam Husain.
55. Ghaffari, Amir Saham-ud-Din (Zuka-ud-Dauleh).
56. Ghaffari, Hasan Ali (Mu'avin-ud-Dauleh).
57. Ghani, Qasim.
58. Gulshayan, Abbas Quli.
59. Hai'at, Ali.
60. Hakimi, Ibrahim (Hakim-ul-Mulk).
61. Hazhir, Abdul Husain.
62. Hidayat, Abdullah, Major-General (Sarlashgar).
63. Hidayat, Izzatullah.
64. Hidayat, Khusrau Bahman.
65. Hikmat, Ali Ashgar.
66. Hikmat, Riza (Sardar Fakhir).
67. Hishmati, Abbas.
Hishmat-ud-Dauleh (see Valatabar, Abul-Fath).
68. Humayunjah, Muhammad Ali.
69. Huvarisian, Ardashis.
70. Ibtihaj, Abul Hasan.
71. Ibtihaj, Ghulam Husain.
72. Ibtisham, Dr. Hisam-ud-Din.
Imad-us-Saltaneh (see Fatimi, Mihdi).
73. Imami, Dr. Hasan.
74. Imami, Jamal-ud-Din.
75. Imami, Nizam-ud-Din.
76. Intizam, Abdullah.
77. Intizam, Nasrullah.

78. Iqbal, Ali.
79. Iqbal, Dr. Manuchehr.
80. Isfandiari, Asadullah Yamin (Yamin-ul-Mamalik).
81. Isfandiari, Fathollah Nuri.
82. Isfandiari, Musa Nuri (Muvaffaq-us-Saltaneh).
83. Iskandari, Abbas.
84. Iskandari, Iraj.
85. Issayeff, Ramon.
86. I'tibar, Dr. Abdul Husain.
87. I'timadi, Nasir Quli (Nasir-ud-Dauleh).
88. Izz-ud-Mamalik (see Ardalan, Amanullah).
89. Jahanbani, Amanullah, General (Sipahbud).
90. Jahanbani, Muhammad Husain, Brigadier (Sartip).
91. Jam, Mahmud (Mudir-ul-Mulk).
92. Jazayiri, Dr. Shams-ud-Din.
93. Kafa'i, Hasan.
94. Kaihan, Mas'ud.
95. Kaivan, Amir Aga.
96. Kambakhsh, Abdus-Samad.
97. Kashani (or Kashi), Sayyid Abul Qasim.
98. Kazimi, Baqir (Muazzib-ud-Dauleh).
99. Kazimi, Mustafa (Dabir-ul-Mulk).
100. Khajeh-Nuri, Ghulam Ali (Nizam-us-Sultan).
101. Khajeh-Nuri, Ibrahim.
102. Khosravi, Ahmad, Major-General (Sarlashgar).
103. Kishavaz, Dr. Faridan.
104. Kupal, Sadiq, Major-General (Sarlashgar).
105. Kuros, Isa (Esau).
106. Lankarani, Shaikh Husain.
107. Malk-us-Shuara (see Bahar, Muhammad Taqi).
108. Mansur (Rajab), Ali, C.B.E. (Mansur-ul-Mulk).
109. Mansur-us-Saltaneh (see Adl, Mustafa).
110. Maragheh, Muhammad Sa'id (see Sa'id, Muhammad).
111. Marzban, Dr. Isma'il (Amin-ul-Mulk).
112. Mas'ud, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dauleh).
113. Mas'udi, Abbas.
114. Mas'udi, Ahmad.
115. Mas'udi, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dauleh).
116. Mas'udi, Abbas.
117. Mas'udi, Ahmad.
118. Mas'udi, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dauleh).
119. Mas'udi, Abbas.
120. Mas'udi, Ahmad.
121. Mas'udi, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dauleh).
122. Mas'udi, Abbas.
123. Mas'udi, Ahmad.
124. Mas'udi, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dauleh).
125. Mas'udi, Abbas.
126. Mas'udi, Ahmad.
127. Mas'udi, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dauleh).
128. Mas'udi, Abbas.
129. Mas'udi, Ahmad.
130. Nikpay, Izaz (Azizullah).
131. Nizam-Qaraguzlu (see under Qaraguzlu).
132. Nizam-us-Sultan (see Khajeh-Nuri Ghulam Ali).
133. Nurzad, Ghulam Riza.
134. Pahtavi, Muhammad Riza Saah.
135. Pahlavi, Royal Family.
136. Pahravan, Fathollah (Amir-i-Arfa').
137. Pirnazar, Hasan.
138. Puryadi, Abul Qasim.
139. Qadimi, Dr. Husain.
140. Qaraguzlu, Ali Riza (Baha-ul-Mulk).
141. Qaraguzlu, Husain Ali.
142. Nizam Qaraguzlu, Husain Quli (Amir Nizam).
143. Qashqa'i, Khusrau.
144. Qashqa'i, Malik Mansur.
145. Qashqa'i, Muhammad Husain.
146. Qashqa'i, Muhammad Nasir.
147. Qavam, Ahmad (Qavam-us-Saltaneh).
148. Qavam, Ibrahim (Qavam-ul-Mulk).
149. Qizilbash, Aziz.
150. Qubadani, Abbas (Amir Maksus).
151. Quds (Nakha'i), Husain.
152. Radmanish, Dr. Riza.
153. Rahnama, Zain-ul-Abidin.
154. Ra'is, Muhsin.
155. Razmara, Haji Ali, General (Sipahbud).
156. Rosta, Riza.
157. Saqid, Dr. Isa (Sadiq-i-A'lam).
158. Sadiq, Sadiq (Mustashar-ud-Dauleh).
159. Sadr, Sayyid Muhsin (Sadr-ul-Ashraf).
160. Saham-us-Sultan (see Bayat, Murtiza Quli).
161. Sa'id (Maragheh), Muhammad (Sa'id-ul-Vizarch).
162. Sa'id, Muhammad.
163. Sajjadi, Dr. Muhammad.
164. Salih, Allahyar.
165. Salih, Dr. Jahanbani.
166. Sam'i, Husain (Adib-us-Saltaneh).
167. Samsam (see under Bakhtiari).
168. Sardar Fakhr (see Hikmat, Riza).
169. Sarim-ud-Dauleh (see Mas'ud Akbar).
170. Sayyah, Hamid.
171. Sayyah, Kazim.
172. Shafa'i, Isma'il, Major-General (Sarlashgar).
173. Shahab-ud-Dauleh (see Shams-ul-Mulk Ara'i).
174. Shahbakhti, Muhammad, General (Sipahbud).
175. Shahruk, Bahram.
176. Shams-ul-Mulk Ara'i, Asadullah, K.C.V.O. (Shahab-ud-Dauleh).
177. Siavi, Dr. Ali Akbar.
178. Sipahbud, Anushirvan.
179. Siphr, Ahmad Ali (Muvarrikh-ud-Dauleh).
180. Suhaili, Ali.
181. Sururi, Muhammad.
182. Taba, Dr. Abdul Husain.
183. Tabataba'i, Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq.
184. Tabataba'i, Sayyid Zia-ud-Din.
185. Tadayun, Sayyid Muhammad.
186. Tahiri, Dr. Hadi.
187. Taqizadeh, Sayyid Hasan.
188. Tihrani, Sayyid Jalal-ud-Din.
189. Valatabar, Abul-Fath, K.B.E., (Hishmat-ud-Dauleh).
190. Varasteh, Muhammad Ali.
191. Vusuq, Hasan, G.C.B. (Vusuq-ud-Dauleh).
192. Yamin-ul-Mamalik (see Isfandiari, Asadullah Yamin).
193. Yazdan Panah, Murtiza, General (Sipahbud).
194. Yazdi, Dr. Murtiza.
195. Zahidi, Fazlullah, Major-General (Sarlashgar).
196. Zand, Ibrahim.
197. Zanganeh, Dr. Abdul Hamid (see A'zam-Zanganeh).
198. Zanganeh, Dr. Ahmad Ibrahim.
199. Zarin-Kafsh, Ali Asghar.
200. Zuka-ud-Dauleh (see Ghaffari, Amir Saham-ud-Din).

L. Adham, Dr. Abbas (Alam-ul-Mulk)

Born in 1882, son of Mirza Zain-ul-Abidin Khan (Luqman-ul-Mamalik). Is a native of Azerbaijan. Educated in Persia and at Paris University where he studied medicine. Did post-graduate work in France.

Minister of Health under Hazhir in June 1948 and again under Sa'id when he reshuffled his Cabinet in March 1949. Continued in office under Sa'id when he shuffled his Cabinet again in January 1950, although Dr. Farhad was at first designated to replace him. Not reappointed by Monsur, April 1950.

Was previously head of the School of Medicine in Tehran and is still head of the Razi Hospital. He is also a court physician. Speaks French and Turki. His daughter is married to Nusratullah Muntassir of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

2. Adl, Ahmad Husain

Born in Tabriz c. 1895, son of the late Adl-ul-Mulk and younger brother of Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us-Saltaneh). Educated partly in France.

Appointed Minister of Agriculture in March 1942, which post he held until February 1943, showing himself friendly and helpful. He was then tried in the Officials Court on charges of misappropriation of funds but was acquitted. Appointed to the Supreme Economic Council in April 1945; he became Minister of Agriculture again in November that year. Again Minister of Agriculture under Qavam in June 1947. He was associated with the Seven-Year Plan under Dr. Nafisi and took his place as chairman of the Provisional Organisation of the Seven-Year Plan in January 1949, until May 1949 when he was appointed a member of the Supreme Council of the Plan. He was successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949.

Speaks French and a little English.

3. Adl, Mustafa (Mansur-us-Saltaneh)

Born in Tabriz about 1885. Went to Egypt when quite young. There he finished his primary education and afterwards went to Paris. In Paris he graduated from the Faculty of Law. Secretary at the consulate at Tiflis in 1903. At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a short period, and then transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Appointed a member of the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission in 1913. From then until 1927 employed principally as Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice. He became in that year legal adviser to the Ministry and drafted a number of new judicial codes. A member of the Supervisory Board of the National Bank from 1929-32; in 1933 Director of the Legislation Department of the Ministry of Justice, and professor in the Law Academy at Tehran.

Appointed Persian Minister at Berne in 1934. Recalled to Tehran December 1936. Political Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs March 1937. Under-Secretary July 1937. Acting Minister March 1938. Minister at Rome July 1938 and also accredited to Budapest September 1938.

Returned from Rome late in 1941. Director of the Faculty of Law 1941. Minister of Education in Subhaili's Cabinet March to August 1942. He was not conspicuous for help to the Allied cause in 1942. He was, however, appointed Minister without Portfolio in Subhaili's Cabinet January to March 1944 and again in Sa'id's Cabinet from March to August 1944, when, on the reconstruction of the Cabinet, he was dropped. Minister of Justice in Bayat's Government of November 1944 and again Minister without Portfolio in Sadr's Cabinet of June 1945. Delegate to U.N.O. January 1946.

Minister of Justice and later Minister without Portfolio under Qavam June to December 1947. Minister without Portfolio in Hakim's Cabinet

December 1947 and again under Hazhir in 1948. In February 1949 he joined Sa'id's Cabinet in the same capacity and assumed direction of the Ministry of Labour in May. Dropped in Sa'id's reshuffle of January 1950, he was nominated by the Shah to be a Senator for Tabriz, February 1950.

A quiet man without much personality. A good bridge player. Speaks French.

4. Afshar, Riza

Born at Urumieh (now Riza'iyeh) about 1888. Joined the Ministry of Finance as a young man, and during Mirza Kuchik Khan's rebellion in Gilan acted as financial agent to him; and soon after the war he got away with certain funds from the Finance Office in Resht. With these he brought carpets and took them to America for sale. Served also under Sir P. Cox, who paid him well. Returned to Persia in 1921, full of American ideas and education. Joined the staff of Dr. Milspaugh, the American financial adviser. A staunch supporter of the Pahlavi régime, elected to the 5th, 6th and 7th Majlis. Opposed Piruz Mirza when the latter was Minister of Finance. Governor of Gilan in 1929. While at that post he organised the Gilan Import and Export Company, which was founded in opposition to Russian trade monopoly methods. As a result he incurred the hostility of the Russian interests there. Governor-General of Kerman in 1931. Minister of Roads in February 1932. Resigned in the following July, being unable to build the Chalus road fast enough for the Shah. Governor of Isfahan September 1932 to December 1933. Was put under surveillance in Tehran in 1935 owing to supposed inefficiency (perhaps complicity) in connexion with the Bakhtiari plots in 1934. Sentenced to six months' imprisonment and permanent exclusion from Government service in June 1936 for accepting a bribe when Minister of Roads.

Governor-General of Isfahan May-June 1944 until Supreme Court of Appeal decided he was ineligible for office on the grounds of the sentence passed on him in 1936. Secretary to the Iranian Airways December 1944. Deputy for Riza'iyeh in 16th Majlis.

Speaks English fluently. Full of ideas and energy. Very nationalistic.

5. Ala, Husain, C.M.G. (Mu'in-ul-Vizarch)

Born about 1884. Son of the late Prince Ala-us-Saltaneh, for many years Persian Minister in London. Educated at Westminster School, where he seems to have received rough treatment, which resulted in a strong anti-British bias, at any rate for the next few years. Created C.M.G. in 1905, when he accompanied his father on a special mission to London for the Coronation of the late King Edward VII. Appointed "chef de Cabinet" in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1906, his late father being then Minister for Foreign Affairs. He remained as "chef de Cabinet" to various Ministers until 1915. Appointed Minister of Public Works in January 1918, and continued to direct that Ministry during the Cabinet presided over by Samsam-us-Saltaneh, which was in power from May to August 1918. This Cabinet abrogated the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

After accompanying the abortive Persian mission to the Paris Peace Conference in 1918, he became minister at Madrid (1919) and then at Washington (1920). Returning to Persia in 1925 he alternated office at home with headship of missions abroad, being minister at Paris 1929 to 1933 and at London 1934 to 1936. President of the National Bank in 1941 and Minister of Court 1942.

Appointed ambassador to Washington in August 1945 when status of Persian Legation there was raised to that of an embassy. Was very active in giving publicity in the United States to the Persian case over the Azerbaijan problem and showed ability

presenting Persia's case to the Security Council in March and April 1946.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs by Sa'ad in February 1950 and continued under Mansur, April 1950, and returned to Persia at the end of May 1950. He was successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949.

Married Fatimeh Khanum, the only daughter of the late Abul Qasim Khan Qaraguzlu (Nasir-ul-Mulk), Regent of Persia, in July 1927. Mrs. Ala was one of the first of her generation to leave off the veil.

A hard worker and a staunch patriot; intelligent and well-read; interested in the literature of many countries and quite a good pianist. Has a perfect command of English and speaks good French. He is a sensitive Persian Nationalist who realises the failings of his fellow-countrymen; however, while Minister of Court was apt to overrate the virtues of the Shah.

6. Alam, Asadullah

Born c. 1920. Son of the late Shaikat-ul-Mulk, who was hereditary Khan of Birjand and the Qa'imat, he has inherited much of his father's influence over the Baluchi tribes of East Persia. In 1947 appointed Governor-General of Persian Baluchistan, in which post he showed commendable energy and efficiency. Deputy for Birjand in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Left Baluchistan to become Minister of the Interior under Sa'ad, January 1950. In the Cabinet reshuffle of February he was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. Continued in this post under Mansur, April 1950.

Friendly, intelligent and helpful. Married to a daughter of Qavam-ul-Mulk. Speaks good English and French.

7. Alavi, Dr. Hasan

Born 1910 in Shiraz. Studied medicine in Bombay and London where he held post of ophthalmic surgeon at St. Thomas's Hospital and at other English hospitals. He was recalled to Persia by Riza Shah in 1938 and appointed Court Physician and consulting specialist to the Persian army. In March 1947 he was promoted to brigadier (honorary).

Hard-working and staunch patriot; intelligent and well-read with a perfect command of English. A sensitive Persian Nationalist who deprecates the failings, especially peculation, of his countrymen. A great admirer of British institutions, he helped to found the United Kingdom Universities' Society of the Anglo-Persian Institute. Has considerable private practice and is commonly acknowledged to be the best ophthalmic surgeon in Persia.

A friend of the Shah, it was on his insistence, he says, that he stood for Bushire for which he was elected to the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Deputy for Bushire in 16th Majlis. Prominent in the affairs of the "Iran" group in this Majlis. He is a staunch supporter of Sayyid-ud-Din.

8. Amini, Dr. Ali

Fourth son of Muhsin Amini (Amin-ud-Daulah). Born at Tehran in 1903. Educated in Persia and in France. Studied law at Paris. Married one of the daughters of Hasan Vusuq (Vusuq-ud-Daulah). Served for some years in the Customs Administration; appointed acting head of Customs about May 1936 and (1939) head thereof until the autumn, when General Amir Khusrovi had him transferred to the Ministry of Finance as one of the Minister's assistants.

Secretary to Qavam-us-Saltaneh when Prime Minister in 1942. Appointed as head of a commercial mission to Washington by the latter, but did not proceed.

Was sent by the Persian Government to India in 1945 to study the possibilities for developing trade between India and Persia and to examine the foreign exchange control question. Chairman of the board of directors of the Industrial Bank November 1946. Member of Democrat Party of Iran. Elected to 15th Majlis for Tehran. President of Exchange Control Commission in 1949. Successful in first stage Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949. Minister of National Economy under Mansur, April 1950.

Speaks French and is intelligent. Accused by his enemies of various kinds of peculation and sharp practice. Agreeable and usually helpful.

9. Amir Ahmadi, Ahmad, General (Sipahbud)

Born in Tehran about 1880. Comes from an Ardibil family, his forebears having emigrated from the Caucasus. Enlisted in the Cossack Brigade in 1899 and received speedy promotion; he was soon commissioned, and was a general in 1920. Took a prominent part in operations against the Jangalis in 1919. When the army was reorganised in 1922 he was given the rank of Amir Lashgar (chief of a division) and held successively commands in West, North-west (with Ammeh) and South-west Persia where he did good work in disarming the tribes up to 1933. Promoted Sipahbud in April 1929. Director of Remounts 1935.

Minister of War in Faruqi's Cabinet, which negotiated the Tripartite Treaty in 1942. Military Governor of Tehran in December 1942, when he quickly put a stop to rioting and looting; and then Minister of War under Qavam-us-Saltaneh and Suhaili. Resigned December 1943 when Suhaili reformed his Cabinet and at the Shah's instance appointed Zand, a civilian, as Minister of War. Minister of War in Qavam's Cabinet February 1946. Resigned July 1947. Appointed Minister of the Interior in Hakimi's Cabinet March 1948 and Minister of War under Hazhir June 1948, and again under Sa'ad November 1948. Went to the United Kingdom for medical treatment September 1949, returning December 1949. Dropped from Ministry of War January 1950 and nominated a Senator for Tehran February 1950.

His accumulated wealth and large properties appear to have satisfied his desires, so that he seems to have got over his youthful inclination towards robbery. He is strongly opposed to General Razmara. During his periods of Cabinet office was very friendly to us. Speaks Russian.

10. Amir Ala'i, Shams-ud-Din

Born about 1896. Senior official in the Ministry of Agriculture until his appointment as Acting Minister under Qavam-us-Saltaneh February 1946. Appointed Minister under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in August and again in October 1946. Dropped when the Cabinet was re-formed in June 1947. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949, in which month he also took "bast" with Dr. Musaddiq in the Royal Palace as a protest against the conduct of the 16th Majlis elections. Quiet, ineffective little man with no great administrative capabilities, but will always do what he is told.

11. Amir, Javad

Born in Tehran 1895, from a Simman family. Educated in Persia and France. Speaks French, and has studied law in Paris. Entered the service of the Ministry of Justice in 1914, and was for many years assistant to the French judicial adviser attached to the Ministry of Justice. Was a professor in the law school. In 1928 appointed president of the Tribunal of Commerce. President of the court of first instance in Tehran 1931-34. Director of the Department of Legislation in the Ministry of Justice

in 1934. Went to Bagdad with Fathullah Nuri Isfandiari in December 1935 as legal and technical adviser in the abortive negotiations about the frontier, &c., with Iraq. Juridical Counsellor in charge of the Advisory Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1938. Administrative Director-General August 1938 and Under-Secretary January 1939 in that Ministry.

In charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the time of the invasion 1941. Minister of the Interior in Suhaili's Cabinet 1942, and later Minister of Justice; in the former post he was a disappointment, in the latter he was more at home but was soon replaced. Elected to the 14th Majlis from Simman, December 1943. Re-elected to 15th Majlis 1947. Deputy for Simman in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in Simman, autumn 1949. Deputy for Simman in 16th Majlis.

Accompanied Qavam-us-Saltaneh on his mission to Moscow in February 1946.

A man of considerable influence and importance in his capacity as technical adviser on legislation. Having been trained by the French legal advisers here, his ideas of law are somewhat different from those held by British lawyers.

Conscientious and hard-working, with a lawyer's capacity for rapid assimilation of detail. Amiable but weak.

12. Amir-Taimur Kalali, Mohammad Ibrahim

Born about 1895. Member of a well-known Khurasan tribe. Educated in Tehran. Elected to the Majlis in the time of Riza Shah, and again for Meshed in the 14th Majlis elections 1945 where he headed the poll. Vice-President of the Majlis 1944.

A rich landowner who smokes opium. Was on Foundation Committee of Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society March 1944.

In 1945 he showed an inclination to turn to the Embassy for support against Russian pressure.

Arrested August 1946 under Military Law Ordinance. Released after a short detention. Elected Deputy for Meshed in 15th Majlis 1947. Represented Meshed in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Unsuccessful candidate in 16th Majlis elections at Meshed.

A talkative demagogue, fond of working himself into passionate indignation about subjects which he does not understand. For instance, he opposed the Tripartite Treaty and caused the Faruqi Cabinet a great deal of trouble. But he is amenable to argument, and, though vain, is not entirely without good ideas.

13. Ansari, Abdul Husain Mas'ud

The eldest son of the late Ali Quli Ansari (Mushavir-ul-Mamalik). Born 1899. Educated at Tehran and in Europe. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. Served for a number of years in the Persian Embassy in Moscow as secretary, and his rapid promotion is largely due to his father's influence. Counsellor at Moscow in 1927 and held that post till he was transferred to Tehran in 1931. Head of the Economics Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in September 1933. Went to Germany as a member of the Persian Economic Mission to Germany in July 1935. Head of the Third Political Section (dealing with British affairs) 1936. Head of the Protocol Department November 1937. Consul-general, Delhi, May 1938. Minister to Sweden 1941. Returned to Tehran in 1944 and was appointed head of the Tripartite Pact Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Vice-president of Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society March 1945. Appointed Governor-General of Gilan November 1945. Transferred to Isfahan October

1947. While Governor-General of Isfahan was markedly friendly to His Majesty's Consul and to the British Council there. He was always ready to furnish information to His Majesty's Consul and did not pretend to favour the "balanced" foreign policy *vis-à-vis* Russia and the West. Not a strong Governor-General, he made no secret of his wish to get back to diplomatic life. His smooth manner and lack of interest in local politics alienated some of the people among whom he worked.

Appointed Ambassador at Kabul, March 1949.

Married a Russian in Moscow; the lady was suspected of being a spy; she died in Berlin in 1936 leaving one child, a boy. Married a Persian in 1937.

Speaks excellent Russian and French, German and fair English.

14. Aramish, Ahmad

Born about 1902. Has held various Government posts. June 1944 was in charge of all Accounts Departments in the Ministry of Finance factories. Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry June 1946—resigned September 1946. Set up the Labour Inspection administration in Khuzistan in June 1946 and became Secretary-General to the Democrat Party of Iran July 1946. Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister October 1946 when he resigned his secretaryship of the Democrat Party of Iran. Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry late October 1946. Minister of Labour and Propaganda December 1946. While Minister of Labour and Propaganda was strongly opposed by many of his Cabinet colleagues because of his efforts to collect party funds by irregular means which he was suspected of turning to his own advantage. His Ministry's programme of social reform was also extremely unpopular with certain Right-wing members of his party.

Omitted when Qavam re-formed his Cabinet in June 1947. Successful in 1st stage Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949.

Affable and energetic but unreliable, immature and lacking political sense. Speaks fair English and French.

15. Arasteh, Nadir

Born about 1893, son of a Qajar prince. Governor of Pahlavi in 1928. Deputy-Governor of Azerbaijan in 1930-32. Governor of Khuzistan May 1932—August 1933. Has also served in the Persian Legation in London. Appointed minister to Poland December 1933. Appointed first Persian Minister to the Argentine Republic August 1935; presented his letters in October 1935. Recalled to Tehran October 1936; the post being abolished. In charge of the Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a short while in 1937. Minister at Berlin August 1937. Accredited also to The Hague in 1939. Recalled from Berlin May 1940. Governor-General of Mazandaran January 1942 and of Gilan January 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs November 1944 in Bayat's Government and for Communications under Hakimi in May 1945 and then in Sadr's Cabinet June to November 1945. Appointed Governor-General, Isfahan, May 1946, withdrawn October 1946.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs under Hazhir June 1948, retained the portfolio under Sa'ad November 1948, but exchanged it for that of Roads in March 1949.

Appointed ambassador at Moscow April 1949 and proceeded to Moscow in June.

Of unimpressive appearance, but friendly and intelligent. Speaks French, English and Russian.

16. Ardalan, Dr. Ali Quli

Born about 1900; brother of Amanollah Ardalan. Served mostly under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

in various posts from 1922. Secretary at Washington 1932 where he had a dispute with Ghaffar Jalal, the Minister. Counsellor at Vichy after the collapse of France in 1940. Returned to Tehran 1942 and was in charge of the English Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for more than a year, fulfilling his duties with efficiency. Counsellor at Angora 1943. Under-Secretary for Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1948. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on appointment of Ala February 1950.

Speaks English. Very helpful to us at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

17. Ardalan, Amanullah (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik)

Born about 1888. Son of Haji Fakhr-ul-Mulk of Kurdistan. Educated at Tehran. Elected a Deputy to the 2nd Majlis through the influence of his father, when the latter was Governor of Arabistan. Served first in the Ministry of Finance. An active member of the Democratic Party and elected to the 3rd Majlis from Kermanshah. A pro-German during the war of 1914-18, he left Persia for Turkey at that time. After the war he became financial agent for Kerman through bribing Akbar Mirza, the Minister of Finance, and made a good thing of that post. Financial agent for Fars 1923-25. A member of the 5th Majlis. A close friend of Sulaiman Mirza and the Socialists. Minister of Public Works in Sardar Sipah's Cabinet of October 1923. Resigned April 1924. Again employed under the Ministry of Finance in Kerman and Fars. Governor of Astarabad 1928; of Luristan, &c., in 1932, of Gilan in 1933, and again of Luristan in 1934, of Bushire and the Gulf Ports 1935; and Governor-General of Kerman in May 1936. Recalled in August 1937.

Governor-General of Azerbaijan (West) at the time of the invasion 1941; fled precipitately to Tehran when the Russians advanced, fearing that revenge would be taken on him for various anti-Russian measures which he had been ordered to take. Then Director-General of Ministry of Finance and Governor of Isfahan in 1942. Minister of Public Health in Suhaili's Cabinet of February 1943. Minister of Finance in Suhaili's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Minister of Commerce and Industry in Sa'ad's Cabinet March 1944, but dropped in August 1944. Returned to Cabinet under Bayat in November 1944, resigned April 1945. Minister of Justice in Hakim's Cabinet November 1945 to January 1946. Appointed Minister of Roads and Communications in Hakim's Cabinet March 1948. Governor-General, Fars, June 1948. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hazhir's Cabinet of June 1948 but declined to leave Fars. Deputy for Sanandaj (Kurdistan) in Constituent Assembly April 1949 and successful in first stage Senate elections there in autumn 1949.

Has been very helpful to us since 1941. Speaks some English. Appointed Minister of the Interior in the reshuffle of Mansur's Cabinet at the end of April 1950.

18. Ardalan, Nasir Quli

Born in Tehran 1896. Third son of the late Haji Fakr-ul-Mulk, who was a court official, his mother is the daughter of Izz-ud-Dauleh and granddaughter of Muhammad Shah. Educated at Tehran and in Belgium. Spent a year in London learning English. Returned to Persia 1915 and entered the service of the Ministry of the Interior, where he served for fifteen years. Served at Governor of Dasht-e-Kavir in Mazandaran, of Firuzkuh, and in Khuzistan as Acting Governor. Then was Governor of Sari, Acting Governor of Mazandaran and Governor of Simnan. Governor of Muhammarah (Khorramshahr) in 1925, and Governor of Abadan in 1930. Employed in the National Bank since 1931.

Elected Deputy for Simneh in the 14th Majlis elections of December 1943. Deputy for Sanandaj in 15th and 16th Majlis. Intelligent and capable.

19. Arfa', Hasan, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born about 1890, the eldest son of the late Prince Riza Arfa (Arfa-ud-Dauleh). Educated in Russia and France; his mother, now mentally deranged, being a Caucasian. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1907 as secretary to the Persian Consulate at Tiflis. Secretary at the Persian Legation at St. Petersburg in 1908. Joined the gendarmerie in 1911; and has been in the army since then. Commanded the crack cavalry "Pahlavi" Regiment in 1931. Has served as military attaché in London for a short time, and has been a prominent officer in the new army. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in 1934. In 1935 on the General Staff, in charge of a training school. Persian delegate to the Zahidan Conference in 1935, where, no doubt under strict orders, he took an extremely nationalistic and anti-British standpoint.

Officially attended Ataturk's funeral in 1938. Promoted brigadier-general April 1939. Inspector of Cavalry 1942. Commanding the 1st Division 1943.

Appointed Chief of the General Staff December 1945. Worked hard to resist "Tudeh" activities and had some success in organizing resistance to the Azerbaijan Democrats and their independent Government in Tabriz. In consequence, he incurred enmity of the pro-Russian groups and when Qavam took office in February 1946 with the task of restoring good relations with Russia, Arfa was at once relieved of his post. Arrested April 1946 by order of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Released October 1946. In 1947 started "Asia Society" aiming at co-operation between Middle East States.

Speaks French, English, Turkish and Russian. He is married to an Englishwoman, *nee* Bewicke. Intelligent and outspoken but at times rather a firebrand. He has been most careful to avoid the limelight since his release.

20. As'ad, Muhammad Taqi (Amir-i-Jang)

Born about 1906, son of the late Sardar As'ad; a Bakhtiari Khan imprisoned with other tribal leaders under Riza Shah, released in September 1941. Owns properties near Dizful from where he was elected Deputy for the 14th Majlis. Was from the beginning one of the most loyal supporters of Shyyid Zai. Successful in the first stage Senate elections at Bikhaban, autumn 1949. Extremely friendly to the British. Honest, patriotic and much opposed to the spread of Soviet influence.

21. Asadi, Salman

The eldest son of the late Muhammad Vahid Asadi, mutawalli of the shrine at Meshed, who was shot for treason in 1938. Born about 1896. Educated at the American College, Tehran; spent a few years also at Cambridge and in London; speaks English. Owing to his father's influence elected to the Majlis as member for Sistan for the seventh and eighth sessions.

Served for a short time in the News Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as a translator. In charge of the Department of Propaganda 1941 to March 1942. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Food 1942 and worked hard to ensure the food supply of Tehran with Mr. Sheridan in the famine winter of 1942-43. Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Finance and head of the Rice Monopoly April 1944. Member of Economic Section of Qavam's Mission to Moscow February 1946. Appointed chairman of the Industrial Bank October 1946. Minister of Labour June to September 1947. Elected to 15th Majlis for Meshed.

Pleasant, well read and intelligent, but an intriguer and rather lazy. Has some good ideas but is indiscreet and given to mis-statement and flattery. At one time he aspired to act as an intermediary between the Shah and Qavam, but since Qavam left the country at the end of 1948 he has been unable to conceal the fact that he is working for Qavam's return to power.

His wife, who is a sister of Dr. Taba (*q.v.*), went to Europe in 1949 to study dressmaking and on return to Tehran established a flourishing school of dressmaking.

22. Adrafi, Ghulam Husain

Related to Ali Suhaili.

After being Director-General Ministry of Commerce and Industry he became Under-Secretary of State in Prime Minister's office. A member of the National Bank Supervisory Board 1945. Appointed Governor-General, Khorasan, and Deputy Guardian of the Shrine at Meshed in July 1946; was recalled when the two posts were separated in April 1948. Minister of National Economy under Hazhir in September 1948, and again under Sa'ad in November 1948. Dropped, January 1950.

Speaks good French. Amiable but weak; not averse to using his official position for private gain.

23. A'zam-Zanganeh, Dr. Abdul Hamid

Born at Kermanshah about 1899, of a well-known family; his half-brother being Amir-i-Kull. Educated at Tehran in the Law School and the Political School. Went to Paris 1929 and obtained a doctorate in law and economics, his thesis being on oil; has also been in England. 1935 returned to Persia and was employed in the Ministry of Education; professor in the Law School. Also a pleader in the Court, mostly in mortgage-bank business and in agricultural cases. Co-editor with Dr. Surattar of the newspaper *Iran Javan* (no longer appearing). Deputy for the 14th Majlis for Kermanshah when he seemed to regard himself as elected by the personal order of the Shah.

Parliamentary Under-Secretary to Hakim December 1947. Minister of Education December 1948-March 1950. Dean of the Faculty of Law, Tehran University. A member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party founded by Sardar Fakhr Hikmat in July 1949.

Many of the difficulties encountered by the British Council in the winter of 1949-50 appear to have been caused by him, partly at the instance of the Muslim clergy.

24. Azodi, Yadullah (Amir A'zim)

Born in Tehran about 1890. The son of the late Nusratullah Mirza, and a grandson of Vajihullah Mirza Sipahsalar who was the grandson of Fath Ali Shah. Inherited large estates from his father, all of which were situated in the neighbourhood of Damghan and Shahrud. Educated in Persia; has spent some years in Europe. Married first a daughter of Hasan Pirnia (Mushir-ud-Dauleh), who died a few years later; he then married a daughter of Vusuq-ud-Dauleh (Hasan Vusuq).

Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. First secretary of the Persian Legation at Berlin in 1928, and for some time was Chargé d'Affaires there. Chief de Personnel at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1929-30. Counsellor at Washington 1931, and acted as Chargé d'Affaires there. Minister at Warsaw in March 1933; but recalled to Tehran as the result of some scandal dating from his Washington days the following December. Chief of the Passport Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs August 1935. Administrative Director-General of

the Ministry March 1937 until November 1937. Minister of Roads under Qavam-us-Saltaneh 1942, and did well in that post. Resigned early in 1943 partly owing to accusations of nepotism; appointed Minister to Brazil, and proceeded thither July 1943. Replaced March 1944.

Speaks French and German, and usually very helpful and forthcoming.

25. Badir, Mahmud

Younger brother of the late Abdul Wahhab Badir. Born in 1893. Educated in England (Harrow and Cambridge). Has been in the service of the Ministry of Finance since 1910. Assistant to the Accountant-General at the Ministry of Finance for a number of years. Chief Accountant of the Ministry of Public Works October 1928. In the same capacity in the Ministry of Roads and Communications 1930. Director-General of the Ministry of Finance 1933. President of the Persian Economic Mission to Germany in July 1935. Succeeded Abul Qasim Furuhar as Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Finance in April 1936. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance on the death of Davar in February 1937. Minister of Finance September 1937 until October 1939.

Minister of Finance in Suhaili's Cabinet 1942, and in that capacity showed himself helpful in smoothing over financial difficulties and in negotiating currency agreements. Minister of Industry in Suhaili's Cabinet of 1943, but was not very successful in settling various wages disputes, and on Suhaili's forming a new Cabinet in December 1943 he was not included in it.

Minister of Finance in Sadr's Cabinet, June-September 1946. Capable and helpful but exposed to criticism for failing to suppress corruption and for introducing nepotism which, it was alleged, flourished in his Ministry on an excessive scale even by Persian standards.

Appointed Head of the Shrine Office at Meshed April 1948. Undoubtedly the most disliked man in Meshed but it is considered that he is favoured by the Shah to whom, as nominal Head of the Shrine, he has sent large sums of money collected from the Shrine lands.

Speaks very good English.

Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Kazirun (Fars), autumn 1949.

26. Bahar, Muhammad Taqi (Malik-ush-Shuara)

Born in Meshed 1882. Son of a well-known poet named Saburi. A member of the old Democratic party, and edited a paper in Meshed called the *Nau-Bahar*. A member of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Majlises from Meshed, and of the 6th from Tehran. Edited his paper *Nau-Bahar* in Tehran during the war of 1914-18, and was pronouncedly pro-German. Nevertheless, he supported Vusuq-ud-Dauleh's Cabinet of 1918-20 during which time he edited the *Iran* newspaper. Opposed the Government during the term of the 5th Majlis and was an opponent of the change of régime. An attempt was made on his life when the debate on the change of régime took place in the Majlis; but another unfortunate man who resembled him was the victim. Sayyid Hasan Mudarris helped him to get elected to the 6th Majlis.

Nothing much was heard of him during Riza Shah's reign, except that he composed some odes in celebration of the Firdausi centenary in October 1934, and translated into Persian verse a poem by John Drinkwater on that occasion. He has been exiled from Tehran on more than one occasion.

In spite of a fondness for opium has been fairly active at Tehran since the change of régime in 1941. Up to August 1942 he and Mas'ud Sabiti actively supported Qavam-us-Saltaneh's candidature

for the post of Prime Minister. After the latter's fall early in 1943, he obtained newsprint from the Russians with which he kept his paper *Nam-Bahār* going. On Committee of Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society March 1944.

Minister of Education in Qavam's Cabinet February 1946, dropped when Cabinet was reformed in August 1946. Elected to 15th Majlis for Tehran. Democrat Party leader in Majlis. Went to Switzerland for medical treatment January 1948. Returned and was received by Shah April 1949.

A shifty and over-subtle politician. Acknowledged to be a leading poet and a practical newspaper writer.

27. Bahrami, Farajullah (Dabir-i-A'zam)

Born about 1890. A member of a well-known and numerous Tehran family. Munshi or secretary to Riza Shah before and after his accession to the throne in 1925. Was appointed member of a commission of examination in connexion with the Lionsoff Caspian Fishery claim, but resigned from that position.

Lost the Shah's full confidence in about 1927, and was sent abroad to take charge of the Persian students in Europe, at Paris, Berlin, &c. Returned to Persia about two years later. In July 1930 appointed Governor of Isfahan, and a year later Governor-General of Fars. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in March 1932. Resigned on the fall of the Hidayat Cabinet in September 1933, and was sent to Meshed as Governor-General in the following January. Superseded as Governor-General of Khurasan in October 1934, for reporting that adequate facilities did not exist at Meshed for the accommodation of the orientalists attending the Firdausi millenary. Since that time under a cloud. In the summer of 1935 he was suspected of complicity in some plot and was exiled to Malayir. Allowed to return to Tehran under surveillance, October 1936.

Minister of the Interior in January 1943, but he very soon became involved in a quarrel with his chief, Qavam-us-Saltaneh, which led to the collapse of the latter's Cabinet. Is very alarmed at the Soviet menace to the independence of Persia. Governor-General of Isfahan 1943-44. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949.

A very friendly person, who always appears to do what he can to help British consular officers. Has great aspirations to literary eminence; a great admirer of Hafiz. As Minister he incurred some criticism from his fellow-countrymen for inaccessibility and lack of hospitality. Speaks very little French. Businesslike and hard-working.

28. Bahrami, Fazlullah

Born about 1897. For some time a colonel in the police, and in charge of the detective force. Acting chief of the Tehran Municipality in 1937. Director of Census and Civil Status January 1938.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Suhaili's Cabinet of 1942 and filled that post adequately. Head of the municipality again July 1943; suspended from his functions during the Tehran elections at the end of 1943 owing to accusations of illegal intervention in the elections, but resumed his functions January 1944.

Governor-General of Kerman 1944-45 where he showed great initiative by organising various schemes for improving water supply, raising money for orphanages, &c.—popular there. Offered post of Governor-General, Kermanshah, in August 1945 but refused. Governor-General, Kerman, again January 1949 until August 1949 when he became Governor-General of Khuzistan.

Health undermined by malaria. Friendly and co-operative when in Kerman. Normally reserved and placid but clever and not easily taken in.

29. Bakhtiari, Abul Qasim Khan

Born 1915. Son of the late Amir-i-Mufakkhkham. Educated in England. Governor of Kashan 1941-42. Set up as a rebel leader in Janiki in March 1942, but three months later surrendered to General Zahidi, who appointed him and Manuchihir Khan As'ad as army representatives responsible for order in Bakhtiari. Rebelled again after Zahidi's arrest, but was arrested in 1943 and went to Tehran. In 1946 appointed by Qavam-us-Saltaneh as Co-Governor of Bakhtiari, and shortly afterwards entrusted with the formation of Qavam's Democrat Party there. Ordered to Tehran at the end of 1947 he refused, took to the hills, and after a short scuffle was once again arrested in April 1948. He was tried and condemned to three months' imprisonment and two years' banishment from tribal country, but his sentence was remitted by the Shah.

Intelligent and plausible, but ambitious and unreliable. He did not hesitate to turn King's evidence for purely personal motives on the outbreak of the tribal revolt of September 1946 of which was one of the ringleaders himself.

30. Bakhtiari, Aqa Khan

Born 1908, fifth son of Sardar Muhtashim. Educated in England and speaks good English.

No actual experience of tribal affairs in the tribe as opposed to intrigue in Tehran or Isfahan.

Deputy for Shahr Kurd in 15th Majlis.

31. Bakhtiari, Johanshah Samsam

Born 1910, the second son of Murtiza Quli Samsam by his second wife, a sister of Saadat-ud-Daulah Qashqa'i. Is more of a tribesman than his brothers and has had more tribal experience than they. After his father he has probably more influence than any other of the Ilkhani Khans in the tribe and of all the Khans comes second to Abul Qasim.

In 1943 was awarded the Humayun medal, 1st class, for arranging a meeting between the Qashqa'i Khans and General Jahanbani. Always friendly with British, he was presented with a silver tray at the end of 1945 in appreciation of the hospitality he had shown to British officials during the war.

Farmandar of Shahr Kurd and Deputy Governor of the Bakhtiari June 1944. Joint Governor of the Bakhtiari with Abul Qasim in July 1946. Arrested by Qavam who dismissed him in September 1946 for complicity in the plot by Bakhtiari and Qashqa'i to rise against the Central Government. Governor (Farmandar-i-Kuli) Kurdistan, March 1949, until January 1950, when promoted Governor-General, Kermanshah.

Active, patriotic and comparatively honest, but not very clever.

32. Bakhtiari, Manuchihir As'ad

Born 1905, sixth and youngest son of Haji Ali Quli Khan, Sardar As'ad (buzurg). Married to a daughter of Murtiza Quli Samsam.

Arrested with his brothers in 1933 by Riza Shah and condemned to ten years' imprisonment. Was released in 1941 on Riza Shah's abdication. When in prison formed a friendship with Dr. Yazdi, the Tudeh leader. On the strength of this became (without success) Tudeh candidate for Isfahan in the 14th Majlis elections 1943. Took up with Sayyid Zia-ud-Din the following year only to quarrel with him later. Worked against the Tudeh in Isfahan in the winter of 1945-46. Co-Governor of the

Bakhtiari with Abul Qasim November 1947, and sole Governor after arrest of Abul Qasim in April 1948. Recalled June 1949.

33. Bakhtiari, Murtiza Quli Samsam

The son of the famous Samsam-us-Saltaneh. Born probably about 1875. Took part in operations against Salar-ud-Daulah in 1911. Represented the Bakhtiari tribe in the Majlis in the same year, and appointed Ilbeggi of the tribe in 1912. Governor of Yazd in 1914. Helped the Germans during the war 1914-18. Made his peace with the British Legation after the war. Has held the appointment of Ilbeggi or Ilkhani of the tribe on several occasions. Was with the tribe when most of the Bakhtiari Khans were arrested in December 1933; he then had the appointment of Ilkhani. He escaped the fate of his fellow khans, and has assisted the Government in their policy of inducing the Bakhtiari tribe to abandon their traditional nomadic habits. Appointed Governor of Bakhtiari early in 1943 and did well, suppressing various upstarts like Abul Qasim and establishing order in that tribal area, thereby serving British interests well during the war. By the end of 1945 he had, however, become unpopular with the other tribal khans and he was relieved of his appointment by Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Arrested in September 1946 for complicity in joint Bakhtiari-Qashqa'i rising. Released December. Deputy for Shahr Kurd in Constituent Assembly April 1949.

A clever man, not above intrigue. Quick-tempered, jovial and obstinate. Served Riza Shah well. Very pleasant to meet, but not the sort of man one can trust very far, as he is very much in the hands of his strong-minded wife and also places implicit trust in a worthless agent, Mishah Fatimi.

34. Bakhtiari, Dr. Shapur

Born 1909, Elder son of Sardar Farid. Educated and obtained his doctorate in France where he lived for sixteen years and served with the French Resistance Forces during the war. On return to this country was appointed in 1946 as Director of Provincial Labour Office in Isfahan. Aroused opposition from factory owners by trying to implement labour legislation too enthusiastically. Factory owners succeeded in obtaining his transfer from Isfahan, and early in 1947 he was appointed Director of Provincial Labour Office in Abadan. Was unsuccessful candidate in opposition to official Government candidates for 15th Majlis for Isfahan. Contested Khorramshahr unsuccessfully in 16th Majlis elections, October 1949, and in the same month was relieved of his post as Director of Labour.

In Abadan worked hard to improve industrial relations and preserve industrial peace. Conscientious and apparently strictly honest. Relations with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were on the whole good.

Speaks French and a little English. Is an intense nationalist and professed anti-Communist.

35. Bayandur, Ghulam Husain, Captain

Elder brother of Ghulam Ali Bayandur. Was a captain in the army until 1930, when he went to Italy on a course of naval engineering. Returned in 1934, and was appointed engineer officer of the southern naval force. Promoted major in 1935. Port officer of Abadan and Khorramshahr in 1936. Lieutenant-colonel, 1938. Transferred to General Staff 1944 and appointed Head of the Naval Directorate.

Keenly interested in mercantile affairs, and helped to float the monopoly company for the landing of cargo in the port of Khorramshahr in 1937. Unpopular with his subordinates. Quick and hot-tempered, but less so than formerly. Uses his position for his financial advantage. Not very intelligent, but hard-working. Speaks French and Italian.

36. Bayat, Murtiza Quli (Saham-us-Sultan)

A landowner from Sultanabad, born about 1882. Owns considerable property. Member of the Majlis on several occasions, and Minister of Finance 1926-27. Deputy Speaker of the 10th Majlis. Member of the Adalat party 1942. Accused of hoarding wheat during the winter of 1942-43. Minister of Finance in Suhaili's Cabinet 1943 and performed the useful function of effacing himself completely in favour of Dr. Millsaugh. Not included in Suhaili's revised Cabinet of December 1943.

Minister without Portfolio in Sa'id's Cabinet March-August 1944. Prime Minister November 1944-April 1945. He sought to improve relations with the Russians but his efforts only resulted in the paralysis of the administration of the country. Sent as Governor-General to Tabriz in December 1945 but failed to do anything to check the Azerbaijan independence movement and soon returned to Tehran. Joined Qavam's Cabinet in February 1946 as Minister of Finance, but was not included when Cabinet was re-formed in August 1946. Deputy for Arak in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Elected Senator from Hamadan, autumn 1949, and elected First Vice-President of the Senate on its inauguration, February 1950.

Speaks a little French.

37. Bihbahani, Mirza Sayyid Muhammad

An aged divine wielding great influence in Tehran, especially among the old-fashioned type of bazaar merchant. He has the reputation of being quite unscrupulous and corrupt, ready to sell his influence on the bazaars to the highest bidder. Believed to have some close connexion with the Shah and to accept monetary payments from him.

38. Bushihri-Dihdashli, Aqa Javad (Amir Humayun)

Born in Tehran 1898. Second son of the late Haji Muin-ut-Tujjar. Educated at Tehran and in Europe.

Speaks French and English. Married a daughter of the late Haji Amin-uz-Zarb. Elected a Member of the 7th Majlis.

Was in Hamburg at the outbreak of the war in 1939, and spent some time in Germany thereafter. Finally got away to Istanbul in 1942 with the help of Count Schulenburg and returned to Tehran March 1943. Arrested and sent to Sultanabad as a suspect in June 1943. Released May 1945. Appointed Governor-General of Fars October 1946 with approval of the Qashqa'i but only held the appointment for a few months.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs under Qavam-us-Saltaneh September-December 1947 and Minister of Agriculture under Hazhir June 1948. Deputy for Bushire in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in Bushire but elected a Senator from Tehran, October 1949.

More interested in politics than his elder brother, Aqa Riza. Fond of pomp, and very extravagant in his manner of living. Nicknamed by some of his friends "Prince Merchant."

A clever man who in the past has always maintained friendly relations with British officials.

39. Dashti, Ali

Born about 1887. Educated in the schools of the Holy Places of Iraq. Returned to Persia about 1922 and edited a paper called the *Shafaq Surkh*. As an editor he became notorious for slanderous abuse and the extortion of money by blackmail, and his abuse of Great Britain and British statesmen was frequently the subject of complaint from His Majesty's Legation to the Persian Government. He was elected a Deputy to the 5th Majlis in 1924, but he was refused a seat by the Parliamentary Commission, whose duty

it was to scrutinise his election proceedings. He was prominent in the abortive Republican movement in 1924, and is said to have received and pocketed large sums from Riza Pahlavi, on whose behalf he worked. He espoused the cause of Riza Pahlavi against Ahmad Shah, and was elected a Deputy to the 6th Majlis in 1926. He was invited to Moscow in October 1927 to attend the tenth anniversary of the Soviet régime. From Moscow he went to Berlin and Paris and returned to Persia early in 1928. He was elected a Deputy to the 7th Majlis in 1928 and to the 8th Majlis in 1930.

Edited or controlled his paper till about July 1935, receiving subsidies now from the Shah and now from the Soviet Embassy.

In July 1935 he fell into disgrace and was said to have uttered disparaging remarks about Riza Shah's regime. His paper was suppressed and he himself was allowed to plead sickness and to retire to a Government hospital where he was made to pay well for his maintenance.

At liberty again at the end of 1936. In charge of the Press Bureau of the Ministry of Interior in 1937.

After the fall of Riza he returned to the foreground of Tehran politics. A severe critic of Faruqi and Suhaili in 1942, he worked hard for the return of Qavam-us-Saltaneh as Prime Minister. When the latter came back to power and did not make Dashti a Minister, he turned against him and criticised him in many speeches.

Elected to 14th Majlis in 1943. Since the oil crisis of 1944 he has opposed the spread of Russian influence in Persia and has strongly supported the "resistance" Cabinets preceding Qavam-us-Saltaneh's. Was consistently attacked by Tudeh press during this period. Arrested May 1946. Released December 1946.

Did not obtain a seat in 15th Majlis. Presented credentials as ambassador in Cairo December 1948. Successful in the 1st stage of Senate elections in Tehran and Bushire, autumn 1949.

He is a hot-headed firebrand with no scruples and no principles and is capable of the basest villainy if it will help him to obtain his ends.

Trusted little, even by his friends who regard his excessive attachment to women (which he publicly displays) as not in keeping with high office.

A persuasive orator, who holds the attention of the Majlis as few other persons can do.

40. Divanbagi, Aqa Riza Ali

Born in Kurdistan about 1891. Educated in Persia. In the employ of the Ministry of the Interior for some years. Went to Turkey with the Nationalists during the war. "Chef de Cabinet" to the Governor-General of Kirman when Tamurtash was in charge there. A member of the 6th, 7th and 8th Majlises. Governor of Gilan in 1931. Resigned in 1933, and appointed Governor of Mazandaran in October 1934; relieved early in 1936. Governor-General of Khuzistan July 1942 and showed some energy, but is reported to have lined his pockets pretty thoroughly in connexion with certain contracts. Recalled early 1943. Governor-General, Gilan, October 1947-February 1950, when nominated Senator for Kermanshah.

Speaks French. Agreeable to talk to, but unreliable. Related to the Qaraguzlu family.

41. Fahimi, Khalil (Fahim-ul-Mulk)

Born about 1885. Related to the Mukhbir-ul-Dauleh (Hidayat) family.

Employed in various posts in the Foreign Office early in his career. Minister of Finance in June 1922. Appointed Governor-General of Kerman in October 1925, but did not proceed. Member of the Majlis for Quehan on several occasions. *Rapporteur* of the Financial Commission of the Majlis.

Supported, by a speech in the Majlis, the cancellation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company concession. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in February 1934. Ambassador to Turkey May 1936. Recalled November 1939.

Prominent member of the Society of Supporters of the League of Nations, founded in December 1933. Governor-General at Tabriz 1941 after the fall of Riza Shah. Did not display much energy in dealing with a difficult and delicate situation. Recalled to Tehran at the end of 1942. Minister without portfolio in Suhaili's Cabinet of 1943. Minister without portfolio August 1944-April 1945. Minister of Interior in Hakimi's Cabinet November 1945, but was forced by the Prime Minister to resign at the end of December. Minister of Interior under Haxhir in June 1948. In September 1948 appointed Governor-General, Azerbaijan, whence he was recalled to join Sa'id's Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio in March 1949. Dropped January 1950.

Speaks French. Very agreeable and reasonable in conversation.

42. Farhudi, Dr. Hosain

Born about 1899. Son-in-law of Vahid-ul-Mulk Shaibani. Educated in Tehran. Served in various capacities in the Ministry of Education, at Tehran and in the provinces. Has also done newspaper work. One of the Directors-General of the Ministry 1943. Successful candidate for Dashti-i-Mishun and Susan-gird in the 14th Majlis 1943. Arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh December 1946. Released January 1947. Deputy Prime Minister in Hakimi's Cabinet December 1947. Represented Dizful in Constituent Assembly 1949. Deputy for Dizful in 16th Majlis. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran, autumn 1949.

Speaks French.

43. Farrukh, Mibdi (Murtasim-us-Saltaneh)

A Sayyid. Born about 1887. Was for some years in the employ of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and head of the 2nd Political Department, dealing with eastern countries. Minister at Kabul in 1927-28. Subsequently Director-General of Industry. Governor of Western Azerbaijan February 1936. Again Director-General of Industry and Mines September 1937 and shortly afterwards raised to the newly-created appointment of Minister of Industry and Mines. Removed from this post without explanation March 1938.

Governor-General of Fars 1940, and of Kerman in 1941. Minister of the Interior of Suhaili's Cabinet July 1942 and in spite of Majlis opposition maintained his place in the Cabinet. Qavam-us-Saltaneh, in August, made him Minister of Food, in which post he displayed a sort of crazy activity which irritated many and did not achieve much. Having fallen out with the American adviser Sheridan, he left the Ministry of Food on the fall of the Qavam Cabinet in February 1943. Elected a Deputy for Zabul in the 14th Majlis November 1943.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars December 1945 but was recalled in February 1946. Presented credentials as ambassador at Nanking November 1948. Arrived in Tehran, December 1949, after withdrawal of mission. Appointed Chief of Police at the end of May 1950.

44. Fatih, Mahmud

Brother of Mustafa Fatih. Born about 1900 at Isfahan and educated at Tehran and at Montpellier. Trained in agriculture and husbandry. In charge of the Karaj agricultural school for some years. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture 1943. Has planned a model village at Viramin, of which he is very proud. Minister of Agriculture in Sa'id's

Cabinet March 1944 but only retained office for a few days. Member of Directing Committee of the 7-Year Plan 1947.

Helpful and business-like, though inclined to be too optimistic and to imagine that all Persia's agricultural difficulties can be solved by tractors.

45. Fatih, Mushafa

Born in Isfahan about 1897. Son of Fatih-ul-Mulk, a servant of the Prince-Governor of Isfahan, Zill-us-Sultan. Educated at Tehran and at Columbia University, United States, where he graduated in economics. Entered the Anglo-Persian Oil Company about 1922 and is the senior Persian official in that company drawing a large salary. Author of a book on the economic condition of Persia published in 1926. Appointed Assistant General Manager (Adm.) of A.I.O.C. at Abadan in February 1947.

Has a perfect command of English and is keenly interested in Persian politics. In 1943 founded the Hamrahani Party with a reform programme; the party had faded out by 1945. He also has an international outlook and a considerable knowledge of world politics, particularly those of the Left. Intelligent, friendly and very approachable. Is a mine of information about the foibles of his own countrymen. Since his appointment as Assistant General Manager he has been a focus of mischief and pointless intrigue. He aspires to become General Manager at Abadan.

Has a son in England and a daughter married to Asghar Mirza, the son of Sarim-ud-Dauleh. His wife was daughter of the Zill-us-Sultan's head secretary, Siraj-ul-Mulk.

46. Fatimi, Mibdi (Imad-us-Saltaneh)

Born about 1886. Has had an official career in the Ministry of Finance and in 1918 was financial representative in his native city of Isfahan, where he is influential both through his own family and through that of his wife, who is a daughter of the late Prince Zill-us-Sultan. Appointed Deputy-Governor of Fars in 1922-23. Elected a Deputy from Isfahan in the 5th and 6th terms of the Majlis. Appointed Minister of Education in August 1925. Minister of Justice in December 1925 and Minister of Interior February to May 1927.

As a Minister and a Deputy he was uniformly popular and successful. In 1928 he fell out with the Minister of Court and was not allowed to be elected to the 7th term of the Majlis. Elected a Deputy to the 8th Majlis 1930. Governor of Gilan from December 1933 until October 1937.

Head of the Municipality of Tehran under Suhaili's Cabinet February 1942. Resigned 1943 and elected Deputy for Na'in 1943. One of the leaders of the Ittihad-i-Milli group in the 14th Majlis which contained about twenty Right-wing members.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars in March 1946. Recalled during the Qashqa'i revolt in autumn but reappointed February 1947. Recalled May 1947. Elected Senator for Isfahan October 1949.

Speaks a little French.

47. Fatimi, Saifpur

Born about 1905, one of three brothers, a Naini family which claims relationship with Mibdi Fatimi (Imad-us-Saltaneh), though the latter denies it. Educated at the Stuart Memorial College, Isfahan, where he became a baptised Christian; but he made away with some of the mission funds and the mission do not forgive him. He and another, named Husain Sandat, wrote a book against Islam. In order to marry his present wife, who is well off, became a Bahai.

Farmandar (Governor) of Shiraz 1941-43; then resigned, apparently because he had amassed too much money there. His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz.

41582

considered him energetic, helpful and capable. Then returned to Isfahan as candidate for the Majlis for Najafabad, and though he had little real following in that area success was engineered for him by Murtiza Quli Bakhtiari and Sarim-ud-Dauleh. Intelligent, entirely unscrupulous, and very ambitious; speaks good English and has studied English and English literature, and can remember many extracts. Has many enemies, both Persian and British, but is a man who can, when he wishes, make himself very useful. Was largely responsible for organising the anti-Tudeh Workers' Union in Isfahan.

Before Qavam came into power in 1946, he pretended to be passionately opposed to him (a ruse enacted to please the British). In fact he almost certainly supported him as was shown by an article appearing in his brother's paper *Bakhtiar* on the day that Qavam was elected.

After the demise of the 14th Majlis he went on a visit to the United States, where he was still living in June 1950.

48. Fidakar, Taqi

Born about 1905 in Isfahan of humble origin. Educated at the Sarimiyyeh school in Isfahan. Trained as a lawyer. Worked for a time in the Soviet Consulate General at Isfahan in connexion with the sale of Soviet textiles in Isfahan. From 1940 onwards devoted most of his energies to improving the lot of the Isfahan factory workers. Founded a primitive type of trade union and became workers' spokesman in disputes about conditions of employment. Affiliated his union to the Tudeh party and, with the latter's support, was elected to the 14th Majlis in 1943 as Deputy for Isfahan.

Lost his political following among the factory workers of Isfahan during 1944-45 when the Isfahan workers' union broke away from the Tudeh, but in April 1946 he succeeded in re-establishing Tudeh influence. During 1947 when, arising from their support of the Azerbaijan democrats, the Tudeh party became discredited, Fidakar lost much of his influence in Isfahan, professed disillusionment with the Communist inspiration of the Tudeh movement and retired to Tehran. He resigned from the Tudeh party and was dismissed from the Tudeh trade union, since when he has lived quietly in Tehran obtaining what business he can as a lawyer and giving free services to any workers in legal difficulties. Suspected by the Right-wing because of his earlier record and by Tudeh sympathisers because of his defection from that movement, he is living in near poverty. He retains his idealism and enthusiasm for social reform and is likely to appear again in the political arena.

49. Firoz, Mohammad Hovain, Major-General (Sarabshgar)

Born about 1895. The fourth son of the late Farman Farma. Educated at the military college at Petrograd. Entered the Persian army during the 1914-18 war, and was regarded as one of the promising young officers of the army. Appointed Chief of Staff of the Southern Division in 1925, and did very good work in organising the troops in Fars and enforcing discipline and efficiency. Sent to Delhi as representative of the Persian army at the Indian army manoeuvres early in 1925. Felt under suspicion for some reason about 1929 and resigned his commission. His Qajar origin was no doubt the cause of his collapse.

Returned to Persia late in 1941, and was sent to Fars as G.O.C. and Governor-General in March 1942. Superseded in both appointments by Marshal Shahbakhfi a year later. He had succeeded in keeping a rather precarious order in Fars, but never succeeded in repressing Nasir Qashqa'i's rebellious movement. Head of the air force 1943. Again

c 2

appointed Governor-General of Pers in early summer of 1944 but did not get on with the influential Qavam-ul-Mulk or the Qashqa'i Khans. His enemies accused him of weakness and of truckling too much to the Tudeh, but His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, on the contrary, considered that his refusal to take unnecessarily repressive measures against the Tudeh was more sound. Appointed Minister of War in Sa'ad's reconstituted Cabinet in August 1944 but refused the appointment. Minister of Communications in Hakimi's Cabinet November 1945. Resigned a month later. Returned to the same Ministry in Qavam's Cabinet in February 1946, but was left out when Qavam re-formed his Cabinet in October 1946. Appointed Inspector-General, Persian Air Force, March 1947, and retired from military service in 1949.

Speaks very good French and Russian and some English; intelligent and enlightened. Very attached to his brother Firuz (Nusrat-ud-Dauleh). Married a Miss Namazi, who was educated in Hong Kong, speaks English perfectly, and is one of Persia's leading feminists.

50. Firuz, Muhammad Vahid Mirza (Farmanfarmaian)

Third son of the late Farman Farma. Born about 1893. Educated at Beirut and Paris. Sent to Tabriz as head of the Finance Department 1915. Said to have taken many bribes while in that appointment. Is very thrifty and has large properties both in Tehran and Tabriz. Elected a Deputy to the 4th, 5th and 6th Majlises for Tabriz. On the fall of his brother, Nusrat-ud-Dauleh, in 1931, he retired from public life and was seldom seen. Has been in Europe a good deal.

Elected to the 13th Majlis for Sarab in September 1941, and again to the 14th in November 1943. His appearance being that of an underfed bird of prey, seems to keep him in the background, but he has a good deal of his father's intelligence. Became Minister of Labour and Propaganda in October 1946 but resigned in December to stand as a candidate for the 15th Majlis. Went to Switzerland February 1947.

51. Firuz, Muzaffar

Born about 1910, grandson of Farman Farma, brother of Muhammad Ali Shah, and accordingly uses the title of Prince in social life. Educated at Harrow and Cambridge. Speaks excellent English and fair French; is bitterly hostile to the Pahlavi dynasty and his sole *raison d'être* is to avenge the murder of his father by Riza Shah. His hostility has recently been sharpened by the fact that his wife's relation, Ismit-ul-Mulk, one of the wives of Riza Shah, was evicted from the palace on a charge of improper behaviour. At one time employed in Persian Legation in Washington, whence, it is believed, he was removed at the request of the United States Government for abuse of diplomatic bag privileges.

It was Firuz who went to Palestine and brought from there Sayyid Zia's first manifesto. He remained an ardent supporter of Sayyid Zia until May 1945 when he broke with him. He says that the breach was caused by Sayyid Zia's becoming more and more dictatorial, but Sayyid Zia's version was that they had to part because Firuz would not abandon his newspaper campaign, in the newspaper *Ra'd-i-Jmruz* which he owns and edits, against the Shah, and Sayyid Zia felt that it was impossible to fight the Russians and the Shah at the same time. Towards the end of 1945 he became one of the chief supporters of Qavam-ul-Saltaneh. As a reward for this, Qavam, when he became Prime Minister in February 1946, appointed Firuz Political Under-Secretary, an office apparently created for the purpose, and Director of Propaganda. He became Minister of Labour and Propaganda in August 1946, but was dropped when

Qavam-ul-Saltaneh re-formed his Cabinet in October 1946 and sent to Moscow as ambassador. Relieved of this appointment in the autumn of 1947, he took up his residence in Switzerland and has since moved to Paris. He has a bent for propaganda and sensational journalism and has succeeded in making himself extremely unpopular even with his colleagues. His madness is enhanced by a titanic conceit but not by conspicuous courage.

Rash, unbalanced, dishonest, untruthful and malicious, would probably sacrifice anything to bring about the downfall of the Shah. In view of his record he was naturally suspected of having helped Qavam-ul-Saltaneh to write the open letter to the Shah about the suspensory veto which caused some stir in Tehran in April 1950.

52. Furuhar, Abbas

Born about 1895. Though his junior in age, is an uncle of Abul-Qasim Furuhar. Member of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1934, and acted as head of that department in 1935 and part of 1936. Head of the Personnel Department July 1936 to April 1937. Counsellor, Angora, until September 1938. Head of the Protocol Department September 1938.

Sent to Beirut with the vague title of "Délégué" at the end of 1942. Recalled temporarily in 1943 to give explanations about the conduct of Muzaffar Firuz. Chargé d'affaires to Greek Court in Cairo June 1944. Minister to Yugoslavia April 1946. Replaced mid-1949 but had not returned to Persia by June 1950.

Speaks French. Married in 1939 a daughter of Muhammad Ali Muqaddam. Polite, friendly and well-meaning, but the head of the Protocol Department under Riza Shah had a thankless task. Nevertheless, M. Furuhar, unlike his colleagues at the Court, survived the ordeal of the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations.

53. Furuhar, Abdul-Qasim

Born in Tehran about 1883. A grandson of Mirza Abbas Khan Qavam-ud-Dauleh, who was Minister of Finance for some years. Educated in Tehran and Switzerland; studied law. A judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1915-21. Chief of Construction at the Tehran Municipality 1921-24. President of the Tribunal 1926-27. Assistant Director of the Registration Department in the Ministry of the Interior 1927-28. Judge in the Appeal Court in 1929. Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance under his great friend Davar October 1933. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934. Minister to France June 1936; but recalled in January owing to an anti-Persian press campaign in some French newspapers. Acting Minister of Interior July and Minister September 1937. Minister of Industry and Mines March 1938. Minister of Interior August 1938 to February 1939 when superseded for no stated reason. A Deputy for Tehran in the 12th Majlis October 1939, and in the 13th Majlis 1941. Appears to have lost some of his energy, being unwilling to become Minister of the Interior to run the elections in 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and later Minister of Finance in Sa'ad's Cabinet March-August 1944.

Delegate to U.N.O. Assembly September 1947. Appointed minister to Switzerland 1948. Also accredited to Vienna August 1949. Married to a Bulgarian lady.

54. Furuhar, Ghulam Husain

Born in 1903. Educated at the School of Political Science, Tehran, and at Berlin University where he studied economics and law. Entered the Ministry of

Justice in 1928 and held various appointments in that Ministry until 1934 when he transferred to the Ministry of Finance. Director-General in the Ministry of Finance in 1940. In 1941 was appointed to Germany to investigate commercial relations between Persia and Germany. After relations with Germany were cut, he acted as economic counsellor to the Persian Legation in Switzerland. Returned to Persia early 1946 and was appointed Director-General of the Taxation Department of the Ministry of Finance. Minister of Roads and Communications in Qavam-ul-Saltaneh's Cabinets December 1946 to December 1947. Head of Industrial Bank October 1948-August 1949, when appointed Minister of Labour by Sa'ad. Dropped January 1950.

Gained much influence recently by his wife's close association with Princess Ashraf. Generally considered to be venal. Intelligent but more of a showman than an administrator. Staunch supporter of the Government sponsored E.S.K.I. trade union group.

Speaks fluent French and German.

55. Ghaffari, Amir Saham-ud-Din (Zaka-ud-Dauleh)

Born in Tehran about 1880. The second son of the late Muhandis-ul-Mamalik. Educated in Persia and Germany. On the staff of the Ministry of Education 1914-18. First Persian representative to League of Nations. Appointed Persian Minister in Berne 1919-22. Did not venture to return to Persia till the Pahlavi régime was well established in 1931. A chamberlain to Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah and Ahmad Shah. Employed in the Ministry of Education 1934, as a professor of economics. Imprisoned 1939 by order of Riza Shah, on an accusation of having expressed doubts whether the trans-Iranian railway would pay. Sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but kept in prison when his term had been served. Finally obtained release on the fall of Riza Shah in 1941. Director of the Propaganda Section in 1942 and 1943 though he was not very effective in that post and was relieved of his duties early in 1943. Advocated propaganda in favour of religion in order to keep men's minds away from communism.

Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in Qavam's Cabinet February 1946. Left out when the Cabinet was re-formed in August. Now a director of the Persian Insurance Company. Successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949.

Speaks French, German and some English. A very voluble, persistent, tedious little man, with a great idea of his own importance and infallibility. Has a large family of daughters.

56. Ghaffari, Hasan Ali (Mu'avin-ud-Dauleh)

Born about 1890. Son of the late Mu'avin-ud-Dauleh, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Europe. At one time attaché to the Persian Legation in Brussels and head of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. After the Coronation of Riza Shah in 1926, Ghaffari was appointed Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Court, a post he held until March 1929 when he was appointed Political Director-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Dismissed November 1929 for permitting publication in the press of the judicial safeguards accorded to foreign subject after the abolition of extra-territorial privileges, but reinstated a month later owing to his friendship with Taimurash, the Minister of Court. Minister at Brussels 1933-36. *En disponibilité* for ten years living in Switzerland and France. Returned Tehran mid-1947. In 1947 he was appointed first Persian Ambassador to Pakistan but did not proceed. Appointed minister to Brazil with personal rank of ambassador March 1949. Presented credentials as Minister also to Chile February 1950.

An agreeable and well-educated man. Speaks French and German fluently.

57. Ghani, Qasim

Born about 1894 at Sabzivari. Sent to Tehran for education by his uncle, Aqa Khazra'i, and studied in the Bahai "Farbiat" school for four years. Then went to Beirut where he qualified as a doctor after a course lasting about seven years. On return to Tehran stayed a short time and then went back to his native town and practised medicine, founding a hospital and doing many good works. Then went to Meshed, where he married a rich wife. A great student of Persian literature. Elected as a Deputy for Meshed in the 13th Majlis. Minister of Health in Subaili's revised Cabinet of December 1943, Minister of Health in Sa'ad's Cabinet of March 1944. Resigned in April 1944. Member of the Persian Farhangistan or Academy. Member of Persian Delegation to U.N.O. September 1946.

Appointed ambassador in Cairo June 1947. Returned towards end of 1948 and proceeded to Angora as ambassador at the end of December 1948. Accompanied the Shah to the United States November 1949.

A cultured and widely-read man, reputed to be a Bahai, but that is doubtful. Author of a history of Sufism. Speaks English and French.

58. Gulshayan, Abas Quli

Successively Minister of Finance, Communications and Justice under Farughi August 1941-March 1942. Appointed Governor-General, Tabriz, September 1943 but did not proceed. Head of Tehran Municipality January-August 1944. Minister of Communications under Sadr June 1945. Governor-General, Khurasan, April-September 1948 when he was appointed Minister of Justice under Hozhir. Minister of Finance in successive Sa'ad Governments from November 1948 to March 1950. Persian Government plenipotentiary in the negotiations with the A.I.O.C. which culminated in the signature of a Supplemental Agreement between the Persian Government and the A.I.O.C. in July 1949.

Speaks French and has only a limited knowledge of English. Capable, affable and friendly but weak. Is generally regarded as corrupt.

59. Hal'at, Ali

Of Azerbaijani origin. Was opposed to Riza Khan before he became Shah but later became one of the late Shah's friends. A Deputy on several occasions before becoming a magistrate. President of section of Supreme Court of Appeal when arrested at instance of Allied Security authorities and interned at Arak (Sultanabad) August 1943. Public Prosecutor at Supreme Court of Appeal when appointed Minister of Justice by Mansur April 1950; he appears to have owed his appointment to the fact that he was acceptable to such mutually incompatible elements as the Court and the National Front.

60. Hakimi, Ibrahim (Hakim-ul-Mulk)

Born in Azerbaijan 1870; studied medicine in France for ten years; speaks French. Was Qajar Court Physician as was his father. Deputy in the 1st Majlis 1908. Minister of Finance 1910. Minister of Education 1910, 1911. Minister of Finance 1911. Minister of Finance or Education several times up to 1918. Minister of Education 1920. Lived in retirement throughout Riza Shah's reign. Minister without Portfolio in Qavam-ul-Saltaneh's Cabinets August 1942 and February 1943. Associated with Qavam-ul-Mulk in his pro-German intrigues before the invasion. Member of the National Bank Advisory Council in 1943, 1944 and 1945; was considered an ancient nonentity, deaf and infirm, but in May 1945 was appointed Prime Minister because all other candidates were opposed by one or other faction in the Majlis.

His Cabinet failed to obtain a vote of confidence and resigned a month later. He again became Prime Minister in November 1945 and did his best to deal with the Russian-inspired independence movement in Azerbaijan and had courage enough to refer to the Security Council of U.N.O. the situation created by the Russian refusal to allow the Persian Government to send troops to Tabriz.

In December 1945 wished to go to Moscow for direct negotiations with the Russians but his request was turned down. Exhausted by his efforts and intimidated by the growing hostility of the Shah and the factions in the Majlis, he resigned in January 1946.

Appointed Prime Minister December 1947 after the fall of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. He survived in that office until June 1948, when his Government resigned on failing to obtain a vote of confidence. A member of the Regency Council during the Shah's visit to the United Kingdom in July 1948. Elected to the Constituent Assembly for Tehran April 1949 and as a Senator for Tehran October 1949. Again a member of the Regency Council and also appointed Minister of Court on the eve of the Shah's departure to the United States November 1949.

Effusively friendly and sincere, and not without backbone, but elderly, deaf and lacking in grip.

61. Huzair, Abdul Husain

Born about 1895. The son of one of the "Fida'is" of the early days of the Constitution, who served under Taqizadeh.

In 1930 served under Taqizadeh in the Ministry of Roads and Communications; and in the following year followed that Minister to the Ministry of Finance. Government Inspector of the National Bank. A favourite of Davar's, he was given various lucrative posts by him, including the management of the Cloth Monopoly ("Shirkat-i-Qumash") and, most important of all, the direction of the Exchange Control Commission. Relinquished his post at the Exchange Control Commission in the summer of 1937 to proceed to Europe as part of a commission to purchase stocks for the Cloth Monopoly. Head of the Industrial and Agricultural Bank August 1938. Minister of Commerce and Industry March 1942 and Minister of Roads and Communications in Suhaili's Cabinet of February 1943. Showed commendable energy in inspecting communications in person.

Went to England to study transport conditions in June 1943 and was still away at the end of the year; meanwhile in December 1943, on the Cabinet being reshuffled he became Minister of the Interior. Again Minister of the Interior in Sa'id's Cabinet of March 1944, but was dropped when there was a reshuffle of the Cabinet in August 1944. Minister of Finance in Hakimi's Cabinets of May and of November 1945. Again Minister of Finance in Qavam's reformed Cabinet of August 1946.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1947. Appointed Minister without Portfolio under Hakimi in March 1948 and subsequently put in charge of Ministry of Labour. Elected Prime Minister on fall of Hakimi's Government in June 1948. Member of Regency Council during the Shah's visit to the United Kingdom July 1948. In November 1948 he resigned the Premiership despite vote of confidence. Elected to the Constituent Assembly for Tehran April 1949. Minister of Court July 1949. On 4th November 1949 was shot in the Sipahsalar Mosque at the Ashura mourning service by a "Fanatic of Islam." Died the following morning.

A man of conspicuous ability and intelligence. In his early days he was an interpreter and munshi at the Russian Consulate-General. Spoke French, Russian and English; very talkative but had many

sound ideas and a shrewd knowledge of his countrymen, among whom he was generally unpopular. Was unmarried.

62. Hidayat, Abdullah, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born about 1902, the son of Mushfir-ud-Daulah (Ghulam Riza Khand-Hidayat), and so member of a family that has usually been pro-British. Brigadier Hidayat is outwardly friendly, and is intelligent and ambitious but something of an intriguer. Trained at the French Ecole de Guerre, and also at Fontainebleau. Head of the Third Bureau, General Staff, February 1941; at the Staff College November 1941; Deputy Chief of the General Staff May 1942; Commandant of the Officers' School November 1942. Under-Secretary, Ministry of War, April 1944. Acting Minister of War September 1944. Director of Artillery November 1945. Under-Secretary of War February 1946. While still retaining this post he left for the United States in March 1947 to negotiate purchases of military supplies under a loan to the Government for this purpose. Returned in 1948 and continued in the same post until appointed Commandant of the Staff College in February 1950.

A well-qualified serious officer, more staff officer than a commander. Has a good reputation for honesty. When with the General Staff supported Yazdan-Panahi in his opposition to a foreign military mission, but now appears very friendly to the Americans. Belongs to the military clique headed by his friend Razmara. Speaks good French and fair English.

63. Hidayat, Izzatullah

Son of the late Sani-ud-Daulah, who was murdered in Tehran during the Constitutional troubles about 1908. Born about 1895. Educated as a civil engineer in Germany. Member of the staff of the legation at Berlin 1920-23. On the staff of the Ministry of Public Works 1925. Appointed Chief of Railway Construction about that time. Interested in various engineering projects in Tehran, and in a spinning factory. Director of the port of Pahlavi 1930. Arrested and tried for complicity in the irregularities in the Ministry of Roads and Communications February 1936; sentenced in the autumn to six months' imprisonment and a fine. Exonerated after the fall of Riza Shah but not re-employed in Government service. In 1943 engaged in contracting work. Appointed Inspector of Railways in August 1945, and Director-General January 1947. Relieved of this post January 1949 but remained Inspector.

Intelligent and of charming manners. Speaks French and German. His mother was a daughter of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah. He is married to a Russian. He speaks Russian and French fluently and has a fair knowledge of English. Cousin of Khusrav Hidayat. Visited England and Europe early 1949—on railway matters. Very friendly and frank, but lacks drive.

64. Hidayat, Khusrav Bahman

Aged about 40. A qualified mechanical engineer. Assistant head of Iranian State Railways May 1944 and appointed Director-General November 1944. Relieved of post early 1945, but reappointed for a few months in October 1946.

One of the first members of Qavam's Democrat Party (September 1946) and was made responsible for organising a trade union section of the party to oppose the Tudeh movement. Obtained an appreciable following among workers, especially on the State Railway, presided at two congresses in Tehran in 1947 when the I.S.K.I. Trade Union was formed (this being the Democrat Party organisation in disguise), and in August 1947 became first secretary of the "Federation of Trade Unions of Workers

in Iran" (I.S.K.I.). Elected to 15th Majlis for Tehran in 1947. Deputy for Tehran in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Workers' delegate to the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 1949. Elected president of Asian Federation of Labour January 1950. Failed to get elected to the 16th Majlis from Tehran 1950.

Represents workers on High Labour Council and other joint negotiating bodies, but has little in common with the working class. Slight knowledge of the principles of trade unionism and insignificant organising abilities. Uses his position to improve his own status and settle personal scores.

He was previously married to a Belgian who left him a few years ago. He owes his position to his influence at Court particularly with Princess Ashraf. Speaks French.

65. Hikmat, Ali Asghar

Born about 1894. A member of a Shiraz family and cousin to Mushfir-ud-Daulah (Mirza Nizam-ud-Din Khan Hikmat) and Sardar Fakhir (Mirza Riza Khan Hikmat). Educated in the Church Missionary Society School at Shiraz 1908-09. Well-read in Arabic. Went to Tehran in 1914, where he entered the American College, graduating in 1917. Joined the Ministry of Public Instruction as an inspector. Appointed Director of Education for Fars about 1920, but kept out of the position owing to intrigues. Candidate for the 5th Majlis in 1923, for Shiraz and also for Jahrum, but was not successful. Employed in the Ministry of Education until about 1930, when he went abroad to Paris to study law. Said to have done well in his examinations. Returned to Tehran in September 1933, to take charge of the Ministry of Education as Acting Minister. Raised to the rank of Minister in February 1936. Dismissed July 1938 owing to the Shah's displeasure about a telegram connected with the Paris Exhibition, but restored to favour as Minister of the Interior February 1939. Resigned March 1940. Was proposed for minister, Berlin, but the German Government hesitated about his agreement. When it did come the Shah decided to re-employ him as Minister of the Interior instead, but dismissed him in June 1940.

Minister of Industry and Commerce in Furughi's Cabinet in 1941, and had a good deal to do with the negotiations about the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Minister of Health March 1942. Minister of Justice in Suhaili's Cabinet of February 1943, but resigned in July owing to differences of opinion with his chief. Headed cultural missions to India 1944 and again in 1947. Delegate to United Nations Education Conference 1945. Minister without Portfolio June and September 1947 under Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Delegate to U.N.E.S.C.O. November 1947. Head of Persian delegation to Tashkent for centenary of poet Nava'i April 1948. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs under Sa'id November 1948. Minister without Portfolio under Sa'id January 1950 until he fell in March 1950. After his fall from office he continued his University work and also served as president of the Persian U.N.E.S.C.O. Committee and on the Ancient Monuments Commission.

The author of some literary works, he spends some time instructing students in Persian literature at the university. Most friendly and shrewder than he at first appears. He is eminently a professor and not a man of action, but he has considerable influence in his own circle.

Speaks both English and French but neither well.

66. Hikmat, Riza (Sardar Fakhir)

Born Shiraz about 1888. Cousin of Ali Asghar Hikmat. During the 1914-18 war was a determined enemy of Qavam-ul-Mulk and friendly with the Qashqais. Since that war settled down in Tehran

and was employed in various Government appointments. Governor-General of Kirman 1940-41. Head of the Statistics and Civil Status Office 1942. Elected to the 14th Majlis 1944 for Shiraz. He still enjoys the support and friendship of the Qashqais. Appointed Governor-General, Kirman, June 1946. Is a member of Central Committee of Iran Democrat Party. Elected Deputy for Shiraz in 15th Majlis.

Elected President of Majlis October 1947. On the fall of Qavam in December 1947 was elected Prime Minister, but failed to form a Cabinet. Leader of the dissident group of Qavam's Democrat Party. Re-elected President of the Majlis April 1948 and again in October and April 1949. A member of the Regency Council during the Shah's visit to the United Kingdom July 1948. Elected to the Constituent Assembly from Shiraz April 1949. In July 1949 he founded the Socialist Party of Persia. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Shiraz and Lar autumn 1949. Deputy for Shiraz in 16th Majlis and elected President of the Majlis February 1950.

A corpulent and polite man. More intelligent than he appears.

67. Hishmati, Abbas

Born circa 1895, a Qajar prince, the son of Sardar Hishmat. Educated in France; speaks French.

After serving for some time in the army he was elected to the 14th Majlis from Mahallat. In that Majlis he was a member of the Kazimi Party. Arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh in January 1947 and held until the elections in Mahallat were over—his bitter rival, Shahab Khusravyani, whom he defeated in the 14th Majlis, was elected. He was released after promising to co-operate with Qavam and was appointed Governor of Hamadan January 1947. In August of the same year was appointed Governor-General of Mazandaran where he remained until transferred to Kermanshah in February 1949. A Member of the Constituent Assembly for Mahallat April 1949. Relieved of Governor-Generalship January 1950.

68. Humayunjah, Muhammad Ali

Born about 1888. A graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Judge of the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1922-25. Has held various clerical posts in the Ministry, culminating in that of head of the personnel section of the Ministry 1932-34. Sent as counsellor to Paris in 1935; a post to which he was singularly ill-fitted owing to his scanty knowledge of French.

For some obscure reason, said to be connected with seniority, was made Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1942; in which post he maintains his reputation of benevolent and useless stupidity.

Promoted to personal rank of ambassador April 1946 and awarded Humayun Medal, First Class. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs under Qavam December 1946 and Minister without Portfolio in June 1947. Dropped in October 1947, subsequently appointed ambassador to Ankara. He left Tehran to take up his new post in June 1948 but left Ankara for medical treatment in Paris November 1948. Superseded as ambassador by Oasim Ghani in December 1948.

A corpulent individual showing few indications of intelligence; his appointment to a foreign post was looked upon as a very good joke in Tehran.

69. Huvarisian, Ardashes

Born in Resht in 1905. Educated in the American school at Resht and in 1924 went to study at the Sociological College in Moscow. After his return from Moscow took up the cause of the workers and was imprisoned in 1928 and again from 1931 to 1941. Is said to have carried on underground activity

from prison. One of the founder members of the Tudeh Party. Elected Deputy in the 14th Majlis for Armenians and Assyrians of Azerbaijan; his election was almost unanimous owing to Russian pressure. Gifted with a certain power of invective he writes occasionally for the Tudeh press and is a leading member of the Tudeh organising committee. Was on good terms with the autonomous "Government" of Azerbaijan. Speaks Turki, excellent Persian and Russian and some English, French and German.

Sentenced to death *in absentia* May 1949, following the attempt on the Shah's life in February 1949.

70. Ibtihaj, Abul-Hasan

Second son of Ibtihaj-ul-Mulk, and brother of Ghulam Husain Ibtihaj. Born at Resht about 1900. Interpreter to the British forces in Gilan towards the end of the war. Entered the service of the Imperial Bank of Persia at Resht about 1920. Did well there, and was transferred to Tehran 1925. Assistant to the chief inspector from then till he resigned in 1936.

Head of the Mortgage Bank 1939. Realised one of his ambitions when he became Governor of the National Bank of Iran in September 1942. In this capacity he has achieved much and has also been of considerable service to us in many ways. Was Persian representative in the negotiations in London leading to the conclusion of a financial agreement between the National Bank and the Bank of England in August 1947 and to its renewal in November 1948. He maintains very cordial relations with the British Treasury and the Bank of England.

He has a complex against the Imperial Bank, on whom he made an unsuccessful legal attack in 1936. In 1949 he did his best to make the bank's position untenable. He took his defeat philosophically but will return to the charge if he can.

As a Persian financier he is unusual since he possesses intelligence, ability, energy and integrity. He is a sincere patriot and his financial theories and policy are largely dictated by his genuine desire to improve Persia's economic position. An avowed economic Nationalist but generally regarded as strongly pro-American.

He is inordinately vain, sensitive and hot-tempered and has made many enemies among his own countrymen. His unpopularity rose to its height in 1949 when his defiance of the business community threatened to precipitate a dangerous financial crisis. There is little doubt that much of his obstinacy and unreasonableness is due to ill-health from which he has been suffering for some months.

His truculence and intransigence during 1949, however, lowered him in the Shah's opinion and earned for him a reputation of wishing to become "a financial dictator."

Married in 1926 Maryam, daughter of Taqi Nabavi (Munazziz-ud-Dauleh). No children. Both he and his wife have been much in the confidence of the Shah and Princess Ashraf.

71. Ibtihaj, Ghulam Husain

Born at Resht 1898. Eldest son of the late Ibtihaj-ul-Mulk, who was for years in charge of the Gilan estates of Fathullah Akbar. Educated at Resht and completed his studies at Beirut, and for a short time in France. Interpreter to the British Expeditionary Force 1918-20.

His father was assassinated by the Jangalis, and he, together with his family, fled to Tehran when the Bolsheviks occupied Gilan in 1920. Clerk in the Prime Minister's Office 1920-21. Secretary to the Governor of Gilan 1921-22. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and assistant to the American adviser, Colonel Morris 1923-28. Dismissed from that post, apparently for dishonesty. Joined the Ulen Company in 1929, when the latter had a contract to construct the railways in the south.

Transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1931; first secretary in London April 1932. First secretary in Cairo March 1933. Suspended by the Ministry shortly after, apparently for conduct in London when the d'Arcy Concession was cancelled. In 1934 Chief of Personnel at the Ministry of the Interior; and then director of the Tourist Department and chief of the Touring Club of Iran. Went to Moscow in September 1936 to arrange the transfer of the Russian tourist organisation "Intourist" to his organisation, newly named "Iran-tour." Assistant to the Chief of the Tehran Municipality October 1937, but returned to the Ministry of Interior in 1938. Director of Administrative Services in the Ministry August 1938. Acting Chief of Tehran Municipality July 1939.

Incurred Riza Shah's displeasure and was relieved of his charge of the Municipality in September 1940. He then joined "Iran-tour" and also served on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Mixed Administration. In 1942 divorced his Persian wife and married a Polish refugee. Appointed Mayor of Tehran in 1944. A supporter of Sayyid Zia he was actively opposed to all Tudeh Party influence in the Municipality. He thus incurred the hostility of all Left-wing elements and in December 1945 Hakim (then Prime Minister) dismissed him as a gesture of conciliation. In 1946 he became managing director of Iranian Airways. Deputy for Bandar Pahlavi in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Mayor of Tehran again November 1949, but resigned in February 1950 on taking up his duties as Deputy for Lahijan in 16th Majlis.

Author of a widely used guide book to Iran. Speaks English, French and Russian. Clever and resourceful but not to be trusted very far.

72. Ihtisham, Dr. Hissam-ud-Din

Born about 1910 of an Ardistan family. Studied in France where he obtained a commercial degree. Employed in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Delegate to the International Labour Conference September 1945. Accompanied Ali Amini on a commercial mission to India in October 1945. Director of the Foreign Trade Control Department March 1946. Member of the High Labour Council November 1946. Under-Secretary, Ministry of National Economy, October 1949.

Speaks French and English. Intelligent and helpful.

73. Imami, Dr. Hasan

Son of Abul Qasim, brother of the late Imam-i-Jum'eh of Tehran.

Born about 1912. On the death of his father in 1947 he was appointed Imam-i-Jum'eh by the Shah, the old Imam's eldest son being unwilling to follow a religious calling.

Studied law in France and Switzerland and married a Frenchwoman.

He is a professor of law at the university and also practises as a solicitor and Commissioner for Oaths.

Although his upbringing and probably his present outlook are worldly he conducts himself with much decorum, wearing the regulation costume from which, however, his addiction to a Dunhill pipe somewhat detracts. He is nervous of foreign contacts but is ready to receive foreign visitors if discretion is observed. He is alleged to be conducting a thriving business in the acquisition of the title deeds to mortmain lands.

Elected to the Constituent Assembly for Tehran April 1949. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949.

Speaks French, Arabic and Turkish.

74. Imami, Jamal-ud-Din

Born about 1900, son of the Imam Jum'eh of Khauy. Educated in Belgium and speaks French.

Deputy in the 14th Majlis for Khauy, which place had been represented by his brother, Javad, for several years. After at first supporting Ali Dashti, in 1946 he was encouraging the Adalat Party in Ahwaz and district. In May of that year he was arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh for intrigues against the State.

Under Hahzir in June 1948 he became Minister without Portfolio, charged with looking after the affairs of Azerbaijan. He continued as Minister without Portfolio under Sa'id November 1948. Resigned in October 1949 to stand for the 16th Majlis, to which he was elected from Tehran.

75. Imami, Nizam-ud-Din

Brother of Jamal-ud-Din Imami. Married to a daughter of Yusuq-us-Saltaneh. Speaks English.

Served with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1930-42.

Director-General, Transferred Lands Department, early 1943-September 1944. Head of Persian Trade Delegation to India October 1944. Persian Government representative with the A.I.O.C., London, June 1947. A member of the Persian Government delegation in the negotiations leading to the Supplemental Agreement with the A.I.O.C. February-July 1949. He has the appearance of an intriguer and is not trusted by the A.I.O.C.

76. Intizam, Abdullah

Born about 1897. Brother of Nasrullah Intizam. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in about 1921. In the Press Department 1933-35. Consul at Prague 1936. Chargé d'affaires at Berne 1938. Head of the Third Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1941. Secretary at Berne 1942. Appointed in 1947 to investigate Persian claims against Germany and sent to Stuttgart with the rank of consul-general. Also accredited to The Hague as Minister August 1949.

A pleasant and go-ahead person. Speaks English and French.

77. Intizam, Nasrullah

Born about 1899. Son of the late Intizam-us-Saltaneh, and nephew of Hasan Ali Ghaffari. Educated in Tehran at the School of Political Science. Secretary at Paris 1926. Secretary at Warsaw 1927-32. Secretary to the Persian delegates to the League of Nations during the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dispute in 1933. Member of the Persian delegation to the World Economic Conference 1933. Secretary at London May 1933. Transferred to Washington 1934. Has also served in the Treaty Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. First secretary at Berne 1936. "Délégué suppléant" at the League of Nations May 1938. Head of the Third Political Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (dealing *inter alia* with Great Britain), July 1938. Attended the Duke of Spoleto's wedding in Italy June 1939.

Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1941. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the reconstruction of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet in February 1943, a post which he retained in the following Cabinet of Suhaili. Minister of Communications and subsequently of Foreign Affairs in Bayat's Cabinet of November 1944. Resigned in April 1944. Member of the Persian Delegation to San Francisco. Persian Delegate to Executive Commission of U.N.O. in London with rank of ambassador. Member of Persian Delegation to U.N.O. January 1946 and again in September. Persian representative on U.N.O. Palestine Commission June 1947. Now permanent Persian delegate at U.N.O.

Quiet and attractive. Helpful and honest. Very intelligent. Speaks French and English.

41582

78. Iqbal, Ali

Born in Meshed about 1895. Son of a well-known landowner of Khurasan, with property at Kashmar and elsewhere in the province. Deputy for Meshed in the 12th, 13th and 14th Majlises. Never in Government service, but well acquainted with Khurasan politics. Aspired to becoming the mutawalli-bashi of the Meshed shrine 1943, but did not succeed owing to the opposition of the Governor-General. An enemy of Suhaili, he was a professing supporter of Sayyid Zia-ud-Din when his fortunes were at their height.

Deputy for Kashmar in the 15th Majlis and successful in first stage of Senate elections there autumn 1949.

79. Iqbal, Dr. Manuchihr

Younger brother of Ali Iqbal. Born at Meshed about 1898. Educated at Tehran at the medical school, and then in France, where he qualified as a doctor and received a medal for research. Returned to Persia in 1939 and was employed for some time in the Ministry of Public Health. Under-Secretary of the Ministry 1943, he ran the technical side of the Ministry's work with success. Minister for Health August 1944 (Sa'id's Cabinet). Enjoyed patronage of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Minister for Health in Qavam's Cabinet February 1946. Minister for Education under Hahzir, June 1948. Minister for Health under Sa'id November 1948 and then Minister for the Interior March 1949. Transferred to Ministry of Roads, January 1950, and continued in that office under Mansur April 1950.

Married to a Frenchwoman. Ambitious, friendly and intelligent he has a pleasant personality and is said to be a good doctor. Although criticised for his handling of the elections to the 16th Majlis (written 1948-49) it was never suggested that he made money out of them, and his personal integrity is undoubted.

80. Isfandiari, Asadullah Yamin (Yamin-ul-Mamalik)

Son of the late Yamin-ul-Mamalik and a nephew of Hasan Isfandiari. Born in Tehran 1885. Educated in Tehran and Tiflis. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1901; in 1908 had reached the rank of deputy chief of the Foreign Office Tribunal. Karguzar in Isfahan 1917. Governor of the Gulf Ports 1921-23. Consul-general at Baku 1924-29. Governor of Mazandaran 1930-32. Recalled from that post and under a cloud for some time. Director of the Tehran Telephone Company. Deputy in the 13th, 14th and 15th Majlises for Babul, which he also represented in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Elected Senator from Tehran, October 1949.

Is a director of most of the important companies of the capital, and finds time to look after the affairs of the Aero-Club as well. Has a typical capitalist and conservative outlook, but nevertheless spoke in the Majlis in favour of the factory workers at Isfahan.

81. Isfandiari, Fathollah Nuri

Second son of Hasan Isfandiari (Muhtashim-us-Saltaneh). Born about 1895. Educated in Switzerland and France. Second secretary of the Persian Legation in London 1914-24. Assistant chief of the English Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1925. First secretary at Washington 1926-29. Counsellor at Paris 1929-30. Counsellor in London and chargé d'affaires 1930-31, and was in charge at the time of the Persian Exhibition. Chief of the Economics Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1932. Chargé d'affaires again in London March to December 1933. Head of the Treaty Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1934; served also in the Passport Section. For three months from the end of 1935 he was in Bagdad on a mission charged with negotiations over the frontier dispute, but achieved little. "Chef du protocole" May 1936 to December

D

1937. In charge of the Government-controlled "Iran" Insurance Company 1938. Appointed Persian Government representative with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1942 in London. Minister to Polish Government in London January 1944. Returned to Persia 1945. Minister in Washington May 1947. Appointed Persian representative on International Bank June 1947. Returned to Persia after his two years' appointment and made a member of the Seven-Year Plan Council August 1949. Was head of the Persian Delegation to the Islamic Economic Conference at Karachi (1949).

Married to a Frenchwoman; speaks French and English. Conscientious and helpful; an excellent type of permanent official.

82. Isfandiari, Musa Nuri (Muvallaq-us-Saltaneh)

Brother of Asadullah Yamin Isfandiari. Born in Tehran 1894. Educated in Tehran and Europe. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1916. Secretary at Rome for some time. Chief of the Economic Section of the Ministry 1929. Chief of the League of Nations Section 1932. Counsellor and chargé d'affaires at Paris 1933. Counsellor at Moscow in December 1933, and very soon afterwards transferred to Angora, where he was chargé d'affaires for some time. Head of the Consular Department March 1937. Director-General of Industry and Mines July 1937. Summarily relieved of that appointment in September owing to a muddle over the Chalus silk factory that was in reality due to his predecessor, Jahanbani. Administrative Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs December 1937. Minister, Baghdad, August 1938. Sent on a special mission to Berlin 1939. Left Berlin on rupture of relations in 1941, and returned to Baghdad as minister; recalled to Tehran, on the conclusion of five years' foreign service, in 1943. Though at first suspected of pro-German feelings, owing to his visit to Berlin, he behaved correctly on his second period of office in Baghdad. Minister of Agriculture in Suhaili's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Ambassador to Turkey 1945. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Qavam-us-Saltaneh September-December 1947 and again under Hakimii March 1948 and Hazhir June 1948. Ambassador to India January 1949.

Speaks French and Italian. Pleasant, married very early, and has a son who is a champion at lawn-tennis.

83. Iskandari, Abbas

Uncle of Iraj Iskandari and a Qajar prince. One of the founders of the Tudeh Party, but soon broke away to lead a dissident section. In 1942 became a director of Iran Insurance, in which he made money and went to Egypt 1943-45. Appointed Governor of Tehran in June 1946 and Governor-General a month later when Tehran was made an independent Ustan. Elected to the 15th Majlis for Hamadan. In August 1947 made a violent attack in the Majlis on Taqizadeh, the former ambassador in London. Repeatedly attacked Hakimii's Government in the first part of 1948 and was foremost in demanding a revision of the A.I.O.C.'s concession and the return of Bahrain to Persia. In January 1949 attacked Taqizadeh for signing the revised A.I.O.C. concession of 1933 and was thus largely responsible for the present agitation for a further revision.

Left Persia for Europe very soon after the attempt on the Shah's life on 4th February, 1949, and is still abroad.

He is something of a mystery man. Can almost certainly be identified with Soviet agent No. 16 mentioned in Agabekov's famous revelations. He is now rich, owning the greater part of Mirabad aerodrome.

84. Iskandari, Iraj

Born 1900. Educated in France as a lawyer. In 1938 published a philosophical review which was nothing more than disguised Communist propaganda, and in that year was one of a group of young Communists imprisoned by Riza Shah. Member of the editorial board of *Rahbar*, the Tudeh Party organ, of which he owned the licence. On Tudeh Central Committee from August 1944 and secretary-general to the party. Owns large properties and is generally regarded as very wealthy. Deputy for Sari in the 14th Majlis and Minister of Commerce and Industry under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in August 1946—dropped in October of the same year. Replaced large numbers of non-Tudeh members of the Ministry with Tudeh sympathisers and members during his tenure of office. Went to France January 1947 and has not returned to Persia. "Persian delegate" to Partisans of Peace Conference in Paris April 1949. Condemned to death *in absentia* May 1949 for activities hostile to the constitutional monarchy and for separating part of Persia (Azerbaijan).

85. Issayeff, Ramon

A Caucasian Armenian of about 55 and one of the biggest Armenian businessmen in Tehran. Has the reputation of being pro-Soviet although according to some people this is merely cover for his intense desire to realise an independent Armenia. He is, however, mistrusted by the majority of Armenians who have defeated his recurring attempts to have himself elected as their Majlis Deputy. He was a prime mover in the scheme for getting Armenian peasantry to return to Soviet Armenia in 1947 and in this connexion handled large sums of money subscribed by American Armenians. Is said to have made a great deal of money as a contractor to the Red army during the war. In his plans to increase his company holdings he has met with opposition because of his pro-Soviet reputation, but he has reserved a large interest in several important industrial and commercial enterprises. He is also a considerable shareholder in Iranian Airways. He entertains lavishly and is evidently amply supplied with funds which, it is reported—especially among the Armenian community—may well emanate from the Soviet Embassy.

Although uncouth in appearance he is well-educated and speaks excellent Russian. In spite of his reputation as a crook he is kind-hearted and generous.

86. Utibar, Dr. Abdul Husain

Born about 1910 and was partly educated in Germany. Married a German. In 1943 was head of the Technical and Construction Department in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, a post in which he made large sums of money by the gilding of the Palais de Justice. Elected Deputy for Burujird in the 14th Majlis, and in April 1945 was a member of the Persian Delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Head of water department of Tehran Municipality October 1946. Deputy for Burujird in 15th Majlis. Since the end of the 15th Majlis has been engaged in business.

Speaks excellent German, good English and French.

87. Pirmadi, Nasir Quli (Nasir-ud-Danleh)

Born about 1886. A Qajar prince, descended from the famous vazir, Mirza Taqi Khan. Occupied various posts in Government service, including Governor of the Gulf Ports in 1923. Sent on an economic mission to Germany in connexion with the settlement of various accounts about 1939. Also held other diplomatic posts in Europe. Returned to Persia 1942, and soon after appointed assistant to the Prime Minister by Suhaili, with the rank of Under-

Secretary of State. Governor-General of Khurasan December 1945. Recalled July 1946. Appointed director of the Caspian Fisheries November 1946.

Ambitious and clever, but without much stability. A good bridge player. Spoke French and German. Died 3rd February, 1950.

88. Jahanbani, Amanullah, General (Sipahbud)

Born about 1890, son of the late Amanullah Mirza, Zia-ud-Daulah (a descendant of Fath Ali Shah), who committed suicide in the British Consulate in Tabriz, where he had taken refuge from the Russians in 1917. Joined the Persian Cossack Artillery School in 1907 and then graduated in Russia where he served two years with the Imperial Guard.

Was made a general, and became Chief of the General Staff in 1922. He visited France and England in 1923. Although a Qajar prince, he favoured the change of dynasty in 1925.

Held various military commands with periodical falls from and restorations to royal favour. He was appointed Director-General of Industry in March 1936. Dismissed in July 1937. Reported in prison in Tehran in July 1939, and in poor health. Liberated 1941 and made Minister of the Interior in September. Minister of Roads and Communications December 1941. Minister of War March 1942 and employed in the autumn at court as a kind of aide-de-camp general to the Shah.

General Officer Commanding, Fars, September 1943. Commandant, Cadet College, 1946, until November when he went on a tour of training establishments in France and Belgium. On his return in February 1947 he was appointed to the sinecure post of Inspector to the Eastern Forces in the Ministry of War.

First vice-president of Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society March 1945.

Retired from the army on being nominated Senator for Fars February 1950.

Speaks Russian and French fluently; has a Russian, as well as at least one Persian, wife. Has been very active for some years in encouraging sport, both in the army and in civilian clubs and visited Europe in connexion with this in 1949. One of his sons studied four years in the Soviet Union and was then forced to leave by the Russians before completing his studies.

89. Jahanbani, Muhammad Husain, Brigadier (Sartip)

Born about 1892, cousin of Amanullah Jahanbani. Educated at Tehran and in Russia, and joined the Persian Cossack Division about 1916. Chief of Staff to General Amir Ahmadi in the Luristan operations about 1928. Military Governor of the Boir Ahmadi country shortly afterwards, where he governed with some success. Fell from favour with Riza Shah at the same time as his cousin in 1935. Then served in various capacities at the Ministry of Industry, especially in some purchasing commissions. Director-General at the Ministry of the Interior 1943, being in charge of the arrangements for the elections to the 14th Majlis, an occupation which nearly drove him crazy. Chief of Police February 1944. Head of Road Transport Department in January 1945. Resigned two months later. In January 1947 he was appointed Administrative Assistant to the Minister of War and retired from the army in 1948. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949.

Speaks French, Russian and some English. The author of an anthology of Persian poetry. Said to be very corrupt financially, but is easy to get on with.

90. Jam, Mahmud (Mudir-ul-Mulk)

Born about 1880. Has had a long career in the customs and other Government departments, and was, for more than ten years, Persian secretary to the

French Legation in Tehran. Director of the Alimentation Service, Tehran, from 1916 to 1920, where he did good work. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the short-lived Cabinet of Sayyid Zia-ud-Din 1921. Acting Minister of Finance January 1922, and Minister of Finance October 1923 to August 1924. Appointed as assistant to Prime Minister, Sardar Sipah (Riza Shah), until the latter became provisional head of the State on 31st October, 1925, and then assistant to the two following Prime Ministers. Appointed Persian Minister to Brussels in 1926, but did not proceed. Appointed Governor of Kerman Province in September 1927, and Governor-General of Khurasan in April 1928. Recalled from Khurasan in December 1928 and appointed Minister of Public Works. Returned to Khurasan as Governor-General in August 1929. Appointed Minister of the Interior in Forughii's Cabinet of 1933, and succeeded him as Prime Minister in December 1935. Headed the mission to Egypt on the Crown Prince's betrothal to Princess Fauzieh June-July 1938 and received the Order of Muhammad Ali from King Farouk. Minister of Court October 1939. Ambassador to Egypt 1941. Minister for War September-December 1947. Minister of Court January 1948. Accompanied the Shah to the United Kingdom July 1948, just after the announcement that he was to become Governor-General, Azerbaijan—an appointment he did not take up. Ambassador at Rome June 1949.

An amiable and pleasant man who speaks French fluently.

91. Jazayiri, Dr. Shams-ud-Din

Born in Tehran 1905 of a family of Khuzistan Sayyids. Educated at Tehran University and Law School. Joined the Ministry of Education in 1925 and then in 1932 went to France whence he returned in 1938 having obtained his doctorate.

Director of Instruction in Ministry of Education 1938. Later transferred to Ministry of Finance and became head of Tobacco Monopoly in 1941. Adviser on Millspaugh Price Stabilisation Committee 1943. *En disponibilité* August 1944. Legal Adviser, Ministry of Finance March 1946 and Legal Adviser Ministry of Labour 1946-48. Member of board of directors of Iran Insurance Company 1948. Member of the Council of the 7-Year Plan May 1949. Resigned August 1949.

Keenly interested in education, he has been working closely with the education expert of Overseas Consultants Incorporated who speaks highly of him. Also has considerable knowledge of labour and social developments and assisted in preparation of Persian Labour Code.

Married in 1941 Mah Munir, daughter of Dr. Muaddab Nafisi. A charming and intelligent wife. Speaks French.

92. Kafa'i, Hasan

Son of the late Akhund Mullah Muhammad Kazain, who was the chief mullah at Najaf. Managing director of the Khosrauvi Cotton Mill and Electricity Company in Meshed. A clever and unscrupulous businessman who has accumulated a large fortune during his four-year association with the Khosrauvi Company. Most unpopular.

His elder brother, Haji Mirza Ahmad, is the most influential and most respected mullah in Meshed. His nephew, Ja'afar (son of the Haji) was elected from Turbat-i-Haidari to the 15th Majlis and to the Constituent Assembly April 1949.

He was himself elected to the Constituent Assembly from Meshed. He is a director of the Private Commercial Bank established in spring 1950.

93. Kaihan, Mas'ud

Born in Tehran 1886. Educated in Persia and at Saint-Cyr. Joined the gendarmerie in 1913 and rose

to the rank of colonel. Minister of War under Sayyid Zair-ud-Din Tabataba'i after his *coup d'Etat* of 1921. After Riza Khan's *coup d'Etat* he joined the Ministry of Education and became a teacher in secondary schools and later at Tehran University, where his department is reputed (1950) to be the best run in the University. Was also professor of geography at the Military Academy. Minister of Education under Mansur April 1950.

94. Kaivan, Amir Agha

Born 1917. Has lived most of his life at Isfahan in employment for sixteen years as an engineer in the power house of the Nur textile factory. With Shams Sadri was active in the formation of the first Isfahan trade union in 1943-44. The Tudeh movement attempted to absorb this union in 1945. Shams Sadri yielded without much struggle, but Kaivan organised resistance to Tudeh, as a result of which a personal attack was made on him and he lost the use of one eye. Then had to lie low until the Tudeh eclipse in the winter of 1946 when he revived his Isfahan union. In 1947 affiliated his union to the I.M.K.A. Federation, but later withdrew because of I.M.K.A.'s venture into politics. Again affiliated in 1949. In March 1948 claimed that his union had 6,000 industrial members and 12,000 agricultural members or sympathisers. By June 1949, because of strong opposition from employers, I.S. K.L. civil and military authorities, the number of active members had fallen to a few hundred enthusiasts. He is popular with his members and has considerable power over them. He denounces the dependence of trade unions on political parties and insists on the political independence of his organisation. In 1945 Kaivan attended the Paris Conference of the I.L.O. as workers' delegate. Violently anti-Russian and anti-Tudeh, for this reason has the friendship of certain religious leaders and Members of Parliament. The Isfahan employers are strongly opposed to him because of his obstinacy in pursuing the cause of the workers and his refusal to be bribed. A likeable person, who gives the impression of being genuinely devoted to the welfare of his fellow-workers. Speaks Persian only.

95. Kambakhsh, Abdus-Samad

Born 1905, at Qazvin; his father, still alive in 1943, was Ain-ul-Mamalik, a Qajar prince and wealthy landowner at Qazvin. Entered Persian army about 1923; sent to Leningrad for training and became a pilot there; also imbibed the doctrines of communism with enthusiasm. On return was active Communist and was known as the Persian representative on the Comintern. Sentenced to death by Riza Shah, but was pardoned and then imprisoned with fifty-three other Communists. Exiled in 1940 to Bandar Abbas; released on the fall of Riza in 1941.

Elected to the 14th Majlis for Qazvin, by help of the Soviet representative. Generally regarded as one of the more decent Tudeh members. He is believed to be dissatisfied with the complete subservience of his party to Soviet interests. Put in charge of the publicity of the Tudeh Party in August 1944. Married to a Persian related to the Kia family who acts an *accouchante* in Tehran.

Believed to have taken refuge at Soviet Summer Embassy after the attempt on the Shah February 1949. Sentenced to death *in absentia* May 1949, for acting against the Constitutional Monarchy. His wife was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

96. Kashani (or Kashi), Sayyid Abul-Qasim

Born about 1888. Educated at Kerbelah and lived there for many years as a mujtahid. Expelled by the Iraq Government in 1922 for non-co-operation with our policy in that country, and came back to

Persia. Kept in the background during Riza Shah's reign, but on the latter's abdication in 1941 came back into prominence and achieved a certain popularity partly owing to his reputation as an opponent of Riza Shah. His anti-British bias, a legacy from 1922, led him into intrigues with German agents and in August 1943 he fled from Tehran to avoid arrest. He was arrested by British security authorities in June 1944 and confessed to having helped German agents. Released in August 1945. He nursed a bitter enmity towards the British. Arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh July 1946 and released in November.

A prominent political mullah. In June 1948 he instigated demonstrations against Abdul Husain Hazhir after the latter had been elected Prime Minister. Arrested by military authorities after attempt on Shah's life 4th February, 1949 and banished to Khurramabad, but later allowed to leave the country for the holy places of Syria, and spent some time in Beirut.

Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949. Elected to the 16th Majlis from Tehran as a protégé of the National Front but is still abroad.

97. Kazimi, Baqir (Muazzib-ud-Dauleh)

Born about 1887. Educated in the School of Political Science in Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, being first attached to the Russian section, and later employed in the Cabinet of the Ministry. Appointed Chief of Cabinet in 1921. Appointed counsellor to the Persian Legation in Washington in 1925. Sent to Iraq to inspect Persian consulates in 1928. Later in the same year appointed counsellor to the Persian Legation in Kabul, but could only proceed as far as Herat, where he remained as Persian Consul-General. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Roads and Communications in 1930, and Acting Minister in 1931. Appointed substantive Minister of Roads and Communications in May 1931, but had to resign in February 1932, owing, it is said, to being unable to build roads fast enough for His Majesty the ex-Shah. He was subsequently appointed Persian Minister in Bagdad, towards the end of 1932. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Furughi's Cabinet of September 1933.

Went on official visits to Afghanistan and India November-December 1935, and was the guest of the Viceroy (Lord Willingdon) at Delhi. Resigned March 1936, and unemployed until appointed Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan April 1937. Ambassador, Kabul, July 1938. Ambassador, Angora, October 1939.

Minister of Public Health December 1941 to March 1942. Then Minister of Finance in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942, but resigned before its fall in circumstances which did him little credit. Appointed to Angora as ambassador in May 1943, but did not proceed: the Turks appear to like him as little as the Iraqis, who have not forgotten how he opposed them in the dispute concerning the Shatt-al-Arab waters. Minister of Education in Sa'idi's reshuffled Cabinet of August 1944. Delegate to U.N.O. January 1946. Minister to Denmark, Norway and Sweden April 1946.

In January 1948 he was offered, and is reported to have accepted, the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in Hakimi's Cabinet but he remained in Stockholm. Presented his credentials as minister to Finland also February 1949. Nominated Senator for Tehran February 1950 but has not yet returned to Persia.

A man of intelligence and energy.

98. Kazimi, Mustafa (Dabir-ul-Mulk)

Born in Tehran 1891. Brother of Baqir Kazimi. Educated at the School of Political Science, Tehran.

Entered the Ministry of Education 1914, and appointed Director of Education at Kerman in 1915. Caused a great deal of trouble to the British forces and the Imperial Bank of Persia during the war of 1914-18. Financial agent at Isfahan 1920-22. In the Ministry of Finance 1923-25. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice 1927-28. Chairman of the Caspian Fisheries Committee 1928-32. Governor-General of Kerman 1932-33.

Engaged in politics after the fall of Riza Shah; tried to found a new party without success June 1942. Elected member of the Majlis for Kerman 1943, after vehement protestations of repentance for his anti-British past.

As one of the leaders of the Ittihad-i-Milli fraction in the Majlis, he consistently and strongly opposed the spread of Soviet influence, and right at the end of the 14th Majlis he was not afraid to deliver a speech violently critical of the Soviet's breach of the Tripartite Treaty.

99. Khajeh-Nuri, Ghulam Ali (Nizam-us-Sultan)

Son of Amir Nuri (Nizam-ud-Dauleh). Member of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for several years, with an interval as secretary at the legation in Rome in 1935. Visited London in September 1937 on business connected with the printing of bank-notes for the Persian Government and commissions for the Royal palace. Chief Inspector in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1946. Head of Protocol Department 1949.

Educated partly in Russia, where he learnt ballet-dancing. Speaks French and Russian. Though of decadent appearance, he is helpful and friendly. Aided by his cultivated and charming wife, who is a daughter of Dr. Ali Asghar Nafisi, he is hospitable and popular with the Diplomatic Corps.

Has done various services for the Court after the fall of Riza Shah, the latest one being French instructor to the Queen-Mother, whom he admires with an enthusiasm which is no credit to his intelligence.

He prefers to be known as Nizam Khajeh-Nuri.

100. Khajeh-Nuri, Ibrahim

Legal Adviser to the Tehran Chamber of Commerce. Born about 1905. Member and Secretary of the Adalat Party from 1942. Unsuccessful candidate for the Tehran elections in 1944. Director-General of the Publications and Propaganda Department in 1944 and again in 1947, when he also held the office of Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister. Elected Senator from Tehran October 1949.

A well-known and popular writer, his best-known work being "Bazigaran-i-Asr-i-Tala'i," a series of twelve biographies of outstanding personalities in Riza Shah's reign. For some years he has produced a fortnightly Newsletter called *Khajeh-Nuri Letter*. As a historian he is most readable but not very accurate. In politics he is an idealist of strongly pro-British tendencies.

101. Khosrovani, Ahmad, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Was in temporary command of the air force in 1931 during the occasions when General Ahmad Nakhjivan was suspended, and again in 1937 when General Nakhjivan was appointed assistant to the Minister of War. Promoted brigadier (Sartip) and placed in command of the air force 1939. Officer Commanding Troops, Tabriz, 1942 but returned to be head of the air force at the end of 1944, after he had been expelled by the Russians from Azerbaijan.

Head of the Transport Directorate, Ministry of War, 1946. Deputy Chief of the General Staff 1947. While still holding this appointment he was made Military Governor of Tehran on imposition of martial law after the attempted assassination of the Shah

February 1949, and again after the assassination of Hazhir.

Shows commendable energy, but his ideas are out of date. Though he has recently been friendly, he was strongly against the purchase of Hurricane aircraft at the time this deal was being concluded.

102. Kishavarz, Faridun, Dr.

Born in 1906. Partly educated in France as a doctor of medicine and formerly practised at Pahlavi. Then ran a large and prosperous children's clinic in Tehran. In 1944 became one of the leading members of the Tudeh Party, of which he is a member of the Central Committee, and since then has been responsible in large measure for the organisation of the party. Editor of the Tudeh newspaper *Razm*. Tudeh Deputy for Pahlavi in the 14th Majlis. In December 1945 was invited by the Soviet Government to attend ceremonies held in Tashkent on the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the Central Asian Middle East College. Minister for Education under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in August 1946, but was dropped in the Cabinet reshuffle of October of the same year. During his tenure of office he succeeded in filling many important posts in the Ministry with Tudeh members and sympathisers.

After the attempt on the Shah's life of 4th February, 1949, he was reported to have taken refuge in the Russian Embassy. Sentenced to death *in absentia* May 1949 for actions hostile to the constitutional monarchy.

Completely unscrupulous and reported to be a perfect tool for the Russians. An accomplished public speaker.

103. Kupal, Sadiq, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born in Tabriz about 1890. Educated in Persia and Constantinople. Originally an artillery officer; but joined the gendarmerie in 1911. Was with the Turks when they approached Hamadan in 1916. (Has the Gallipoli star.) Went to Angora on a congratulatory mission in 1922 and remained there as military attaché till 1924. On the staff of the General Officer Commanding, North-West Division, in 1924. Chief of Police in 1929. In temporary command of the air force in 1931. Liaison officer with the Iraq forces in the operations against Jaafar Sultan 1931-32. Head of the Conscription Department 1934. Accompanied the Shah on his journey to Turkey in 1934.

Governor of Riza'iyeh in 1941, but retired thence in a great hurry when the town was threatened with insurrection by Kurds and Assyrians in March 1942. Suspected of complicity in the Zahidi plots. Very intimate with the Turkish Ambassador 1943. Arrested at the instance of the Allied security authorities September 1943, released May 1945. Director of Military Tribunal, Tehran, February 1946. Appointed Chief of Gendarmerie 1947.

Energetic and loquacious. Has a Turkish wife. Neither studious nor professionally ambitious. Shows some interest in horse racing.

He is considered by the American Mission with the gendarmerie to be honest and sincere.

104. Kuros, Isa (Isa)

Born about 1896. A commissioned officer in the South Persian Rifles during the 1914-18 war. For many years a leading and reputable merchant of Tehran, representative of Imperial Chemical Industries, Metropolitan Vickers, and many other important British firms. Has a branch in London, and his wife and children are in England (1949). Speaks excellent English and is well disposed towards us. Patriotic and of strict integrity. Fell into disgrace under Riza Shah through no fault of his own. Stood for the Majlis for Tehran 1943 without success. Vice-President of Tehran Chamber of Commerce since October 1942. Member of Tehran Municipal

Council 1943. Member of board of directors of Iranian Airways 1946.

One of the wealthiest merchants in Tehran.

105. Lankarani, Shaikh Husain

Born about 1890 in Soviet Azerbaijan. Elected Deputy for Ardabil in the 14th Majlis. Owed election to Soviet intervention. Without Russian backing would have no influence. Noted Tehran intriguer, mob orator and trouble-maker. In 1943-44 was employed by the Shah to stir up trouble against Sayyid Zia-ud-Din. A typical Akhund, venal and double-faced. Qavam arrested him July 1946, but released him in December.

Arrested in March 1948, together with his three brothers, in connexion with the murder of the journalist Muhammad Mas'ud. Subsequently released. Again arrested with his brothers after the attempted assassination of the Shah 4th February, 1949, but again later released.

106. Mansur (Rajab) Ali, C.B.E. (Mansur-ul-Mulk)

Born about 1888. Educated in the School of Political Science at Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and was employed in the English section. He subsequently transferred to the Tribunal section, where he rose to be Director of the Civil Court. Appointed Director of the English section in 1917. Appointed Under-Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1919, and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior in 1920. Created C.B.E. 1920. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in April 1927, and held that post until January 1931, when he was made Minister of the Interior. Transferred to the post of Minister of Roads and Communications in January 1933. Arrested in January 1936 on charges of misappropriation and incompetence. Acquitted August 1936. Rehabilitated as Minister of Industry and Mines August 1938. Selected by Riza Shah for the post of Prime Minister June 1940, it was to him that the joint Russo-British ultimatum was delivered on 25th August, 1941. As the result of the subsequent events he resigned in September 1941. Governor-General of Khurasan February 1942, in which post he showed some energy in collecting wheat, though his administration of the funds of the shrine laid him open to various accusations of embezzlement. Recalled from Khurasan in the autumn of 1945. Governor-General, Azerbaijan, December 1946-July 1948.

Elected to the Constituent Assembly from Tehran April 1949. President of the Council of the 7-Year Plan May 1949.

Prime Minister March 1950. A clever man, addicted to money. It is too early (May 1950) to judge his performance as Prime Minister. Speaks French.

107. Marzbani, Dr. Isma'il (Amin-ul-Mulk)

Born about 1875, at Resht. Studied medicine in France, and has practised as an oculist at Tehran for about the last forty years. Visited London in connexion with the Constitutional movement in 1906. Has had several excursions into politics, having been Minister of Posts and Telegraphs whenever his fellow-citizen, the late Sipahdar, was in power. President of the Iran Club after Jam, a post which he still holds.

Universally liked and respected as an honest old gentleman. Owns a little property in Resht, but is not rich, and still practised up to his appointment as Minister of Public Health under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in 1942. He resigned from that post in December 1942. Took a prominent part in supervising the Tehran elections December 1943. President of the Anti-Narcotic League January 1944. Minister of Health in Hakimi's Cabinet May 1945.

Benevolent and agreeable manner. Speaks French.

108. Mas'ud, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dauleh)

Born 1885. Eighth, and second surviving, son of Mas'ud Mirza Zill-us-Sultan, son of Nasir-ud-Din Shah. Was early recognised as one of the most intelligent of the Zill's fourteen sons, and now has succeeded to the major part of his father's inheritance. Minister of Public Works and Commerce 1915. Minister for Foreign Affairs 1916. Governor of Isfahan in 1917. Minister of Finance in Vus'uq-ud-Dauleh's Cabinet of 1919; one of the triumvirate who arranged the abortive Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1920; Governor of Kermanshah and Hamadan in November 1920. Governor-General of Fars 1922-23, and again in 1929. Arrested shortly after the fall of Firuz Mirza in 1929, and kept under surveillance near Tehran for several months. Thereafter lived quietly in Tehran till 1932, when he was allowed to return to his vast properties in and around Isfahan.

Killed his own mother at his father's instigation on a point of honour in 1906. He seems to have lived down the odium of this deed. Has been several times to Europe and has visited England. Speaks English and French fluently and is pleasant-mannered, clever and intelligent. The two-fold stigma of being pro-British and a Qajar prevented him coming back to power during the régime of Riza Shah. At the fall of Riza Shah he at first continued aloof from public affairs, though he kept in touch with what was going on. He has now become the unofficial controller of almost everything in Isfahan, displaying commendable initiative in supporting such improvement projects as the Kuhrang tunnel and the thermal power station in Isfahan. He takes a great pride in his model village at Asgharabad, near Isfahan, and may very easily have a part to play in shaping Persia's future in the next few years. Has one surviving son and two daughters. A famous hunter.

Is on good terms with the present Royal Family and accommodates members of it when they visit Isfahan. (He was the twenty-fourth person to see the Shah after the *attentat* and gave a large sum of money to the Imperial Social Services as a thanksgiving for the Shah's deliverance.)

Headed the poll from Isfahan in the elections to the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Isfahan and in Faridan autumn 1949.

109. Mas'udi, Abbas

Born in 1895 in Tehran. Educated in Tehran, and for a year in France. A journalist by profession and by nature. Proprietor with his brother, Jamal Mas'udi, of one of the two principal vernacular daily papers in Tehran (the *Juhd'at*) and of the French daily paper *Journal de Téhéran*. He accompanied the present Shah, when Crown Prince, to Iraq, Syria and Egypt on his wedding tour as press representative, and kept the Tehran press supplied with a stream of accounts of the Prince's doings, in that quasi-religious style that alone was permitted to Persians when speaking of their monarchy. A Deputy in the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th Majlises.

In the 13th Majlis came out strongly in opposition to Qavam-us-Saltaneh, being severely beaten by some of his opponents in the riots of the 8th December, 1942. Visited Palestine and Egypt in May-June 1943. Appointed Director of Iran Airways December 1944. Visited United States in April 1945, as one of several representatives of the Tehran press invited by the American Government. Covered the U.N.O. meetings in London in early 1946 as unofficial representative of the Persian press. Returned from America August 1947 and took over direction of *Juhd'at*.

Elected to 15th Majlis for Tehran which he also represented in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Elected Senator for Tehran October 1949.

110. Matin-Daftari, Dr. Ahmad

Born in Tehran 1898. A nephew of Dr. Musaddiq, whose daughter he has married. Educated in Tehran, partly at the American College. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1918. Persian secretary to the German Legation in Tehran 1920-23. Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1923-27. Joined the Ministry of Justice in 1927 and appointed Attorney-General of the Court of Appeal. Sent to Europe by the Ministry of Justice in 1929 to take up an advanced course of law, during which he studied in Germany, and for a time was sworn in as a judge in a German court. Obtained a degree as doctor of law. Returned to Persia 1931. Director-General of the Ministry of Justice 1932. Acting Minister of Justice when Davar was away at Geneva in 1933. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice 1934. Represented Persia at the International Law Conference held in Berlin in 1935. Minister of Justice 1936. Member of the mission to Egypt for the Crown Prince's marriage February-April 1939. Prime Minister October 1939.

Appeared pro-German in various negotiations while Prime Minister and was forced by Riza Shah to resign in June 1940 but in this may well have been scapegoat for the Shah. In 1943 was evidently hoping to re-enter the political arena. Arrested as a suspect June 1943 but soon released. Minister without Portfolio in Qavam's Cabinet February 1946.

Stood, unsuccessfully, as candidate for Tehran in elections for 15th Majlis, but was elected from Khiav. An active member of the Opposition which defeated Qavam-us-Saltaneh in December 1948. Elected Senator from Tehran October 1949.

Speaks French and German, and a little English; he has travelled in England. A very hard-working and conscientious official, always very helpful when approached. A good speaker, with a thorough knowledge of local legal administration.

111. Mishah-Fatimi, Ali Naqi

Born about 1898. Related to Imad-us-Saltaneh (Mihdi Fatimi) of the well-known Isfahan family, though not related (he says) to Saifpur Fatimi and his brothers. Has had a career under the Ministry of the Interior, in various posts and inspection duties. Vice-Governor of Isfahan 1925. Governor-General of Khuzistan in 1940 and again in 1943. Replaced August 1949.

Speaks English and French. Got on well with the authorities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with whom he co-operated satisfactorily during the labour troubles of the summer of 1946.

112. Mishbahzadeh, Dr. Mustafa

Owner of the newspaper *Kaihan*. Head of Press and Propaganda Department June 1943. He was the Shah's candidate for Bandar Abbas in the 14th Majlis elections but was not successful. He was, however, elected from that constituency to the 15th Majlis and also represented it in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Now represents it in the 16th Majlis.

Went to the United States in November 1949 to cover the Shah's visit for *Kaihan*.

Speaks English and French.

113. Mu'azid, Mas'ud

Born about 1890. Educated in the School of Political Science at Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and served in certain Russian posts, also Trebizond. A personal friend of Baqir Kazimi, who, when Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1934, appointed Muazid head of the second political section of the Ministry which deals with Russia. Consul-General at Herat in 1937. Head of the Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs November 1937. Counsellor, Angora, November 1938.

Returned to Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1940 and in 1941 became the head of the Consular and Passport Department.

Persian Government representative at Beirut January 1944 with the rank of minister plenipotentiary. Withdrawn end of 1946. Appointed Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 1948. Joined Sardar Fakhir's Socialist Party in July 1949 and stood unsuccessfully for the Senate in Tehran.

A somewhat dried-up individual. Speaks Russian and French.

114. Muqaddam, Hasan, General (Sarlashgar)

Born about 1890. Commanded at Mahabad in 1929. General Officer Commanding, North-West Division, December 1929. General Officer Commanding, Kurdistan Division, at Senneh 1936. When in Kurdistan had a reputation for efficiency and energy. Was the undisputed ruler of the Province of Kurdistan from 1938 to 1941. General Officer in command of the troops in the West when the Russo-British invasion took place in 1941, and after handing over to the invading forces retired to Tehran.

Being an old friend of Riza Shah he was retained in the army and in June 1942 was made Governor-General of Azerbaijan till August 1943. Ministry of War Inspector, June 1945, but retired soon after. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Maragheh.

Muqaddam gives the impression of being a clever though cautious old soldier, unable to resist the temptation to make money whenever possible. His daughter is married to Riza Qavam, son of Qavam-ul-Mulk.

115. Muqbil, Ahmad

Appointed Under-Secretary at Ministry of Finance in February 1944 but resigned in September 1944. A member of the Supreme Economic Council April 1945, and in August 1945 was sent to United Kingdom, France and United States to study economic and financial affairs. Minister of Agriculture under Sa'id November 1948-November 1949. Member of 7-Year Plan Council April 1950.

Quiet and friendly. Not a prepossessing personality and lacks drive. Is co-operative, and B.M.E.O. advisers have found him helpful. Both he and his wife know little English but speak fluent French.

116. Musaddiq, Dr. Muhammad (Musaddiq-us-Saltaneh)

Born about 1885; a nephew of Farman Farma. Has studied law in Paris to a certain extent and poses as a jurist. Appointed Governor-General of Fars in 1920. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1921, and sought and obtained authority from Parliament to purge and reform that Ministry. However, during his six months' tenure of that portfolio he destroyed indiscriminately the good with the bad, and at the end the organisation was worse than before, as he proved himself entirely incapable of making reforms. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in 1922, and in 1923 became Minister for Foreign Affairs for a period of four months. Elected Deputy to the 4th, 5th and 6th terms of the Majlis from Tehran. Owing to his opposition to the Government in the 6th term, steps were taken to prevent his election to the 7th Majlis.

Imprisoned and otherwise ill-treated by Riza Shah, he spent the last few years of Riza's reign in a village near Tehran. Headed the poll in the Tehran elections in 1944. Tried unsuccessfully to unseat Sayyid Zia.

Sponsored the Oil Law of December 1944 prohibiting the grant of any oil concession until after the departure of all foreign troops from Persia. Made a determined effort to be re-elected to 15th Majlis

but, though he obtained a large number of votes, was defeated by the candidates of the Iran Democrat Party.

Headed the poll in the first stage of the Senate elections in Tehran October 1949, but was not elected in the second stage. Led a deputation of twenty "National Front" supporters, who took "bast" in the Shah's Palace for five days in October 1949 as a protest against the conduct of the 16th Majlis elections. Headed the poll in both the initial Tehran 16th Majlis elections and the re-held ones in February 1950: with him were elected seven other members of his National Front. He has built up a considerable position for himself as the opponent of the Court and the Government. Unfortunately he does not seem to have any constructive programme. A skilled orator.

117. Musavizadeh, Ali Akbar

President of Provincial High Court of Ustans 1 and 2 in May 1942. Was suspected of pro-Axis activities in World War II and was interned by the British and released in July 1945. Was not a prominent fifth columnist and is said, by the Minister of War, to bear the British no ill-will for having been interned. Member of delegation under Muzaffar Firuz which went to Tabriz in 1946 to announce agreement between Central Government and Democrats. Member of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Democrat Party of Iran 1946. Member of Elections Supervisory Council 1946. Appointed Governor-General of Tehran in October 1946, but did not take up the appointment owing to his inclusion in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet of October 1946 as Minister of Justice.

Dropped from Cabinet in June 1947 and appointed Governor-General of Tehran. Relieved of this appointment in January 1948.

118. Mushavir, Dr. Fazlullah

Formerly an inspector in the Agricultural Bank, he has been associated with the Planning Organisation since its inception and became a foundation member of the Council of the 7-Year Plan May 1949. Resigned August 1949.

Said to be capable and intelligent.

Speaks French fluently, and English.

119. Mu'tamidi, Ali

Born about 1897. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1919. Served abroad as secretary at various posts: chargé d'affaires at Rome in 1933. Head of the Third Political Department of the Ministry (which dealt with British affairs) in 1934 and 1935. Transferred to direct the First Political Department June 1936. Hard-working and intelligent; a good type of the younger school, who showed himself reasonable and conscientious in dealing with our affairs in the Ministry. Head of the Department of Registration of Land and Documents under the Ministry of Justice March 1938. When the Minister of Justice (Matin-Daftari) was made Prime Minister in October 1939, he took Mu'tamidi with him as Private Secretary.

Married the sister of Ghulam Ali Khajeh-Nuri. Private Secretary to the Prime Minister in Suhaili's Cabinet of 1942, and became Minister of Posts and Telegraphs for a few days at the end of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet February 1943. Was also in charge of the Road Transport Board in 1942 and 1943. Appointed Consul-General at Delhi July 1943. Member of Advisory Council of Anglo-Persian Institute 1943.

Became first Persian Ambassador to India 1947. Appointed to Hakim's Cabinet as Minister of Roads and Communications January 1948 but did not accept office. Also refused Hahiri's offer of office June 1948. Resigned his ambassadorship in November 1948 as a protest against conditions in Persia.

Honest. Speaks French, Italian and a little English.

120. Nabavi, Taqi (Muazziz-ud-Dauleh)

Born in Tehran 1882. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1899. Consul at Batumi 1908. Consul at Ashkabad 1910. Karguzar (Government agent) at Meshed in 1912. Consul-general at Tiflis 1919-21. Has served as consul-general in India. Minister for Foreign Affairs for two months in Sayyid Zia's Cabinet of 1921. Consul-general in Syria 1930. Minister in Iraq 1931-32. Appointed president of the Iran-Soviet Caspian Sea Fisheries Company 1935. Minister at Brussels August 1937. Recalled August 1938.

Head of the Caspian Fisheries Board again 1940. A difficult post which he seemed to occupy with some success, as he knows Russians well and was often able to frustrate, by a little diplomacy, the Russian plans to gain complete control of that undertaking. Appointed minister at Lisbon October 1944, but did not proceed as the plans to open a legation there fell through. In November 1946 left the Caspian Fisheries to become minister at Prague.

A corpulent little man, speaking French, Russian and English. Was well in with Tammurtash, but survived the latter's fall. Suspected of making irregular use of customs privilege while employed abroad. Quite a well-disposed person, though not exceedingly intelligent.

121. Nafisi, Habib

Born about 1909. Son of Dr. Mu'adib-ud-Dauleh. Educated Toulouse University and Paris, qualifying as an engineer. Completed practical training in the United States (three years), Czechoslovakia and Germany. On return to Persia was employed as a technical expert in the administration and management of State factories and was for a time director of the Tehran Small Arms Factory. Then employed as Director-General in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce where he became increasingly interested in social problems and employment conditions. He drafted the first Persian Labour Law approved by the Council of Ministers in May 1946. Was appointed Under-Secretary of the newly-formed Ministry of Labour and Propaganda, to which labour functions previously performed by Ministry of Industry and Commerce were transferred in May 1946. In 1947 succeeded in separating propaganda functions from Ministry of Labour. It was almost entirely due to his enthusiastic and insistent efforts that the Labour Law was finally approved by formal vote of the 15th Majlis in June 1949. Has remained Under-Secretary, Ministry of Labour, despite marked enmity of the recent Minister of Labour, Ghulam Husain Furuhan.

He shows a wide interest in social services, whether or not within the official scope of his Ministry: in 1948 he established an experimental trade training centre in Tehran, he works hard for the Royal Organisation for Social Services, and he has inspired an embryonic co-operative movement in Persia.

He has paid numerous visits to Europe, to London in 1945 to study the organisation of the British Ministry of Labour and National Service, and to International Labour Organisation Conferences in Paris (1945), Geneva (1947), Geneva (1949). A great admirer of British achievements in social and labour spheres, and pro-British in so far as this does not conflict with his strong nationalism. Extremely hard working, conscientious and apparently honest—by Persian standards he is a poor man. Through his late father who was in charge of the Shah's education, and his second wife who was a lady-in-waiting to Princess Ashraf, Nafisi has close contact with the Royal Family.

His first wife, by whom he has a son born about 1942 and now at school in Switzerland, was drowned at Geneva in 1947. In 1948 he married the niece of Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us-Saltaneh).

Speaks fluent French and English.

122. Nafisi, Hasan (Musharraf-ud-Dauleh)

Third son of the late Dr. Nazim-ul-Atibba. Born in Tehran 1896. Educated in Persia and went to France in 1909, where he graduated from the Lycée Henri IV. Returned to Persia in 1914 and joined the Ministry of Finance. On the staff of that Ministry till 1921, when he was appointed Director of the Inspection Department of the Tehran Municipality. Left for France in 1922, where he studied law for two years. Obtained the degree of doctor of law from the University of Paris, and the diploma of the School of Political Science. Returned to the Ministry of Finance for two years in 1925. Assistant to the procureur général of the Court of Appeal in 1927, and in 1928 president of the Tribunal of Commerce. Joined the staff of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as legal adviser in 1928. Visited London 1929. Left the company's service in 1930, and set up private practice as an advocate in 1930; but remained the company's lawyer. Has one of the best legal practices in Tehran. Visited London again in 1933 and 1935.

Minister of Finance in Furughi's Cabinet 1941, and did good work in the difficult task of reconstructing the country's finances on a new basis. Resigned with that Cabinet early in 1942. Persian Government representative to International Bank in 1946. Appointed Financial Adviser to the Prime Minister under Qavam-us-Saltaneh autumn 1947 and charged with preparation of preliminary report on Seven-Year Plan. Within one month produced report which was basis of subsequent legislation. Post as Financial Adviser abolished January 1948, but he remained chairman of Provisional Planning Authority until the end of the year when he resigned after disagreeing with Sa'id's Cabinet over the staffing of the Planning Authority. Was appointed Member of the Council of the the Seven-Year Plan May 1949 and Managing Director of the Plan August 1949. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949.

Married the daughter of Amin-ud-Dauleh in 1931. Speaks English and French. A very sensible man, with a sound knowledge of local and French law; has been very helpful on many occasions to this embassy on legal points.

123. Nafisi, Sa'id

Second son of the late Dr. Nazim-ul-Atibba. Born in Tehran 1893. Educated in Persia and later in France. Returned to Persia in 1911, and was employed in the Ministry of the Interior. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works in 1916, where he held different posts till 1927. Since then has been professor of the Persian language and literature in various schools. Has also done a good deal of journalism for the *Titil'at*, the *Journal de Téhéran* and other newspapers. Was also active in promoting the first Persian cinema film. Has a great reputation as a prose writer. Author of a life of the poet Rudaki, and of a French-Persian dictionary. Published some violently anti-British articles in the local press when the D'Arcy Concession was cancelled. Has a certain knowledge of the Pahlavi language. A member of the Iranian Academy (Farhangistan).

A scholar of sorts and an active propagandist of pro-Russian views. Visited Moscow in autumn of 1945. In the latter part of 1949 and early 1950 has been in India in connexion with the "Peace through Education" movement.

Prominent in the Soviet-Iranian Cultural Society.

124. Najm, Abul-Qasim

Born in Tehran 1893. Son of the late Najm-ul-Mulk, a noted astronomer.

Educated at the School for Political Science at Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1911. Chief accountant at the Ministry 1920-24, and again from 1926-28. Transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and appointed

41582

Director-General there in 1930. Under-Secretary to that Ministry in 1933. In November of that year appointed minister to Germany. Minister in Tokyo early 1940; recalled on rupture of relations 1942. Said to have expressed admiration for Japanese methods. Ambassador at Kabul 1943-45.

His Majesty's Minister, Kabul, reported that he was friendly but ineffective, his co-operation with His Majesty's Legation being adequate but no more. Understands English tolerably well. Minister in the short-lived Hakim's Government in the summer of 1945 but had not left Kabul when that Government fell. Minister for Foreign Affairs in Hakim's Cabinet of November 1945. He did his best to deal with the Azerbaijan crisis but the difficulties were too great for him.

Minister of Finance in Hakim's Cabinet December 1947-June 1948. Member of the Council of the Seven-Year Plan May 1949. Elected from Tehran October 1949 and resigned from Seven-Year Plan on opening of Parliament February 1950. Mentioned as possible Prime Minister March 1950 but Majlis opposition was too strong.

125. Nakha'i, Muhammad

Born about 1902. Educated in Persia; speaks French.

Secretary of the Persian Legation in Brussels from 1928 for some years, and then remained in Belgium teaching Persian. Also studied law, and eventually returned to Persia to join the National Bank as head of its legal department. Later transferred to the Ministry of Finance as private secretary to the Minister (General Amir-khusruvi). 1941 became president of the Exchange Commission. At the end of 1943 private secretary to the Prime Minister (Suhaili). Has visited England, and his thesis for his doctorate was a dissertation on *Le Pétrole en Iran*.

In autumn 1943 helped to organise Government Employees' and Tenants' Association. President of Association of Iranian graduates of Belgian Universities.

Minister of Commerce in Sa'id's reconstituted Cabinet of August 1944. Minister of Agriculture in Sadr's Government in 1945. Minister without Portfolio November 1949 and then Minister of Agriculture January 1950 and of Labour February 1950 under Sa'id. Continued in this last office under Mansur April 1950.

Capable, intelligent and well-disposed towards us. Brother of Dr. Husain Quds. Brother-in-law of Najm. Married a Belgian while in Brussels for medical treatment 1949-50.

126. Nakhjivan, Muhammad (Amir Muvassaq) General (Sipahbud)

Born at Tehran about 1882. His father was an officer in the Cossack Brigade. Educated partly in the Russian Military School at Tiflis. On his return to Persia he joined the Cossack Brigade. Director of the Military Academy at Tehran in 1922, as a reward for loyalty to Riza Shah; he had previously been engaged in the fighting in Gilan with the Bolsheviks and Kuchik Khan. In 1928 appointed Acting Chief of the General Staff. Acting Minister of War in August 1934; attained the rank of Amir Lashgar in 1935. Relieved of his functions as Acting Minister in April 1936. Head of the Persian Staff College from 1942 till February 1949 when he retired from the army on being nominated Senator for Tehran.

An exceedingly stupid, fat man, who appears to owe his high appointments to a habit of carrying out orders with no comment. Very susceptible to flattery. Openly critical of Russia.

Speaks Russian, French, German and a little English.

127. Nasr, Sayyid Ali

Born Tehran about 1890, of a well-known family of Sayyids, one of whom was assassinated while serving in the Finance Ministry in 1924. A Government servant whose career has been mostly in the Finance Department, under which he has served in Khuzistan and on various inspection duties. Ministry of the Interior as Assistant 1943, and was in charge of the Ministry on the departure of Tadayyun in December 1943. Appointed Minister to China January 1944. Promoted Ambassador when status of Legation was changed to that of an Embassy in February 1945. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs under Qavam June-September 1947. Ambassador at Karachi March 1949.

One of the moving spirits in the Persian repertory theatre at Tehran; in his youth he was an actor, and has translated and adapted for the Persian stage a number of foreign plays, including those of Molière. Speaks French.

128. Nasr, Taqi

Born c. 1909.

Was chief of the economic section of Ministry of Finance before becoming the head of the Agricultural Bank. In 1941 went to United States as Ministry of Finance delegate on a permanent Persian trade and finance mission in Washington. Was deputy Persian representative first on the International Monetary Fund and later at the International Bank. Recently has been working in the United States with a Persian-American trading group. In the past eight years he has spent very little time in Persia. Appointed executive director of Seven-Year Plan May 1949. Resigned August 1949 and went to United States. Returned to become Minister of National Economy under Sa'ad January-March 1950.

He is a close friend of Prince Abdur Riza whom he assisted in his studies in the United States. He is keen, intelligent and adaptable.

129. Navib, Saifullah

Born about 1893.

Educated in France.

Formerly Director-General of Census and Civil Registration Department, he became a member of the Economic Advisory Committee April 1945. Governor-General of Mazandaran in September 1945 and again in February 1949. In between these two appointments he returned to the Census and Civil Registration Department. Recalled from Mazandaran August 1949. Successful in first stage Senate elections in Tehran October 1949.

Speaks fluent French.

130. Nikpay, F'az (Azizullah)

Born in 1896. Educated by the Church Missionary Society at Isfahan and at the American College in Tehran. Speaks English and French. Started his career in the Ministry of Finance. Director of a large and important mill in Isfahan. Governor of Kermanshah in 1940-41. Represented factory owners at International Labour Conference in Paris October 1945. Governor-General of Kermanshah May 1946 when he set himself almost unreservedly the task of promoting Government interests in face of increasing Tudeh displeasure. Until the time of his recall to Tehran, he resolutely pursued his policy of strengthening Right-wing opposition to the Tudeh, and where unsurmountable opposition was not encountered, he directed local affairs with exemplary efficiency. Political Under-Secretary and Assistant to the Prime Minister, Qavam-us-Saltaneh, in July 1946; granted Ministerial rank September 1946 and Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in October 1946. Resigned December 1946 to become a candidate for Isfahan in

the elections for the 15th Majlis; was elected and thereafter reappointed Minister. Dropped from the Cabinet in June 1947.

A zealous administrator and frankly pro-British. Intelligent. An intriguer, not entirely honest, but thrifty and capable. Appears to be enlightened on matters regarding relations of employer and employee.

131. Nurzad, Gholam Riza

Born in Tehran about 1880. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1905 and held different posts in various consulates in Russia. First secretary of the Embassy at Moscow in 1922. Counsellor there in 1924, and later Chargé d'Affaires. Chief of a section at the Ministry 1929. Consul-general at Delhi 1933. Head of the Consular Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1938.

Consul-general at Istanbul May 1941. Recalled July 1943 and appointed head of the International Relations Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs November 1943. Transferred to the Court 1944. On committee of Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society 1944.

Speaks French and Russian, as well as a certain amount of English. A rather long-winded person, but quite harmless.

132. Pahlavi, Muhammad Riza Shah

The eldest son of Riza Shah by the daughter of Taimur Khan; this lady was the ex-Shah's chief consort and was known as the "Malikeh."

Born on 26th October, 1919, and proclaimed Valiahd, or heir-apparent, on 1st January, 1926. Educated in Tehran under tutors at first, and then in Switzerland at La Rosey, under the direction of Dr. Mustapha Nafisi. Returned to Persia in the spring of 1936. Speaks excellent French and good English.

Betrothed in June 1938 and married Princess Fauzieh, sister of King Farouk of Egypt, at Cairo on 15th March, 1939. The marriage was preceded by a very pompous journey through Iraq, Syria and Egypt. The principal wedding festivities took place in Tehran in April, on the couple's arrival, and were attended by delegations from many countries, including the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice, the Duke of Spoleto and General Weygand. The only offspring is one daughter, Shahnaz, born in 1940. Queen Fauzieh left for Egypt in 1943 and never returned. Her divorce by mutual consent from the Shah was announced on 19th November, 1948, and attributed to the fact that her health did not permit her to live in Persia.

Muhammad Riza succeeded to the throne on the abdication of his father in September 1941. From the first he took a considerable part in public affairs and he showed an unmistakable sign of his intention to exert his influence in State matters when in 1946 he conceived a strong antipathy to Qavam. Eventually it was due to his active intervention that Qavam fell from power at the end of 1947.

His private visit to Britain in July 1948 was a considerable success and he created a good impression.

On the 4th February (15 Bahman) 1949 an attempt was made on the Shah's life. His escape was miraculous and created a profound impression. The Shah's bearing on this occasion greatly enhanced his prestige. He then decided to introduce the constitutional reforms which he had been contemplating for over a year and in which he considered the primary remedy for the country's deplorable condition lay, and the Constituent Assembly, in May 1949, granted him the right to dissolve either Chamber.

In November 1949 the Shah left for a visit to the United States which lasted for six weeks. From 1st-16th March 1950 he visited Pakistan. An event of great personal importance to himself took place in May 1950, when, in an impressive ceremony, he attended the re-burial of his father, Riza Shah, in a mausoleum especially constructed at the principal shrine near Tehran.

The Shah is well-informed, intelligent and courageous. Although he has not the forcefulness of his father, whom he greatly admires, he is determined to do his best for his country, and with his recently increased constitutional powers it is to be hoped that he will develop a greater self-confidence and more balanced judgment. His greatest weakness is his inability to select wise counsellors and his readiness to listen to the advice of the first-comer, including some worthless adventurers. He is susceptible to the influence of his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, and in a diminishing degree to that of his mother, who is said to make a practice of comparing him unfavourably with his autocratic father.

In spite of reports to the contrary, the Shah is neither vicious nor particularly interested in money. Indeed, since his accession he has in the hope of benefiting his people freely expended much of the vast fortune amassed by his father. He is a keen all-round sportsman and a good amateur pilot. He is also a very hard worker. He has a lively apprehension of Soviet designs and is inclined to be irritated by American ineptitude. He is still to some extent torn between a partiality for liberal institutions and methods, which is no doubt the product of his Swiss education, and an ardent desire to transform the economy of this corrupt and backward country. It remains to be seen whether His Majesty will develop the patience and judgment necessary for his purpose, or whether, under pressure of events, he will eventually follow in the footsteps of his father.

133. Pahlavi Royal Family

The following are recognised members of the Pahlavi Royal Family:—

Sons:—**(i) Shahpur Ali Riza**

Born 1st March, 1922.

He was sent away from Persia soon after his father's abdication in 1941 and remained abroad, nominally completing his education, until February 1948, when he returned unexpectedly to Tehran. During his absence he married a Frenchwoman, but the marriage has not been officially recognised. He is reported to be a man of violent character and to have inherited much of his father's temperament, but since his return to Tehran has behaved quietly. In the spring of 1950 he began to show an interest in political affairs.

(ii) Shahpur Gholam Riza

Born 13th April, 1923.

He was married in January 1948 to Huma A'lam, daughter of Dr. A'lam and granddaughter of Vusuqu-ud-Dauleh. Made a second lieutenant in the army in 1947 after passing out from the Officers' Training College in Tehran. Went on a cavalry course in France, July-October 1949. Has, apparently, an amiable disposition.

(iii) Shahpur Abdur Riza

Born 19th August, 1924.

He returned to Tehran in January 1948 after several years at Harvard University. He has made a good impression on those who have met him. Went to United States again in 1948 for medical treatment but returned to Persia on the passage through the Majlis of the Bill relating to the Seven-Year Plan of

41582

the Organisation for which he was appointed honorary president May 1949.

Began his military training at the Officers' School at Tehran May 1950 and is likely to take less interest in the Seven-Year Plan while under training.

(iv) Shahpur Ahmad Riza

Born 17th September, 1925.

Mentally not normal. Married to Simin Bahrani of Tehran, who bore him a daughter 10th March 1949.

(v) Shahpur Mahmud Riza

Born 3rd October, 1926. Is now in the United States at Michigan University.

(vi) Shahpur Hamid Riza

Born 4th July, 1932.

An unruly boy, who three times ran away from school in the United States. Finished his schooling in 1948 and is now in Tehran, but apparently unoccupied.

Daughters:—**(i) Shahdukht (Princess) Shams-ul-Mulk**

Born 18th October, 1917.

Married, first, Faridun, son of Mahmud Jam; one daughter; divorced; second, Muhammad Pahlbud, a man of low origin, by whom she has two sons.

The Princess is president of the Red Lion and Sun Society. Has travelled in the United States and also, last year, in Europe, seeing hospital and welfare work.

(ii) Shahdukht Ashraf-ul-Mulk

Born 24th October, 1919, a twin sister of the Shah.

Married, first, 1937, Ali Qavam, son of Qavam-ul-Mulk, divorced 1942; one son, Shah-Ram; second, Ahmad Shafiq, an Egyptian of good family, who for some time has been Director of Civil Aviation.

The Princess visited Moscow in 1946 and the United States and United Kingdom in 1947 to study social welfare organisations. Visited India and Pakistan in November 1948 and Europe November 1949-February 1950.

Much criticised for interference in political and administrative matters.

(iii) Shahdukht Fatimeh

Born 30th October, 1929.

Went to school in the United States. Returned to Tehran 1948. Accompanied Princess Shams to the United States again May 1949. Returned with the Shah as far as Rome, December 1949, and there married an American medical student, Vincent Lee Hillyer, April 1950, without the Shah's permission. Deprived of Royal prerogatives, but on remarrying by Moslem rites was apparently forgiven.

Of the above, the following are the offspring of Riza Shah's first wife:—

Princess Shams.
Princess Ashraf.
Prince Ali Riza.

Riza Shah's second wife was Malikeh Turan, who was of Qajar stock on her father's side. She bore Gholam Riza, but was divorced after three months. (In 1942 she married an obscure merchant in Tehran named Zahihullah Malikpur).

Riza Shah's third wife was Ismat-ul-Mulk, a Qajar Princess of the Daulatshahi family. She bore him four sons and a daughter, i.e.—

Prince Abdul Riza.
Prince Ahmad Riza.
Prince Mahmud Riza.
Prince Hamid Riza.
Princess Fatima.

134. Pakravan, Fathullah (Amir-i-Arfa)

Born about 1885. First became known as a member of the 2nd Majlis, where it appears that he was the laughing-stock of his colleagues. In 1910 he obtained the appointment of Persian Consul-General in Constantinople. From Constantinople he went to Egypt as consul-general, and later became Persian Minister there until he returned to Tehran early in 1925. In 1925 he was appointed Director of the Russian and Turkish section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Appointed Persian Minister in Rome in December 1928. Appointed Persian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in February 1931. Was accredited also to Finland and Estonia as Minister in 1932. Recalled from Moscow in February 1934. Appointed Governor-General of Khurasan November 1934. Recalled and brought to Tehran under arrest on various charges of peculation and irregular conduct in February 1942 but was released without trial. Appointed ambassador to Italy late 1945. Left to take up appointment May 1946. Replaced June 1949.

Speaks French fluently. Has a Russian wife who speaks fluent English.

135. Pirnazar, Hasan

Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1920. First Secretary in Cairo 1925. Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo 1930. Returned to Persia 1931. Consul at Bombay 1932. Consul-general at Baku 1935. Head of the economic section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1941. Promoted Director-General 1943. Accompanied Qavam-us-Saltaneh to Moscow February 1946. Appointed Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs January 1948. Appointed Minister to Yugoslavia end 1948 and arrived Belgrade October 1949.

Speaks French and some English. Seems a conscientious official.

136. Pervin, Abul-Qasim

Born in Tehran about 1896. Educated in Tehran at the School of Political Science. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1921. A judge in the Foreign Office Tribunal from 1922 to 1924. Second secretary at Brussels 1925-27. First secretary at Rome 1927-30. Transferred to the Department of Commerce in 1931, and employed there as chief of the Import Permits section. In 1933 chief of the Passport and Nationality section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1934 appointed counsellor at Berlin. Consul-general, Hamburg, 1938. Head of Personnel Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1939.

Head of the second section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which deals with Iraq and Turkey, 1942. First Chargé d'Affaires and then Minister at Berne 1944-48. Minister at Beirut December 1949. Married to a German lady.

Speaks French. A voluble little man, who has a great idea of his own importance, and has never gone out of his way to give us any help.

137. Qadimi, Dr. Husain

Born in Tehran 1895. The second son of the late Asadullah Qadimi, Mushar-us-Saltaneh. Educated in France, and holds a doctor's degree. Attaché at Paris 1918-21. His wife is French. At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1922-23. Secretary at Berne and for the League of Nations 1924-28. Chief of the League of Nations and Treaty Section of the Ministry 1929-32. Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm 1932. Counsellor at Berne 1936. Director of the League of Nations Section of the Advisory Department of the Ministry 1937, and of the League of Nations Department, when that section was raised to a department in September 1938.

Chargé d'Affaires at Berne 1941-44. Inspector, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 1949.

Speaks perfect French. A very efficient man at his job.

138. Qaraguzlu, Ali Riza (Baha-ul-Mulk)

Born about 1880. Owns property at Hamadan, and is a cousin of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk. Has lived in Europe for a number of years and is a graduate of the School of Political Sciences of Paris. Elected to the 4th Majlis as member for Hamadan. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1923, though he had held no Government office before. Resigned in April 1923, as he found that he was controlled by Dr. Millsbaugh. President of the Government Supervisory Board of the National Bank of Persia 1929-32.

Minister of Justice in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942; resigned in the following January without having accomplished anything valuable. An honest politician, but much too old to learn anything new or useful. Lives in Tehran; used frequently to visit Paris. A queer and eccentric man, with a reputation for honesty.

139. Qaraguzlu, Husain Ali

Second and younger son of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk. Regent of Persia. Born in 1900. Educated at Harrow and Balliol College, Oxford. Married the daughter of Taimurtash in 1931; and divorced her in 1935. An attaché at the Legation in London 1931. In the same capacity at Paris 1932. Returned to Tehran at the end of that year, and since employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at first in the Treaty Department, and from the end of 1936 in the Protocol Department. Transferred to the Ministry of Interior at the end of 1937.

Resigned from Government service in 1938 and took to chicken farming. After the fall of Riza Shah was not employed in Government service until he became secretary to Dr. Millsbaugh at the end of 1942; and in May 1943 was employed at Court, his brother-in-law, Ala, being Minister of Court. Accompanied the Shah to the United States December 1949 and remained there.

Charming but ineffective; his failure to fulfil his early promise has been a disappointment, but he is a believer in Anglo-Persian co-operation. An idealist with a certain intelligence and a reputation for honesty.

Speaks perfect English and French.

140. Nizami-Qaraguzlu, Husain Quli (Amir Nizam)

Born in 1883, the eldest son of the late Amir Nizam. A member of the Qaraguzlu family of Hamadan and a nephew of the late Regent, Nasir-ul-Mulk. Educated in England and Austria. Passed through the Military Academy at Vienna, and served with a commission in an Austrian infantry regiment for three years. Inherited large estates from his father in the district of Hamadan, but owing to his absence in Europe from 1921 to 1929 these estates have been allowed to deteriorate. Was appointed Governor of Kermanshah by Vusqu in 1919, where he was very popular on account of his honesty and integrity. Being a rich man he was imprisoned at the time of the *coup d'Etat* in 1921, and made to pay 20,000 toman as the price of his release. He was so disgusted at this unmerited treatment that he left Persia and vowed never to return. During his stay in Europe he lost heavily at Monte Carlo and Deauville. Taimurtash met him in Europe in 1928, and persuaded him to return to Persia, which he did in 1929. Appointed Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1929. Sent to Europe on private business for the Shah in March 1930 and returned at the end of December.

A reputation for honesty saved him from sharing his friend Taimurtash's fall. Grand Master of Court Ceremonies (Foreign) 1938. Dismissed owing to royal irritability during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations in April 1939, and retired to his estate at Kabul-Rahang, near Hamadan.

An extremely agreeable and likeable man, with more than a veneer of European culture. Is the best type of educated Persian, and is noted for his honesty and integrity. Speaks fluently French, German and English.

Is tremendously rich with ample investments abroad. Devotes much time and energy to improving the lot of his peasants. Obstinate, but great force of character and personality. Has great influence in Hamadan area where he is looked on as experienced, wise and good. Honest, hard working and pro-British. In June 1945 bequeathed all his lands to his peasants and distributed copies of the will among them. Appointed the British Embassy and the Imperial Bank of Iran as two of the executors.

141. Qashqa'i, Khusrav

Born 1921. Youngest son of the late Isma'il Qashqa'i (Saulat-ud-Dauleh). Was appointed Governor of Firuzabad in November 1943, but preferred making frequent trips to Tehran to living at his post. Made large sums of money by selling monopoly goods destined for the tribes at an enormous profit in the open market. Elected to 15th Majlis from Firuzabad. Went to Europe in December 1947. Spent a long holiday in the United States (1948-49) where he picked up English in a very short time. Deputy for Firuzabad in 16th Majlis.

The reprobate of the family, he has great personal bravery and recklessness. Inherits his father's cruelty and sadism, and is credited with a number of reckless killings. Has personal charm, considerable powers of persuasion and a boundless capacity for making mischief. Is generally described as a "child" which is intended by some to excuse his excesses and by others to mean that it is time he grew up.

Khusrav is intelligent but has an ungarded tongue, which continually gets him into trouble.

142. Qashqa'i, Malik Mansur

Born 1905. Second son of the late Saulat-ud-Dauleh. Studied at Brasenose College, Oxford. Of hawk-like appearance and attractive personality, he talks much but slowly and tends to repeat himself. Speaks good English and German and a little French, Turkish and Turki. Reported to be loved by the tribespeople where Nasir is feared. Devoted to tribal pursuits of hunting and riding. Says that he will do his utmost to oppose any Government interference with the tribe and that he is prepared to fight the army.

Returned to Persia late 1949 after undergoing medical treatment in Switzerland.

Has great influence amongst the Boir Ahmadi tribes with whom he spent many years of his youth. He is very popular among the whole Qashqa'i confederation. Married the daughter of Jahangir Khan (Qashquli Kuchik Family) by whom he has a daughter.

143. Qashqa'i, Muhammad Husain

Born about 1907. Third son of the late Saulat-ud-Dauleh. Studied at Reading University, but left because of chronic asthma. Studied economics at Berlin University. Deputy in 14th and 15th Majlis for Abadeh. Elected to Constituent Assembly from Firuzabad April 1949. A voluble speaker. Excitable and untrustworthy.

He is known as the "merchant" brother. Not very popular in the tribe—he married, last year, a rich Tehrani girl, another cause for tribal criticism.

144. Qashqa'i, Muhammad Nasir

Born 1904. The eldest son of the late Isma'il Qashqa'i (Saulat-ud-Dauleh). Elected to the 8th Majlis as a member of the Qashqa'i. Ikhami and the most influential chieftain of his tribe for a short time during 1930. Deprived of parliamentary immunity and arrested for conspiracy in 1932. Fled from Tehran during the general disorder in September 1941 and recovered his old position in Fars where he is now the accepted but not entirely undisputed leader of the Qashqa'i. Does not smoke or drink and is a model family man. Tall, broadly built, staring eyes, slight smallpox marks on face, of commanding presence. A fast talker and a good raconteur. Fond of town society and, when living in civilised surroundings, is very reasonable and amenable. When living with the tribes he seems to lose his balance (where matters outside the parochial affairs of the tribes are concerned) and to be easily misled. This instability probably results from his varied earlier experiences including imprisonment in Tehran with his father who died in captivity.

Until the summer of 1945, when he eventually screwed up courage to come to Tehran, he seems to have been generally in fear of re-imprisonment. His anxiety to consolidate his positions leads him, at the prompting of others, to see in himself a future Governor-General of Fars, Prime Minister and even Shah of Persia.

Speaks a little English and understands much. He had two Germans with him in 1943 and made a landing ground, intended for German aeroplanes, near Farrashband. He rebelled in 1943 and was attacked by troops under Marshal Shahbakt but the operations were very half-hearted and soon fizzled out. In April 1944 he handed over the Germans who had taken refuge with him and undertook to co-operate with the Allies. Was a leader of a tribal revolt in Fars in summer of 1946 in which his brothers also took part. After some fighting the Qashqa'is came to an understanding with the Government and peace was restored. Elected to the 15th Majlis but did not take his seat. Deputy for Shiraz in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Successful in first stage Senate elections in Shiraz and Firuzabad autumn 1949, and nominated Senator for Fars February 1950.

Muhammad Nasir Qashqa'i has made himself tribally unpopular by permitting the greed of his wife (Rudabeh Bibi) who wishes to seize all she can for Nasir's children (the eldest boy—Amanullah Khan—born c. 1922—is studying in Switzerland; the other son—Jingiz—born c. 1940—is with the tribe; there are several daughters—who of course count for little in the tribe).

145. Qavam, Ahmad (Qavam-us-Saltaneh)

A brother of Hasan Vusqu, than whom he is younger by a few years. Began his career in the Ministry of Finance. Became Minister of War, July to October 1910, and Minister of Interior July to November 1911, and again in December 1911. Minister of Finance July to August 1914, and Minister of Interior November 1917 to January 1918. Appointed Governor-General of Khurasan April 1918 and remained there for three years, during which he administered the province with uniform success during troublous times. Became Prime Minister and Minister of Interior June 1921 to January 1922, and again Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs from June 1922 to February 1923. Banished to Europe in October 1923, being accused of having plotted against the life of Riza

Khan (Riza Shah). Was allowed to return to Tehran at the end of 1928 and arrived in March 1929, when he went to reside quietly on his property at Lahijan near Resht.

Came back to live in Tehran after the fall of Riza Shah. Prime Minister August 1942, after the fall of Suhaili. Worked hard, but gradually surrounded himself with his own relations and friends. Tried hard to gain control of the Ministry of War, but failed to counteract the young Shah's enthusiasm for the control of the army. The Shah's opposition to him was shown in the disturbances of the 8th December, 1942, in which Qavam did extremely well and undoubtedly performed a great public service in re-establishing governmental authority. Thereafter, however, he became more and more involved in petty intrigues and favouritism, and had to resign in February 1943; since when he has been more or less openly accused of being the real instigator of the riots of December 1942.

Believed to have been in touch with the Japanese Legation early in 1942, and to have received, when Prime Minister in 1942, messages from persons whom he knew to be German agents, without informing us. This was brought to the notice of the Shah in January 1944.

Became Prime Minister in February 1946 with additional offices of Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior. His policy was to seek reconciliation with the Soviet Government. For this purpose he went to Moscow in February 1946.

Responsible for the arrest of Sayyid Zia and General Arfa in March 1946, probably at Russian insistence. In April 1946 concluded an agreement with the Russians granting them an oil concession in the north, to be presented for approval to the 15th Majlis. Submitted to Russian pressure to settle the Azerbaijan problem by conciliatory methods in return for which the Red army was withdrawn early in May. During his first year of office he destroyed the autonomous régime of the Azerbaijan Democrats, broke up the Tudeh Party and their affiliated trade unions and established the Iran Democrat Party with which he won a big majority in the general election held in 1947. This majority gradually wasted away during the latter half of 1947—in December he was defeated in the Majlis and obliged to resign. In January 1948 he went to Europe for medical treatment. Returned to Tehran May 1948. Abstained from overt politics but after the attempt on the Shah's life a warrant for his arrest was issued; he immediately obtained an audience of the Shah and then left for Paris where he still is. He paid a short visit to Tehran November-December 1949, after which he returned to Europe. In March 1950 he addressed a strongly worded letter to the Shah, copies of which he sent to the press, criticising the proposed revision of Article 49 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws. For this he was deprived of the title of "Highness" granted to him in 1947.

Intriguing, ambitious and fond of money but of great experience and competence. He is a genuine patriot and has generally been friendly to His Majesty's Embassy.

146. Qavam, Ibrahim (Qavam-ul-Mulk)

Born 1888. The son of Mirza Habibullah Khan Qavam-ul-Mulk, who was killed accidentally in May 1916. During the war of 1914-18 was very friendly to us, and carried on his father's traditional policy of opposition to the powerful Qashqa'i group of tribes headed by the late Ismail Khan Sa'adat-ud-Dauleh. Having inherited vast properties in Fars from his father, as well as the titular headship of the "Arab" tribes of that province, he wielded immense authority in the south of Persia at the time

of the *coup d'état* of 1921. Riza Khan (late Riza Shah) when Minister for War met the Qavam at Isfahan in August 1923 and expressed a wish that he should reside at Tehran; he therefore became elected to the Majlis as member for the Khamseh (Arab) tribes and thereafter resided a good deal in Tehran. In 1929 as a result of various question of validity of title to property Qavam was given crown lands in Nishapur, in the neighbourhood of Tehran and elsewhere in the centre of Persia, in exchange for his Fars properties. It is believed that he did well out of these transactions, and that he is one of the wealthiest landowners of Persia at present.

In the 9th Majlis of 1933 he was a Deputy for Baluchistan. He had also accompanied Riza Shah on several of his journeys, and was generally supposed to enjoy His Majesty's full confidence. In November 1933, however, on the arrest of the Minister of War, Sardar As'ad, while in attendance on the Shah at the Turcoman races, the Qavam seems to have become the object of suspicion, and he was placed under arrest with As'ad.

Played his part in the "events of 1941"; he and his family at one time "took bast" in the British Legation at Gulbek; and when Riza Shah abdicated and went to Isfahan it was Qavam who was sent by the Government to obtain Riza's signature to documents handing over his properties and private fortune to the State and to his son respectively.

Visited India 1941-42 and bought a house at Bangalore.

Sent back to Shiraz to help Marshal Shahbakhti with his attack on the Qashqa'is in June 1943.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars September 1943, but could not agree with any of the military chiefs about tribal policy, and returned to Tehran November 1943. Deputy for Shiraz in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Elected Senator from Fars April 1949.

Qavam's influence in the Fars of to-day is unimportant. Three or four of his family (Brigadier Qavami—Chief of Police Shiraz, &c.) hold appointments in Fars, however. The Khamseh tribes no longer look to him as their feudal chief. The general tendency among his own family, whose obedience but not consciences he commands, is to regard him with the utmost respect as the survival of a day that is gone. He himself does not seem to be conscious of, or will not admit, this passage of time.

His son, Ali Muhammad, married Princess Ashraf Pahlavi in March 1937 but the marriage was dissolved. He subsequently married a girl of the Shaibani family, daughter of Muhasib-ul-Manalik. He had previously been an undergraduate at Bristol where he did badly. At the end of 1941 he went to Washington as Assistant Military Attaché. The other son, Riza, married a daughter of General Muqaddam and is at present employed in the Ministry of Labour. One daughter is married to Asadullah Alam, son of the late Shaikat-ul-Mulk, and the other to Dr. Abul Qasim Nafisi.

147. Qizilbash, Aziz

Born about 1900. A Kurd by birth, from Kermanshah. His father and mother were killed during the constitution riots (1905-10). He himself joined in the rioting at the age of 6 or 7. Spent six or seven years in India working on the railway and then lived in Ahwaz, where he was friendly with Mr. Soane. His Majesty's Consul at Khurramshahr (later in Kurdistan and Iraq). Acted as interpreter for the consul with the tribes and with him was under fire on several occasions. After Mr. Soane had returned to England and died it was found that he had left a legacy to Qizilbash, which was paid to him by His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz. For approximately twenty

years Qizilbash has worked on the Iranian State Railway and is now in the Inspection Department. Anti-Communist, he joined the Democrat Party and the I.S.K.I. trade union immediately on their inauguration in December 1946. Became second secretary of the trade union and attended the I.L.O. Conference, Geneva, in 1947 as a workers' representative. Led I.S.K.I.'s more militant anti-Communist activities, touring the railway system, identifying Tudeh members and insisting upon their removal from employment with the State Railway. In winter 1948, owing to personal differences with Khusrau Hidayat (the first secretary of I.S.K.I.), Qizilbash was dismissed from the I.S.K.I. union. Since then he has operated independently, using his personal influence among railway workers and in the bazaars to draw support away from I.S.K.I. to his own newly formed "Central Council of the Federation of Workers, Peasants and Tradesmen of Iran." In May 1950 claims to have eighteen small unions in Tehran and the provinces under his control with a total nucleus membership of about 3,000. Speaks Turki and Urdu.

148. Qubadian, Abbas (Amir Makhsum)

Born about 1900, son of Da'ud Khan, first paramount chief of the Kalhurs. Suspected of being pro-German in 1917-18 when Turks and Germans occupied Western Persia. Seized power in the tribe after the murder of Sulaiman Amir A'zam by Pasha Khan, Qubadian's brother, in 1922. He led a revolt against him, was captured and imprisoned. Vain and obstinate, he is at loggerheads the whole time with most of his own family. Deputy for Kermanshah in the 14th Majlis. In early 1946 succeeded in forming a union of the western tribes to combat the Tudeh and the Democrats in Kurdistan. Re-elected to the 15th Majlis for Kermanshah, which he also represented in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Now Deputy for Kermanshah in 16th Majlis.

149. Quds (Nakha'i), Husain

Born about 1892. Graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Has held various posts under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was secretary in London for five years. Edited, for a short time, a small literary review. Private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 1934. Secretary and, for a time, *Chargé d'Affaires* at Washington 1935, until relations were broken off. Accused of having abused customs franchise while in charge at Washington. Secretary in London March 1937. Consul, Izmir, 1939. Counsellor in London early 1943. Returned to Persia in 1947. Appointed head of Third Political Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1948. Director-general (Personnel) later 1948.

Speaks English and French. A quiet and level-headed official.

150. Radmanish, Dr. Riza

Born about 1900. In 1938 he was arrested by Riza Shah for making Communist propaganda. Elected Deputy for Lahijan in the 14th Majlis. Has been a prominent member of the Tudeh Party and the Tudeh Majlis group since its foundation and was a dominating member of the Tudeh Party General Party Conference in 1944. Edits Left-wing paper *Mardam*. One of six editors invited by the Ministry of Information to visit the United Kingdom in the autumn of 1943, but did not accept. A genuine Communist who is not best pleased with the complete subservience of the Tudeh Party to the Russians but unable to help himself. Rather naïve.

Believed to have taken refuge in Soviet Embassy after attempted assassination of Shah 4th February, 1949. Sentenced to death *in absentia* May 1949 for activities against the constitutional monarchy.

151. Rahnama, Zain-ul-Abidin

Born about 1888, one of the sons of the late Shaikh-ul-Iraqain, a Persian subject and small mujtahid of Kerbela.

Rahnama was educated in Iraq and came to Persia about 1910. He was a member of the Democratic Party and edited first the newspaper *Rahnama* and subsequently the semi-official paper *Iran*. He was elected a Deputy to the 5th and 6th terms of the Majlis. Was sent to Europe in 1923 on a mission to publicise Persia, and stayed most of the time in Paris. Was appointed Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Public Works at the end of 1926 and Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior in April 1927. In June 1927 he fell from favour and confined himself to journalism, and accompanied the Shah on his journey to Khuzistan in October 1928 as press representative.

Rahnama is an ambitious man, with plenty of "push." His great ambition has always been to obtain a Government post, which he hoped would culminate in a ministerial appointment. With that object in view, he discarded his turban and gave up his title of "shaikh." This brought him three different under-secretaryships in succession. He is intelligent and clever in a certain sense.

Went to Europe in 1933 to purchase printing machinery. In the summer of 1935 was exiled to Iraq and took up his residence in Beirut; the Shah was said to have suspected him of plotting against the régime.

Returned to Persia after the fall of Reza Shah in 1941, and resumed his editorship of the newspaper *Iran*. On a mission to the ulama of Iraq in 1942, and brought back certain messages addressed to the young Shah. Plunged into political intrigue in 1942 and after being disappointed at not being accepted by the Iraq Government as Minister, became a sort of secretary and spy in Suhaili's Administration in 1943, but soon resigned. Minister in Paris 1944. Appointed minister in Beirut February 1947. First Minister to Amman July 1949. Returned to Tehran on conclusion of duty October 1949.

Speaks French and English.

152. Ra'is, Muhsin

Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Persia and France. The eldest son of the late Zahir-ul-Mulk. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1919. Sent to Switzerland as secretary of the Persian Delegation to the League of Nations. Returned to Persia in 1924, and served in the Ministry till he was sent to Paris as counsellor in 1930. Head of the Treaty Section of the Ministry in 1933. Minister at Berlin and The Hague 1935. Political Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs September 1937. Minister at Bucharest for Roumania, Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia December 1938.

Transferred to Vichy in 1941, and returned in July 1942 to Tehran. Minister in Bagdad July 1943. Ambassador to London June 1947.

A very agreeable man, not afraid of hard work. Speaks good French. Married one of the many daughters of Farman Farnia in 1935.

153. Razmara, Haji Ali, General (Sipahbud)

Born about 1900 and trained at the Military School at Saint Cyr. In 1931, he was commanding the 2nd Infantry Regiment and in the same year he became Military Governor of the Khamseh tribes of Fars. During the following year, he commanded the forces operating against the Kurdish leader Jafar Sultan. In 1941 he was Deputy Commandant of the Staff College and an instructor at the Military Academy. He commanded the 1st Division at Tehran from October 1941 to May 1943. In July 1943 he became Chief of the General Staff, but was replaced in September. In January 1944 he became head of

the Shah's Military Cabinet. He was again Chief of the General Staff from April to December 1945. In July 1946, in spite of opposition from the Minister of War and the Shah, who at that time expressed distrust in him, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff for the third time, and has held this appointment continuously until now. He was promoted Sipahbud in March 1948.

After his appointment as Chief of the General Staff he was closely associated with Muzaffar Firuz in furthering Russian interests, but the latter's leading part in the arrest of Sartip Hijazi threw him into opposition to Firuz and the Tudeh Party and in favour of the Shah, who is believed now to have deep confidence in him. He has gradually increased the power and influence of his appointment to the exclusion of the Minister of War.

He is the son of an ex-cavalry officer who is still alive and a centenarian. He has numerous brothers and sisters, is related to the Kamal-Hidayat family, and, by marriage, to Muzaffar Firuz. He has two younger brothers in the army and one who is an engineer on the Iranian State Railways and who studied the railways in England. He has several children, including one son who is studying in America. His wife, who does not speak any language other than Persian, rarely goes out.

He is an outstanding officer with great energy and determination, and with a reputation as a disciplinarian. He is clever, quick and decisive and a strong nationalist. He is ambitious, and his earlier reputation was that he was an intriguer, ready to trim his sails to any wind. During the last few years, however, he has undoubtedly worked wholeheartedly for the army, in which he has effected numerous improvements. He is well read, with an intimate knowledge of his own and other countries. Though he does not go out more than his duties or interests demand, he is affable in society and has a good sense of humour. Stories of his ambition to become Prime Minister have recently been on the increase, and he undoubtedly has considerable support in the country, though he also has a number of enemies and many people fear that if a military man became Prime Minister a military dictatorship might follow. He speaks good French, Russian and German and fair English. He is fit and active, does not smoke and drinks very little.

154. Rusta, Riza

Born about 1900. Imprisoned by Riza Shah for espionage—map stealing from the military office at Kerman. In 1944 was in close touch with the Soviet Trade Delegation and was the channel through which Soviet help, in the form of cash, paper or transport facilities, reached the Tudeh Party. In the same year became a member of the Tudeh Inspection Committee and was strongly opposed to the moderate policy then pursued by the Tudeh Central Committee. Appointed secretary of the Central United Council of the Persian Federation of Trade Unions (Tudeh) and, following Louis Saillant's visit to Persia in 1946, was officially recognised by the World Federation of Trade Unions as representative of Persian workers.

In December 1946 complained to W.F.T.U. and British Trades Union Congress of oppression of Persian workers, arrests and victimisation. He appealed for a W.F.T.U. delegation to visit the country to investigate. On arrival of this delegation in February 1947 Rusta was closely associated with the President, El Aris, and the Russian member, Borisov. His reputation with the Persian workers was strengthened by this delegation. Arrested April 1947 on charges of high treason in connexion with the Azerbaijan secessionist movement. Released on bail of 1 million rials in November 1947, allegedly through intervention of the then Prime Minister Qavam. After his release from prison he avoided the public eye, but worked

energetically and quietly consolidating the Tudeh trade union movement and organising a purge of waverers. Is believed to have left for Moscow shortly before the attempted assassination of the Shah and was sentenced to death in the subsequent trial, *in absentia*, of Tudeh leaders.

155. Sadiq, Dr. Isa (Sadiq-i-A'lam)

Born about 1892. Educated partly in England (here he was for a time munshi to Professor Browne) and partly in America, where he took a doctor's degree. Began his career in a very lowly station in the Ministry of Education. Rose to be Director of Education in Gilan. Attended an international congress on education in England about 1929, where he lectured on modern educational methods in Persia. Principal of the Teachers' College (École normale) 1932.

Minister of Public Instruction in Furughi's Cabinet September 1941. On the resignation of that Cabinet in 1942 became dean of the University of Tehran. Again Minister of Education in Suhaili's reshuffled Cabinet of December 1943. Minister of Education in Bayat's Government of November 1944. As chairman of Tehran Telephone Company went to the United Kingdom to buy equipment for the Company in 1947. Minister of Education under Qavam-us-Saltaneh June-December 1947. Deputy for Tehran in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Represented Persia at the "Peace through Education" conference at Calcutta September 1949. Elected Senator from Tehran October 1949.

An intelligent and go-ahead man speaking English and French. Well disposed towards Anglo-Saxon methods of education. The author of several works on education.

156. Sadiq, Sadiq (Mustashar-ud-Dauleh)

Born about 1865. Educated at Constantinople. Was a secretary at the Persian Embassy in Turkey for many years. Elected a Deputy for Tabriz, his native town, to the 1st Majlis in 1906. Elected President of the 2nd Majlis in 1909. An ardent constitutionalist he was arrested by Muhammad Ali Shah in 1908 and imprisoned until January 1909. Elected a member of the committee which was convened to draw up the Electoral Law. Appointed Minister of Interior in 1911, Minister of Posts in 1914 and 1915, and again Minister of Interior in 1915 and in June 1917. In the following Cabinet he was a Minister without Portfolio.

Before the war of 1914-18 he was pro-Russian, but when war broke out he espoused the cause of Germany and Turkey, and was one of the most extreme of "enemy partisans." After the war His Majesty's Legation demanded that he be exiled to some outlying province of Persia. From that time, with the exception of a short period in 1921 when he was a Cabinet Minister without Portfolio, he lived a retired life and had little or no influence.

Appointed Persian Ambassador to Turkey in January 1931. Returned to Tehran on retirement at the end of 1935.

Minister without Portfolio in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942, and continued in that capacity, with vague duties, in Suhaili's Cabinet of February 1943. Highly respected and considered a wit, but almost useless and senile. Dropped from Cabinet December 1943.

Proposed Governor-General of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, should agreement be reached between autonomous Azerbaijan "Government" and Central Government. Took part in discussions with mission from Azerbaijan which came to Tehran April 1946 but with no official status.

Speaks French and Turkish.

One of the "fathers of the Constitution" consulted by the Shah before summoning the Constituent Assembly in March 1949, but although he stood for

election from Tehran he was not elected. Nominated Senator for Tehran February 1950 and is the "doyen d'âge" of that House.

157. Sadr, Sayyid Muhsin (Sadr-ul-Ashraf)

Born about 1873. An almost unknown person in Tehran politics until appointed Minister of Justice in Furughi's Cabinet of 7th September, 1933. Spent the whole of his previous service in various judicial posts under the Ministry of Justice. Has been president of the Court of Cassation. One of the old school, who looks much better in the turban than in a hat. Was responsible for some of the new sections of the Civil Code. Resigned September 1936.

Minister of Justice in Suhaili's Cabinet of 1943. Said to have been one of the pro-German "Kabud" Party in 1942.

Became Prime Minister on 6th June, 1945. Resigned October 1945. During his period of office he was bitterly attacked by all Left-wing elements and accused of being a reactionary. Did his best to resist Soviet encroachment on Northern Persia, but the pressure was too strong and he was replaced by Hakimi who was less unpopular with the Russians.

In charge of pilgrim train to Mecca on resumption of pilgrimage in autumn 1948. Appointed Governor-General, Khorasan, January 1949.

158. Sa'id (Maragheh), Muhammad (Sa'id-ul-Vizureh)

Born about 1885. Educated in the Caucasus. Served in various capacities in the Persian consular posts in the Caucasus; viz., at Baku, Tiflis and Batum. Acting consul-general at Baku in 1927. Head of the Russian Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1933. Appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow in February 1934. Minister at Rome June 1936. Accredited also to Hungary 1938. Ambassador at Moscow April 1938.

Recalled from Moscow to be Minister for Foreign Affairs in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet August 1942. Held the post in Cabinet of Suhaili February 1943. In the running for Prime Minister, being favoured for that post by the Shah 1943, but the Majlis would not agree.

Appointed Prime Minister in March 1944. Resigned on 10th November, 1944. After Kavtaradze's arrival he was persistently opposed by the Tudeh and the Russians and was thus able to do little during his tenure of office. His Government's rejection in October 1944 of the Russian demand for an oil concession brought about a crisis which resulted in Sa'id's resignation.

Elected to 15th Majlis for Riza'iyeh.

Member of Regency Council during Shah's visit to the United Kingdom July 1948 and again during his visit to the United States November-December 1949.

Became Prime Minister again November 1948. Resigned March 1950. Nominated Senator for Riza'iyeh April 1950.

A very agreeable official, whose Russian is better than his Persian. He must have an intimate knowledge of the Caucasus and of Soviet methods of administration. He has a handsome Latvian wife. Always willing to help. Appears to have no delusions about Russia. As Prime Minister from November 1948-March 1950 he showed himself as well-intentioned rather than effective.

159. Sa'idi, Muhammad

Appointed Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Communications April 1944. He was helpful in the prolonged negotiations about payment for the use of the Persian railways during the war and since a

settlement was reached has remained consistently helpful. He speaks English well. His wife edited a women's newspaper, *Bam*.

160. Sajjadi, Dr. Muhammad

Born in 1899 in Tehran. Son of a Mulla. Employed in the Ministry of Justice, by the late Davar and later transferred to the Customs as Acting Director-General 1934. Then employed in the Tobacco Monopoly until 1937, when he became Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Communications. Acting Minister of Communications on Abi's dismissal in November 1938.

Minister of Roads in Furughi's Cabinet of September 1941 and then head of the Tehran Municipality in 1942. Arrested and sent to Sultanabad by the Allied security authorities September 1943. Released at end of war 1939-45.

Director of the Exchange Control Department in the Ministry of Finance in Hakimi's Government of November 1945. Resigned November 1945.

Minister of National Economy under Qavam-us-Saltaneh September-December 1947. Again under Hakimi December 1947-June 1948. Minister of Roads under Sa'id November 1948 but changed to Justice March 1949. Lost office with Sa'id March 1950.

Spent several years in France and speaks French. A talkative and clever man. Married his brother's wife.

161. Salih, Allahyar

Graduate of the American College at Tehran. Born about 1900. For some years employed as a secretary in the American Legation at Tehran. He then entered the Ministry of Justice, where he held various appointments as judge, public prosecutor, &c. Was transferred to the Ministry of Finance through the influence of Davar, and appointed director of the opium monopoly, and afterwards director of the tobacco monopoly.

Head of the customs for a short time. Then accountant-general.

Sent to Washington on an economic mission 1941. Returned in the autumn of 1942 to be Minister of Finance in the hope that he would work well with Dr. Millspaugh, but he proved a disappointment, quarrelled with Dr. Millspaugh, and was allowed to resign by Suhaili in March 1943.

Sent on a Commercial Mission to India September 1943. Member of the Persian Delegation to San Francisco and spent some time in London on his way back to Persia. Minister of the Interior in Hakimi's Cabinet November 1945 to January 1946 when he dismissed Ghulam Husain Ibtihaj, the pro-Sayyid Zia Mayor of Tehran and replaced him by Nariman, as being more acceptable to the Russians.

In Hakimi's Cabinet he was regarded as the leader of the appeasement group. Is said to have the ear of the American Embassy where his brother is a Munshi. Minister of Justice August 1946; resigned October 1946. Successful in first stage Senate elections in Tehran October 1949. Unsuccessful in 16th Majlis elections in Tehran but elected from Kashan April 1950.

An intelligent and able man. Speaks French and English.

162. Salih, Dr. Jahanshah

Born 1904, brother of Allahyar Salih. Educated at the American College, Tehran, and in America where he qualified as a doctor in 1933. After post-graduate work in America he returned to Persia where he now holds the headship of various hospitals. He is Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at Tehran University where he holds the professorship of

anatomy and gynecology. Served in the Finance Department before taking up medicine.

Married to an American. Speaks English and French.

163. Sami'i, Husain (Adib-us-Saltaneh)

Born about 1878, a native of Resht. Spent his early career in the Ministry of Interior and was once Governor of Resht. Appointed Minister of Public Works 1921 to June 1922. In March 1923 he became Minister of Interior for three months. When the late Shah became Prime Minister in October 1923, Sami'i was chosen as his assistant, until, in August 1924, he was appointed Minister of Justice. Early in 1926 he was appointed Governor of Tehran and held that post until he was appointed Minister of Interior in June 1927. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in May 1931. Grand Master of Ceremonies (Internal) 1938. Dismissed during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations April 1939. Ustadar (Governor-General) of the IVth Ustan (Western Azerbaijan) July 1939.

Ambassador to Kabul 1939. Returned to Tehran July 1942 and became Minister of State, without portfolio, in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942. Appointed Minister of the Interior by Suhaili in July 1943, ostensibly in order to supervise the elections to the 14th Majlis, but he soon resigned. President of the Farhangistan (Academy) at Tehran 1943. Grand Master of Ceremonies 1943-1949.

Went to Russia at invitation of Soviet Government for anniversary of Science Academy in Tashkent 1945.

Member of Regency Council during Shah's visit to the United Kingdom July 1948, and at the same time Acting Minister of Court. Deputy for Resht to Constituent Assembly April 1949. Elected Senator for Resht September 1949. Also successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949.

Sami'i is a pleasant man, but of little influence. He is not very energetic nor highly intelligent. He speaks a little French.

164. Sayyah, Hamid

Born in Isfahan 1886. Brother of Humayun Sayyah. Educated at Moscow. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1916. For some time a judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry. Commercial secretary at Moscow 1922-26. A director of the Caspian Fisheries Joint Board 1927-31. Chief of the Russian section at the Ministry in 1932. In charge of the Eastern Department 1933. Consul-general at Beirut March 1934. Minister at Warsaw June 1936.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Furughi's Cabinet of September 1941, and was most helpful to us. Again Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942 until January 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs again December 1943. Minister of Communications in Sa'id's Cabinet March-August 1944. Accompanied Qavam to Moscow in February 1946. Appointed minister to Moscow March 1946. Returned October 1946 and became Minister of Commerce and Industry until June 1947. Re-appointed Ambassador at Moscow November 1947. Recalled April 1949 and appointed Minister of Roads (Sa'id) May 1949. Transferred Ministry of Roads September 1949. Dropped January 1950.

Speaks French and Russian. Married his cousin, Fatimeh Khanum Sayyah, but afterwards divorced her. An agreeable but not a brilliant personality. He knows too much about Russian methods ever to incline towards bolshevism. A good bridge player.

165. Sayyah, Kazim

Born about 1892. A family of Turkish descent, sometimes calling themselves Sayyah-Siparlu, and

not related to Hamid Sayyah. Served in the Turkish army in the 1914-18 war, and taken prisoner by the British troops 1917. Then employed in the Caucasus where he had various adventures in 1920 and 1921. A strong supporter of Sayyid Zia in the latter's *coup d'Etat* of 1921, and when the Sayyid fell he fled with him to Switzerland. Returned to Persia about 1923 and was imprisoned by Riza Shah for some time. Then employed under the Ministry of Industry in supervising the factories at Isfahan. Was also in charge of the Fine Arts Department at that place 1940 to 1942. Fell under suspicion as pro-German owing to his relations with the factory engineers, most of whom were Germans. Transferred to Tehran 1942 and put in charge of the glycerine factory. In 1943 employed by the Americans in the price stabilisation section of the Ministry of Finance. Appointed "Rais-i-Intizam" or head of the organisation section of the Ministry of Interior 1944. Kazim Sayyah is well known as a strong supporter of Sayyid Zia. His appointment as "Rais-i-Intizam" therefore, raised an outcry by all Left-wing elements and by those who favoured a policy of appeasement towards the Russians. Appointed one of the directors of the Tehran Electricity Company 1945. Director-General in Ministry of Labour and Propaganda April 1947. 1949 employed in the Factories and Industries Department of the Seven-Year Plan.

A man of the world, capable of good work, and claims to be well-disposed towards us. Married to a Greek.

166. Shafa'i, Isma'il, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born in Tehran about 1885. Educated in Persia and Russia. Joined the Cossack Brigade in 1910. Appointed chief of the arsenal in 1922. Visited Europe in 1923, and again in 1926, in connexion with the purchase of machinery for a new arsenal. Promoted brigadier-general March 1932. Went to Europe that year to purchase military stores. Ceased to control the arsenal in 1934 on going to Europe, where he remained, usually at Bern, as chief of the Arms Purchasing Commission until 1937, when he returned to Persia.

Employed at Court 1943 and supervised the arms and powder factories; his services appear to have pleased the Russians.

Minister of Industry December 1943, but in coping with a strike had the misfortune accidentally to kill one of the strikers. Resigned March 1944. Military attaché to Moscow September 1944. Returned with Qavam in February 1946. Deputy Chief of General Staff November 1946. Placed on retired list June 1949. Believed to have been Razmara's go-between with the Russians.

Friendly, but rather formal. Speaks Russian and German.

167. Shabbakhti, Muhammad, General (Sipahbud)

Born about 1882, the son of a peasant inhabiting the village of Ishtihar, near Tehran, but has now been heard to describe himself as a native of Azerbaijan, possibly to cover up his humble origin.

He enlisted in the Cossack Brigade about 1901, distinguished himself by bravery in the field, and received a commission. In 1914 he was a captain. He attached himself to Riza Khan, whose influence with General Starosselsky secured him promotion to the rank of colonel in 1919. After the *coup d'Etat* of 1921 he was appointed to command the Ahan regiment of infantry. In 1925 he was promoted brigadier and given command of an infantry brigade in Tehran. In 1926 he was sent to command the western division, but was recalled in the spring of 1928 for corruption; he was appointed shortly afterwards to command the Persian troops in

Kurdistan. In December 1928 he was sent to command the troops in Fars, but was superseded by General Shaibani.

Appointed to command the troops in Azerbaijan in 1932. Promoted to the rank of Amir Lashgar (major-general) in March of that year. Transferred to Ahwaz as general officer commanding January 1939.

Appointed commander of the western forces October 1941, with the rank of general (sipahbud). Controlled the Kermanshah area pretty thoroughly, ignoring completely the civil governor, till he was transferred to Fars to quell the Qashqa'is under Nasir Qashqa'i in February 1943. He was not very successful in that campaign and after the defeat of the garrison at Simurum in July 1943 came to Tehran to report. Suspected of taking large bribes when at Kermanshah and again from the Qashqa'is.

Placed on the retired list October 1943. Recalled to active list 1947. Appointed Inspector of Troops in Azerbaijan, which appointment was changed to Commander-in-chief of Forces in Azerbaijan early in 1949. Thought somewhat arrogant, he is a very charming old man and has a great reputation in Azerbaijan.

An almost entirely uneducated survival from the Cossack Brigade, resembling in appearance the more famous product of that corps, Riza Shah.

His activities and strength of character have made it hitherto impossible for any strong Governor of Azerbaijan to co-exist with him. Up till now he has always come off best, but his days of authority are thought to be numbered.

168. Shahruckh, Bahram

One of the six sons of Arbab Jamshid Shahruckh, formerly Zoroastrian Deputy in the Majlis and murdered by order of Riza Shah during the last war. He has studied in Germany and has visited England several times.

Married to a German, by whom he has three children. During the war he was in Berlin and constituted himself leader of the Persian colony there, displaying strong pro-German sympathies. For a considerable time he broadcast in Persian from Berlin radio, his talks being listened to eagerly in Persia on account of their eloquence and vitriolic invective against the British. In the latter days of the war he saw which way the wind was blowing, left Germany for Turkey and completely abandoned his German friends. After returning to Germany for several months he decided to settle in Persia. He is agent for Gestetners and is trying to obtain agencies for German firms.

In addition to his commercial activities Shahruckh takes a keen interest in politics having managed to gain the confidence of many prominent politicians. Appointed Director-General of Press and Propaganda by Sa'id September 1949 and despite much opposition from the press and other circles has held on to the post, in which he has shown commendable energy and zeal. He is clever, confident and his chequered career shows him to possess considerable courage and an iron nerve. In spite of his European upbringing he is a genuine Persian at heart, combining considerable patriotism with unlimited vanity. His political ambitions are much hampered by his being a Zoroastrian. He still hankers after national socialism which he thinks may have a future in Persia. Now claims to be strongly pro-British and pro-American.

Speaks excellent German, English and French.

169. Shams-ul-Mulk Ara'i, Asadullah (Shahab-ud-Daulah), K.C.V.O.

A Qajar prince. Born about 1880. Educated in Persia. For many years employed in the Telegraph Department. Governor of Yezd in 1911. Minister

41582

of Posts and Telegraphs 1914-15. Minister of Public Works 1915. Master of Ceremonies at the Court 1922-25. Governor of Kermanshah 1929. Recalled 1933, and appointed Governor of Kurdistan in October 1934. Recalled April 1936, owing, it is said, to having incurred the displeasure of the Shah through not accelerating reforms in his province.

Holds the dignity of K.C.V.O., received when in attendance on Ahmad Shah during his visit to London in 1919.

Governor-General of Fars early 1942, but was superseded in the following summer, without having accomplished much. Governor-General of Kermanshah October 1946.

A rather pompous man, said to be a great intriguer, but he is not averse to the society of foreigners, and probably regrets the good old days.

Speaks English and French fluently.

170. Siasi, Dr. Ali Akbar

Born 1893. Educated in France 1911 and stayed in France till the outbreak of the 1914 war. Took a course in pedagogy. Employed as dragoman and Persian secretary at the French Legation from about 1917 to April 1941. At the same time he was instructor in psychology and law at the University of Tehran; later professor. Went to Europe 1927 and took a further course in France, obtaining a doctorate in philosophy. Married the daughter of the late Bayat, and so acquired wealth. One of the founders of the French-sponsored "Young Persian Club" in 1921.

Minister of Education August 1942. Resigned from Suhaili's Cabinet in August 1943. Dean of the University of Tehran. Minister without Portfolio in Bayat's Government 1944.

Member of Persian delegation to San Francisco Conference March 1945. Visited United Kingdom after the conference.

Invited by Soviet Government to visit Tashkent for the twentieth anniversary of the Science Academy there December 1945.

Minister of Education in Hakim's Cabinet December 1947. Resigned April 1948 after being attacked in the Majlis for saying that the university should be free not only from political but also from religious control. Arrested after the attempted assassination of the Shah at the university 4th February, 1949, but immediately released. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949. Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sa'id) January-February 1950.

An intelligent man with a perfect command of French; his outlook is more French than Persian in some respects. Always polite and agreeable to talk to. Is also able to make a very good speech in English.

171. Sipahbudi, Anushirvan

Born in Tehran about 1890. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1907 and worked there till 1910. Vice-consul at Vladikavkaz in 1910, and thereafter served at different posts in the Caucasus till 1918. Then chief of a section at the Ministry; in charge of the Protocol Department in 1926. Minister in Switzerland 1929-33. Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs July 1933. At the beginning of 1934 made minister at Rome, being accredited also to Vienna, Prague and Budapest. Ambassador at Moscow June 1936 until April 1938. Minister, Paris, July 1938 and also accredited to Spain in June 1939.

Ambassador to Turkey 1940. Minister for Foreign Affairs June-October 1945. Minister for Justice in Qavam's Cabinet February 1946. Ambassador in Paris August 1946. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs by Qavam in June 1947, but did not take up his post. Recalled to Persia February 1948. Nominated Senator for Tehran and also appointed Master

r 2

of Ceremonies at the Court February 1950. Accompanied the Shah to Pakistan March 1950.

A man of no particular family, he has made his way to the top while still young. Speaks French and Russian. Is quite well supplied with brains, but is often too lazy to use them. On friendly terms with Shah. Hates Russians.

172. Sipih, Ahmad Ali (Minvarrih-ud-Dauleh)

In June 1942 he was mixed up in a German plot involving Qavam-us-Saltaneh and Husain Ali Qaragzulu (not the same man as No. 139). Was Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry at the beginning of 1944. In February 1944 became Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry. He was removed from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in the summer of 1944 and remained without an appointment until August 1945 when he was appointed head of the Caspian Fisheries, a post which brought him into close touch with the Russians. Closely associated with Qavam-us-Saltaneh and joined the Cabinet as Minister for Commerce and Industry in 1945. Dismissed from Cabinet and banished to Kashan July 1946. Permitted to return to Tehran December 1946.

For a time remained in retreat but reappeared in social life after Qavam's fall in December 1947. In June 1948 tried to get himself put up as Prime Minister but only obtained the support of a few unimportant newspapers and was never considered a serious candidate. Successful in the first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949.

Has a bad name for intrigue.

173. Suhaili, Ali

Born about 1890. Educated partly in Russia and talks Russian well, also French and a little English. His career has been in various Government administrations. In January 1931 was appointed Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Roads and Communications under Kazimi. In September 1933 he was transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as Under-Secretary, when Kazimi was appointed Minister. Suhaili had also served as chief Persian representative on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Directorate. Several times Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of his chief. Minister in London March 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs May 1938, but dismissed in July, owing to the late Shah's displeasure over a telegram concerning the Paris Exhibition. Ustadar (Governor-General) of the VIIIth Ustan (Kerman) February 1939. Ambassador, Kabul, October 1939.

Became Prime Minister, rather unexpectedly, in March 1942, after having been Minister for Foreign Affairs in Faruqi's Cabinet from September 1941 (during which time he was the Persian signatory of the Tripartite Treaty of February 1942). His Cabinet fell in July 1942, partly owing to lack of support from the Court and the army. Again Prime Minister on the fall of Qavam-us-Saltaneh in February 1943, once more unexpectedly; this time it was largely because Mu'tamin-ul-Mulk could not stand and the Majlis did not want the Shah's candidate, Sa'idi. Proved himself once more a hard worker, but carried little weight in the country and had to maintain himself by various "combinations" and political deals with Majlis Deputies.

During 1944-45 he was frequently a strong candidate for the Premiership but was suspected by many of being too well-disposed towards the Russians. Went to Egypt in the summer of 1945 and was made member of the Persian delegation to U.N.O. in January 1946.

Was tried in February 1948 for illegal interference in the elections for the 14th Majlis and on other political charges, but was acquitted. Minister without

Portfolio in Hakimi's Cabinet March 1948. Appointed Ambassador to Paris June 1948 and is still there. Also accredited as Minister at Lisbon January 1950.

A very reasonable, matter-of-fact person, with a businesslike manner. Hard working and approachable. In his contacts with His Majesty's Embassy he has always given the impression of his willingness to help and to arrive at a reasonable settlement. He has the reputation of being a liar and of rarely keeping his word.

He is universally suspected of having taken a great many bribes. Has a Caucasian wife.

174. Sururi, Muhammad

Born about 1900. Served in various Government Departments, being one of the favoured young men selected by Davar, then Minister of Justice, when he revised the organisation of the Ministry in 1929. Has been judge in the Tehran courts, and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice. Director of the Agricultural Bank 1942, but removed from that post June 1943. Posted to the Ministry of the Interior to look after it till Hahiz's return, January 1944. Minister of Interior in Sa'idi's Cabinet of August 1944 and again in Bayat's Cabinet in November 1944-June 1945. He did well, but incurred the displeasure of the Tudeh party when he arrested the worst of the professional toughs of Tehran and imprisoned them in Bandar Abbas.

Minister of Justice under Hakimi December 1947-June 1948. Elected Senator from Tehran October 1949.

Businesslike and said to be honest. Lacking in real initiative, but carries out orders efficiently. Brother-in-law of the deputy Malikmadani.

175. Taba, Dr. Abdul Husain

Born in Tehran about 1911. Educated in medicine in England and qualified in medicine and surgery after eight years in Birmingham and at Guy's Hospital. Real name is Tabataba'i of the Yazdi family of that name. Employed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a doctor 1940-42, and since practising in Tehran. Elected to the 15th Majlis for Na'in, which he also represented in the Constituent Assembly April 1949 and now represents in the 16th Majlis.

A bright young man who seems keen on his profession. Married the youngest daughter of Vusuq-ud-Dauleh.

176. Tabataba'i, Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq

Second son of the late Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i, who was a prominent figure in the Nationalist movement of 1906 to 1910. Born in Tehran about 1880. Elected to the 3rd and 4th Majlises. In close touch with pro-Germans during the war of 1914-18. Emigrated to Turkey in 1916. Returned in 1918 and co-operated with Sulaiman Mirza in forming the Socialist party. During this phase he was in close touch with the Soviet Embassy. Ambassador to Turkey 1924-27. Recalled in 1927 and offered a post as a judge in the High Court of Appeal, but did not accept it.

Was more or less under arrest for about ten years in Tehran until the fall of Riza Shah 1941. Gradually entered political life after that and initiated and fostered the "Millat" party ("The Nation").

Head of the Election Committee for Tehran 1943-44, and himself elected Deputy.

Elected President of the 14th Majlis. An opium addict for thirty years, he frequently found it difficult to keep awake when he was presiding over the Majlis.

Unsuccessful candidate for Tehran in elections for 15th Majlis, but elected from Tehran to the Constituent Assembly, of which he was elected President April 1949. Member of the Regency Council during

Shah's journey to Europe July 1948 and again during the Shah's journey to the United States November 1949, but declined on grounds of illness. Chairman of the Electoral Supervising Committee for the first 16th Majlis elections in February 1949, which were cancelled. In new elections was himself elected.

An incorrigible intriguer he stands close to the Shah to whom he has always offered bad advice. His "liberal" ideas are not to be taken seriously. He and his friends pride themselves on their patriotism and the pursuit of the middle way between Britain and the U.S.S.R. For reasons unknown he is generally regarded as a "national" figure. Would like to be Prime Minister.

Speaks French.

177. Tabataba'i, Sayyid Zia-ud-Din

Born about 1893. Son of the late Sayyid Ali Yazdi Tabataba'i. Edited the newspaper *Rad* (Thunder) in Tehran in 1915-16. Played a considerable political rôle in 1917-18. Sent to Baku by Vusuq-ud-Dauleh in 1919 as Persian representative to Caucasian Azerbaijan. While in Baku he issued a long statement entitled "A new Epoch in the History of Persia." This statement was a spirited defence of the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 which, although it had not been ratified by the Majlis, he endeavoured to bring into force during his brief period of office as Prime Minister. Returned to Tehran in May 1920. Carried out *coup d'Etat* with the help of the Cossacks in February 1921, and seized the reins of office. Appointed Prime Minister with full powers by Ahmad Shah on 1st March, 1921, and effected numerous arrests. His reforms were too radical for the country and the time, and he fell from power in June, fleeing the country. He was in the tobacco business while exiled.

Took a prominent part in the Pan-Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in 1933.

Said to have assisted Kazimi in the negotiations with Iraq at Geneva during 1935.

In 1942, being by that time the owner of a very prosperous farm near Chazza in Palestine, which he had developed himself, he began to think of returning to his native country, and Muzaffar Firuz began with great energy and indiscretion to run a newspaper campaign in his favour in Tehran. He published a letter from the Sayyid in which the Russians were praised in fulsome language. His name came forward a good deal in the Tehran press during 1943, and quite a number of Deputies in the 13th Majlis seem to have favoured his return. The Russians and the Shah, however, were steadfastly opposed to his return, the former because they mistrusted Firuz's unfortunate letter, and the latter through fear that the Sayyid might become a dictator. However, he returned to Tehran in September 1943 and was elected to the 14th Majlis from Yazd, his native place. Caused annoyance by insisting on wearing a woollen hat of Caucasian style, and alienated some of his friends by an appearance of stubbornness and obstinacy.

Founded a political party which in the summer of 1945 was officially launched under the name of "Iradeh-i-Milli" or National Will. His followers claimed that the party numbered about 9,000 in Tehran, at the end of 1945. Was the particular bugbear of the Tudeh and the Russians, who never tired of vilifying him as the arch-enemy of his country and the principal tool in Persia of imperialists, reactionaries, &c. During the near-panic which prevailed in Tehran in November-December 1945 as a result of the approach of the Azerbaijan Democrats towards Qazvin many leading politicians and Deputies began seriously to consider that Sayyid Zia should be exiled from Persia as a sop to the Russians.

His continued opposition to Qavam-us-Saltaneh's pro-Soviet gambits in the beginning of 1946 resulted

in his arrest and imprisonment but this was changed to house arrest a year later and shortly afterwards he was released. Early in 1948 the Shah tried without success to enlist his support for his project of constitutional reform. Thereafter Court and Government circles evinced great hostility towards him and he was widely accused of disloyalty and even of pro-Soviet sympathies. There was, however, no concrete evidence to support these charges. On the other hand, although he was mainly preoccupied with his experiments in agriculture, Sayyid Zia-ud-Din was known to have criticised the Shah's "unconstitutional" behaviour. But he remained rabidly opposed to communism and the Russians in general.

After the attempt on the Shah's life in February 1949 he made his peace with His Majesty and has remained on good terms with him since. As a result the number of his enemies has dwindled. Among those elected in the first stage of the Senate elections in Tehran October 1949 but resigned from the electoral college. During the first half of 1950 he was much spoken of as a possible Prime Minister and commanded much support.

Scrupulously honest, religious, widely read and travelled, of active habits and practical outlook, Sayyid Zia-ud-Din is an unusual Persian. Originally a journalist by profession he has become a successful farmer. His main faults are obstinacy and impatience of criticism. He speaks English, French, Arabic and Turkish.

178. Tadayun, Sayyid Muhammad

Born about 1884, a native of Birjand in East Persia; educated in Tehran, where he graduated and became a schoolmaster. After the split up of the original Democrat Party in 1912, Tadayun became the leader of one of the more important Democrat factions. He was elected a Deputy from Tehran to the 4th term of the Majlis, and from Birjand to the 5th and 6th terms. Was elected President of the Majlis in the second half of the 5th term, and again at the beginning of the 6th term. In February 1927 he was appointed Minister of Education, but in December he resigned that appointment owing to disagreement with his colleagues in the Cabinet, but he resumed office nine days later at the personal request of the Shah. On 7th January, 1928, the Shah ordered him to resign, and his fall was said to be due to the personal animosity towards him of Taimurtash. In June 1930 he was appointed Governor of Kerman.

He was recalled from Kerman in March 1931, and he appears to believe that one reason for his recall was that he was too friendly with Lieutenant-Colonel Noel, then British Consul.

Returned to politics on the fall of Riza Shah; was Minister of Education in Faruqi's Cabinet of 1941-42, and spoke eloquently in favour of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Minister of Food after Farrukh in 1942; resigned in July 1943. Minister of the Interior September 1943 and did well in running the elections, but was not included in the reshuffled Cabinet of December 1943. Tried in summer of 1947 on a charge of interfering with elections for 14th Majlis and acquitted. Elected Senator for Khurasan September 1949. Also successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949.

A pleasant man of dignified mien; very friendly to us. He exerts a certain influence in political circles and still aspires to Ministerial office.

179. Tahiri, Dr. Hadi

Born at Yazd about 1888. Son of a mulla. Formerly a landowner and proprietor of various concerns at Yazd. A great rival of the Navvab family of Yazd. Elected to the Majlis on various occasions, and has served as president of the Financial Commission of the Majlis. In the 13th Majlis was one of

the Vice-Presidents and was considered one of the leading members of the Majlis. Served on the Committee of the Anglo-Iranian Relief Fund, 1943, and was helpful in providing local knowledge. Was largely responsible for the success of Sayyid Zia-ud-Din in the Yazd elections of 1943, thereby incurring the dislike and distrust of the Shah. Very friendly to us. Accused of various speculations at Yazd, but nothing was proved.

In the 14th Majlis he was, with Sayyid Kazim Jalili Yazdi, the most influential Deputy. Bitterly anti-Soviet he worked hard to maintain the Majlis majority against Soviet pressure.

Arrested November 1946 for political activities against Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Released February 1947. Appointed Minister without Portfolio under Sa'id November 1948. Resigned September 1949 to stand for the 16th Majlis, to which he was elected from Yazd.

Though very slow in speech and manner he is extremely astute and had a profound knowledge of his Majlis colleagues and particularly of their weak points. Though patriotic he would not allow his patriotism to interfere unduly with his personal interests in Yazd. He has a congenital aversion to the obvious course and delights to achieve his objectives by devious means through the agency of others.

180. Tagizadeh, Sayyid Hasan

Born in Tabriz about 1880, the son of a small preacher. He was educated in his native town, and used to haunt the booksellers' shops, where he showed great eagerness to acquire knowledge. In his early youth he was an ardent Nationalist, and was connected with the Nationalist movement in Persia from the beginning. He was elected to the 1st term of the Majlis and was one of its most prominent members.

In the *coup d'Etat* of 1908 Tagizadeh took refuge in His Majesty's Legation and as a condition of his amnesty went to the United Kingdom. Returned late 1908 and played prominent part in 2nd Majlis. Elected to 3rd and 4th Majlis *in absentia*. He stayed in Europe and America during the whole period from 1914 to 1923 and was for years in Berlin, where he edited a paper called *Kaveh*. He negotiated the Perso-Soviet Commercial Treaty in Moscow in February 1921, and finally returned to Persia in 1924. Member of 5th and 6th Majlis. Appointed Governor-General of Khurasan in January 1929; he was recalled in May and appointed Persian Minister in London, where he remained until April 1930, when he returned to Persia and became Minister of Roads and Communications. In August 1930 he was appointed Minister of Finance in addition.

Tagizadeh fell from grace in September 1933, for reasons which are obscure. The Shah is said to have suspected him of intrigue with Majlis members in connexion with the purchase of gold. He was, however, soon re-employed as minister in Paris.

Recalled from Paris in August 1934, but obtained prolonged leave of absence and did not return to Persia. Appointed Persian representative at the Congress of Orientalists at Rome in September 1935. Appointed minister in London by Furughi 1941 and became ambassador in 1944. Headed Persian Delegation to the United Nations Organisation in London in January 1946 and ably presented the Persian case when the Security Council considered the Perso-Russian dispute about Azerbaijan. Appointed to act as Persian representative in winding up the League of Nations in Geneva March 1946.

Elected Deputy for Tabriz in 15th Majlis and as the five years of his appointment in London had ended he agreed to return to Persia to take his seat. As an old friend he helped Hakimi when the latter became Prime Minister in December 1947.

In a speech in the Majlis in January 1949 he said that he signed the 1933 A.I.O.C. Concession under emphatic orders from Riza Shah and against his better judgement. This brought into being a vociferous school of thought that the concession was therefore invalid and thereby provoked the present demand for its revision.

Elected to the Constituent Assembly April 1949, but did not attend because of "illness." Elected Senator from Tehran October 1949 and President of the Senate on its inauguration in February 1950.

He is married to a German and talks German fluently. He speaks English and French less well.

181. Tihrani, Sayyid Jalal-ud-Din

A famous astronomer who first appeared on the political scene when he became Minister without Portfolio under Qavam just before the latter's fall November-December 1947. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October 1949. Minister without Portfolio under Sa'id November 1949. Transferred to Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones January 1950, and retained this office under Mansur April 1950.

182. Valatabar, Abol-Fath, K.B.E. (Hishmat-ud-Dauleh)

Born about 1885. A member of the Tabataba'i family of Tabriz. A chamberlain of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah when the latter was Crown Prince residing in Tabriz. Private secretary to Muhammad Ali Shah before he came to the throne, and continued in that post till 1909. An open enemy of the Nationalists. Governor of Resht in 1915. Minister of War 1916-17. Governor of Kerman 1918-19. Minister of the Interior 1920. Imprisoned by Sayyid Zia. Governor-General of Khurasan May 1924; resigned the next year owing to differences with the military authorities.

Aspired to employment in a suitable post at court, and attained an appointment as a kind of chamberlain at the court in 1943. A respectable old-timer who helped us during the 1914-18 war and received a K.B.E. He took no part in politics during Riza Shah's reign.

Appointed Governor-General, Azerbaijan, April 1949. Represented Tabriz in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Surrendered Governor-Generalship on being nominated a Senator for West Azarbaijan February 1950.

Has owned large properties near Tabriz, but has spent most of his substance. Speaks French.

183. Varasteh, Muhammad Ali

Was Under-Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior and in 1942 was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. 1944-46 Governor-General of Isfahan, where he enjoyed the support of the Shah and was considered by His Majesty's Consul to have been honest and done his best to maintain law and order. Minister of Post and Telegraphs in Hakimi's Cabinet December 1947-June 1948. Joined Hazhir's Cabinet as Minister of Finance September-November 1948. Governor-General Kerman August 1949-February 1950. Minister of Health (Mansur) April 1950, but transferred to the Ministry of Finance later the same month.

Regarded as an honest but not very forceful man.

184. Vusuq, Hasan, G.C.B. (Vusuq-ud-Dauleh)

Born about 1868. Began his career in the Ministry of Finance. Elected a Deputy to the 1st and 2nd terms of the Majlis, and in 1909 chosen to be a member of the Nationalist Committee, which directed the affairs of State after the abdication of Muhammad Ali Shah. His first Cabinet appointment was as Minister of Justice in October 1909. In the following month he became Minister of Finance, but resigned

in July 1910. In July 1911 he became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Again Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 1913, he left for Europe in June of the same year. Minister for Foreign Affairs July-August 1914 and Minister of Finance August-December 1915. Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs August 1916 to May 1917. Prime Minister and Minister of Interior from August 1918 to June 1920. Negotiated the Anglo-Persian Convention of 1919. Visited Europe in June 1920, and only returned to Persia at the beginning of 1926. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1926, but resigned in November to take his seat in Parliament. Elected as a Deputy from Tehran to the 7th term of the Majlis 1928-30. Appointed president of the new "Academy" for the revision of the Persian language December 1935.

A man of great ability and character. He became unpopular over the Anglo-Persian Convention, but, after a most able and convincing defence of his acts as Prime Minister during the period 1918-20 before the Majlis, he regained a large measure of popularity.

Went to Europe for a serious operation 1940; survived it, unable to return to Persia; he was appointed ambassador to Turkey by his brother, Qavam-us-Saltaneh, in 1942, but could not proceed.

Returned to Persia summer 1946. Is now too old to take an active part in politics.

Speaks French fluently, also a little English.

185. Yazdan Panah, Murtiza, General (Sipahbud)

Born about 1891; son of Mirza Ali Akbar, a small shopkeeper in the village of Sardasht. In 1907 he entered the Cossack Cadet School. Received his commission in 1912, showed strong pro-Russian sympathies, and consequently gained rapid promotion. Made lieutenant-colonel in 1919 and colonel in 1920. During the whole of his service he was intimate with Riza Khan, and accompanied him on the march to Tehran in February 1921 which culminated in the *coup d'Etat*. Was promoted general and given command of the Central Division. In July 1927 he fell from favour, and was put under arrest for an unknown reason, but released very soon. In the autumn of 1928 he was appointed inspector of the gendarmerie, but was superseded in 1930 and left without any active command.

Inspector of Infantry in 1932. Commandant of Tehran Cadet College 1933.

On the fall of Riza Shah, he became Chief of the General Staff, and worked as a loyal supporter of the young Shah.

Appointed adjutant-general to the Shah autumn 1943, a post he still retains. Member of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee February 1944.

Leader of military contingent chosen to represent Persia at Victory Parade in London June 1946. Minister of War in Hakimi's Cabinet December 1947-June 1948; Minister of Roads (Sa'id) September 1949; transferred to Ministry of War January 1950 and retained this post under Mansur April 1950. As Adjutant-General accompanied the Shah to the United States November-December 1949, but not to Pakistan March 1950.

He is active, intelligent, honest, genial and staunchly patriotic. Although he is one of the Shah's closest advisers, he does not have a very high opinion of him personally, though he is devoted to the monarchy. He is one of the few senior army officers who are incorruptible.

Speaks, French and Russian and has a Russian wife.

186. Yazdi, Dr. Murtiza

Born about 1900. Educated in Germany where he is reported to have joined the Communist Party. Often represented Tudeh workers in negotiations

between them and their employers. In early months of 1946 made a tour of the south and south-east in an effort to whip up Tudeh support and was responsible in large measure for the troubles in Isfahan in April of that year. A member of the Directing Committee of the Russo-Persian Cultural Relations Society 1946. Minister of Health under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in August-October 1946 when he used his position to fill important posts in the Ministry with Tudeh members and sympathisers.

After the attempt on the Shah's life he was tried with other Tudeh leaders and sentenced to five years' solitary confinement April 1949.

187. Zahidi, Fashollah (Basir-i-Diyari), Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born in Hamadan about 1890. His father was for many years in charge of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk's property at Hamadan. Joined the Constitutional movement and was wounded. Joined the Cossacks and thus came into contact with Riza Khan, under whom he served. Commanded the troops at Shiraz in 1922. In 1924 commanded the troops sent to Khuzistan, and helped to arrest the Sheikh of Muhammerah in 1925. Transferred to Resht in 1926, where he commanded the Northern Independent Brigade. Recalled to Tehran December 1928. Commanded the Road Guards 1929. Arrested and degraded for neglect of duty in 1929. Soon after he was pardoned and reinstated. Chief of Police 1931. Relieved of this post after a few months owing to the escape of some prisoners from prison. Dismissed from the army in 1931. Turned his attention to business and became a partner in the "Kazadema" Ford agency. Reinstated in the rank of general 1932 and made aide-de-camp to the Shah. Member of the Iranian commercial delegation to Russia in April 1935, and subsequently visited Central Europe.

Commanded troops at Isfahan 1942, and gradually took charge of all departments of Government; proof was found that he was working with the Germans, and he was arrested by British troops and taken out of Persia in the autumn of 1942. Released in 1945. Appointed Inspector of the Forces of the South July 1946. Placed on the retired list June 1949. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Hamadan autumn 1949. Appointed Chief of Police November 1949. Nominated Senator for Hamadan February 1950 while remaining Chief of Police. Forced to resign from this post May 1950, largely owing to the activities of Razmarn, Chief of the General Staff.

More of a politician than a soldier. Made a good deal of money in Khuzistan. Being capable of generosity he was not unpopular with the troops under his command. As Chief of Police showed himself active and enterprising and gained a certain popularity.

Married the daughter of Husain Pirnia (Mu'tamin-ul-Mulk) in 1927, but divorced her and subsequently married one of the rich Ittihadieh family.

188. Zand, Ibrahim

Born about 1890. Educated at the Cadet College at St. Petersburg. Then sent to study law in France, where he was a contemporary and friend of Javad Anjiri. Towards the end of the 1914-18 war became an active member of the Musawat Party in Azerbaijan, and in 1919 became a member of the short-lived Azerbaijan Government. After its fall he went back to France, and a few years after returned to Persia, where Davar employed him in the Ministry of Justice as an adviser. He was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and in 1938 became a member of the board of the National Bank. On the appointment of A. H. Ibtihaj as director of that bank he left the bank and was employed at Court as Comptroller of the Royal Accounts. Minister of

War in Suhaili's third Cabinet December 1943. Minister of War in Sa'id's Cabinets March and April 1944, in Bayat's Cabinet November 1944, Bakimi's Cabinet May 1945 and Sadr's Cabinet June 1945. Governor-General, Isfahan, January 1949-February 1950, when appointed Minister of the Interior by Sa'id. Continued in this office under Mansur for a few weeks and then appointed Governor-General of Azarbaijan April 1950.

Suffers from ill-health and has made frequent trips to Palestine for treatment. A patriotic and honest man with a background of military training of the Russia of Tsarist days. Had sound ideas about eliminating corruption in the army but lacked courage to enforce his will.

Married to the sister of Farajullah Bahrani. Speaks Russian extremely well, probably better than Persian.

189. Zangeneh, Dr. Ahmad Ibrahim

Born c. 1909. Director of Industrial and Mining Bank and for a time managing director of this bank. He had been connected with the Planning Organisation of the 7-Year Plan for some time before being appointed a member of the Council of the Plan on its creation in May 1949. Has shown keen interest in economic development schemes. Said to be progressive and active.

190. Zarin-Kafsh, Ali Asghar

Born about 1885, of a Tehran family of Kurdish descent. Educated at the Political School in Tehran, and employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in subsidiary posts for several years. In 1923 and 1924 was head of a section of the Ministry and was always very courteous and helpful whenever referred to by

members of this embassy. Served as "chef de Cabinet" to Furughi while the latter was Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was subsequently posted to Washington, where he spent more than a year as secretary to the Persian Legation. He was recalled to Tehran in about 1927, and served in the Ministry of Justice for a time under Davar, at the time when the Ministry was being fundamentally re-formed. He was for a time a judge of the Cour de Cassation. He then was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, where he was serving as Under-Secretary when the Minister of the Interior, Ali Mansur, was transferred to the Ministry of Roads on 26th January, 1933. From thenceforward he served as Acting Minister of the Interior until Furughi's Cabinet was formed in September 1933.

Proceeded to England as commissioner of the Persian Government with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in December 1933, with his wife and two children. Honorary counsellor to the legation in London 1937.

Returned to Persia December 1940. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice from 1941. Has always been helpful in settling cases and giving advice on points of Persian law. On Hikmat's resignation from Suhaili's Cabinet in June 1943, became Acting Minister of Justice, but on the appointment of Sadr as Minister returned to the post of Under-Secretary. Minister of Finance 1944. Appointed chairman, Industrial and Mining Bank February 1948. Replaced towards the end of the year. In 1950, on his return to Persia from England where he had a serious operation, was appointed to the Majlis Committee supervising the Seven-Year Plan.

Speaks English and French.

Zarin Kafsh is honest and socially most pleasant. In 1945 he joined the Iradeh-i-Milli Party and has a very high regard for Sayyid Zia.